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The objective of this study is to provide an economic assessment of the impact of the current VAT 
regimes and the likely effects of alternative VAT regimes in order to assist the Commission in making 
policy choices. 
Background 
In December 2011 the European Commission set out the fundamental features of a future VAT system, 
one of the key priorities of which was that it should be more efficient than the current system. In respect of 
passenger transport services, this system, with its many exemptions and special and reduced rates, has 
resulted in the application of a multiplicity of different rates depending on the transport modes, the transport 
markets and the Member States. The current rules for passenger transport have long been believed to result 
in many competitive distortions. These output distortions are exacerbated by the complexity of the current 
place-of-supply rules, which are believed to result in high compliance costs and voluntary or involuntary 
non-compliance. These impacts are greater for passenger transport than most other economic activities 
because of the international nature of many of the services provided. 
Two approaches to resolving these issues are possible – maintaining the status quo with some fine-tuning 
or adopting a fresh start with many fewer exemptions and compliance barriers.  
This study contributes to the debate on possible options for reform by providing a summary of the current 
state of the passenger transport market, a review of the current VAT regime, an assessment of the impact 
of many of the perceived distortions and an evaluation of some of the alternative VAT structures on which 
a future VAT regime for the transport sector might be based1. 
Main Messages 
Since the last large-scale review in 1997, the passenger transport sector has changed in a considerable 
way, as a result of the greater impacts of airline deregulation, implementation of rail concessioning, and the 
deregulation of bus transport. The cruise industry has also changed and experienced high growth.  
This study provides an update on the structure of the passenger transport industry as it relates to VAT, 
an assessment of the distortions arising from the current VAT rules and regulations, and an evaluation of 
some of the changes that might be considered to address those distortions. 
The assessments carried out in this report indicate that the distortions are generally small- or medium-
sized. For the distortions on output, part of the explanation is in the low elasticities of demand; while for 
input distortions, it is the ability of operators to reclaim any VAT incurred on inputs, so the only cost is that 
of financing these costs between when they are paid and when they are rebated. These costs are relatively 
small because of the reduced times between payment and reimbursement and the current low interest rates 
on that financing. 
                                                   
1  There are other taxes and subsidies than those pertaining to the VAT regime in the sector (most importantly subsidised 
infrastructure and the system of charges related to that).  This report concentrates exclusively on the current VAT rules. 
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The study identifies one set of measures that addresses the output distortions with regard to different 
VAT rates and the place of supply rules and another to address the input distortions. These changes would 
require a large amount of consensus among Member States and the European Commission.  
The study also provides valuable insights for tax administrations. It reveals the enormous potential of the 
application of VAT in the passenger transport sector with regard to generating revenue and the limited 
impact of applying reduced VAT rates and exemptions on the demand for passenger transport services due 
to low elasticities of demand and pass-through rates that vary between 7% and 50%.  
We can conclude that the above mentioned characteristics of the passenger transport sector suggest a 
simplified and harmonised application of VAT to all modes and markets. At least the benefits from 
changing the place of supply rules can be obtained at virtually no cost. 
Demand For and Supply of Passenger Transport 
The demand for and supply of passenger transport services were considered in terms of four markets: 
urban, other domestic, intra-EU (between Member States), and extra-EU (between Member States and non-
EU countries), and each of these from the perspective of each Member State. 
The first two markets dominate, accounted in 2010 for more than 99% of total passengers, of which about 
two-thirds (63.1%) are urban and 36.0% are other domestic. Intra-EU passengers account for only 0.7% of 
the total and extra-EU passengers for only 0.2%. However, because of different trip lengths, urban 
passengers account for only 24% of passenger kilometres (PKM), other domestic passengers for 41%, intra-
EU for 15%, and extra-EU for 20%. 
 Within the urban market, metro passengers account for about 46% of passengers, but only 24% of 
PKM, bus passengers for 41% of passengers and 38% of PKM, while rail accounts for only 13% 
of passengers, but 35% of PKM; 
 Air transport accounts for a small share of domestic passengers (0.5%), but a much larger share of 
PKM (7.1%), the largest share of intra-EU passengers (72%) and an even larger share (87.2%) of 
PKM, and a dominant share of both extra-EU passengers (91.5%) and PKM (98.6%);  
 Bus transport accounts for the largest share of domestic passengers (81%), but a smaller share of 
domestic PKM (59.4%), and the smallest share of intra-EU passengers (8%) and PKM (4.1%) and 
extra-EU passengers (3.6%) and PKM (4.1%); and  
 Rail has the second largest share of domestic passengers (15%) and PKM (33.5%), as well as of 
intra-EU passengers (20%) and PKM (8.8%). It has a slightly higher share of extra-EU passengers 
than bus (5%), but about the same small share of PKM (0.7%). 
These market and mode shares are important in assessing the overall significance of the market 
distortions attributable to differences in VAT rates. Although the intra-EU and extra-EU markets attract 
more attention in terms of these distortions, since they account for less than 1% of all passengers, their 
overall impact on competitive distortions is small. The difference in market shares of PKM shows that the 
two international markets (intra-EU and extra-EU), which together account for 35% of the total, will be 
more important in assessing the impacts of any market distortions on VAT revenues.  
There are four features of all passenger transport markets within the European Union that impact the 
competitiveness of both their demand and supply: 
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 They tend to be concentrated; 
 Demand is more heterogeneous than supply; 
 Providing transport services is highly capital-intensive; and  
 There are large economies of scale, resulting in competitive advantages for larger operators and 
significant barriers to entry for new competitors. 
While competition between modes is influenced by VAT distortions, competition within modes is less 
so as operators face the same VAT rates on their outputs. Within air markets, competition between airlines 
increased significantly after deregulation, but has since slowed down.2 Within bus markets there is a wide 
range of competition, greater than for airlines. In most rail passenger markets the nature of competition is 
rather different; for most Member States, it is competition “for markets” (through competition for 
concessions) rather than competition “within markets” (through competition between different operators 
on the same tracks).  
The Current VAT Regime  
Currently the taxation of passenger transport services falls within the competence of the Member State 
where the transport takes place. Consequently, in the case of cross-border passenger transport, the service 
will be subject to the VAT rules of multiple Member States. In this case, the allocation is to be made 
proportionately in terms of the distances covered in each Member State.  
Chapter 3 of this report provides an overview of the VAT rates in the European Union as applied to 
passenger transport services. For each mode of transport (road, rail, inland waterways, maritime shipping, 
and air), we distinguish between domestic, intra-EU, and extra-EU transport. In the case of domestic 
transport, a further distinction is made according to type of transport (e.g. bus, taxi, tram, metro, or 
scheduled or unscheduled services).  
While standard VAT rates in Member States range from 15% (Luxembourg) to 27% (Hungary), 
passenger transport services are frequently taxed at lower rates, or even zero-rated or exempt from VAT.3  
With respect to domestic passenger transport, six Member States apply the standard rate to all domestic 
passenger transport services (Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia). In 12 Member 
States, (primarily) reduced rates are applied (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden).4 Luxembourg is the only Member State that taxes all 
domestic passenger transport at a super-reduced rate of 3%. Denmark and Ireland exempt most domestic 
passenger transport services and in the UK, a large majority are zero-rated. The remaining six Member 
                                                   
2 Competitiveness is measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI has a scale between 0 and 1, with a lower 
value indicating a more competitive market. In the period 2003 to 2010, for the five Member States for which data is available, 
the HHI reduced from 0.39 to 0.32. 
3 Passenger transport is among the supplies that may be taxed at the reduced rate according to the VAT Directive. In addition, intra-
EU and extra-EU passenger transport services are exempt with credit (i.e. effectively zero-rated) in many Member States based 
on derogations in the VAT Directive. 
4 With the following exceptions: Belgium: maritime shipping is zero-rated; Italy: urban transport services by taxi and ship are 
exempt (without credit); Netherlands: domestic air transport is taxed at the standard rate, certain ferry services can opt for VAT 
exemption. 
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States use different criteria to distinguish between various types of domestic services, which are also subject 
to different VAT rates.5  
Currently there are no differences with respect to VAT rates between intra-EU and extra-EU passenger 
transport services, as they are treated as international transport. While all 28 Member States zero-rate 
international passenger transport by maritime shipping and air, other modes are frequently subject to 
positive rates. International passenger transport by road is taxed in 10 Member States (Austria, Belgium, 
Croatia, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, and Spain)6 and international passenger 
transport services by rail are subject to a positive VAT rate in 7 Member States (Austria, Belgium, Croatia, 
Germany, Greece, Netherlands, and Spain). 7  Most of these countries apply a reduced rate, with the 
exception of Croatia (road and rail), Denmark (non-scheduled bus services), and Germany (long-distance 
services), with international passenger transport taxed at the standard rate. 
In the case of business travel, VAT incurred on passenger transport services is usually deductible. This, 
however, does not hold for France, Greece, Italy, and Portugal. Other Member States also apply restrictions 
in certain cases. 
Aside from the VAT taxation of the actual passenger transport service itself, consideration must also be 
given to the taxation of inputs, such as means of transport and fuel. Article 148 of the VAT Directive 
provides exemptions from VAT for certain inputs to maritime shipping and international aviation, which 
are valid, with only minor implementation-specific differences, in all Member States. Other inputs are, as 
a general rule, subject to the standard VAT rules and, therefore, taxed at the standard rate, with VAT 
deductibility for the buyer. There are, however, certain exceptions from that rule (e.g. a few Member States 
extend provisions of Article 148 to other vessels due to special derogations, and some Member States 
restrict deduction with respect to certain inputs, especially passenger cars and fuel). 
Other taxes on passenger transport, aside from VAT and user charges, are mostly on air transport. Air 
passenger taxes are currently in place in Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and the UK. Usually, they are 
levied per embarking passenger and the rate mostly depends on flight distance (e.g. Austria, France, 
Germany, and the UK), but sometimes also on the travel class (e.g. France and the UK). A special case is 
the tax for air taxi services in Italy, which is only applicable to chartering the whole aircraft. The highest 
rates are currently charged in the UK and the lowest are charged in Italy and France.  
Competitive Distortions Resulting from the Current VAT Regime 
A distortion is defined as the unequal treatment of passengers and/or operators with 
respect to any of the parameters composing the VAT regime in force in Member States in 
the passenger transport sector, and which leads to economic, social, and/or 
environmental changes in behaviour. 
There are four groups of distortions deriving from the current VAT regime, those resulting from 
different: 
                                                   
5 Often scheduled services are taxed at a lower rate than unscheduled services. This is the case in the Czech Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Malta. In Germany, the main factor is the distance, whereas in Cyprus, the mode of transport and the location are 
decisive. 
6 Additionally Denmark taxes non-scheduled bus services. 
7 Additionally France taxes certain international rail services. 
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 VAT rates between transport services provided in different modes, markets, and Member States; 
 Member States in the way they define passenger transport services and their associated inputs;  
 Treatments by Member States of inputs in the passenger transport services by different modes in 
different markets; and 
 VAT rates and regulations regarding the place of supply of transport services and their inputs. 
1a) Different VAT Rates within One Mode at the Domestic Level 
Twelve Member States have some form of this distortion. The distortion can apply to a specific mode 
(e.g. short distance buses and taxis might have a different rate than those used on longer distance routes), 
vehicle size (e.g. passengers using some sizes of vehicle might or might not be eligible for lower VAT rates 
than those using other sized vehicles), or scheduled versus unscheduled services. 
1b) Different VAT Rates between Modes at the Domestic Level 
This distortion is not very common. Unambiguous examples include: the Netherlands, where domestic 
air travel is taxed at the standard rate of 21%, whereas all other modes benefit from a reduced rate (6%); 
Belgium, where maritime shipping is zero-rated, while other modes are taxed at 6%; and Cyprus, where the 
standard rate (19%) is applied to transport by air and inland waterways, and maritime shipping is taxed at 
the reduced rate of 9%. Road transport in Cyprus is subject to three different rates (19%, 9%, and 5%). 
1c) Different VAT Rates within One Mode of Transport between Domestic, Intra-EU, and 
Extra-EU Transport 
This distortion is one of the most widespread, and, for some Member States, the differences between 
domestic and intra-EU VAT rates are quite high. All but three Member States apply a lower effective VAT 
rate to at least one mode of intra-EU or extra-EU passenger transport than they do for that mode in domestic 
transport.  
Fourteen Member States zero-rate all international services irrespective of mode of transport; while at 
the same time applying a positive VAT rate to all modes of domestic transport. One Member State has a 
different rate for four modes, four Member States for three modes (maritime shipping and inland navigation 
are included as two more modes, although the passengers are not included in the statistics of numbers of 
passengers), five Member States for two modes, and two Member States for one mode.8 The practical 
impact of the distortion is less than its potential, as there is only limited competition between the markets 
that could be influenced by transport fares.  
Transport cost is not the main criterion for choice of destination (and therefore of travel market) for most 
non-business passengers, and even less so for businesses passengers. Hence, differences in VAT rates for 
a given transport mode between transport markets do not have a significant impact on the choice of market 
for travel. The overall assessment of the distortion is that it is large, due in great measure to the distortion 
                                                   
8 Two Member States (Denmark and Ireland) have the same effective VAT rate for passenger transport outputs (exempt for 
domestic and zero for intra-EU and extra-EU), so this makes a difference on how VAT is assessed on inputs.  
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in the domestic air market compared to the international air market. Other modes are less affected by this 
distortion. 
1d) Different VAT Rates between Different Modes of Transport for Intra-EU and Extra-EU 
Travel 
Whereas all Member States zero-rate intra-EU and extra-EU air and maritime passenger transport, 10 
Member States apply positive tax rates to extra-EU road passenger transport, 7 to rail transport, and 6 to 
inland navigation. The gap between the rates applied to the different modes of intra-EU and extra-EU 
passenger transport within the same Member State ranges from 5 to 25 percentage points. 
The extent of the distortion was quantified in terms of numbers of passengers and revenue to operators, 
but the extent of the distortion depends on what it is compared to. We have compared the current VAT rates 
with a situation in which all modes would be zero-rated, since 80% of the Member States and mode 
combinations in the two international markets are zero-rated.  
The impact of this distortion is considered to be of medium impact. There would be a loss of some 0.5 
billion PKM for these two modes, less than 1% of the total, but a rather greater percentage of loss of operator 
revenue of between 2% and 3%, and greater still for operators specializing in international passenger 
transport. These losses are measured against the 2013 numbers of passengers and mode shares, but as high 
speed rail (HSR) and international bus services expand to compete more with air services, the losses might 
be expected to be slightly greater. 
1e) Different Delimitation between Domestic, Intra-EU, and Extra-EU (Two-Sector Trips) 
This distortion results from some Member States (e.g. Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, and Spain) applying the domestic VAT rate to the domestic part of an 
international passenger trip.  
Even where the domestic section of an international trip can be identified, the addition of the national 
VAT to the fare has only a small impact on competitiveness. For a typical intra-EU trip,9 the fare increases 
by about 2.4%, which results in a reduction of number of trips by 0.8%, as compared to a no-VAT case. 
Nevertheless, the number of multi-sector trips where the first section is domestic is a small proportion of 
the total, even for the Member States that currently apply this distortion. We thus assess the extent of the 
distortion as small for the Member States involved and very small for the EU as a whole. 
1f) Lower VAT Rates Applied in Certain Regions 
 Some Member States apply a lower VAT rate for passenger travel within or to and from some of their 
less developed regions. The differences in VAT rates are small. Portugal applies 5% VAT for travel in 
Madeira and the Azores (and zero-rates travel to and from the islands), instead of the usual 6% for domestic 
passengers, and France applies a 0% rate to Corsica instead of the national reduced rate of 10% (except the 
section within continental France).10 The fare reduction through the application of a lower VAT rate as a 
                                                   
9 With an average trip length of 1,540km, of which 300km are in the origin Member State, and an average fare of EUR 0.15/km 
including an average VAT rate of 12%. 
10 Travel within Corsica is VAT rated at 2.1%. 
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percentage of the total cost of a tourist trip to the affected regions is less than 1%. However, the proportion 
of national tourists (international tourists are mostly subject to zero rates for their air and maritime travel) 
to each of the two destinations is quite high, at about one-third for Madeira11 and about two-thirds for 
Corsica.12 
2a) Definition of Passenger Transport and Related Incidental Services 
Most Member States have a clear directive in their legislation regarding which passenger services are 
subject to VAT. Other Member States are less clear, particularly with respect to vehicles that are not used 
exclusively for passenger transport. For example, some exclude rental cars without a driver, while others 
apply a lower limit on vehicle size. The extent of this distortion is small, as the majority of passenger travel 
falls clearly within or outside Member State VAT regulations. 
2b) Consumption On Board Ships, Aircraft, or Trains 
This distortion is not included in the assessment, since it is covered in another report13 and was not 
included in the terms of reference. 
3a) Exemptions Following Article 148 of VAT Directive – Delay in Processing VAT Refunds 
Article 148 of the VAT Directive provides the framework for the zero-rating of supplies for maritime 
and international aviation, but not to the same supplies for international bus and rail services.  
The impact on operators’ costs is not as great as might first appear. While these two modes do not have 
to pay VAT on their qualifying inputs, the competing modes of rail and bus transport can reclaim such 
VAT. Their additional costs derive only from the financing costs of VAT for the period between when the 
payments are made and the reimbursements are received. 
The impact of this distortion has been measured as the total avoided cost of financing the VAT liability 
maritime and air passenger operators would have incurred if Article 148 were not operational. The 
combination of the ability of operators to recover VAT on inputs when the outputs are positively rated, the 
relatively short periods within which input VAT is now reimbursed by most Member States, and the current 
low interest rates that apply to funding the VAT during this period, result in a small overall cost impact of 
this distortion (EUR 121 million). 
                                                   
11 Anuario Estadistico da Regiao Autonoma de Madeira, 2012.  
12 Ministère des Transports de Equipment du Tourisme et de la Mer, Ministère délègue au Tourisme, France. 
13 For further information, see EC Report COM (2012) 605 final available on: http://ec.europa.eu/
taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/vat/key_documents/reports_published/com_2012_605_en.pdf and the “Expert 
study on the issues arising from taxing the supply of goods and the supply of services, including restaurant and catering 
services, for consumption on board means of transport” by PWC available on: https://circabc.europa.eu/w/browse/59941dff-
4fd3-47bb-8ee9-c502cab5b7b6.  The report does not cover the distinction between the supply of goods and services and does 
not clarify if the supply of services might be covered by the derogation listed under Annex X, Part B, Point 9 of the VAT 
Directive.  
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3b) Specification of Vehicle Use for Passenger Transport for Purposes of Input VAT 
All Member States allow for the deduction of input VAT on vehicles used for the provision of 
commercial passenger transport services (except for cases where passenger transport services are exempt). 
A few Member States apply restrictions, though, mainly in connection with private cars that are used for 
passenger services. The effect of these restrictions is most likely not relevant for competition, as they 
address the possibility of abuse of deductions. We evaluate it as not relevant for purposes of this study. 
3c) Tax Incentives for Fuel and Electricity  
To encourage the use of public transport, in general, and, in select transport modes and in certain Member 
States, to have lower VAT rates and reduced tax and duty rates for other inputs. While possibly helping to 
achieve this objective, these lower rates can introduce distortions. 
Energy is about 10% to 12% of train operating costs, up to 20% for bus operations, and about 30% for 
air passenger operations. However, all VAT expenditures on fuel used as an input to passenger transport 
operations can be reclaimed (other than in the Member States where services are exempt from VAT without 
the right to reclaim). 
As with VAT on other inputs to passenger transport operations, those for energy are refundable, so the 
only cost distortion is that of financing the difference in energy cost from those operators who do not benefit 
from the distortion. Even when the refund period is long, the financial cost is a small percentage of total 
operator cost. The overall impact of this distortion is very small.  
4a) Place of VAT Liability: Complexity of Calculating Place of Supply (Distance) of Extra-
EU and Intra-EU Rail and Road Transport 
The place of VAT liability has attracted much attention for the administrative costs that it is believed to 
impose on transport operators for its collection and distribution to the various Member States through which 
passenger trips pass. 
Measuring VAT according to distance obliges companies in the bus and railway passenger transport 
sector to determine VAT for each trip separately. Whereas the use of informatics tools allow for such 
calculations, they do involve start-up and maintenance costs. The costs are a handicap for small operators 
that cannot so easily make use of professional software tools.      
The correct calculation of the distances passengers travel in each country is particularly important for 
small Member States whose passenger travel VAT revenue is largely earned from transit passengers. This 
proportion is higher for Member States located closer to the geographic centre of the EU territory. 
4b) Additional Compliance Costs 
Although there are four different distortions in this group, they were assessed together as no data was 
found for the individual distortions. Supplying passenger transport services in certain Member States 
necessitates higher administrative costs than in others.  
Coping with these differences is particularly onerous for small operators. Based on the data for the UK 
(the only Member State where compliance by company size was found), compliance costs for small and 
large companies is about the same, but several times higher than that for medium-sized companies. From 
three other Member States, it was found that compliance costs are higher when there are more VAT rates 
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to be dealt with. Overall, the impact of this distortion is small, but it does result in some discrimination 
against small transport operators. 
4c) Different Treatment of Sections in or above International Areas outside the EU 
Each Member State has its own regulations for determining the VAT liability for passenger transport 
that takes place in international water or airspace when it forms part of a domestic trip. Distortions also 
derive from the different ways of differentiating between domestic and international trips and from 
measuring the domestic part of the distance when VAT is applied to that part of an international trip. 
A variation of this distortion is where domestic passengers might extend their trip a short distance to an 
international destination and then make a return international trip to their real destination. There are very 
few instances of this being feasible.  
Although there are anecdotal instances of each variation of this distortion occurring in practice, when 
taken together, they account for a very small proportion of total trips and PKM. 
4d) Difficulty in Determining Place of Supply (Distance) of Extra-EU and Intra-EU Air and 
Sea Transport 
This distortion is different to the others in that it does not yet occur and would only occur if air or 
maritime international passenger transport were to be subject to VAT. If this were to be implemented, it 
could be difficult to determine what distance had been travelled in the territorial water or air space of 
transited Member States and what VAT liabilities would be incurred. Rail and, to a lesser extent, road 
transport is constrained in its distances and routes by the fixed infrastructure that it uses, which subsequently 
limits the complexity of calculating the distances travelled in each Member State. Sea and air transport are 
less constrained in this sense. 
However, technology has greatly simplified such calculations and software used by airlines to assess 
their liability to Eurocontrol charges could easily be adapted to assess VAT liabilities. Similar software is 
available to ferry and cruise line operators. This is, therefore, unlikely to be an important distortion. 
However, small operators might incur proportionally higher administration costs than large operators, 
particularly in dealing with trips that end up taking different routes to those expected when the passenger 
ticket was purchased and VAT liability first estimated.  
Overall Assessment of Distortions 
Six of the distortions have been assessed on the basis of the quantification of their impact on passenger 
demand, and through that on operator costs and Member States VAT revenues. Of the others, three have be 
assessed by the order of magnitude of their impacts, one has already been considered by other studies and 
actions and not considered further, and the remaining five could only be described quantitatively. None of 
the fifteen was found to have a large impact on passengers, operators, and Member States, but three were 
assessed to have a medium impact, seven a small impact, and three a very small impact. 
Two of the three distortions that have a medium impacts are among those related to different VAT rates 
on passenger services: within one mode between domestic, intra-EU, and extra-EU services, and between 
modes for the same three markets. The third is the distortion that results from different delimitations 
between the three markets.  
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1 - Different VAT Rates 
1a 
Different VAT rates within one mode at 
the domestic level 
 





Different VAT rates between modes at 
the domestic level  
Only applies to three MS Very Small 
1c 
Different VAT rates within one mode 
between domestic, extra-EU, and intra-
EU 
-1.8 billion 




Different VAT rates between modes for 
domestic, extra-EU, and intra-EU 
-0.5 billion 




Different delimitation between 
domestic, extra-EU, and intra-EU (two-
sector trips) 
Limited  Small  
1f 
Lower VAT rates applied in certain 
regions at the domestic level 
  Small 
2 - Scope of Passenger Transport Services and Associated Supplies 
2a 
Definition of passenger transport and 
related incidental services 
400 million 
Excess VAT collected on 
taxis etc. in UK 
Small 
2b 
Consumption on board ships, aircraft, or 
trains 
n.a. Not addressed in this study 
3 - Treatment of Inputs in the Passenger Transport Sector 
3a 
Exemptions following Article 148 of 
VAT Directive - Delay in processing 
VAT refunds 
121 million 
Estimate of possible 




Specification of vehicle use for 
passenger transport for purposes of 
input VAT deductibility 
 
Aimed at avoiding abuse 
of deductions 




Tax incentives on fuel and electricity 
between Member States 
  Very Small 
4 - Place of Supply 
4a 
Complexity of calculating the place of 
supply (distance) of extra-EU and intra-
EU rail and road transport 
  Small 
4b 
Additional compliance costs 
(proportion of distance, multiple 
registration)14 
2 million  Small 
                                                   
 
 
14 E.g. different registration and documentation requirements, invoicing rules, VAT returns, and languages. 
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4c 
Different treatment of sections in or 
above international areas outside EU 
  Small 
4d 
Difficulty in determining the place of 
supply (distance) of extra-EU and intra-
EU air and sea transport 
  Medium 
 
Scenarios 
Eleven indicative VAT scenarios have been used to help assess the impacts of possible ways to address 
the distortions. None of these scenarios address all distortions; hence, no scenario could be considered a 
candidate for an alternative VAT regime. The scenarios have been designed only to help determine whether 
each could be designed and how it might influence the three main players in passenger transport: the users, 
the operators, and the Member States. Some of the scenarios were amenable to quantification, others only 
to an order of magnitude estimate, while some could only be described quantitatively. 
Scenario 1: Output VAT on all modes of passenger transport in the urban, other domestic, and intra-EU 
markets is set at national standard rates. VAT rates on extra-EU passengers and on all inputs to the operation 
of passenger transport are unchanged. 
Scenario 2: Similar to Scenario 1, but with the output VAT rates set to the reduced national rates.  
Scenario 3: The same as Scenario 1, but the place of taxation is changed from the Member State in which 
the transport service is provided to the Member State of passenger departure.  
Scenario 4: The same as Scenario 2, with a change in place of taxation as in Scenario 3. 
Scenario 5: Applies current VAT rates, but with the place of taxation as per Scenario 3. 
Scenario 6: Applies current output VAT rates, but abolishes Article 148 of the VAT Directive exempting 
VAT on inputs to air and maritime intra-EU and extra-EU services.  
Scenario 7: The same as Scenario 6, but instead of removing the exemptions of Article 148, it extends its 
provisions to inputs for bus and passenger rail services.  
Scenario 8: Is similar to VAT Scenario 4, which applies national reduced VAT rates to passenger outputs, 
uses the Member State of passenger departure for where VAT liability is incurred, and extends that liability 
to the extra-EU passenger trips.  
Scenario 9: is similar to VAT Scenario 8; however, the VAT liability for VAT on extra-EU passengers is 
based on the fare before user charges or taxes are added, with specific ticket taxes eliminated as they are 
replaced by VAT.  
Scenario 10: Retains current input and output VAT rates, but implements the one-stop-shop provision for 
passenger transport VAT transactions. 
Scenario 11: Applies current domestic VAT rates on inputs and outputs, but harmonizes the output VAT 
rates on intra-EU and extra-EU passengers to zero (or provides an exemption with the right to deduct). 
Assessment of Scenarios 
Table ES.2 presents an overview of the highlights of the results of the model simulations, which are 
discussed in detail in the main text of this report. 
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By design, the various scenarios eliminate one or several of the distortions that have been identified and 
discussed or quantified. Thus, to the extent that the elimination of these distortions could be a desirable 
policy objective, the objective would be accomplished. The simulations displayed in Table ES.3, therefore, 
have to be considered as a quantification (to the extent possible) of the effects of the elimination of such 
distortions. If the elimination of the distortion is a benefit, the simulations give us an indication of the 
potential costs associated with these benefits. Not all of the consequences, however, are in the form of costs. 
While different scenarios may be associated with reductions in transport volume, employment, or even 
(modestly) GDP, there are also benefits accruing from the scenarios, for instance, in the form of reduced 
environmental emissions and increased VAT revenues (at least in some of the scenarios), which can then, 
in turn, be used for other purposes by national governments. 
With this caveat, Table ES.3 shows that the scenario with the largest economic and environmental impact 
is Scenario 1, which is not surprising in view of the fact that it provides the largest shock to the existing 
system. Overall demand for transport declines by between 0.7% and 4.8% by 2030 (for the EU28, with 
wide variations across Member States). VAT revenue from passenger transport almost trebles as a result of 
the increase to national standard rates. However, transport operator revenue decreases by 3% (short term, 
full pass through) up to 10% (long term, limited pass through) when compared to the reference scenario, 
where the current VAT rules are maintained. 15 In addition, economy-wide effects on GDP are minor 
because of the hypothesis that compensatory tax reductions or transfer increases cushion households from 
a negative fiscal shock. However, employment in the sector declines, sometimes substantially, according 
to mode. 
Scenario 2 has a much more moderate effect on all of the variables that have been discussed, since the 
increases in rates are more limited and apply to fewer Member States and modes (i.e. many Member States 
already use reduced rates). 
Scenarios 3, 4, 5, and 8 provide information on the consequences of a change in the place of taxation. 
The main message here is that, if such change were to be desirable for policy purposes, its effects would be 
rather marginal and we presume easily handled with minor compensatory mechanisms. 
Scenarios 6 and 7 explore the consequences of removing or extending the provisions of Article 148 to 
all operators. Our conclusion is that the consequences are trivial.   
Scenario 9 shows that using VAT based on pre-tax fares and national reduced rates for all transport 
modes and on the Member State of departure would not have a significant impact (on fares, demand, and 
competitiveness between or within modes) compared to VAT based on final ticket prices. One further 
option would be to replace the already existing ticket taxes by VAT. 
Scenario 10 argues that the introduction of a single window for passenger transport VAT issues might 
be desirable, but cannot be evaluated without a specific study. We argue that such a scheme could be offered 
on a voluntary basis and then assessed on the basis of accumulated experience. 
Finally, Scenario 11, which is the closest to the principle of subsidiarity, in that it would only affect 
international travel, has minimal consequences on relevant variables affecting the demand or supply of 
passenger transport. 
                                                   
15 This reference scenario is referred to in the Report as “Business as Usual” or the BAU Scenario. 
Table ES.2 – Overview of Assessment of Scenarios 
Scenario Description of VAT Scenario Distortions 
Addressed 
Method of  
Assessment 
Main Highlights 
(comparison to the BAU Scenario) 
1 The national standard rates will apply to outputs of all 
modes of urban, other domestic, and intra-EU passenger 
transport. 
1 Q Total transport demand declines by between 0.7% and 4.8% 
by 2030 (for the EU28, with wide variations across Member 
States). Business demand, however, increases due to 
deductibility of VAT for business passenger transport 
purposes. VAT revenue almost trebles as a result of the 
increase to national standard rates. However, revenue of 
transport operators decreases by 3% (short term, full pass 
through) up to 10% (long term, limited pass through) when 
compared to the BAU Scenario. Economy-wide effects on 
GDP minor. Employment in the sector declines, sometimes 
substantially according to mode. Environmental effects are 
generally positive and proportional to the reduction in 
different forms of passenger transport modes. 
2 The national reduced rates will apply to all modes of 
urban, other domestic, and intra-EU passenger transport. 
If no reduced rate exists, the standard rate will apply. 
1 Q Total transport demand declines slightly or increases slightly 
(depending on the scenario). The increase in VAT revenues 
is more modest than in Scenario 1 (about 23% for full pass-
through in 2030), and so is the decline in revenues of 
operators. In some Member States, VAT revenues decline. 
GDP effects are minimal.  
Employment effects in the sector are also smaller than in 
Scenario 1.  
3 As for Scenario 1, but with the place of taxation changed 
to the Member State of departure/arrival. 
1, 4a, 4d Q This Scenario extends Scenario 1. Results are identical except 
that a redistribution of revenues among Member States 
occurs, limited to revenues from international tariffs. Smaller 
Member States tend to see an increase in their revenues at the 
expense of the larger ones. 
4 As for Scenario 2, but with the place of taxation changed 
to the Member State of departure/arrival. 
1, 4a, 4d Q Same as in Scenario 3, with very few differences. 
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5 Current VAT rates, but the place of taxation changed to 
the Member State of departure/arrival. 
4a, 4d Q Effects of Scenario consist of re-distribution of international 
travel revenues among Member States. In practice, the 
resulting changes are small, and no Member States gain or 
lose more than 1% of its revenues. 
6 Exemptions according to Article 148 of the VAT 
Directive abolished. 
3a O Minimal effects on the air and sea transport industries, 
provided right of deduction is allowed. 
7 Exemptions according to Article 148 of the VAT 
Directive extended to buses and trains. 
3a O Would allow the recovery of capital costs for buses and trains 
more speedily. Magnitude of the effect hard to estimate, but 
likely of minor importance. 
8 As for Scenario 4, but with an obligation to VAT 
extended to extra-EU passengers departing from a 
Member State. 
1, 4a, 4c, 
4d 
Q Relatively small impacts given that the long-term fare 
elasticities of demand are quite low. 
9 As for Scenario 8, but with VAT applied to pre-tax fares 
as for the Air Passenger Duty. 
1, 4a, 4c, 
4d 
O Relatively small impacts once all transport modes are liable 
for VAT at the same rates. 
10 Implementation of One-Stop-Shop for all VAT 
transactions. 
4a, 4b D The reform would be desirable, although estimating its 
quantitative impacts would require a separate study. 
11 Current rates apply on all domestic transport, intra-and 
extra-EU rates set to zero for all operators. 
1d, 4b Q Minimal impact on PKM and on VAT revenues from this 
Scenario, given the low share of bus and rail in international 
travel. 
Q = Quantitative; O = Order of Magnitude; D = Description. 
 
  
Chapter 1. Introduction 
This is the Final Report for the “Study on the economic effects of the current VAT rules for passenger 
transport,” under FWC No. TAXUD/2010/CC/104. This study was conducted by CASE (Center for Social 
and Economic Studies, Warsaw), IHS (Institute for Higher Studies, Vienna), and TML (Transport and 
Mobility, Leuven). 
Objective 
The objective of this study is to provide an economic assessment of the impact of current VAT regimes 
and the likely effects of alternative VAT regimes to assist the Commission in making policy choices. 
Background 
In December 2011, the Commission published its “Communication on the Future of VAT” ((COM2011) 
851 Final). In the communication, the Commission sets out the fundamental features of a future VAT 
system and priority areas for further work. One key priority is a more efficient VAT system. For this, 
broadening the tax base and limiting the use of reduced rates would promote tax neutrality and improve 
economic governance either by generating new revenue streams or by facilitating a reduction in standard 
rates without adverse revenue consequences. For passenger transport activities, public consultation has 
confirmed that the current situation (where services are VAT exempt or subject to reduced rates in Member 
States, variable by means of transport involved) creates distortions of competition. Even where exemption 
or reduced rates do not apply, the complexity of current place-of-supply rules increase compliance costs (in 
particular, for activities that extend across two or more Member States) and may cause voluntary or 
involuntary non-compliance. Consultation responses highlighted two possible but conflicting approaches: 
maintaining the status quo with minor changes to apply exemptions in a more uniform way or abolishing 
the exemptions. The latter option is more in line with the objective of increasing the neutrality and efficiency 
of the tax. The Commission's preference is for a more neutral, consistent, and simple VAT framework for 
passenger transport activities. 
Passenger transport activities are always, in principle, subject to VAT. Nevertheless, the European 
Council’s VAT Directive has a range of provisions allowing for either exemptions or reduced rates. Several 
of these provisions flow from derogations accorded to Member States on the basis of exemptions already 
in place on 1 January 1978 or at the time of accession. These exemptions are in Articles 371 to 390 and 
Articles 390a and 390b.16 
Businesses supplying international passenger transport services across several Member States must be 
familiar with the specific VAT rules for each Member State. That these rules can vary depending on the 
means of transport used not only adds to its complexity, but is also at odds with neutrality (e.g. VAT may 
be due on coach services but not on airline services). 
                                                   
16  All legislative references are to Council Directive 2006/112, the VAT Directive. 
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However, these are not the only exemptions affecting passenger transport services. Other provisions 
allow certain service providers (e.g. international sea and air transport) to make VAT-exempt purchases. 
There are two types of VAT purchase exemptions: 
 Output Exemption: the exemption of passenger transport provided by transport providers to their 
customers, subject to certain conditions, and 
 Input Exemption: the exemption of select supplies to transport providers, subject to certain 
conditions. 
These exemptions create an additional level of complexity and cause administrative burdens for both 
economic operators and tax administrations. The input exemption provides a cash flow advantage to the 
sector concerned, as it does not have to pre-finance the VAT on its purchases (notably, investment goods 
such as the means of transport itself). 
Finally, passenger transport is taxed according to where the transport effectively takes place, 
proportionate to the distances covered (Article 48), and may be subject to reduced rates as provided for in 
point (5) of Annex III, leading to further complexity in cross-border operations.  
Passenger Transport Services 
All passenger transport services are potentially subject to VAT. In practice, certain Member States have 
chosen to exempt services based on the size of vehicle used or the geographic region where the service is 
operated. For reasons that were originally related to not inhibiting international trade, international 
passenger travel by air and sea are also exempt from output VAT. 
For the purposes of the analyses made here, passenger transport is defined as all passenger trips that 
would be subject to VAT if there were no exemptions. This includes passenger travel by public transport 
vehicles in urban areas (urban passengers), on inter-urban travel within the country where the trip originates 
(other domestic passengers), intra-EU travel (between the territory of one Member State and another, and 
extra-EU travel (between the territory of a Member State and non-member state). 
This assessment includes travel by all modes of transport; however, in our quantitative analysis using 
three scenario models, analysis is constrained by available data. The data excludes passenger travel where 
making the trip is an essential part of the reason for traveling (e.g. travel by tourist coaches and ships). The 
data also excludes travel by hired cars, with or without a driver.17 The data on the number of passengers on 
maritime cruises is available outside of the models; hence, the impact of different VAT regimes on these 
trips can be quantified, but outside of the models used for the other passenger travel.  
The data source used does include travel between the EU-28 Member States and third countries, so the 
impact of different output VAT regimes on these passenger trips can be estimated in the same way as urban, 
other domestic, and intra-EU passenger trips.  
Structure of the Report 
The structure of this report is as follows:   
                                                   
17 Hired cars without drivers are generally considered as hiring of means of transport and not passenger services. 
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• Chapter 2 discusses the demand and supply in the EU’s passenger transport market and 
examines several issues concerning the competitiveness of the market according to relevant 
dimensions.   
• Chapter 3 analyses the passenger transport sector’s VAT regime as applied by Member States 
across the EU, as well as a brief discussion of other taxes affecting passenger travel.   
• Chapter 4 discusses the competitive distortions that are at the centre of the analysis of 
alternative VAT regimes and provides an assessment of their relevance.  
Input and output VAT exemptions can lead to distortions from an ideal or preferred market 
context. We identify 15 potential distortions and assign them to 4 groups:  
o Group 1: six distortions derived from different output VATs within or between 
modes of transport or based on geography or between markets. 
o Group 2: two distortions related to the definition of passenger transport services and 
associated supplies.  
o Group 3: three distortions derived from VAT exemptions on inputs to operators of 
particular modes of transport or the time taken to process VAT rebates.  
o Group 4: four distortions related to the place of supply and the administration VAT 
costs on passenger transport, mostly input VAT, and derives from the system of 
determining VAT based on the distance travelled in each country, the differences 
between transport modes, and the treatment of VAT on travel outside the EU.  
• Chapter 5 discusses proposed VAT reform policy options to address select distortions.  
In the past, many measures have been considered to address VAT distortions and a few have 
been implemented. However, these measures have addressed VAT distortions in general, 
and not those specific to the transport sector. In Chapter 5, we discuss 11 VAT reform 
scenarios that have the potential to address the identified distortions. The scenarios consist 
of changes to rates (with the aim of better harmonization) and changes to other 
administrative rules of passenger transport VAT. Each scenario is evaluated by a baseline 
run for the year 2010 (2013 for the city-pairs model) and at two points in time (2020 and 
2030) to capture impact and long-term effects of reforms.  
There are several VAT distortions derived from the VAT rules that apply to all economic 
activities which have a greater impact on transport operators than on other producers of 
goods or services. Potential remedies to these distortions are not covered in the analyses of 
this study, as their remedies lay in measures not specific to the transport sector. Such 
distortions include the high administrative costs of providing documentation in a language 
that is not widely used.  
Other distortions that are not addressed in this report are those that have already been the 
subject of recent and detailed studies. One example is that of the place of taxation for the 
supply of goods and services consumed aboard means of transport (PWC 2012).  
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• Chapter 6 discusses the results of the simulations and other assessments of the 11 policy 
scenarios. 
In addition, Annex 1 provides a complete analysis of VAT legislation at the EU level. Annex 2 contains 
a methodological note on the date employed in the report. Annex 3 discussed the models used to simulate 
the various policy scenarios. Finally, Annex 4 provides a more detailed discussion of the estimation of the 
pass-through factors estimated for the different policy scenario. 
This report is complemented by Volumes 2 and 3.  Volume 2 contains a detailed series of country fiches 
on the VAT regime with regard to passenger transport in each EU Member State and country fiches 
containing detailed information on passenger transport statistics.  Volume 3 (in Excel format) contains the 




Chapter 2. Passenger Transport Demand and Supply in the EU 
In this Chapter, we (i) review the features of the demand and supply of passenger transport services in 
the European Union and (ii), using a number of different concepts of competition, we discuss the degree 
of competitiveness of the individual markets for passenger transport. 
A. Demand for Transport in the European Union 
There are two widely used measures of demand for transport in the EU: number of passengers and 
number of passenger kilometres (PKM). We provide data on both measures. Using two large datasets 
containing information on transport volumes, expressed in PKM and number of trips (based on 
EUROSTAT official statistics, see Box 2.1), we explore the importance of the main modes of purchased 
transport: bus, rail, metro, and air. For the purposes of this study, the transport market was split into 
submarkets by product: urban transport, other domestic or intercity transport, international intra-EU 
transport, and international extra-EU transport. These submarkets are distinct and suppliers are faced with 
very different conditions.  
No data was collected for water-based transport or taxis due to a lack of consistent and readily available 
datasets. While these modes are often subject to special treatment from legislators, their market share is not 
projected to be significant. This is confirmed by the EC Statistical Pocketbook,18 which states the passenger 
sea transport 2011 market share is 0.6%, based on PKM, and is primarily concentrated in three regions: the 
Aegean Sea, the North Sea Channel, and the Baltic Sea. 
Starting from a set of tables with aggregated figures for all EU28 countries, the most important 
information for each of the markets is discussed. For each market, we show the modal volumes and shares 
for the applicable modes. Not all modes are present in all Member States (and for one Member State, one 
market is not identified in the data source): 
 Metros or trams are not available in all urban areas,  
 Two countries (Malta and Cyprus) have no rail network, and 
 Two countries (Luxemburg and Cyprus) have no predominantly urban zones according to DG 
REGIO’s classification (Box 2.1).  
Urban Transport 
Purchased transport in cities consists of three modes: metro and tram, standard rail, and bus. The total 
amount of urban trips in the EU28 in 2010 was approximately 35.6 billion (equivalent to 385 billion PKM). 
The largest urban market under both parameters is Germany (6.4 billion trips and 80.4 billion PKM). The 
second largest urban market under both parameters is the UK (5.4 billion trips and 48.8 billion PKM); 
however, the gap is notably smaller for trips than for PKM, which implies that urban trips made in the UK 
are markedly shorter than in Germany. 
                                                   
18 See: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/facts-fundings/statistics/pocketbook-2013_en.htm 
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The largest markets for metro transport are Germany (3.7 billion trips) and France (2.9 billion trips). In 
the UK, the dominant urban transport mode is bus (3.7 billion trips). This is also is the largest market for 
urban bus trips in the EU. However, for bus PKM, Germany is the largest, followed first by Italy and then 
the UK. This confirms the trend of longer urban trips in Germany. 
Almost half the urban trips in the EU are done by metro (45%), yet they only represent 24% of distance. 
On the other hand, only 13% of trips are made by rail, but they cover 38% of the pkm. For urban buses, the 
numbers are 41% and 38%. 
Box 2.1 – Datasets for Demand Analysis 
Two datasets served as the sources for the analysis of transport demand in the EU: the TREMOVE model 
(for PKM) and ETISplus (for number of trips). Both are based on EUROSTAT, with additional post-
processing conducted to fit the needs of the application of the data in its respective contexts. 
TREMOVE is a policy assessment model used to study the effects of different transport and environmental 
policies on the emissions of the transport sector. The model estimates the transport demand, modal shifts, 
vehicle stock renewal, and scrappage decisions as well as the emissions of air pollutants and the welfare level 
for policies as road pricing, public transport pricing, emission standards, and subsidies for cleaner cars. The 
model covers passenger and freight transport in 31 countries and covers the period from 1995-2030. It has 
been applied in projects for DG MOVE, DG CLIMA, DG ENV, and DG ENTR. 
The transport volumes included in the current version of the model (3.5c) were provided by the EC’s JRC-
IPTS in the context of the assessment of the 2011 Transport White Paper. They contain aggregated statistical 
data (EUROSTAT) up to 2009 and projections thereafter. For this project, the first projection year used was 
2010 (the data of which match well with EUROSTAT/ETiF (European Transport in Figures) aggregated 
totals). 
The data extracted from TREMOVE are PKM (passenger kilometres), equivalent to the number of trips 
multiplied by the average trip length, split over a number of relevant parameters, including region, distance, 
and motive. 
TREMOVE has a built-in distinction between urban, non-urban short distance, and non-urban long distance 
transport (among others). There is, however, no way to establish the amount of cross-border transport included 
in these totals. An additional data source was needed for that. 
The additional data source used was ETISplus (date of access: April 2013), a recently-completed EC 
Seventh Framework Program (FP7) project (managed by DG MOVE), which delivered (among other things) 
an online database containing detailed transport volumes in and between Nomenclature of Territorial Units 
for Statistics Level 3 (NUTS3) zones, split by transport mode, for the years 2005 and 2010. The unit in which 
the volumes were delivered is passenger trips. The data is also based on EUROSTAT, but on different tables, 
with substantial additional reviews and validation. From the volumes between zones, it is easy to identify 
international transport. With some processing, this allows for the distinction of international transport volumes 
within TREMOVE data. 
What ETISplus does not have is a proper identification of urban transport. To solve this, we consulted a list 
published by DG REGIO (See: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Urban-
rural_typology_update) that classifies all NUTS3 zones as one of three types: predominantly urban, 
predominantly rural, or intermediate. All intra-zonal trips within a zone classified as predominantly urban 
were marked to be urban. This may, in some cases, lead to unexpected results, like countries with no urban 
transport (if none of its zones are marked as predominantly urban) or countries with excess intercity transport 




Complete lists of figures are presented in the Tables 2.1 and 2.2 below.  
Table 2.1 - Transport Volumes Urban Transport 
 Trips (103 ) PKM (106) 
 Metro Bus Rail Total Metro Bus Rail Total 
AT 891,731 157,647 163,278 1,212,656 4,199 2,603 4,791 11,593 
BE 343,192 426,810 140,474 910,476 1,226 5,144 5,914 12,284 
BG 183,298 75,836 16,397 275,531 504 1,622 888 3,013 
CY 0 0 0 0 0 248 0 248 
CZ 1,252,300 323,110 33,914 1,609,323 8,308 2,224 2,623 13,155 
DE 3,727,375 1,832,791 1,709,324 7,269,490 16,759 26,339 37,279 80,377 
DK 52,000 42,269 49,033 143,302 193 2,049 1,838 4,080 
EE 30,276 57,729 2,546 90,550 86 493 88 667 
ES 1,242,814 1,536,670 484,105 3,263,589 7,130 12,910 8,536 28,576 
FI 113,023 79,486 50,133 242,642 525 2,521 0 3,046 
FR 2,914,714 1,766,299 581,600 5,262,612 14,061 19,326 13,503 46,890 
GR 219,479 456,855 4,968 681,302 1,797 6,428 0 8,225 
HR 183,000 36,744 34,977 254,721 708 272 488 1,468 
HU 677,629 407,167 25,950 1,110,746 2,444 2,421 3,096 7,961 
IE 32,375 94,427 21,808 148,610 204 1,786 116 2,105 
IT 1,055,804 2,085,398 426,267 3,567,470 6,377 20,874 20,614 47,866 
LT 0 158,954 1,104 160,058 0 665 133 798 
LU 0 0 0 0 0 414 0 414 
LV 41,007 67,177 13,495 121,679 300 470 294 1,064 
MT 0 35,604 0 35,604 0 104 0 104 
NL 410,665 615,645 177,731 1,204,040 1,934 2,958 8,653 13,544 
PL 1,165,859 838,456 58,947 2,063,262 4,770 5,224 6,549 16,543 
PT 235,511 310,450 136,213 682,174 1,079 1,069 1,795 3,943 
RO 803,670 399,796 7,348 1,210,814 7,397 1,790 2,675 11,862 
SE 435,212 142,740 78,733 656,684 2,414 3,666 7,457 13,538 
SI 0 26,544 9,193 35,737 0 413 366 779 
SK 89,630 76,109 4,401 170,140 418 1,014 790 2,223 
UK 1,266,242 3,653,842 904,214 5,824,299 9,409 20,289 19,113 48,811 
EU28 17,366,807 15,704,555 5,136,152 38,207,514 92,241 145,336 147,600 385,177 




Table 2.2 - Market Share for Urban Transport 
 Trips PKM 
 Metro Bus Rail Metro Bus Rail 
AT 73.5% 13.0% 13.5% 36.2% 22.5% 41.3% 
BE 37.7% 46.9% 15.4% 10.0% 41.9% 48.1% 
BG 66.5% 27.5% 6.0% 16.7% 53.8% 29.5% 
CY 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
CZ 77.8% 20.1% 2.1% 63.2% 16.9% 19.9% 
DE 51.3% 25.2% 23.5% 20.9% 32.8% 46.4% 
DK 36.3% 29.5% 34.2% 4.7% 50.2% 45.1% 
EE 33.4% 63.8% 2.8% 12.9% 73.9% 13.2% 
ES 38.1% 47.1% 14.8% 25.0% 45.2% 29.9% 
FI 46.6% 32.8% 20.7% 17.2% 82.8% 0.0% 
FR 55.4% 33.6% 11.1% 30.0% 41.2% 28.8% 
GR 32.2% 67.1% 0.7% 21.8% 78.2% 0.0% 
HR 71.8% 14.4% 13.7% 48.2% 18.6% 33.2% 
HU 61.0% 36.7% 2.3% 30.7% 30.4% 38.9% 
IE 21.8% 63.5% 14.7% 9.7% 84.8% 5.5% 
IT 29.6% 58.5% 11.9% 13.3% 43.6% 43.1% 
LT 0.0% 99.3% 0.7% 0.0% 83.3% 16.7% 
LU 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
LV 33.7% 55.2% 11.1% 28.2% 44.2% 27.6% 
MT 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
NL 34.1% 51.1% 14.8% 14.3% 21.8% 63.9% 
PL 56.5% 40.6% 2.9% 28.8% 31.6% 39.6% 
PT 34.5% 45.5% 20.0% 27.4% 27.1% 45.5% 
RO 66.4% 33.0% 0.6% 62.4% 15.1% 22.6% 
SE 66.3% 21.7% 12.0% 17.8% 27.1% 55.1% 
SI 0.0% 74.3% 25.7% 0.0% 53.0% 47.0% 
SK 52.7% 44.7% 2.6% 18.8% 45.6% 35.6% 
UK 21.7% 62.7% 15.5% 19.3% 41.6% 39.2% 




Other Domestic and Intercity Transport 
Other domestic transport is defined as all domestic trips not taking place within urban areas, while 
intercity transport (only trip data from ETISplus available) is defined as between NUTS3 zones that are 
predominantly urban within a country. In cases where only one such zone exists, there will be no intercity 
transport in the data. 
The relevant modes are rail, bus or coach, and air transport. Bus is generally used for the shorter trips 
(approximately 20 km or less) in rural areas, while rail is, by far, the predominant mode transport for longer 
travel between cities. However, the intercity market is only a small part of the total other domestic market, 
making bus the overall largest mode for non-urban domestic transport. Rail sees its highest market shares 
in the UK and the Netherlands (40% and 39%, respectively, based on number of trips). In France, rail has 
a 26% share based on trips, but an over 60% share based on PKM. 
The market share of domestic air transport is negligible in most Member States, except in very large 
countries or countries with a less extensive long distance rail network, such as Spain or Italy. 
In terms of number of trips, the other domestic market is 43% smaller than the urban market, but 70% 
larger in terms of PKM. 
Tables 2.3 to 2.5 below show the market share and transport volumes by mode for other domestic and 
intercity transport.  
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Table 2.3 - Transport volumes "Other domestic transport"  
 Trips (103)  PKM (106) 
 Air Bus Rail Total Air Bus Rail Total 
AT 393 341,607 69,026 411,026 24 6,773 3,145 9,941 
BE 29 220,385 62,589 283,002 1 12,095 1,967 14,062 
BG 138 408,405 15,065 423,607 189 9,139 1,384 10,712 
CY 0 39,860 0 39,860 0 1,092 0 1,092 
CZ 71 916,857 107,064 1,023,991 19 13,624 3,292 16,934 
DE 16,506 2,923,405 623,232 3,563,143 1,443 41,067 36,827 79,338 
DK 943 243,335 129,576 373,854 4 5,291 3,968 9,263 
EE 0 94,617 2,394 97,011 0 2,081 169 2,250 
ES 26,981 631,728 71,444 730,153 15,755 46,388 11,571 73,714 
FI 1,312 228,566 16,581 246,459 367 4,840 3,232 8,439 
FR 20,061 1,387,600 499,550 1,907,212 12,739 26,925 59,363 99,028 
GR 4,502 535,516 7,290 547,309 2,916 15,610 1,895 20,420 
HR 254 196,971 30,442 227,666 512 1,822 533 2,866 
HU 1 584,621 105,166 689,788 2 13,658 4,023 17,683 
IE 227 169,767 17,332 187,326 19 5,122 1,700 6,841 
IT 24,185 3,553,349 415,203 3,992,737 7,754 82,575 26,475 116,805 
LT 0 219,518 3,173 222,690 0 2,786 235 3,021 
LU 0 38,052 17,075 55,126 0 437 172 609 
LV 0 87,828 6,369 94,197 0 1,952 553 2,506 
MT 0 0 0 0 0 414 0 414 
NL 6 256,028 163,811 419,845 0 9,110 6,250 15,360 
PL 671 2,375,112 205,255 2,581,038 160 22,210 13,246 35,616 
PT 1,526 343,161 20,241 364,928 960 9,597 1,950 12,508 
RO 729 707,632 58,250 766,611 382 10,075 4,354 14,811 
SE 3,967 529,486 97,195 630,648 860 4,791 2,532 8,182 
SI 1 77,099 6,236 83,336 2 2,783 341 3,126 
SK 58 601,745 41,315 643,118 10 7,586 1,176 8,771 
UK 12,552 698,864 466,076 1,177,492 2,258 29,850 29,948 62,056 
EU28 115,112 18,411,113 3,256,947 21,783,172 46,374 389,695 220,299 656,367 







Table 2.4 - Market shares "Other domestic transport" 
 Trips PKM 
 Air Bus Rail Air Bus Rail 
AT 0.1% 83.1% 16.8% 0.2% 68.1% 31.6% 
BE 0.0% 77.9% 22.1% 0.0% 86.0% 14.0% 
BG 0.0% 96.4% 3.6% 1.8% 85.3% 12.9% 
CY 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
CZ 0.0% 89.5% 10.5% 0.1% 80.4% 19.4% 
DE 0.5% 82.0% 17.5% 1.8% 51.8% 46.4% 
DK 0.3% 65.1% 34.7% 0.0% 57.1% 42.8% 
EE 0.0% 97.5% 2.5% 0.0% 92.5% 7.5% 
ES 3.7% 86.5% 9.8% 21.4% 62.9% 15.7% 
FI 0.5% 92.7% 6.7% 4.4% 57.4% 38.3% 
FR 1.1% 72.8% 26.2% 12.9% 27.2% 59.9% 
GR 0.8% 97.8% 1.3% 14.3% 76.4% 9.3% 
HR 0.1% 86.5% 13.4% 17.8% 63.6% 18.6% 
HU 0.0% 84.8% 15.2% 0.0% 77.2% 22.8% 
IE 0.1% 90.6% 9.3% 0.3% 74.9% 24.8% 
IT 0.6% 89.0% 10.4% 6.6% 70.7% 22.7% 
LT 0.0% 98.6% 1.4% 0.0% 92.2% 7.8% 
LU 0.0% 69.0% 31.0% 0.0% 71.8% 28.2% 
LV 0.0% 93.2% 6.8% 0.0% 77.9% 22.1% 
MT    0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
NL 0.0% 61.0% 39.0% 0.0% 59.3% 40.7% 
PL 0.0% 92.0% 8.0% 0.4% 62.4% 37.2% 
PT 0.4% 94.0% 5.5% 7.7% 76.7% 15.6% 
RO 0.1% 92.3% 7.6% 2.6% 68.0% 29.4% 
SE 0.6% 84.0% 15.4% 10.5% 58.6% 30.9% 
SI 0.0% 92.5% 7.5% 0.1% 89.0% 10.9% 
SK 0.0% 93.6% 6.4% 0.1% 86.5% 13.4% 
UK 1.1% 59.4% 39.6% 3.6% 48.1% 48.3% 






Table 2.5 - Transport Volume and Market Share for Intercity Transport 
 Trips (103)  Market Share 
 Air Bus Rail Total Air Bus Rail 
AT 207 3 4,165 4,375 4.7% 0.1% 95.2% 
BE 18 7 29,894 29,918 0.1% 0.0% 99.9% 
CZ 0 845 1,373 2,218 0.0% 38.1% 61.9% 
DE 6,190 1,800 93,377 101,367 6.1% 1.8% 92.1% 
DK 38 0 0 38 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
ES 11,101 3,152 16,545 30,798 36.0% 10.2% 53.7% 
FR 8,222 10 74,317 82,548 10.0% 0.0% 90.0% 
GR 810 787 495 2,091 38.7% 37.6% 23.7% 
IT 7,422 459 24,869 32,751 22.7% 1.4% 75.9% 
LV 0 1,045 1,167 2,212 0.0% 47.2% 52.8% 
NL 1 21 89,187 89,209 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
PL 266 2,482 15,722 18,470 1.4% 13.4% 85.1% 
PT 741 962 2,034 3,737 19.8% 25.8% 54.4% 
RO 0 39 1,014 1,052 0.0% 3.7% 96.3% 
UK 6,344 19,401 220,701 246,446 2.6% 7.9% 89.6% 
EU28 41,359 31,012 574,859 647,231 6.4% 4.8% 88.8% 





International Intra-EU Transport 
The international intra-EU transport market is heavily dominated by air transport, with 72% of trips. 
Still, the market share for rail transport is important as well at 20%. The highest market shares for rail are 
found in smaller Western (Luxemburg, Belgium) and Central (Austria, Slovenia) European countries. The 
highest market shares for air transport can be found in countries at the borders of the EU, notably in the 
East. 
The largest markets for international intra-EU transport are the UK, Germany, and Spain (by amount of 
trips). Of these three, Germany has the lowest share of air transport and the highest share of rail transport. 
Intra-EU travellers to and from Spain generally fly the farthest, followed by the UK and Greece. With Spain 
and Greece among the EU’s primary touristic countries, this is not unexpected. The largest market for intra-
EU rail transport is France. Its central location with fast railway connections to the EU’s largest countries 
is a determining factor.  
The relative market size of the intra-EU international market versus the domestic market in terms of trips 
is about 0.6%, but 24% in terms of distance. 
A small note on the methodology of data collection: the PKM values presented are not a direct output of 
TREMOVE. These were derived as follows: 
 TREMOVE has distance classes for trips greater than 500 km and less than 500 km. 
 For both classes, ETISplus data was consulted to find the international trips starting in a given 
country. The trips were split into two groups, greater than 500 km and less than 500 km, the same 
distance classes of trips as defined in TREMOVE.  
 The ratio of the PKM for international trips and the PKM for all trips (from ETISplus) was then 
taken as a measure of the share of international trips in TREMOVE as well. 
 The PKM from TREMOVE were then split according to these ratios. Logically, for many small 
countries, almost all of the PKM in the distance class greater than 500 km was assigned to 
international transport. 
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 below show the transport volume and market share by mode for intra-EU transport.   
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Table 2.6 - Transport volumes international transport (Intra-EU) 
 Trips (103) PKM (106) 
 Air Bus Rail Total Air Bus Rail Total 
AT 4,696 694 5,592 10,981 2,596 365 1,193 4,153 
BE 6,341 660 10,082 17,083 2,384 1,414 1,955 5,753 
BG 1,787 1,525 95 3,408 2,516 592 70 3,178 
CY 2,543 0 0 2,543 6,031 0 0 6,031 
CZ 3,355 994 2,943 7,293 5,009 245 482 5,735 
DE 32,098 3,595 11,689 47,382 18,800 941 2,183 21,924 
DK 5,018 265 4,181 9,463 4,057 61 350 4,468 
EE 479 55 20 554 338 57 6 401 
ES 44,572 2,345 1,823 48,740 58,136 269 1,000 59,405 
FI 3,767 3 33 3,803 4,207 197 263 4,667 
FR 22,928 4,189 13,919 41,036 12,272 1,243 6,547 20,062 
GR 9,317 530 39 9,887 20,525 91 18 20,634 
HR 1,102 358 427 1,888 864 19 88 971 
HU 2,916 494 1,741 5,150 2,025 821 1,368 4,213 
IE 9,175 17 317 9,508 5,396 260 66 5,722 
IT 25,727 4,690 3,352 33,769 13,197 199 1,793 15,189 
LT 846 205 219 1,270 689 139 32 860 
LU 447 108 1,021 1,576 237 6 138 381 
LV 1,173 62 99 1,334 774 69 35 878 
MT 1,233 0 0 1,233 2,109 0 0 2,109 
NL 10,716 688 3,934 15,339 3,455 285 1,201 4,941 
PL 6,970 2,940 1,051 10,960 3,579 510 243 4,331 
PT 7,311 689 841 8,842 9,514 173 193 9,879 
RO 3,338 1,546 292 5,176 3,627 603 199 4,429 
SE 8,236 225 3,807 12,268 5,928 68 160 6,156 
SI 416 73 438 927 244 51 122 418 
SK 1,478 757 1,508 3,743 581 126 183 890 
UK 48,515 842 3,960 53,317 27,948 1,323 1,981 31,251 
EU28 266,498 28,550 73,425 368,473 217,039 10,123 21,867 249,029 





Table 2.7 - Market shares international transport (intra-EU) 
 Trips PKM 
 Air Bus Rail Air Bus Rail 
AT 42.8% 6.3% 50.9% 62.5% 8.8% 28.7% 
BE 37.1% 3.9% 59.0% 41.4% 24.6% 34.0% 
BG 52.4% 44.8% 2.8% 79.2% 18.6% 2.2% 
CY 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
CZ 46.0% 13.6% 40.4% 87.3% 4.3% 8.4% 
DE 67.7% 7.6% 24.7% 85.8% 4.3% 10.0% 
DK 53.0% 2.8% 44.2% 90.8% 1.4% 7.8% 
EE 86.4% 9.9% 3.7% 84.3% 14.1% 1.6% 
ES 91.4% 4.8% 3.7% 97.9% 0.5% 1.7% 
FI 99.0% 0.1% 0.9% 90.1% 4.2% 5.6% 
FR 55.9% 10.2% 33.9% 61.2% 6.2% 32.6% 
GR 94.2% 5.4% 0.4% 99.5% 0.4% 0.1% 
HR 58.4% 19.0% 22.6% 89.0% 2.0% 9.1% 
HU 56.6% 9.6% 33.8% 48.1% 19.5% 32.5% 
IE 96.5% 0.2% 3.3% 94.3% 4.5% 1.2% 
IT 76.2% 13.9% 9.9% 86.9% 1.3% 11.8% 
LT 66.6% 16.1% 17.3% 80.2% 16.1% 3.7% 
LU 28.4% 6.8% 64.8% 62.3% 1.5% 36.2% 
LV 88.0% 4.6% 7.4% 88.2% 7.9% 4.0% 
MT 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
NL 69.9% 4.5% 25.7% 69.9% 5.8% 24.3% 
PL 63.6% 26.8% 9.6% 82.6% 11.8% 5.6% 
PT 82.7% 7.8% 9.5% 96.3% 1.7% 1.9% 
RO 64.5% 29.9% 5.6% 81.9% 13.6% 4.5% 
SE 67.1% 1.8% 31.0% 96.3% 1.1% 2.6% 
SI 44.9% 7.9% 47.2% 58.5% 12.2% 29.3% 
SK 39.5% 20.2% 40.3% 65.3% 14.2% 20.5% 
UK 91.0% 1.6% 7.4% 89.4% 4.2% 6.3% 




International Extra-EU Transport 
Most trips between EU and non-EU countries are made by air (see Table 2.8). Only for countries at the 
edges of the territory do other land-based modes reach a market share of more than 10%. The average 
market share for air transport is 91.5%. The market share for bus and rail transport are 3.6% and 4.9%, 
respectively, in terms of number of trips. Land-based modes of transport each represent less than 1% of 
transport volume in terms of PKM. 
Among border countries, we can identify two groups: Central countries (Austria, Germany, Italy), which 
register a large amount of land-based trips to neighbouring Switzerland, and Eastern countries (Czech 
Republic, Croatia, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia), where trips are mainly further eastward. 
Among the first group, most land-based trips are made by rail, while bus is the dominant land mode for the 
second group of countries. 
The total amount of extra-EU trips is just under 40% of the amount of intra-EU trips, yet extra-EU trips 
cover almost 30% more distance. The largest market for extra-EU trips is the UK, with many trips covering 
long distances. Germany is the second market, but with a significant portion covering a short distance. The 
gap between the UK and Germany is considerably larger in terms of PKM than in amount of trips. 
Neighbouring Switzerland is likely the main cause of that. 




Table 2.8 - Transport volumes international transport (Extra-EU) 
 Trips (103)  PKM (106) 
 Air Bus Rail Total Air Bus Rail Total 
AT 2,412 83 669 3,163 5,495 116 51 5,663 
BE 4,163 44 63 4,269 5,920 268 33 6,222 
BG 535 18 147 700 1,795 67 109 1,971 
CY 1,617 0 0 1,617 2,886 0 0 2,886 
CZ 1,238 280 18 1,536 6,294 165 7 6,467 
DE 21,673 1,455 2,135 25,263 46,666 164 370 47,200 
DK 2,293 50 42 2,385 5,787 3 14 5,804 
EE 289 11 13 313 510 38 8 556 
ES 10,208 113 23 10,344 41,175 124 19 41,318 
FI 1,360 4 32 1,396 4,562 7 293 4,862 
FR 18,502 197 1,186 19,884 41,914 29 555 42,499 
GR 2,632 30 54 2,715 10,707 28 24 10,759 
HR 439 170 25 633 959 57 4 1,020 
HU 1,114 66 54 1,235 2,153 149 59 2,362 
IE 1,768 0 0 1,769 6,444 0 0 6,444 
IT 12,151 664 1,640 14,455 27,672 23 441 28,136 
LT 237 9 51 297 352 9 8 368 
LU 233 2 22 256 437 1 6 443 
LV 401 47 46 494 466 54 19 539 
MT 133 0 0 133 562 0 0 562 
NL 7,329 160 33 7,522 11,608 12 27 11,647 
PL 2,741 805 129 3,675 3,893 335 42 4,269 
PT 2,058 0 0 2,058 8,775 0 0 8,775 
RO 790 529 170 1,489 1,901 136 157 2,194 
SE 3,747 10 322 4,079 7,587 53 48 7,688 
SI 237 51 6 295 219 45 5 270 
SK 583 110 19 711 1,076 32 11 1,120 
UK 27,427 89 18 27,534 68,011 136 17 68,163 
EU28 128,310 4,995 6,916 140,221 315,826 2,052 2,326 320,204 





Table 2.9 - Market shares international transport (Extra-EU) 
 Trips PKM 
 Air Bus Rail Air Bus Rail 
AT 76.2% 2.6% 21.1% 97.0% 2.0% 0.9% 
BE 97.5% 1.0% 1.5% 95.2% 4.3% 0.5% 
BG 76.4% 2.6% 21.0% 91.1% 3.4% 5.5% 
CY 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
CZ 80.6% 18.2% 1.2% 97.3% 2.6% 0.1% 
DE 85.8% 5.8% 8.4% 98.9% 0.3% 0.8% 
DK 96.2% 2.1% 1.8% 99.7% 0.1% 0.2% 
EE 92.3% 3.4% 4.3% 91.8% 6.8% 1.4% 
ES 98.7% 1.1% 0.2% 99.7% 0.3% 0.0% 
FI 97.4% 0.3% 2.3% 93.8% 0.1% 6.0% 
FR 93.0% 1.0% 6.0% 98.6% 0.1% 1.3% 
GR 96.9% 1.1% 2.0% 99.5% 0.3% 0.2% 
HR 69.3% 26.8% 3.9% 94.0% 5.6% 0.4% 
HU 90.3% 5.4% 4.4% 91.2% 6.3% 2.5% 
IE 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
IT 84.1% 4.6% 11.3% 98.4% 0.1% 1.6% 
LT 79.7% 2.9% 17.3% 95.6% 2.4% 2.1% 
LU 90.8% 0.8% 8.4% 98.6% 0.2% 1.3% 
LV 81.1% 9.5% 9.4% 86.5% 10.1% 3.5% 
MT 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
NL 97.4% 2.1% 0.4% 99.7% 0.1% 0.2% 
PL 74.6% 21.9% 3.5% 91.2% 7.8% 1.0% 
PT 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
RO 53.1% 35.5% 11.4% 86.6% 6.2% 7.2% 
SE 91.9% 0.2% 7.9% 98.7% 0.7% 0.6% 
SI 80.5% 17.4% 2.1% 81.3% 16.8% 2.0% 
SK 82.0% 15.4% 2.6% 96.1% 2.9% 1.0% 
UK 99.6% 0.3% 0.1% 99.8% 0.2% 0.0% 






There are many factors affecting the choice of transportation mode for passenger travel. One of the more 
important mode characteristics influencing choice is fare, but the effective fare itself depends on the reason 
the travel is undertaken. Business trip related expenses are often recoverable for VAT purposes and, in that 
case, those who pay for the tickets will not feel the consequences of any change in output VAT policy. It 
is, therefore, useful to illustrate the importance of this part of the market in relation to the full market (see 
Table 2.10, based on ETISplus dataset). Business travellers typically place more value on time efficiency 
and comfort and this has an impact on their mode choice. 
In the urban market, the share of business trips is very small (just under 2.4% of all urban trips are 
business trips), and the largest mode for these trips in most countries is metro or tram. The share of urban 
business trips is somewhat larger in the EU13 (new Member States); however, most urban trips are for 
commuting or other private purposes.  
The dominant mode in business intercity transport is rail. The share of business trips in intercity transport 
is approximately 17.5%, with some of the larger countries with well-established high-speed intercity 
connections at more than 25% (France and Italy). In countries with a low share of business trips, private 
transport (cars) likely accounts for most of the volume. This becomes evident in the difference between the 
EU15 and EU13 countries. In the EU15, with generally denser infrastructure and higher service frequencies, 
the share of business trips in purchased transport is 6% higher than in the EU13. 
The share of international business trips is higher in the market for intra-EU trips (29.3%) than for extra-
EU trips (27.9%), which is probably explained by the fact that business relations are mainly established in 
countries with similar working conditions, and thus occur more between neighbouring countries. Without 
exception, air is the most dominant mode for extra-EU trips.  However, for intra-EU trips, rail is the 
dominant mode in six countries (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Luxemburg and Slovenia) – 
with the exception of France relatively small countries sharing borders with the EU’s largest Member States 
with high-quality rail networks. The difference between EU15 and EU13 becomes greater with distance, at 
6.5% and 9.1% for intra-EU and extra-EU trips respectively. 
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Table 2.10 – Business Passenger Transport 
 Urban Main mode Intercity Main mode Intra-EU Main mode Extra-EU Main mode 
AT 0.87% rail 18.57% rail 32.97% rail 22.17% air 
BE 2.37% tram/metro 17.94% rail 46.55% rail 28.32% air 
BG 3.41% tram/metro   19.26% air 26.09% air 
CY     20.21% air 17.16% air 
CZ 3.67% tram/metro 3.79% rail 21.94% rail 17.38% air 
DE 1.14% rail 19.32% rail 27.08% air 24.23% air 
DK 4.38% tram/metro 33.33% air* 16.61% air 25.83% air 
EE 1.98% tram/metro   23.53% air 22.22% air 
ES 2.22% rail 17.17% rail 23.42% air 23.11% air 
FI 3.46% rail   32.14% air 33.33% air 
FR 3.56% tram/metro 32.78% rail 38.57% rail 30.43% air 
GR 2.39% tram/metro 21.71% rail 18.39% air 19.27% air 
HR 3.03% tram/metro   29.47% air 9.06% air 
HU 3.24% tram/metro   31.40% air 26.01% air 
IE 3.85% tram/metro   30.08% air 32.82% air 
IT 1.66% rail 25.98% rail 30.53% air 29.68% air 
LT 0.85% bus   18.14% air 17.72% air 
LU     32.99% rail 25.43% air 
LV 2.26% tram/metro 4.87% rail 22.52% air 26.11% air 
MT 0.51% bus   32.93% air 30.93% air 
NL 2.33% tram/metro 12.42% rail 28.64% air 28.85% air 
PL 3.14% tram/metro 12.11% rail 24.61% air 21.58% air 
PT 1.97% tram/metro 21.56% rail 26.71% air 24.75% air 
RO 3.08% tram/metro 23.51% rail 23.99% air 15.28% air 
SE 3.12% tram/metro   21.06% air 28.14% air 
SI 1.39% rail   22.54% rail 20.52% air 
SK 3.03% tram/metro   16.38% air 24.77% air 
UK 3.91% tram/metro 12.80% rail 33.44% air 35.45% air 
EU15 2.45% tram/metro 17.73% rail 30.06% air 28.83% air 
EU13 3.16% tram/metro 11.17% rail 23.57% air 19.70% air 








B. The European Passenger Transport Market from the Operators’ 
Perspective 
The structure of the European passenger transport market is rather different from the perspective of the 
supply of services to that of the outcome of the interaction of that supply with demand, as reflected in the 
amount of travel (Section A of this Chapter). The supply of passenger transport services and, in particular, 
the competition between modes and operators, is the topic of this section of this Chapter. 
There are common features of passenger transport markets within the EU that affect the competitiveness 
of its supply.19 First, markets within transport modes tend to be concentrated, with oligopolistic interactions 
between operators interfering even where the markets appear to be competitive ( e.g. airline and 
intercity bus alliances reflect this tendency). Competitive market equilibriums tend to be unstable and 
quickly decline into some form of oligopoly. Many of the EU’s transport policies and regulations are 
designed to address these tendencies, with increasing success in most cases (e.g. railways), but slower 
progress in others (e.g. ferries). 
Second, demand is more heterogeneous than supply. Each passenger has an individual set of attributes 
(e.g. income, family circumstances, and value of time) that weigh differently for each trip for which a 
service is sought, while at the same time the balance of attributes of the service being sought (e.g. fare, 
time, frequency, and comfort) is also different for each trip. In contrast, relatively few suppliers can provide 
the required services. Transport operators have become skilled at market differentiation, being able to offer 
a wide range of fares and service characteristics to satisfy distinct market segments. However, service 
operators should be selective in the vehicles they use to provide a wide range of services. One result is the 
now common practice of yield management through which revenue per vehicle kilometre is maximized 
through a wide range of options offered for seats on the same vehicle. 
Third, providing transport services is a capital-intensive activity. For network-based transport modes 
(e.g. rail and metro), the costs of fixed infrastructure are higher than for the other modes, which use non 
mode-specific infrastructure (e.g. roads, seas, and airspace). However, even for the users of common 
infrastructure, the operator is often required to cover at least the marginal costs of infrastructure use 
and, where the infrastructure is provided as a commercial venture, the operators between them must 
cover the full costs of the infrastructure used. Investments in buses, railway coaches, rolling stock, road 
vehicles, or aircraft, in one way or another (e.g. debt or equity), comprise between 15% and 25% of 
operating costs. These costs are borne directly by operators and must be recovered by fare revenue, except 
where the service is provided for social rather than commercial reasons and can attract a subsidy (e.g. in 
the form of payment of a public service obligation). With large long-term fixed costs in long-lived 
infrastructure and average-term large investments in vehicles, operators face a wide gap between average 
and marginal costs and, therefore, must have a sophisticated tariff scheme to operate in competitive 
markets.  
In part because of the high fixed costs of transport operations, providers of transport services face 
significant economies of scale and network benefits. Both of these characteristics offer competitive 
advantages to larger operators and create substantial barriers to entry for new competitors. The response of 
smaller operators is often to operate a form of joint marketing that may or may not include other forms of 
                                                   
19 A more extensive description of these common features is given in Sevy (2010). 
 48 
cooperation. For example, at least two large marketing associations for smaller transport operators have 
emerged in the EU intercity bus market. In one association, participants include select services in a jointly 
marketed program, while competing with these services in other operations. 20 The joint marketing of 
services is also becoming more prevalent between operators in different transport modes in order to compete 
with large transport operators that offer inter-modal connections. Several of the EU’s larger bus companies 
are also major rail operators (e.g. Arriva is a multinational public transport company with bus, rail, tram, 
and urban ferry services in 14 EU countries, and is now a subsidiary of Deutsche Bahn). Most members of 
the European Passenger Transport Association have similar profiles. 
Even where there appears to be multiple operators (e.g. on intercity bus routes in Central Europe), 
numerous operators are likely to be members of a marketing group that in one way or another reduces 
competition. Where there appears to be competition between modes, in practice, the same company may 
operate the competing services. The various forms of market integration make it difficult to assess the level 
of competition in many passenger transport markets. Less competition is not necessarily a wholly negative 
outcome of service integration. Passengers benefit from operators offering a more extensive range of routes 
and services and from the ability to book travel to destinations that are not served directly by one operator 
or mode from their home city. The more choices offered in terms of routes, schedules, modes of transport, 
and tariffs, the more competitive are its offerings. 
All of these considerations should be taken into account when looking at the supply of transport services 
in particular markets. More available modes or operators do not necessarily indicate more competition.  
Transport Markets 
The passenger transport market in EU Member States is not sufficiently homogenous to permit a single 
profile to describe the demand or supply of transport services or to address sensitivity to price changes, the 
impacts of VAT exemption or reduced rates, market distortions arising from policy differences between 
modes, the presence of powerful incumbents or alliances, or of operators established or supplying services 
in different Member States.  
Most previous transport comparisons in Member States have focused on national statistics. We have also 
started from this same point as it is the level at which the most reliable data on the demand for and supply 
of passenger transport services can be found.   
However, national statistics can hide a wide-ranging variability in passenger transport market 
characteristics. For example, in terms of demand, the mixture of journey purposes, length of trips, and 
frequency of travel are different for urban and inter-urban travel; in terms of supply, few urban vehicles are 
suitable for international transport, but the level of competition between modes and operating companies is 
                                                   
20 Eurolines is a network of 29 cooperating companies serving more than 600 destinations in 38 countries, offering partially 
integrated ticketing and inter-connected services. In some Member States, Eurolines has only one participating operator (such as 
Bus Éireann in the Republic of Ireland), but several operators in others Member States. Although it requires minimum service 
standards, the quality of service depends on the particular operator. Its bus services are strong competitors with rail in some shorter 
intercity routes; however where trip lengths are longer, its bus services are less competitive. Bus Europe is a less integrated 
marketing association of 40 bus operators and bus terminals. Bus Europe markets its services to about 1,200 destinations in 19 




usually greater than in other markets. For example, in urban transport there are up to seven different modes 
of transport available (e.g. bus, trolleybus, tram, light rapid transit, conventional rail, ferry, and funicular) 
and many passenger trips involve combinations of two or more modes of transport. Other markets typically 
have, at most, four modes available (e.g. air, bus, rail, and ferry) and few trips involve more than two modes 
of transport. 
In addition, the market for any particular passenger trip is not the urban, domestic, national, intra-EU, 
or extra-EU market, but that between the place that the passenger is traveling from and to. The ETISplus 
transport model uses almost 1,300 zones as trip origins and destinations, giving a theoretical 1.5 million 
possible combinations. The model also allows for four purposes of travel. For each possible combination 
of an origin and destination zone, the parameters that determine market competitiveness are similar to those 
at the more aggregate levels.  
Our detailed assessment of competition from the passenger perspective combines the four purposes of 
travel from the ETISplus model into two (business and non-business) with 220 possible origin and 
destination zones. For each mode of travel, passenger market perception is influenced by fare and time 
required to make the trip along with the frequency of service.21  
For travel between certain Member States and city pairs, ferry transport plays an important role for select 
market segments (e.g. bus services to and from the UK and Ireland and between Cyprus, Malta, and other 
Member States). However, other than for travel between port cities, ferry travel is part of multi-modal travel 
and is included in the data for bus travel.22 In the passenger market for travel between most Member States 
and non-member countries (extra-EU travel), air services predominate. Still, rail and bus services are 
significant for travel between some Member States and cities, and that significance is increasing with the 
expansion of high-speed rail (HSR) and the liberalization of bus markets.  
An analysis undertaken merely at the national level would overlook many of these differences. Although 
most data relating to passenger transport supply is available only at the national level, we have 
disaggregated the national data into four submarkets to allow for differences in supply competitiveness.23  
Measures of Passenger Transport Supply 
Three indicators of capacity measure supply: number of vehicles, number of seats (static capacity), and 
number of seat kilometres (dynamic capacity). As estimates progress from the simplest (e.g. vehicles) to 
the most useful (e.g. dynamic capacity), additional variables must be estimated, and each of these additions 
                                                   
21 There are other characteristics of the possible trip by each mode that the passenger takes into account but which we have not 
measured here. These include the number of times there is a change of vehicle (such as between a bus and a train, or even between 
two trains) and the reliability of the time taken for the travel. The time reliability can be influenced by the performance of a 
particular transport operator and external factors such as road congestion and weather.  
22 In our city pair analysis, ferry transport is included in that of other modes, as for most trips (but not necessarily most ferry trips), 
ferry travel is a component of a trip that is mostly by bus. We do not include trips made by passengers in cars, as their main mode 
of transport is private and not usually included in a passenger transport market from a VAT perspective. 
23 This analysis excludes the travel markets between small cities within and between the Member State and the rural transport 
market. While important from economic and social perspectives, these markets do not have VAT distortions that are covered by 
the other markets included in the analysis.  
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may reduce the reliability of the final indicator. In addition, there is a trade-off between reliability and 
usefulness in deciding which measure to use.  
For example, using number of vehicles as the measure of capacity often overlooks large differences in 
vehicle size, either in the same mode (e.g. passenger aircraft sizes range from less than 30 to more than 500 
seats) or between modes (e.g. the average bus has a significantly smaller capacity than the average ferry).  
To overcome this problem, the next best measure is number of seats (static capacity), which can be 
derived by multiplying the number of vehicles by its average size. Size estimates are disaggregated as far 
as the data will allow. Although estimates of average size at the EU-level can be made with some 
confidence, providing estimates for each of the four submarkets (and city pairs) becomes increasingly less 
reliable.  
The third measure of supply capacity is seat kilometres (dynamic capacity), which takes into account 
the greater utilization of vehicles in certain circumstances. A small passenger aircraft of 65 seats might fly 
for up to seven hours per day for more than 250 days per year at an average speed of 350 km per hour, 
traveling a total distance of more than 600,000 km in a year. A bus of the same size used in the urban 
transport market might operate for five hours per day for 200 days per year and at an average speed of less 
than 20 km per hour, thus traveling for only 20,000 km per year.  
The aircraft, therefore, provides a more effective annual capacity per seat (i.e. it can transport more 
passengers in any period of time). Estimates of the dynamic capacity measure, obtained by multiplying the 
average seats per vehicle by the average distance travelled in a year, are the most useful of the three 
measures of capacity. However, they are also the least reliable, as estimates of average distance travelled 
by vehicle type per year is very specific to the market and circumstances in which it is operating. 
How to Measure Passenger Transport Capacity 
Not only are there different measures of capacity, but also there are two very different methods of to 
estimate capacity. One method utilizes published data on the number of registered vehicles of each type in 
each country, makes assumptions about vehicle size to estimate number of seats, and then applies vehicle 
utilization to reach an estimate of dynamic capacity. The second method begins from the other end of the 
process, with demand measured in terms of PKM, and subsequently utilizes estimates of vehicle occupancy 
and size to derive estimates of seat kilometres and the inverse of vehicle utilization to reach number of 
vehicles. Both methods provide estimates of the same three measures of capacity. The first method, which 
we have used for the results presented here, is presumed to be more accurate because its starting point is 
actual data (i.e. the number of registered vehicles), while the second method utilizes estimated numbers 
(i.e. those of the originating passengers in each Member State). We use the second method to verify the 
results of the first method. 
 Since we have segmented the EU passenger transport market into four submarkets, capacity estimates 
are required for each. Capacity estimates are also required for each of the 220 city pairs in our database, 
since this is the basic level at which we are estimating the impacts of alternative VAT regimes. At this 
detailed level of analysis, we can introduce service frequency as another measure of capacity that is not 
available at the more aggregate levels. However, at the city pair level, we have to exclude the dynamic seat 
capacity measure, as it does not apply when the distance over which the capacity is being measured is fixed.  
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Estimates of Number of Vehicles 
In the first method of estimating passenger transport supply, the starting point is EUROSTAT data on 
number of vehicles for road, rail, and air in each Member State.24 No data is available from this source on 
the number of ferries registered or operating within the EU28 and its territorial waters. 
Published data on the number of registered transport vehicles in each Member State requires careful 
interpretation. The number of vehicles registered is not necessarily the same as the number of vehicles 
providing services in a Member State. This is particularly applicable to aircraft and ferries, with many 
registered in one Member State but providing most of its supply in other Member States or outside the EU. 
Buses and railway coaches are more likely to provide a large proportion of its services in its country of 
registration, although even for these vehicle types, further integration of EU passenger services is leading 
to increased use outside of its Member State of registration. Urban transport vehicles have the highest 
probability of all of its supply being provided in its Member State of registration. 
In 2010, there were 4,110 civil aircraft, 818,000 registered buses and coaches, and 102,168 rail passenger 
coaches of various types registered in Member States. The data is available at the level of Member State, 
as presented in Table 2.11. The data on number of aircraft is provided in four size ranges, but no data on 
vehicle size is available for other modes. 
This data is the starting point for our estimate of vehicles available for scheduled public passenger 
transport that is subject to VAT. The operation of vehicles used for other passenger transport is subject to 
VAT at the standard rate and is considered a separate part of our analysis of distortions.   
The data on buses and coaches and aircraft includes those not used for scheduled services, but for private 
hire or charter services. These are not subject to the derogations of VAT rates for passenger transport and 
must be separated in our analyses. We estimated that these represented 25% of all registered buses and 
coaches, 6% of metro vehicles, 10% of aircraft, and 2% of rail passenger coaches. 
  
                                                   
24 EU Transport in Figures, Statistical Pocketbook, 2012 
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Table 2.11 – Number of Vehicles by Member State 
 Air Bus Rail Total 
AT 110 9,600 2,974 12,684 
BE 81 16,200 3,412 19,693 
BG 40 24,500 1,369 25,909 
CY 11 3,400 0 3,411 
CZ 49 20,400 4,514 24,963 
DE 673 76,500 18,565 95,738 
DK 101 14,500 1,307 15,908 
EE 9 4,200 189 4,398 
ES 336 62,400 5,665 68,401 
FI 97 13,700 1,071 14,868 
FR 443 96,200 16,890 113,533 
GR 359 27,300 718 28,377 
HR 15 4,900 523 5,438 
HU 60 17,600 3,136 20,796 
IE 359 8,200 592 9,151 
IT 255 99,900 12,465 112,620 
LT 14 13,700 337 14,051 
LU 16 1,600 214 1,830 
LV 37 13,700 491 14,228 
MT 20 1,200 0 1,220 
NL 177 11,300 2,824 14,301 
PL 71 97,000 6,926 103,997 
PT 95 15,600 965 16,660 
RO 55 40,900 3,037 43,992 
SE 101 13,900 871 14,872 
SI 13 2,400 355 2,768 
SK 10 9,400 1,530 10,940 
UK 804 111,500 11,751 124,055 
  4,411 831,700 102,691 938,802 
Source: European Transport in Figures, 2012 
 
After excluding these vehicles, the next task was to separate urban transport vehicles, as they are, to a 
large extent, captive to their market and their characteristics are quite different from those used in the other 
markets. Nearly all trams, metros, and LRT (light rapid transit) vehicles are used in urban transport, while 
no passenger aircraft are used in this market.  
Urban Transport Vehicles 
The estimate of vehicles used in urban transport was based on the data available in Jane’s Urban 
Transport Systems (JUTS 2013). This presents a description of the organization of urban transport in each 
major city of every Member State (as well as for other countries). From the text, it is possible to estimate 
the number of vehicles available for most modes in most cities, other than for rail passenger transport where 
this is provided by a national railway. While certain national railways operate separate vehicle fleets for 
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urban areas, for many, the rail service is part of a regional service and is not possible to separate the vehicles 
used only in urban services or to allocate part of those used in regional services to urban routes. 
To resolve the issue of lack of data, we ran a simple regression analysis using number of vehicles as the 
dependent variable and total city population and urban area as independent variables.25 From this regression, 
we were able to estimate the number of rail passenger vehicles in the cities where the statistic was not 
available. 
With the estimate of number of vehicles by mode for major cities in each country, the next task was to 
scale this estimate to a national total. This was done using a multiplier of the total national urban population 
to the urban population of the cities included in the database.26  
A similar approach was used with another data source: the UITP’s Mobility in Cities Database (UITP). 
This database also provides estimates of the number of different types of vehicles used in major cities, but 
on a more consistent basis and by using a more rigorous definition of vehicle type. Unfortunately, the data 
is for the year 2000, and there have been some significant changes in the supply of urban passenger transport 
since that time. However, by using vehicles and vehicle seats per capita and by updating the population 
data to 2010, it was possible to obtain an alternative estimate of the number of urban transport vehicles. 
Both the JUTS and UITP data distinguish between types of urban transport vehicles, including buses, 
trolleybuses, trams, light rapid transport, metros, and rail. Occasionally, the specifications between these 
types are rather subjective, so to avoid errors, the data has been aggregated into three vehicle types: metro, 
bus, and rail, which is compatible with the demand data by mode presented earlier in this Chapter. 
The resulting estimates of number of vehicles used in urban transport are 87,849 metro vehicles, 222,400 
buses, and 72,400 railway coaches, accounting for 27% of the total buses and 72% of the total railway 
coaches.  
Table 2.12 – Share of Total Registered Vehicles Available for Passenger Services 
Vehicles Metro Air Bus Rail Total 
Number of Vehicles 93,340 4,110 818,600 102,168 1,018,218 
Available for Passengers 
services 
87,849 3,686 622,472 100,512 814,519 
% In luded 94% 90% 76% 98% 80% 
For Urban Transport 87,849 0 222,400 72,400 382,649 
For Non-Urban Transport 0 3,686 400,072 28,112 431,870 
 
                                                   
25 This followed the practice of the UITP in its Mobility in Cities (MiC) database, which included capacity per mode per capita and 
per unit of area as benchmark statistics. We used the MiC data projected to 2010 as a check but not as a primary source as the 
base year for the data was 2001. 
26 These populations were available from JUTS and were generally larger than population estimates for the metropolitan areas of 
the cities. Part of the explanation is that the transport agencies and operators typically cover an area larger than the metropolitan 
area. 
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Allocation of Remaining Vehicles among Other Markets 
There is no data source that provides the allocation of passenger transport capacity between markets. In 
part, this is attributable to fluidity in allocation, with passenger aircraft, buses, and railway passenger 
coaches being interchangeable between the three markets. One way to assess the relative sizes of these three 
markets is to use the distribution of satisfied passenger demand (i.e. numbers of passengers or PKM) 
between them for each of the three principal modes.  
 
Table 2.13 – Allocation of PKM by Mode among Non-Urban Markets 
 Air Bus Rail 
Domestic 8% 97% 90% 
Intra-EU 37% 3% 9% 
Extra-EU 55% 1% 1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
 
This information was provided by the TREMOVE model’s demand estimates and was described in the 
first section of this Chapter. The allocation of capacity between markets is made using the same allocation 
of PKM as with the demand estimates. Approximately 8% of air passenger capacity is given for domestic 
travel, whereas domestic travel accounts for nearly 97% of bus and 90% of the overall capacity of these 
vehicle types. The remainder of this first method of estimation is relatively straightforward, using industry 
estimates of average vehicle size and utilization.  
The second method, which begins with estimates of passenger demand, was used to verify the results of 
the first method. The estimates of dynamic capacity from the first method corresponded to those of the 
second method (within 5%), while the estimates of number of vehicles from the second method 
corresponded to the numbers of vehicles used as a starting point for the first method (also within 5%), other 
than for the number of buses. The estimate from the second method was about 18% less than the starting 
number of vehicles in the first method. The conflict was addressed by assuming a greater share of available 
bus capacity was used for charter services than was originally assumed. 
Seat Capacity 
With vehicles allocated between markets, it was possible to better estimate seats per vehicle using vehicle 
size estimates from previous transport sector studies and operator statistics. 
The average capacity of passenger aircraft was estimated using the distribution of number of seats in the 
EUROSTAT data, with the average for each size group assessed using knowledge of aircraft types. A 
similar approach was used for bus and passenger railway coach seat capacities; however, these figures were 
developed using a single statistic rather than a distribution of vehicle size groups. As average trip length 
increases, both buses and passenger railway coaches tend to provide greater legroom per vehicle to increase 
comfort level, though this reduces capacity in terms of numbers of seats per vehicle, offsetting an opposing 





Table 2.14 – Assumed or Derived Seat Capacity per Passenger Vehicle 
Mode Domestic Intra-EU Extra-EU Average 
Air 59 142 280 159 
Bus 42 50 48 46 
Rail 68 64 60 66 
 
By applying seat capacity by vehicle type and market to the distribution of vehicles by Member State 
and market, it was possible to estimate the second measure of capacity: number of seats. Estimates were 
prepared for each Member State, market, and mode.  
 To convert static seat capacity to dynamic seat capacity, it is necessary to multiply seat kilometres per 
mode in each market by an estimate of the vehicle utilization (i.e. the distance the vehicle travels in one 
year).  
Results of Capacity Estimates 
A summary of the results of the capacity estimates showing the share of each vehicle type in each market 
is shown in Table 2.15.27 The capacity indicators are in the order they are estimated by the first method, 
starting with the number of vehicles, then seats and ending with the seat capacity. The first assessment is 
of the distribution of capacity.   
The distribution of vehicles in Table 2.15 is by market for each mode, to show how the total supply at 
the national level was allocated to markets. The percentages in the table are the result of the sum of data for 
each Member State. 
 
Table 2.15 – Summary of Three Measures of Capacity 
 
Vehicles Metro Air Bus Rail Total Vehicles 
Urban 100% 0% 36% 70% 47% 382,261 
Domestic 0% 25% 62% 27% 50% 411,077 
Intra-EU 0% 48% 2% 3% 2% 17,311 
Extra-EU 0% 27% 0% 0% 0% 3,871 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 814,520 
Vehicles 87,849 3,686 622,472 100,512 814,519  
Seats Metro Air Bus Rail Total Seats 
Urban 100% 0% 38% 68% 49% 21.87 
Domestic 0% 2% 60% 28% 48% 21.27 
Intra-EU 0% 23% 2% 3% 2% 0.89 
Extra-EU 0% 75% 0% 0% 1% 0.59 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 44.63 
Seats (mill.) 5.21 0.59 32.30 6.53 44.63  
Seat km 
(mill.) 
Metro Air Bus Rail Total Seat km 
(mill.) 
                                                   
27 The percentages shown in Table 2.14 are not those usually used. Instead of showing the modal share for each market, they show 
for each mode how the demand and capacity is allocated between the markets. The more usual shares are shown in Table 2.15 
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Urban 100% 0% 18% 47% 21% 595,304 
Domestic 0% 1% 80% 48% 53% 1,523,740 
Intra-EU 0% 20% 2% 5% 7% 189,469 
Extra-EU 0% 79% 0% 0% 20% 565,639 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 2,874,152 
Seat km 
(mill.) 
134,460 707,881 1,702,475 329,335 2,874,152  
Source: Vehicle data from Eurostat, JUTS (2013), and UITP 
 
The most important feature is that the distribution of seats is more concentrated in the markets with 
average longer trip lengths than is the distribution of vehicles, as those used in these markets tend to utilize 
larger vehicles.  For example, domestic aircraft account for 25% of all passenger aircraft but only 2% of 
aircraft seats. Similarly, seat kms are even more concentrated on markets with longer trip lengths as the 
vehicles used on longer trips tend to have higher utilizations, they travel longer distances each year as they 
spend less time in terminals and stations.  
The capacity provided by each mode tends to be concentrated in two markets. Aircraft capacity is mostly 
in the intra-EU and extra-EU markets, with its combined share in these markets increasing from 73% 
through 98% to 99% as the measure of capacity changes from vehicles through seats to seat kms. Bus 
capacity is heavily concentrated in the urban and domestic markets, its capacity allocated to these markets 
remaining constant at 98% independent of the capacity measure. Rail capacity is concentrated in the same 
two markets, their accounting for 97% of vehicle capacity and reducing by only 1% point with each change 
of the capacity measure changes (Table 2.15). 
 These market distributions are important for understanding the competitiveness of the markets, as the 
use of seat and seat km capacity as indicate lower competitiveness than using vehicles as the measure of 
capacity. The use of the single indicator of a number of vehicles would not have given a dependable estimate 
of supply competition. 
The data used for Table 2.16 is the same as in Table 2.15, but instead of showing how the capacity of 
each mode is distributed between the four markets, it shows how the capacity of each market is made up 
by that of each of the modes28. 
 
Table 2.16 – Transport Supply by Market and Indicator 
 
Vehicles Metro Air Bus Rail Total 
Urban 23% 0% 59% 18% 100% 
Domestic 0% 0% 93% 7% 100% 
Intra-EU 0% 10% 72% 18% 100% 
Extra-EU 0% 26% 65% 9% 100% 
Total 11% 0% 76% 12% 100% 
Vehicles 87,849 3,686 622,472 100,512 814,519 
Seats Metro Air Bus Rail Total 
                                                   
28 So that the row totals rather than the column totals are 100% 
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Urban 24% 0% 56% 20% 100% 
Domestic 0% 0% 91% 9% 100% 
Intra-EU 0% 15% 60% 24% 100% 
Extra-EU 0% 75% 20% 4% 100% 
Total 12% 1% 72% 15% 100% 
Seats (mill.) 5.21 0.59 32.30 6.53 44.63 
Seat km 
(mill.) 
Metro Air Bus Rail Total 
Urban 23% 0% 51% 26% 100% 
Domestic 0% 1% 89% 10% 100% 
Intra-EU 0% 75% 17% 8% 100% 
Extra-EU 0% 99% 1% 0% 100% 
Total 5% 25% 59% 11% 100% 
Seat km 
(mill.) 
134,460 707,881 1,702,475 329,335 2,874,152 
Source: Vehicle data from Eurostat, JUTS (2013), and UITP 
 
As illustrated by the data above, the domestic market is dominated by bus capacity, but with its share 
falling from 93% to 91% and 89%, respectively, as the measure of capacity changes. The intra-EU market 
is relatively balanced between air, bus, and rail when measured by number of vehicles; however, as the 
measure of capacity progresses through seats (15%) and seat kilometres (75%), we attribute this to the fact 
that aircraft in this market are significantly larger than buses or railway coaches and have a higher utilization 
rate. The extra-EU market is dominated by air travel whichever measure of capacity is used, and reaches 
almost 100% in this market using the seat kilometres indicator.   
The indications from this assessment by market share strongly reinforce those from the vehicle-type 
share: the level of competitiveness between markets changes according to the measure of capacity used, 
and the measure of capacity by number of vehicles overestimates market competition as compared with the 
other measures. 
Modal Share by Market Supply 
The three measures of transport supply give rather different indications for each of the four markets. 
When measured in terms of vehicles, buses dominate the overall supply with 76% of capacity, followed by 
railcars and metro vehicles (12% and 11% respectively) and less than 1% by aircraft. The shares of seats 
ae not very different, but when seat kms are used the bus share falls to 59% while the aircraft share increases 
to 25%. 
Urban Supply 
Buses have the largest share (59%) of urban transport vehicles market, with metro coaches having a 
slightly higher share (23%) than railway coaches (18%). When supply is measured by seats rather than 
vehicles, the bus share reduces slightly (to 56%) with metro and rail shares each increasing slightly (to 24% 
and 20% respectively). Using seat kms as the measure of capacity, bus share falls further (to 51%) the metro 
coach share falls slightly to 23%, but the rail share increases to 26%. The changes between vehicles and 
seats are attributable to the different seat capacity of vehicles in different modes, while the difference 
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between seats and seat kms is a consequence of the different vehicle utilizations, with that of railway 
coaches being much higher than the other modes.  
Domestic Supply 
The domestic pattern of supply is more concentrated with buses being 93% of the vehicles and railcars 
only 7% and aircraft being less than 1%. On domestic routes the size of aircraft used is not much greater 
than the size of buses and is slightly smaller than rail coaches, so using the seat measure of capacity the 
aircraft share hardly changes, while the bus and rail shares change with a transfer of 2% from bus to rail. 
When seat kms are used as the capacity measure, the aircraft share increases to 1% while the bus share falls 
to 89% and the rail vehicle share increases to 10%. The increased air share measured in seat kms is 
attributable to its much higher utilization (kms per year), which comes from aircraft being operated for 
many more hours per year than are buses or rail coaches, combined with their much higher speed.  
Intra-EU supply 
Aircraft have a 10% vehicle share of the intra-EU market, a 15% share of seat capacity, and comprise 
75% of the seat kilometre capacity. Buses dominate the market when capacity is measured by vehicles 
(72%) and seats (60%), but not when measured by seat kilometres (the share falls to 17%). Rail coaches 
comprise 18% of intra-EU vehicles, 24% of seat capacity, and 8% of seat kilometres. 
 Despite the recent growth of high-speed rail (HSR), rail coaches still only comprise 3% of the intra-EU 
supply, while the deregulation of bus travel has resulted in its supply comprising 8% of the total. However, 
these averages conceal significant differences between Member States. 
Since most of the quantifiable distortions of the VAT regime are most apparent in intra-EU passenger 
transport, the rather different distribution of seat kilometres for this market as compared to the total market 
by Member State is of particular significance (Table 2.17) 
 
Table 2.17 – Modal Share of Supply (Seat km) in the Intra-EU Market 
Country Air Bus Rail Total 
AT 78% 8% 15% 100% 
BE 63% 20% 17% 100% 
BG 57% 41% 2% 100% 
CY 100% 0% 0% 100% 
CZ 80% 11% 10% 100% 
DE 93% 4% 3% 100% 
DK 97% 2% 1% 100% 
EE 90% 8% 2% 100% 
ES 97% 1% 1% 100% 
FI 88% 6% 6% 100% 
FR 80% 15% 5% 100% 
GR 99% 1% 0% 100% 
HR 80% 7% 12% 100% 
HU 70% 19% 12% 100% 
IE 98% 2% 0% 100% 
IT 91% 3% 7% 100% 
LT 56% 40% 4% 100% 
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LU 90% 1% 9% 100% 
LV 87% 12% 1% 100% 
MT 100% 0% 0% 100% 
NL 91% 6% 2% 100% 
PL 62% 36% 2% 100% 
PT 92% 6% 2% 100% 
RO 64% 31% 4% 100% 
SE 98% 1% 1% 100% 
SI 82% 4% 15% 100% 
SK 45% 15% 40% 100% 
UK 93% 5% 1% 100% 
EU28 89% 8% 3% 100% 
 
Seven Member States have less than 75% of their Intra-EU seat kilometres provided by aircraft (Hungary, 
Romania, Belgium, Poland, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Slovakia) and of these, six have more than 15% 
provided by buses (Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Belgium, and Hungary). Seven Member States, 
including three of those with low aircraft supply, have more than 10% provided by rail coaches (Slovakia, 
Belgium, Slovenia, Austria, Croatia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic). Only four Member States have at 
least 10% of seat kilometres provided by all three intra-EU modes (Belgium, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
and Hungary). 
While there are many other contributing factors to the dominance of air transport supply in this market, 
and there are several other transport and taxation issues that work in an opposite direction, the VAT 
advantages enjoyed by air transport relative to other modes of transport is probably one of the more 
important contributing issues. For example, bus and rail are only effectively competing modes when their 
travel times are comparable with those by air. This rules out competition on a high proportion of routes, 
despite the potential of HSR and express bus services. Our assessment of capacity at the city pair level is 
expected to shed more light on the reasons for the current pattern of supply. 
Extra-EU Supply 
In the extra-EU market, aircraft supply 26% of vehicles. The higher seat capacity of aircraft increases its 
share of seats to 75%, and its higher utilization rate brings its share of seat kilometres in this market to close 
to 100%. Buses account for most extra-EU vehicles (65%); however, its relatively smaller size reduces its 
seat share to 20%, and its lower utilization rate (as compared to aircraft) contributes to a 1% share of seat 
km. Rail coaches comprise 9% of extra-EU vehicles, 4% of seats, and a negligible share of seat km. 
Total EU Market 
The total EU28 market is the sum of these submarkets; accordingly, vehicle shares follow the same 
pattern as capacity measures change from vehicles to seats to seat km. The 11% overall metro and 12% 
overall rail share of vehicle capacity increase slightly to 12% and 15%, respectively, of seat capacity while 
the 76% overall bus share of vehicles decreases to 72%. The aircraft share of both vehicle and seat capacity 
is negligible when the four markets are combined; however, the aircraft share of seat kilometres is 25%, 
with corresponding share reductions in metro (5%), buses (59%), and rail coaches (11%).  
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Competition within Modes 
The third passenger choice, after selecting a destination and mode of travel, is to choose a service 
provider. In a competitive market, this choice may offer more options than simply choice of mode; however, 
despite many attempts to increase intra-modal competition (except in air passenger transport), operator 
choices are rather limited. 
Competition within Air Transport 
From the data available on supply, in terms of seat kilometres by airlines operating from the few Member 
States that we were able to collect such data, it was possible to develop a time series measure of the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI is an indicator of competition in a market, where a lower 
index value indicates greater competition (Table 2.18). 
Table 2.18 demonstrates a consistent increase in the competitiveness of air transport in our small sample 
of Member States (excluding France, where the HHI value in 2012 was almost the same as in 2005). The 
HHI for the UK increased after bottoming out in 2004, whereas the values for the Czech Republic, Malta, 
and Denmark have shown a continued increase. Unfortunately, there is insufficient data to distinguish 
between regular and low-cost airlines; thus, it not possible to use this analysis to determine whether it is the 
presence of low-cost airlines, increasing competitive pressures on regular airlines, or both which have led 
to increased competition. It is also not possible to determine in which markets the competition has increased, 
whether it is in the domestic (unlikely), intra-EU, or extra-EU markets. 
Table 2.18 – Measures of HHI for Airlines in Select Member States 
 Member State 
Year Czech Rep. Malta UK France Denmark 
1991   0.346   
1992   0.321   
1993   0.328   
1994   0.303   
1995   0.292   
1996   0.292   
1997   0.278   
1998   0.275   
1999   0.267   
2000   0.249   
2001   0.217  0.284 
2002  0.403 0.214  0.278 
2003 0.513 0.364 0.203  0.238 
2004 0.500 0.349 0.181  0.240 
2005 0.645 0.327 0.186 0.581 0.226 
2006 0.623 0.363 0.187 0.582 0.215 
2007 0.553 0.313 0.179 0.598 0.207 
2008 0.532 0.333 0.193 0.576 0.204 
2009 0.445 0.345 0.210 0.575 0.191 
2010 0.338 0.313 0.212 0.547 0.185 
2011  0.291 0.219 0.562 0.185 
2012    0.580 0.181 
Source: Based on CASE analysis of data from CAPA 
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Competition within Rail Transport 
Even with the increased operation of HSR services, there are still relatively few international railway 
services other than those provided by consortia operators (such as Thalys) or monopoly concessions (such 
as Eurostar). However, we do expect to see more competition in this mode soon; it was announced that an 
additional operator will compete with Eurostar starting in 2017.  
Competition within Bus Transport 
The number of intra-EU bus services continues to expand to such an extent that it is difficult to know 
how many operators there are, even on a route between one city and another. There are at least three large 
cooperative bus operator marketing associations. Eurolines and Bus Europe claim to represent more than 
70 individual bus companies. The third largest bus service integrator, Sindbad, appears to follow a more 
aggressive strategy. While at first entering into operating agreements with other bus lines, it ultimately 
acquires operator names and assumes their services. Other operators included in the Sindbad group are: 
Albatros, Janosik, Riviera, Star Turist, Nord Gydnia, Alambus, Trans-Express, and Turing Sofia. In 2010, 
Sindbad acquired the name Interbus and assumed operation of its routes. Sindbad currently offers services 
between 17 EU countries and Switzerland. There are also several sizable independent bus companies that 
operate large networks of intra-EU routes. More detail on competition in bus services will be available as 
we complete our analysis of services in city pairs’ routes.  
Initial indications are that the HHI for bus services is not significantly different from that of air services 
(Table 2.19). As with airlines, bus services in France appear to have the least competition of the four 
countries for which we currently have data, while Denmark appears to have the most competitive market. 
The Danish bus market is likely even more competitive than the estimate indicates, as there are several 
hundred small operators that comprise the excluded 20% of the market. 
 






Denmark 15 80% 0.120 
Netherlands 7 95% 0.264 
Portugal 12 92% 0.211 
France 7 93% 0.404 
 
Competition within Ferry Transport 
Although not covered thus far in our market assessments, the passenger ferry markets for domestic, intra-
EU, and extra-EU routes are very competitive. A recent assessment of ferry routes in the three main ferry 
regions: the Mediterranean, the English Channel and North Sea, and the Baltic identified more than 20 ferry 
operators, and there are at least as many covering services to the Greek and Balearic Islands. 
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Competition for the Market29  
For many of the domestic passenger ferry services with low demand, there is competition for the market 
rather than in the market, as there is also for low-density urban and rural bus, rail, and even air services. 
The advantages of competition are believed to be largely retained by this form of competition without the 
risk of competition in the market being commercially destructive to those engaged in it, often to the 
detriment of the passengers who depend on the availability of at least one low fare operator. The passenger 
in this form of competition does not have a choice between competing services, but does benefit from, at 
least, having a commercially contested service available. Unfortunately, in many instances, there is only 
very limited competition for many of these low demand services, and, in some cases, there are no bidders 
for the concession. As a rule, it is expected that at least three bids be required to ensure adequate competition 
for a service.  
Coach Tour and Maritime Cruise Passengers30 
Cruise and coach tour passengers have very different travel characteristics than passengers using 
scheduled or regular transport services, and neither are subject to any of the derogations of passenger output 
VAT that are available to those using scheduled services. However, there are some VAT allowances on 
inputs to operators of vessels for cruise passengers, and Article 148 of the VAT Directive only requires that 
the vessels be for “navigation on the high seas and carrying passengers for reward.” 
The most reliable source of data on the number of passengers, vehicles, and companies operating in the 
coach tour market is contained in a study completed for DGTREN in 2009. It provides what little data is 
available; however, it is not always possible to distinguish coach tour data from all bus data.  
One differentiation between types of bus service is based on that given in Regulation 684/92:  
 Regular (domestic and international) services operate at specified times on defined routes, with 
specific boarding and alighting points, and are open to all; 
 Special regular services operate on defined routes and at defined times, but provide for the 
carriage of specific types of passengers to the exclusion of others; and 
 Occasional services are services which do not meet the definition of regular or special regular 
services, and which are characterized, above all, by the fact that they carry groups of passengers 
assembled on the initiative of the customer or the carrier itself. This definition comes closest to 
the coach tour market. 
However, there are very few cases where the data is disaggregated in this way and, where it is, there 
are differences between Member States in how different services are classified. 
The distinction between bus and coach service is particularly problematic for services other than regular 
services. In many Member States, all occasional and special regular services are considered coach 
services; still, in some cases, these may cover short distances and have characteristics that are otherwise 
more similar to regular bus service. In particular, since school transport accounts for a very large proportion 
                                                   
29 Competition for the market is the method applicable to concessions for passenger transport services in other markets where social 
rather than commercial justification requires some form of public financial support (usually now referred to as a public service 
obligation). It widely used in urban transport and increasingly used in rural rail services.   
30 We do not yet have data on river cruise passengers or numbers of vessels or operators. 
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of journeys in certain Member States (such as Sweden), whether or not this is included has a large impact 
on the statistics. 
Demand:  Number of Passengers 
Limited data is available for Member States on the composition of the coach market by passenger 
type. In fact, Lithuania is the only country with a complete dataset. Of the larger Member States, France 
is the only country with nearly complete data. This data shows that occasional transport accounts for 
the largest proportion of coach PKM (45%), but only 23% of passenger journeys, because average 
journey lengths are much longer for this type of journey than for other types of coach transport. 
Due to a lack of available data, our report provides estimates of the sizes of the three markets by using 
data from the few Member States where it is available. The estimates are shown in Table 2.20: 
 













 (million) (million) (km) (%) (%) 
Regular 2,912 81,226 28 44% 38% 
Special Regular 2,226 5,252 2 34% 2% 
Occasional 1,484 129,185 87 22% 60% 
Total 6,622 215,663 33 100% 100% 
Source: Study of passenger transport by coach, Steer Davis Gleave, 2009 
 
The coach tour market accounts for about 22% of all bus passengers; though, because average trip 
length for this type of passenger is considerably longer than for the special regular type of passenger, it 
accounts for about 60% of PKM. 
In most Member States, the vast majority of coach journeys are domestic. The main exceptions are in 
Germany and Austria, which have very large markets for outbound international coach tours but almost 
no regular domestic bus market (Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1 – Percentage of Intra-EU and Extra-EU Bus Trips for Select Member States 
 
Source: Study of passenger transport by coach, Steer Davis Gleave, 2009 
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Supply: Number of Vehicles and Operators 
Estimates for the EU27 (Table 2.21) indicate that there were approximately 250,000 coaches in operation 
out of a combined bus and coach fleet of about 680,000 vehicles in 2009 (this total is lower than that 
reported by Eurostat for 2010, see Table 2.12). 
 
Table 2.21 - Estimated Vehicle Fleet 
 
Source: Study of passenger transport by coach, Steer Davis Gleave, 2009 
 
There are a number of large coach operators in the EU (such as Alsa in Spain, which has 2,300 coaches 
in its fleet). However, the average size of coach companies is small. On the basis of the data available 
(summarized in Figure 2.2), it appears that the average coach operator has only 16 vehicles in its fleet. 
In some Member States, the figure is lower; for example, in the UK, there are 5,610 companies advertising 
coach services. Since the total coach fleet is only about 21,900 vehicles, this indicates that there are, on 
average, less than four vehicles per company in the UK. 
 Figure 2.2 – Estimated Number of Coach Operators for Select Member States 
 
Source: Study of passenger transport by coach, Steer Davis Gleave, 2009 
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Maritime Cruise Market 
This is another market that has only limited data available, but rather more than the coach tour market. 
However, the European cruise market is highly integrated with the global market, such that many cruise 
vessels that are used in Europe during the summer are diverted to other markets during the northern 
hemisphere winter.  
Demand:  Number of passengers 
Passenger demand is measured only in numbers of passengers, as there is no data on how far each cruise 
passenger travels before returning to the port of origin.31 In 2013 there were just over 6m cruise passengers, 
with the UK and Germany each providing more than 25% of the total and Italy having more than a 10% 
market share. Spain’s number of passengers has fallen from more than 700,000 in 2011 to less than 500,000 
in 2013, i.e. from 12% to 7% of the total. 
Supply: Number of vessels and operators 
During 2013 there were 43 European-based cruise lines which operated 125 cruise ships with a capacity 
of 144,717 berths, an average of 1,158 berths per ship. The largest operators have more than 20 ships and 
the smallest just 2. There were a further 24 non-European cruise lines operating in Europe with a further 73 
vessels with an average of 1,430 berths each, more than 20% larger than the European based ships. 
The cruise ships are not limited to any one specific market, and there were at least 166 cruise ships 
operating in the Mediterranean and 108 in Northern Europe during 2013. These ships ranged in size from 
less than 100 to more than 4,000 berths with the majority being in the range of 500 to 2,000. 
 
Table 2.22 – European Cruise Passengers, 2011 
Origin Country or 
Region 
Number of Passengers 2011 Market Share 
United Kingdom 1,700,000 28% 
Germany 1,388,000 23% 
Italy 923,000 15% 
Spain 703,000 12% 
France 441,000 7% 
Scandinavia 306,000 5% 
Benelux 159,000 3% 
Switzerland 121,000 2% 
Austria 104,000 2% 
Other 224,000 4% 
Total 6,069,000 100% 
Source: European Cruise Council, Annual Report 2012/2013 
 
 
                                                   
31 The average cruise length is just over 8 days (Cruise Line International 
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Chapter 3 - The VAT Regime for Passenger Transport 
This Chapter provides an overview of the current VAT regime in EU Member States as encountered by 
providers of passenger transport services, as well as other charges affecting passenger transport. In Section 
A, we review output VAT (e.g. VAT rates and special regimes). In Section B, we provide initial information 
on other transport taxes and user charges. 
Detailed country fiches for the 28 Member States are presented in Volume 2 of this Final Report. 
The symbols and abbreviations used in the tables in this chapter have the following meaning: 
 
Ⓢ … the standard rate is applied normal scope of the VATD 
Ⓡ … the reduced rate is applied. normal scope, based on Art. 98 (2) / Annex III Item 5 of the VAT 
Directive 
Ⓔ … VAT exemption normal scope, based on Art. 132 (p) of the VAT Directive (medical 
and ambulance transport) 
Ⓓ … a derogation from the VAT 
Directive is applied 
a derogation (based on Art. 371/375-390c and Annex X, Part B, Item 
10 or Art. 395 of the VAT Directive) or a special provision (Art. 110, 
114, 149 of the VAT Directive) is applied 
ex. … ‘exempted without credit’ 
n.a. … ‘not applicable’ 
 
For the purposes of this chapter we do not distinguish between a tax rate of zero percent (‘zero-rate’) 
and an exemption with deductibility of input VAT (‘exemption with credit’), both are depicted as ‘0 % Ⓓ‘ 
in the following tables. 32 Detailed explanations on the subject for each Member State can however be found 
in Vol.2 of this report. 
Numbers in brackets furthermore indicate rates (or schemes), which are either restricted to very special 
conditions (e.g. international bus transport of foreign travellers) or which are less frequently applied in 
practice.  
A. Overview of VAT Rates 
In this section, we provide several tables on the current VAT rates concerning passenger transport for 
all 28 EU Member States, as well as a general overview of VAT rates in place in Member States at present.  
                                                   
32 Especially with respect to international passenger transport services, Member States frequently do not charge VAT on the 
transport service itself, while VAT incurred on inputs (fuel, means of transport,…) can be deducted. This has been implemented 
among the Member States in two different ways: Some exempt such passenger transport services from VAT and at the same time 
define it (i.e. the passenger transport) as an activity qualifying for deduction of input VAT (‘exemption with credit’), while others 




We review VAT rates for each mode of transport and distinguish among domestic, extra-EU (i.e. to and 
from third countries), and intra-EU travel. In the case of domestic transport, a further distinction is made 
according to type of transport. For transport by road, the distinctions are: taxi, scheduled bus services 
(including trolleybuses), and non-scheduled bus services. The categories, with respect to rail transport, are: 
(normal) train, high-speed rail, metro or subway, and tram. For the remaining transport modes, we 
distinguish between scheduled and non-scheduled services. To the best of our knowledge, no Member State 
has implemented specific rates for round-trips (A-to-A-transports) as they occur (e.g. in the course of 
cruises or bus tours). For such transport, the same rate as for normal A-to-B-transport is applied. 
The data used for the following tables refers to information from a number of sources: the websites of 
the national Ministries of Finance, documents by the European Commission, the national VAT Acts and 
tax legislation, country reports of the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD), and other 
studies on VAT regimes, as well as documents (e.g. guides, manuals, and application decrees) provided by 
the respective fiscal authorities. As a basis, recent compilations of VAT rates have been used (e.g. European 
Commission (2014), IBFD (2012), and Van Essen et al. (2012)) and, if necessary, updated.  
Rates and special regimes relevant in rare cases are set in brackets. If multiple rates are applicable, a 
short explanation is given, more detailed information can be found in the country sheets in volume 2 of this 
report. Remaining uncertainties were addressed in a questionnaire to the VAT authorities of the Member 
States - together with the information we had collected - , to which we received responses from currently 
23 Member States. 
General National VAT Rates 
 













Austria 20 10 - 12 0 
Belgium 21 6 / 12 - 12 0 
Bulgaria 20 9 - - 0 
Croatia 25 5 / 10 - - 0 
Cyprus 1933 5 / 934 - - 0 
Czech Republic 21 15 - - 0 
Denmark 25 - - - 0 
Estonia 20 9 - - 0 
Finland 24 10 / 14 - - 0 
France35 20 5.5 / 10 2.1 - 0 
                                                   
33 18% before 13th January 2014 
34 5 / 8% before 13th January 2014 
35 Until 31 December 2013 the rates were: standard rate: 19.6%, reduced rates: 7% / 5.5%. The super-reduced rate remained 
unchanged. 
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Germany 19 7 - - 0 
Greece 23 6.5 / 13 - - 0 
Hungary 27 5 / 18 - - 0 
Ireland 23 9 / 13.5 4.8 13.5 0 
Italy 2236 10 4 - 0 
Latvia 21 12 - - 0 
Lithuania 21 5 / 9 - - 0 
Luxembourg 15 6 / 12 3 12 0 
Malta 18 5 / 7 - - 0 
Netherlands 21 6 - - 0 
Poland 23 5 / 8 - - 0 
Portugal 23 6 / 13 - 13 0 
Romania 24 5 / 9 - - 0 
Slovakia 20 10 - - 0 
Slovenia 2237 9,538 - - 0 
Spain 21 10 4 - 0 
Sweden 25 6 / 12 - - 0 
United Kingdom 20 5 - - 0 
Source: National VAT legislation, European Commission (2014), Van Essen et al. (2012), IBFD (2012) and other sources; 
Adaptation and Demonstration: IHS, 2014. 
Road Transport 
Passenger transport on the road is mainly based on transport by buses and coaches, but also covers taxis 
and trolleybuses. 39  It includes scheduled and non-scheduled services for urban, regional, national 
(domestic), intra-EU, and extra-EU journeys. In cases where more than one VAT rate applies, remarks give 
additional information. Table 3.9 shows that the VAT rates applied to road transport services differ 
substantially between Member States. 
 
Table 3.9 – VAT Rates on Road Transport 
Member 
State 












Austria 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ  
Belgium 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ  
Bulgaria 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Croatia 25% Ⓢ 25% Ⓢ 25% Ⓢ 25% Ⓢ 25% Ⓢ 25% Ⓢ  
                                                   
36 21% until 1st October 2013 
37 Since 1st July 2013 (before: 20%) 
38 Since 1st July 2013 (before: 8.5%) 


















21% Ⓢ 15% Ⓡ 21% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 
15% Ⓡ: scheduled 









25% Ⓢ: non-regular 
bus services 
ex./0% Ⓓ: otherwise42 
Estonia 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Finland 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  





















7% Ⓡ: regional46 
19% Ⓢ: long distance 
Greece 13% Ⓡ 13% Ⓡ 13% Ⓡ 13% Ⓡ 13% Ⓡ47 13% Ⓡ  
Hungary 27% Ⓢ 27% Ⓢ 27% Ⓢ 27% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  




ex. Ⓓ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 
ex.: urban public 





21% Ⓢ 12% Ⓡ 21% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 
12% Ⓡ: scheduled 







21% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 
9% Ⓡ: authorized 
public services on 
regular routes 
21% Ⓢ: otherwise 
Luxembourg 3% Ⓓ 3% Ⓓ 3% Ⓓ 3% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
                                                   
40 5%: urban and rural buses; 9%: urban, intercity and rural taxis, tour buses, and suburban buses; flat tax scheme: city taxis; 19%: 
other road passenger transport 
41 exempted; exemption without the right to deduct input VAT 
42 A special scheme for non-scheduled services with foreign registered buses based on an average transport fare was abolished 
effective from 1 July 2014. 
43 Certain international and intra-EU bus transports of foreign travellers. For details, see the country sheet for France.  
44 19% possible in exceptional cases (distance > 50 km). 
45 Journey-specific VAT assessment is applied to occasional bus transport with buses not registered in Germany crossing a third-
country border. For details, see the country sheet for Germany. Ex-post the provider can request a recalculation based on the 
normal tax procedure. 
46 Within a municipality or for distances less than 50 km (in German territory). 
47 Some sources mention, that a lump sum scheme is applied in international bus transport. However we have not been able to 
verify this by official sources. 
48 Urban transport is defined as within a municipality or between municipalities not more than 50 km distant from each other. In 





18% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 18% Ⓢ n.a. n.a. 
0% Ⓓ: scheduled bus 
services and certain 
others49 
18% Ⓢ: otherwise 
Netherlands 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ  
Poland 8% Ⓡ 
8% Ⓡ 
flat rate Ⓓ 
8% Ⓡ 8% Ⓡ 8% Ⓡ 
8% Ⓡ 
(ex. Ⓓ)50 
flat rate Ⓓ: optional 
flat rate scheme for 
taxis 
Portugal 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Romania 24% Ⓢ 24% Ⓢ 24% Ⓢ 24% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Slovakia 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Slovenia 9.5% Ⓡ 9.5% Ⓡ 9.5% Ⓡ 9.5% Ⓡ 9.5% Ⓡ 9.5% Ⓡ  
Spain 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ  





20% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 
0% Ⓓ: ≥ 10 seats51 or 
by a universal service 
provider 
20% Ⓢ: otherwise 
Source: National VAT legislation, European Commission (2014), Van Essen et al. (2012), IBFD (2012) and other 
sources; Adaptation and Demonstration: IHS, 2014. 
Domestic Road Passenger Transport 
Nineteen Member States apply the same rate to all types of domestic road passenger transport services. 
In 6 Member States, it is the standard rate and in 11 it is a reduced rate. Luxembourg applies a super-reduced 
rate of 3% and Ireland exempts all domestic passenger transport. The nine Member States that distinguish 
between different rates apply diverse criteria. Type of service (e.g. scheduled vs. occasional) is used in 
Malta, Latvia, Lithuania, Denmark, and the Czech Republic. Italy exempts urban public transport by taxi 
and similar vehicles. In Germany VAT rate depends primarily on distance. In the UK, the size of the vehicle 
is decisive in most cases. Cyprus distinguishes between urban, for which also a flat tax regime is available, 
and rural taxi transport and several types of bus services. Six Member States apply derogations: Malta and 
the UK zero-rate most services; Italy, Denmark, and Ireland apply exemptions (without credit), and 
Luxembourg uses a super-reduced rate. Furthermore a few Member States provide special schemes for taxi 
services (Cyprus, Poland). The rates in place for domestic road passenger transport range from 0% (UK 
and Malta) to 27% (Hungary). Generally, rates tend to be higher in the Central and Eastern European 
Member States. 
Extra-EU and Intra-EU Road Passenger Transport 
For extra-EU and intra-EU services, the picture is quite different: Intra-EU and extra-EU road passenger 
transport is generally zero-rated in 16 Member States, Denmark only zero-rates scheduled services. 9 
                                                   
49 Scheduled bus transport and regular transport of school pupils, students and workers. 
50 Incidental international road transport by businesses established in third countries is exempt under certain conditions. 
51 There are some exceptions, for details see the country fiche for the UK. 
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Member States apply a reduced rate, ranging from 6% to 13%. Only in Croatia, Germany (long distance 
services) and Denmark (occasional bus transport) intra-community and extra-EU road passenger transport 
services are taxed at the standard rates (25% in Croatia and Denmark, 19% in Germany). Germany, Greece, 
and France apply special rates or regimes for certain types of intra-community/extra-EU road passenger 
transport. 
With respect to the difference between the tax rates applied to domestic and international52 services, 11 
Member States apply, for the most part, the same rates. Looking at the remaining Member States, the gap 
between the rates applied to domestic and international services ranges from 3% (Luxembourg) to 27% 
(Hungary). The highest differences can be found in the Central and Eastern European Member States, which 
frequently zero-rate international transport while taxing domestic services at the standard rate (e.g. 
Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, Estonia, and Bulgaria). 
Rail Transport 
Table 3.10 shows the VAT rates applicable for transportation of persons by rail. Detailed rates are 
additionally given for high-speed rail (HSR), subway or metro, tram, and normal trains. With respect to 
intra-EU and extra-EU transport, this breakdown is omitted since the respective rates are the same for all 
types of rail transport or, in the case of metro and tram, rarely applicable. In Member States where a railway 
system does not exist and thus no taxation occurs (e.g. Cyprus and Malta), the term not applicable (n.a.) is 
noted.  
 










Train HSR Metro Tram 
Austria 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ  
Belgium 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ  
Bulgaria 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Croatia 25% Ⓢ 25% Ⓢ 25% Ⓢ 25% Ⓢ 25% Ⓢ 25% Ⓢ 25% Ⓢ  
Cyprus n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  
Czech 
Republic 
15% Ⓡ 15% Ⓡ 15% Ⓡ 15% Ⓡ 15% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Denmark ex. Ⓓ ex. Ⓓ ex. Ⓓ ex. Ⓓ ex. Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Estonia 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Finland 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ (0% Ⓓ)54 0% Ⓓ  






                                                   
52 ‘International’ means intra-community as well as extra-EU passenger transport services. 
53 The table concerns scheduled transport, conducted with means of transport of more than 9 seats. 
















Greece 13% Ⓡ 13% Ⓡ 13% Ⓡ 13% Ⓡ 13% Ⓡ 13% Ⓡ 13% Ⓡ  
Hungary 27% Ⓢ 27% Ⓢ 27% Ⓢ 27% Ⓢ 27% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Ireland ex. Ⓓ ex. Ⓓ ex. Ⓓ ex. Ⓓ ex. Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Italy 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  























3% Ⓓ 3% Ⓓ 3% Ⓓ 3% Ⓓ 3% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Malta n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  
Nether-
lands 
6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ  
Poland 8% Ⓡ 8% Ⓡ 8% Ⓡ 8% Ⓡ 8% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Portugal 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Romania 24% Ⓢ 24% Ⓢ 24% Ⓢ 24% Ⓢ 24% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Slovakia 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Slovenia 9.5% Ⓡ 9.5% Ⓡ 9.5% Ⓡ 9.5% Ⓡ 9.5% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Spain 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ  
Sweden 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
United 
Kingdom 
0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ if ≥ 10 seats 
Source: National VAT legislation, European Commission (2014), Van Essen et al. (2012), IBFD (2012) and other 
sources; Adaptation and Demonstration: IHS, 2014. 
The situation with respect to rail transport is very similar to road transport, with only a few exceptions. 
In the case of domestic transport, nearly all Member States apply the same rates as for road transport. 
Differing values in the tables often stem from the fact that almost all rail passenger transport is scheduled, 
which is why only the rate for scheduled transport is stated for the Czech Republic, Latvia and Lithuania. 
In the case of the UK, almost all rail passenger services will be zero-rated because of vehicle size. With 
                                                   
55 7% possible in certain cases (distance < 50 km or within a municipality). 
56 Within a municipality or for distances less than 50 km (in German territory). 
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respect to intra-EU and extra-EU transport, three Member States, which tax cross-border road transport at 
the reduced rate, primarily apply a zero-rate to cross-border rail transport (France, Poland, and Slovenia).  
Five Member States tax all rail passenger transport at the reduced rate (Austria, Belgium, Greece, 
Netherlands, and Spain), and one (Croatia) at the standard rate. Sixteen Member States apply a positive rate 
to domestic services (of which 10 apply the reduced, 5 the standard, and 1 a super-reduced rate), but zero-
rate extra-EU and intra-EU rail passenger transport. In the UK, both domestic and international services are 
zero-rated. Denmark and Ireland exempt domestic services without credit. In Germany, finally, the VAT 
rate depends on the distance travelled.  
In summary, the tax rates applied to domestic rail passenger transport range from 0% to 27%, whereby 
23 Member States apply predominantly positive rates. Extra-EU and intra-EU transport, on the other hand, 
is zero-rated by 19 Member States, and the remaining 7 apply rates between 6% and 25%. Cyprus and Malta 
currently do not operate a rail system. 
Inland Navigation 
Inland navigation means passenger transportation by passenger ships on rivers and lakes (i.e. inland 
waterways). A further distinction is made between scheduled and non-scheduled domestic services. For 
extra-EU and intra-EU transport, this differentiation is omitted because no Member State applies different 
rates. The applicable tax rates are listed in Table 3.11. 















0% Ⓓ: usual rate 
10% Ⓡ: on Lake 
Constance 
Belgium 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ  
Bulgaria 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Croatia 25% Ⓢ 25% Ⓢ 25% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  




15% Ⓡ 21% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 
15% Ⓡ: scheduled 
21% Ⓢ: otherwise 
Denmark ex. Ⓓ ex. Ⓓ ex. Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Estonia 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Finland 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ {0% Ⓓ} 0% Ⓓ 
currently no intra-EU 
services 













7% Ⓡ: approved 
regular regional 
services59 
19% Ⓢ: otherwise 
Greece 13% Ⓡ 13% Ⓡ 13% Ⓡ 13% Ⓡ 13% Ⓡ  
Hungary 27% Ⓢ 27% Ⓢ 27% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  








0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 





12% Ⓡ 21% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 
12% Ⓡ: scheduled 






21% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 
9% Ⓡ: authorized 
public services on 
regular routes 
21% Ⓢ: otherwise 
Luxembourg 3% Ⓓ 3% Ⓓ 3% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  






6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 
ex. Ⓓ: optional for 
ferry services 
6% Ⓡ: otherwise 
Poland 8% Ⓡ 8% Ⓡ 8% Ⓡ 8% Ⓡ 8% Ⓡ  
Portugal 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Romania 24% Ⓢ 24% Ⓢ 24% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Slovakia 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Slovenia 9.5% Ⓡ 9.5% Ⓡ 9.5% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Spain 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ  









0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 
0% Ⓓ: ≥ 10 seats61 
20% Ⓢ: otherwise 
Source: National VAT legislation, European Commission (2014), Van Essen et al. (2012), IBFD (2012) and other 
sources (see introduction to chapter 3.1); Adaptation and Demonstration: IHS, 2014. 
The rates applied to passenger transport services on inland waterways are very similar to those applied 
in the rail sector. Noticeable differences can be found in Austria, which zero-rates most international 
transport on rivers and lakes while taxing international rail and road transport at the reduced rate and 
                                                   
57 Ferries and other approved regular services within a municipality or for distances not exceeding 50 km. 
58 Cross-border passenger ferry services across Rhine, Danube, Elbe, Neisse and Oder. 
59 Within a municipality or for distances less than 50 km (in German territory). 
60 Urban transport (by any means of transport on the sea, lakes, rivers or in lagoons) is defined as within a municipality or between 
municipalities not more than 50 km distant from each other. 
61 There are some exceptions, for details see the country fiche for the UK. 
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Croatia, which applies the standard rate to international rail and road transport and the zero-rate to inland 
navigation. France and Poland on the other hand zero-rate (most) international rail transport, while inland 
navigation is subject to the reduced rate (10% / 8% VAT).  
Member States situated in Western or Northern Europe tend to apply the reduced rate to domestic 
passenger transport on rivers and lakes and either the reduced or the zero-rate to extra-EU and intra-EU 
transport, whereas Central and Eastern European Member States more frequently apply the standard rate to 
domestic and the zero-rate to international services. The rates in place for domestic inland navigation range 
from 0% (UK) to 27% (Hungary). All Member States except for the UK (zero-rate) and Denmark and 
Ireland (exempt) apply positive rates. Certain services are also exempt in Italy (urban transport) and the 
Netherlands (optional exemption for ferry services). For extra-EU and intra-EU transport, the range is 0% 
to 19%, however only eight Member States apply positive rates. 62  The only Member State taxing 
international inland navigation at the standard rate is Germany (restricted to non-scheduled and long-
distance services). 
Maritime Shipping 
This section covers passenger transport services by sea ships. Once again, a distinction is made between 
domestic and international services and, in the case of domestic services, between scheduled and non-
scheduled transport. Land-locked countries are marked not applicable (n.a.). To the best of our knowledge, 
no Member States have adopted special tax rates for round trips (A-to-A transport) or cruises; therefore, 
the normal rates as stated in Table 3.12 are applicable. 
 













Austria n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  
Belgium 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Bulgaria 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Croatia 25% Ⓢ 25% Ⓢ 25% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Cyprus 9% Ⓡ 9% Ⓡ 9% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Czech 
Republic 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  
Denmark ex. Ⓓ ex. Ⓓ ex. Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Estonia 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Finland 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
France 
10% Ⓡ 
(0 % Ⓓ)63 
10% Ⓡ 
(0 % Ⓓ)63 
10% Ⓡ 
(0 % Ⓓ)63 
0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
                                                   
62 Thereof Austria only for shipping on Lake Constance. 











(0% Ⓓ) 64 
0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 
7% Ⓡ: regional65 
19% Ⓢ: long 
distance 
Greece 13% Ⓡ 13% Ⓡ 13% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Hungary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  








0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 





12% Ⓡ 21% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 
12% Ⓡ: scheduled 






21% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 
9% Ⓡ: authorized 
public services on 
regular routes 
21% Ⓢ: otherwise 




0% Ⓓ 18% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 
0% Ⓓ: scheduled67 
18% Ⓢ: otherwise 
Netherlands 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Poland 8% Ⓡ 8% Ⓡ 8% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Portugal 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Romania 24% Ⓢ 24% Ⓢ 24% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Slovakia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  
Slovenia 9.5% Ⓡ 9.5% Ⓡ 9.5% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Spain 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  









0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 
0% Ⓓ: ≥ 10 seats 
20% Ⓢ: otherwise 
Source: National VAT legislation, European Commission (2014), Van Essen et al. (2012), IBFD (2012) and other 
sources; Adaptation and Demonstration: IHS, 2014. 
A common feature of maritime passenger transport and air passenger transport is that all international, 
both intra-EU and extra-EU, services are zero-rated. With respect to domestic services, most Member States 
apply the same rates as to inland navigation. Exceptions are Cyprus, which applies the reduced rate instead 
of the standard rate, and Malta, which zero-rates most scheduled sea passenger transport. Germany zero-
rates passenger transport to and from Helgoland (0%) since Helgoland is treated as a third country for VAT 
                                                   
64 Passenger and ferry services with vessels for maritime navigation between domestic seaports and Helgoland (as Helgoland is 
excluded from territorial scope of the VAT Directive); furthermore services starting and ending in German ports, where the 
German section is not longer than 20 km and the foreign section is longer than 10 km. 
65 Within a municipality or for distances less than 50 km (in German territory). 
66 Currently there are no scheduled domestic passenger services by maritime shipping in Lithuania. 
67 Scheduled inter-island sea transport of passengers by authorised carriers and other scheduled sea transport of passengers 
recognised as such by the Commissioner. 
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purposes and France zero-rates the section outside continental France in case of maritime passenger 
transport. The tax rates in place range from 0% (Malta and the UK) to more than 20% (Lithuania, Croatia, 
and Romania) for domestic transport. Intra-EU and extra-EU passenger transport services are commonly 
zero-rated. 
Air Transport 
The VAT rates displayed in Table 3.13 apply to domestic and international flights; in the case of domestic 
flights, a distinction is made between scheduled and non-scheduled services. For extra-EU and intra-EU 
transport, such a distinction is not meaningful since the same rates are in place for both scheduled and 
occasional services. 
 










Austria 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Belgium 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Bulgaria 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Croatia 25% Ⓢ 25% Ⓢ 25% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  




15% Ⓡ 21% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 
12% Ⓡ: scheduled 
21% Ⓢ: other 
Denmark ex. Ⓓ ex. Ⓓ ex. Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Estonia 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Finland 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
France 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Germany 19% Ⓢ 19% Ⓢ 19% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ68  
Greece 13% Ⓡ 13% Ⓡ 13% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Hungary 27% Ⓢ 27% Ⓢ69 27% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Ireland ex. Ⓓ ex. Ⓓ ex. Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  




12% Ⓡ 21% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 
12% Ⓡ: scheduled 




9% Ⓡ70 21% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 
9% Ⓡ: authorized 
services on regular 
                                                   
68 International air passenger transport is not zero-rated in general, but applies only to a list of countries issued by the German 
Ministry of Finance. However, this list covers practically all important connections. 
69 Currently there are no scheduled domestic connections in Hungary. 
70 Currently there are no scheduled domestic flights subject to the reduced rate. 
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routes 
21% Ⓢ: other 
Luxembourg 3% Ⓓ 3% Ⓓ 3% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Malta 0% Ⓓ71 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Netherlands 
21% Ⓢ 




0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 6% Ⓡ: see footnote 72 
Poland 8% Ⓡ 8% Ⓡ 8% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Portugal 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 6% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Romania 24% Ⓢ 24% Ⓢ 24% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Slovakia 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 20% Ⓢ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Slovenia 9.5% Ⓡ 9.5% Ⓡ 9.5% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  
Spain 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 10% Ⓡ 0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ  








0% Ⓓ 0% Ⓓ 
0% Ⓓ: ≥ 10 seats 
scheduled or by a 
universal postal service 
provider 
20% Ⓢ: otherwise 
Source: National VAT legislation, European Commission (2014), Van Essen et al. (2012), IBFD (2012) and other 
sources; Adaptation and Demonstration: IHS, 2014. 
As is evident, all extra-EU and intra-EU air passenger transport is zero-rated in the European Union.73 
With respect to domestic services, 2 Member States apply predominantly the zero-rate (Malta and the UK), 
15 Member States predominantly the reduced rate (2 only for scheduled services), and 9 Member States 
predominantly the standard rate. Denmark and Ireland exempt domestic air passenger transport. The highest 
rates are in place in Hungary (where currently no scheduled domestic flights are offered) with 27%, Croatia 
(25%), and Romania (24%). However, especially in the smaller Member States domestic air passenger 
transport is of minor relevance, especially with respect to scheduled services.74 
                                                   
71 The compilations of VAT rates usually state a rate of 0% for domestic air passenger transport, the VAT Act on the other hand 
doesn’t seem to contain an explicit exemption. 
72 Medical passenger transport services by air and domestic passenger transport with balloons. 
73 In Germany this is restricted to a list of countries published by the Ministry of Finance, which however includes practically all 
important destinations. 
74 E.g. in Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania currently no scheduled domestic air passenger transport services are operated. 
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B. Other Transport Taxes and User Charges 
VAT is only one of several user charges and taxes that passengers must pay in addition to the price of 
the ticket determined by transport operators. Nearly all of these charges and taxes are predicated on the 
need to generate revenue to pay for particular costs and not to contribute to general public revenue. A recent 
study on the internalization of the costs of transport externalities75 provided a comprehensive description 
and quantification of these charges and taxes as shown in Table 3.14. 
 
Table 3.14 – Internalization Charges by Mode and Level of Administration 
Transport Mode EU National Regional Local 
Road 
Transport 
  Fuel taxes (including 
reduced levels and 
exemptions) Infrastructure 
charges: 
o Time-based user 
charges (vignettes) 
o Distance-based user 
charges 
 Insurance taxes 
 Vehicle purchase and/or 
registration taxes  
 Vehicle ownership and/or 
circulation taxes Company car 
taxation 
 VAT reductions/exemptions 
 Tolls on 









ETS  Fuel taxes 
 Electricity taxes 
 Infrastructure charges 
(including fees for delays) 
 VAT reductions or 
exemptions 
out of scope out of scope 
Inland 
Navigation 
  Fuel taxes 
 Fairway dues 
 Charges related to 
prevention of water pollution 
 VAT reductions or 
exemptions 
 Fairway dues  Port charges for 
selected ports of the TEN-
T Core Network, as 
defined in COM (2011) 
650 final 
 Not included in the 
analysis are dues for locks 
and bridges (for maritime 
shipping and inland 
navigation), as far as they 
are not related to one of 
the TEN-T core network 
ports 
 
                                                   




  Fuel Taxes 
 Charges related to 
prevention of water 
pollution 
 VAT reductions or 
exemptions 
  
Aviation ETS  Fuel taxes 
 Ticket taxes 
 VAT reductions or 
exemptions 
  Airport charges for 
selected airports of the 
TEN-T Core Network (as 
defined in COM (2011) 
650 final), in particular: 
Landing and Take-Off 
(LTO) charge 
 
Some of these additional charges are more akin to taxes than to user charges as their incidence is not 
proportional to the use of a specific facility and the revenue they generate is not earmarked for the funding 
of a specific type of infrastructure facility or service. The following subsection reviews, in detail, such taxes 
and charges, limited to those that are directly added to the ticket price of the final consumer. We therefore 
exclude taxes charged to the carrier and possibly passed on via the ticket price later (e.g. noise charges or 
emission charges) as well as fees directly added to the ticket price, but charged for certain services (e.g. 
passenger service charges and security charges at airports, air transport supervision charges, and 
infrastructure charges). 
These taxes are currently in place in Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and the UK. All of them are 
attributable to air passenger transport; the French Tax on public air and sea transport to Corsica is 
additionally applied to maritime navigation.  
The oldest tax is the UK’s Air Passenger Duty (APD), an excise duty introduced in 1994 and charged 
on the carriage of passengers flying from a UK airport on an aircraft that has an authorized take-off weight 
of more than ten tons or more than twenty seats for passengers (which is different from the thresholds for 
VAT liability). The rate applied depends both on the distance and class of travel and ranges from GBP 13 
per passenger (i.e. a short distance in the lowest class available on the flight) to GBP 388 per passenger (i.e. 
a higher rate76 for flights exceeding 6,000 miles). Distance is measured as the distance between London and 
the capital city of the country of final destination. Recently, rates have slightly increased, taking effect on 
1 April 2014; in 2015, it is planned to abolish bands C and D, which would considerably reduce APD on 
long-distance flights. Exceptions of APD are direct long-haul flights originating from airports in Northern 
Ireland, since the North Ireland Assembly set the relevant rate to GBP 0 as of 1 January 2013. The APD 
accounts for distance; however, critics of the APD point out that its rates are not proportional to the 
environmental damage caused by the aviation emissions that it claims to address. 
A similar Air Travel Tax in Ireland was abolished this year, effective 1 April 2014. 
France introduced the Civil Aviation Tax in 1999. The rates are currently EUR 4.36 per passenger for 
journeys to destinations within the European Economic Area and French overseas territories and EUR 7.85 
                                                   
76 For details on the application of the higher rate see footnote 82. 
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per passenger for journeys to other destinations. An annual adjustment of the rates is made based on the 
consumer price index. Unlike APD, the Civil Aviation Tax is also applied to freight and mail transport by 
air. The Solidarity Tax on aircraft tickets was established in 2006 as an additional surcharge on the ticket 
price. The rates of the Solidarity Tax are grouped by distance and travel class. Destinations in France and 
the European Economic Area are taxed at lower rates than other destinations. Additionally, higher rates are 
in place for passengers traveling in first or business class. Finally, a third tax is charged to passengers 
embarking to or disembarking from ships and aircraft in Corsican territory, the so-called Tax on public air 
and sea transport to Corsica. This tax is set by the Corsican Assembly, which also receives the revenue. 
The basic conditions, however, are governed by the central government. Currently, a rate of EUR 4.57 per 
passenger embarking or disembarking is applied. A lower rate is in place for certain short-haul connections 
to and from Sardinia (EUR 1.52). Inland transport in Corsica is exempt. 
Italy has implemented two different taxes on air passenger transport. The so-called City Council Tax 
was introduced in 2004 to generate additional revenues for the state budget as well as for municipalities 
where airports are situated, and for general security measures at airports and in major train stations. The tax 
is frequently increased and currently amounts EUR 7.50 per passenger boarding in the Roman airports of 
Fiumicino and Ciampino and EUR 6.50 per passenger boarding in other Italian airports. Currently, the 
distribution of a large portion of the revenues is managed by the National Institute of Social Security. 
Despite its name, only a relatively small fraction seems to go to the municipalities. Italy’s Air Taxi Tax was 
adopted in 2012. The tax is collected from passengers of air taxi flights (i.e. passenger flights where the 
entire capacity of the aircraft is chartered by a single contract) and the air carrier is liable for payment of 
the tax. The tax must be paid for each section separately and rates range from EUR 100 per passenger and 
leg (less than 1,500 km) to EUR 200 per passenger and leg (great than 1,500 km). According to Agenzia 
Entrate, the Air Taxi Tax is not only due upon embarking in Italy, but also on disembarking. 77 
Germany’s Air Passenger Tax (Luftverkehrssteuer) was introduced in 2011 as an additional fee on the 
departure of passengers from German airports. There are three different rates, for short, medium, and long-
haul flights, ranging from EUR 7.50 per passenger to EUR 42.18 per passenger. The annexes to the Air 
Transport Tax Act define the applicable rates; however, broadly speaking, short-haul corresponds to 
distances less than 2,500 km and long-haul to more than 6,000 km from Frankfurt Airport. Unlike France 
and the UK, Germany does not distinguish between different classes of travel. The tax rate is tied to and 
limited by the costs of EU emissions trading, which lead to a slight decrease in the rates from previous 
years. 
Austria also implemented an Air Transport Levy in 2011, which is very similar to the German Air 
Passenger Tax. However, the Austrian rates are slightly lower at EUR 7 to EUR 35 per passenger. 
Additionally, and in contrast to Germany, VAT for domestic flights is already included in the Air Transport 
Levy, which, in practice, results in a rate of EUR 6.36 for domestic flights. 
A number of Member States applied similar charges in the past, but have since abolished them. This 
holds for Malta, the Netherlands (2008-2009, 2010), Ireland (2009-2014), and Denmark (1991-2006). 




Table 3.8 provides an overview of the respective taxes in place as of April 2014. Further details and 
sources used can be found in the country fiches. 
 
Table 3.8 – Other Indirect Taxes Levied on Passenger Transport Services 









airport using a 
motorized 
aircraft 
The aircraft owner 
performing the 
departure who adds 
it to the ticket price 
 Short-haul: EUR 7 per passenger (incl. 
VAT for domestic journeys) 
 Medium-haul: EUR 15 per passenger 







Air The number of 
passengers and 






The air transport 
company who adds 
it to the ticket price 
As of 1 April 2014, the following rates 
apply: 
 EUR 4.36 per passenger to 
destinations within France (including 
overseas departments and 
collectivities), other EU Member 
States, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway 
and Switzerland 
 EUR 7.85 per passenger to other 
destinations 
 EUR 1.30 per tons of freight or mail 
to any destination 
As of 2011, the rates are revalued annually 
based on the consumer price index. 
France: 
Solidarity 




Air The number of 
passengers 
embarked on the 
French territory 
The air transport 
company who adds 










































in turn add it to the 
ticket price. 
 7 % of the transport fee, with a 
maximum of EUR 1.63 per passenger 
 Reduced rate, if several such 
destinations are visited on the same 
day 
                                                   





Tax on public 






The number of 
passengers em-
barking on or 
disembarking 
from ships and 
aircraft in 
Corsican terri-
tory in the 
course of 
commercial 
flights or on reg-
ular shipping 
lines 
Paid to the 
authorities by 
airlines and sea 
carriers, which, in 
turn, directly add it 
to the ticket price 
 EUR 1.52 per passenger for distances 
of less than 20 km (includes some 
connections from Sardinia) 






Air The number of 
passengers de-
parting from a 
German airport 
The air carrier 
performing the 
departure who adds 
it to the ticket price 
 Short-haul: EUR 7.50 per passenger 
(excluding VAT for domestic flights) 
 Medium-haul: EUR 23.43 per 
passenger 
 Long-haul (great than 6,000 km): 








Air The number of 
passengers 
boarding an 
aircraft in Italy 
The air carrier 
collects the tax 
from the 
passengers and 
passes it to the 
airport, which, in 
turn, forwards it to 
the competent 
authorities 
 Roma Fiumicino and Roma Ciampino 
Airports: EUR 7.50 per passenger 
 Other Italian airports: EUR 6.50 per 
passenger 
Italy: 
Air Taxi Tax 
Air The number of 
passengers trans-
ported on air taxi 
flights79 
The air carrier 
collects the tax 
from the 
passengers and 
forwards it to the 
financial 
authorities 
 Less than 100 km: EUR 10 per 
passenger and leg 
 Between 100-1,500 km: EUR 100 per 
passenger and leg 
 Greater than 1,500 km: EUR 200 per 





Air The number of 
passengers 
departing from a 
UK airport 
The operator of the 
aircraft who adds it 









                                                   
79 Air taxi flights are described as flights by planes or helicopters operated for passenger transport under charter contracts for the 
entire capacity of the aircraft. 
80 Applies to passengers in the lowest class of travel available on the plane (for details see the UK country fiche). 
81 Applies to passengers in travel classes other than the lowest class available on the flight. 








































Source: see respective country sections in Volume 2 
85 
 
Chapter 4. Analysis of Competitive Distortions  
Having discussed the structure of the EU passenger transport market in Chapter 2, and the rules and 
regulations concerning the existing VAT regime in Chapter 3, we now turn to the issue of the distortions 
generated (both realized and potential) by the features and the implementation of the current VAT system.  
We adopt the following definition of distortion: 
A distortion is defined as the unequal treatment of passengers and/or operators with 
respect to any of the parameters composing the VAT regime in force in Member States in 
the passenger transport sector, and which leads to economic, social, and/or 
environmental changes in behaviour. 
Based on a review of existing legislation, as well as feedback from operators, we have identified 15 
possible distortions, categorized into 4 groups: 
 Group 1 – distortions due to different VAT rates: Six possible distortions (1a – 1f) 
derived from differences in VAT rates between transport modes and markets. 
 Group 2 – distortions due to the scope of passenger transport services and associated 
supplies: Two distortions (2a and 2b) derived from the definition of passenger transport services 
and associated supplies; namely, consumption on board ships, aircraft, and trains.  
 Group 3 – distortions due to the treatment of inputs in the passenger transport sector: 
Three distortions (3a, 3b, and 3c) related to input VAT.  
 Group 4 – distortions with regard to the place of supply: Four distortions (4a – 4d) 
related to the current place of supply rules and differing administrative compliance requirements 
among Member States. 
This categorization of distortions is based on their source in a characteristic of the current VAT regime. 
An alternative way of categorizing them is by their impacts. In this, a distortion is considered as having an 
impact when the VAT regime leads to differences in the relationship between price and marginal cost 
between different products and services. Such distortions may occur between passenger transport and other 
goods, or between modes within the passenger transport market, and less possibly, between transport 
markets.  Since different modes of transport are closer competitors than passenger transport and other goods 
and services, the distortions between modes would be given more attention in this assessment. 
In practice, assessment of distortions by the two methods is very similar as they are both based on 
considerations of market impacts of differences in VAT rates, whether on outputs or inputs. 
Certain distortions were more amenable to quantifiable assessment, while others were less so and, hence, 
are best described qualitatively. Initial impact assessments indicated that certain distortions have a much 
smaller overall impact than others, although the impact on particular groups of users or operators is still 
large. Models were developed to evaluate the distortions that were assessed quantitatively (models are 
described in detail in Appendix C).  
This Chapter provides an evaluation of the distortion impacts based on the VAT country fiches included 
in Volume 2 of this report.  
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Assessment of Distortions 
There are some common features of all passenger transport markets within the European Union that 
impact on the competitiveness of both their demand and supply. First, markets within transport modes tend 
to be concentrated, with oligopolistic interactions between operators interfering even where the markets 
appear to be competitive (airline and inter -urban bus alliances reflect this tendency). Competitive 
market equilibria tend to be unstable and quickly decline into some form of oligopoly. Many of the 
transport policies and regulations of the EU are designed to address these tendencies, with increasing 
success in most cases (such as railways) but slower progress in others (such as ferries). 
Second, demand is much more heterogeneous than supply. Each passenger has an individual set of 
attributes (income, family circumstances, value of time, etc.) that weigh differently for each trip for which 
a service is sought. In contrast, the range of service attributes available for each trip is much smaller.   
Third, providing transport services is a capital intensive activity. For the network based modes (such 
as rail and metro) the costs of fixed infrastructure are higher than for the other modes that use non-mode 
specific infrastructure (such as roads, seas and airspace). Investments in buses, railway coaches, rolling 
stock, road vehicles or aircraft in one way or another (debt or equity) make up between 15% and 25% of 
operating costs. These costs are borne directly by the operators and need to be recovered from fare revenue, 
except where the service is provided for social rather than commercial reasons and can attract a subsidy, 
now usually in the form of payment of a public service obligation. With large long-term fixed costs in 
long-lived infrastructure and average-term large investments in vehicles, operators face a wide gap 
between average and marginal costs and therefore need to have sophisticated tariff schemes if they are 
operating in competitive markets.  
In part because of the high fixed costs of transport operations, providers of transport services face 
significant economies of scale and network benefits. Both of these characteristics give competitive 
advantages to larger compared to smaller operators and create significant barriers to the entry of new 
competitors. The response of smaller operators is often to operate a form of joint marketing that may or 
may not include other forms of cooperation.  
Even where there appear to be multiple operators (such as on many inter-urban bus routes in Central 
Europe), some of them are likely to be members of a marketing group that in one way or another reduces 
competition; where there appears to be competition between modes, in practice the competing services 
might be operated  by the same company. The various forms of market integration make it difficult to assess 
the level of competition in many passenger transport markets. Less competition is not necessarily a wholly 
negative outcome of service integration. Passengers benefit from operators being able to offer a more 
extensive range of routes and services, and from the ability to book travel to destinations that are not 
served directly by one operator or mode from their home city. The more choices offered in terms of 
routes, schedules, modes of transport and tariffs, the more competitive are its offerings. 
The distortions assessed in this Chapter impact on competition between operators within a mode and 
between modes. The impacts are assessed separately at the national level and for the four main transport 
markets. 
The first task in the impact assessment of each distortion was to confirm the distortion is a real (and not 
only a theoretical) distortion.  Unequal tax treatment is a potential distortion; it then becomes a real 
distortion when changes in behaviour are observed, either by passengers or operators. The second task was 
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to determine which of the real distortions are so insignificant that their further assessment is not a priority, 
and the third task was a quantitative assessment, where possible and appropriate.  
This assessment involved three stages:  
 To assess how many Member States have VAT regimes that include features which could 
result in the distortion;   
 To assess which proportion of passengers or transport operators in each market are likely 
to be impacted by the distortion. These assessments are made at both the Member State and EU-28 
levels. While the main assessment is at the EU-28 level, it is also important to know the significance 
of the distortions at the Member State level, as some distortions that are not significant for the EU-
28 as a whole can be of great significance for an individual Member State, and;   
 To estimate the scale of impacts on passengers affected by the distortion.   
For the quantifiable distortions (1c and 1d), an assessment of magnitude is conducted using the 
modelling methods discussed in Appendix C.83  
For the non-quantifiable distortions, we have used, in addition to published information from a variety 
of sources, three important sets of data: questionnaires sent to and interviews with agencies representing 
transport operators; submissions to the Commission on the Future of VAT (of the 1,726 submissions, less 
than 5% were from transport operators, their representatives, or representatives of groups of passengers); 
and position papers and other published documents of agencies representing transport operators. An overall 
assessment is provided in Table 4.17, with the metric small/medium/large. 84 
Group 1: Distortions Due to Different VAT Rates  
The Commission is obliged to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. Any potential 
distortion existing only in domestic markets falls within the responsibility of each Member State. Such 
distortions have not been fully quantified; however, these distortions have been described as possible 
changes to the current rules (e.g. abolishing zero and reduced rates) and may have an impact on domestic 
passenger transport services, which should be analysed for each scenario.   
1a) Different VAT Rates within One Mode at the Domestic Level 
Issue: There are two main reasons why Member States apply different VAT rates within a particular 
transport mode. The first reason is that urban transport might be considered to have different economic and 
                                                   
83 In particular, the effect of unequal rates as discussed in 1c and 1d below are assessed by (i) taking as reference a hypothetical 
transport market with no VAT imposed, and (ii) imposing on the affected operators or modes a VAT rate equal to the distortion 
under consideration. 
84 Categorization of distortions into three groups is inevitably subjective.  
For those subject to quantification, the categorization depends on the markets that are impacted. For each market or combination 
of markets, those distortions that have an impact of generating or discouraging less than 0.1% of the total market passenger kms 
are categorized as small, those impacting between 0.1% and 0.5% are considered medium and those impacting more 0.5% are 
categorized as large. Where impacts are on a group of Member States rather than on the total, the impacts are expressed in the 
same percentages, but applied only to the passengers originating in or departing from the relevant Member States. 
So far as is possible with subjective assessments, the categorization of the non-quantified distortions is based on their probable 
impacts within the same three ranges.   
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social impacts than inter-urban travel, for example, because of the number of trips made per person per 
year. For some Member States where this is considered important, a lower VAT rate is applied to a 
particular transport mode in urban transport than to the same transport mode when used for other domestic 
transport. The second reason is that some passenger trips may be considered more necessary and less 
discretionary than others, and so may qualify for a lower VAT rate. The application of this reason is used 
in certain Member States that have a lower VAT rate for regular (and hence more essential) passenger travel 
than for unscheduled (and so more discretionary) travel.  
Description: There are 12 Member States where we identified some form of this distortion (e.g. relating 
to urban transport or scheduled or unscheduled service); however, these distortions often occur in very 
limited situations. 
Urban Transport 
This distortion occurs in the three Member States that have differences in VAT rates between urban and 
other domestic transport within bus and train modes (trams and metros have the same lower VAT rates as 
other urban transport modes, but they have no other domestic transport equivalent). These differences can 
be found in Germany, Italy, and Cyprus. In Germany, passenger transport within municipalities or for trips 
with distances of less than 50 kilometres are VAT rated at 7%, whereas longer distance trips are subject to 
the standard rate of 19%. The criteria in Italy are similar, but urban services by taxi or vessel are exempt 
(without credit) and non-urban and long-distance services are taxed at the reduced rate of 10%. In Cyprus, 
urban and rural bus transport is VAT rated at 5%, whereas tour buses and other domestic road passenger 
transport are rated at 9%. Furthermore, there is a special flat-rate scheme for urban taxis, which does not 
apply to other domestic taxi services. 
Scheduled and Unscheduled Services 
A distinction between scheduled and occasional services is made in the Czech Republic, Latvia, and 
Lithuania, and to a lesser extent in Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, and Malta. 
Type of Vehicle and Other Criteria 
In the UK, the main criterion for determining whether a passenger transport service will qualify to be 
zero-rated for VAT is, for all transport modes, the size of the vehicle (zero-rated if the vehicle has 10 seats 
or more), although a few other factors can also be relevant.  
Related effects could also be based on special regimes, which are, for example, applied in Cyprus (lump-
sum tax for urban taxis) and Poland (flat-rate scheme for taxi services). Furthermore, many Member States 
provide general exemptions or simplified schemes for small taxable persons (not listed below). 
 
Table 4.1 – Summary of Different VAT Rates within One Mode (Domestic)85 
Member State Mode Distortion 
Gap 
(ppts) 
Cyprus Road Road passenger transport services are taxed at different tax 
rates: 
 Urban taxis: flat-rate scheme 
4/10/14/lump-
sum 
                                                   
85 This table does not take into account general VAT rules like exemptions for small enterprises applied in many Member States. 
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 Urban and rural buses: 5% 
 Urban, intercity, and rural taxis, tour buses, and 
suburban buses: 9% 
 Others: 19% 
Czech Republic All Scheduled services (15%) are taxed at a lower rate than non-
scheduled services (21%) 
6 
Denmark Road Tourist bus services are taxed at 25% whereas regular bus 
services and other domestic road transport are exempt 
25% vs. exempt 
Germany All Most short- and medium-distance transport86 is taxed at 7%, 
other connections at 19%. 
12 




Urban passenger transport services by taxi or by any means 
of transport on inland waterways or the sea, is exempt; 
otherwise, the reduced rate of 10% is applicable. 
Exempt vs. 10% 
Latvia All Scheduled services are taxed at the reduced rate of 12% 
whereas other services are subject to the standard rate of 
21%. 
9 
Lithuania All Approved domestic public passenger transport services 
going on regular routes are taxed at a lower rate (9%) than 
other services (21%). Transport services connected with 
social services are furthermore exempt (without credit) 
subject to certain conditions. 
12 
Malta Mainly road Scheduled bus services and special regular services87 are 
zero-rated whereas other services are taxed at 18%. 
18 
Netherlands Air Domestic air passenger transport is taxed at 21%, except for 
transport with balloons and aircraft especially equipped for 
the transport of sick or injured persons (6%). 
15 
Inland waterways Providers of ferry services can opt to apply an exemption 
(without credit) instead of the reduced rate of 6%. 
Exempt vs. 6% 
Poland Road There is an optional flat-rate scheme for taxi services: 
providers can choose to pay a reduced rate of 4% VAT and 






Zero-rating depends on certain criteria: most important are 
the size of the vehicle (10 seats or more), the provider 
(providers of universal postal services), and, in the case of 




Extent of Distortions88 
While the differences in VAT rates apply to specific modes, the distortions that result apply to all 
competing modes. The proportion of EU-28 urban passenger transport that occurs in Member States that 
have a different VAT rate for all urban transport is around 20%, while the share of bus travel in countries 
                                                   
86 The transport of passengers by rail, with motor vehicles in approved regular services, taxis, trolleybuses, cableways and similar 
facilities as well as on ships (in approved regular services) and ferries, if the transport takes place within a municipality or the 
distance is not more than 50 kilometres. 
87 E.g. the carriage of students or workers to and from educational facilities or place of work, respectively. 
88 All references to the extent of distortions are expressed as shares of passenger km. 
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that differentiate between scheduled and non-scheduled bus services is about 5%. The following are country 
details. 
Cyprus 
There are three types of passenger service in Cyprus and, in each, there is strong competition between 
buses and taxis. The latter offer shared rides on a frequent and regular schedule between most towns and 
cities. In cities, the minimum taxi fare is more than double (2.3 times higher) the flat-rate bus fare. The 
differences in VAT rates adds EUR 0.07 to the bus fare but EUR 0.31 to the taxi fare. If taxis were subject 
to the same VAT rate as buses, their minimum fare would reduce to only 2.1 times the bus fare. This could 
have a marginal impact on competition between the modes, but that competition is perhaps more influenced 
by the difference in type of service offered. 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Latvia, and Lithuania 
These Member States all have lower VAT rates for scheduled than for tourist or non-scheduled services. 
Some non-scheduled services, such as those provided by employers to employees, have many of the 
characteristics of public transport (i.e. operating on fixed routes and fixed schedules). There is no published 
data on the scale of these types of services, so the extent of the competition they provide to scheduled buses 
cannot be determined. The fact they are able to reclaim VAT on inputs significantly reduces the impact of 
their operators being subject to VAT. 
Netherlands 
Historically, the only domestic air passenger services in the Netherlands were from Amsterdam to 
Eindhoven and Maastricht, and these exhibited zero passenger kilometres (PKM) in the TREMOVE model. 
However, both services have been closed for several years and there are currently no domestic flights in the 
Netherlands. 
Germany 
The distortion for Germany is different than that of other Member States, as it applies to all short distance 
passenger trips. That is, most trips take place in urban areas. To estimate the impact of this distortion, we 
have compared the current PKM for urban areas in Germany and the current VAT rates (from the 
TREMOVE model, Table 4.1.1) with those that would result from applying the same VAT rate of 19%, 
which is used for other passenger transport. The difference between the resulting PKM is taken as a measure 
of the extent of the distortion. The overall effect of the distortion is an increase in the number of urban 
transport PKM by about 3.3%, slightly more for rail (4.2%), and rather less for metro (2.7%) and bus 
(2.4%). The increase in PKM comes at the price of a loss of VAT revenue, which would be about 79% 
overall for urban transport passengers. Given the large difference in the VAT rates, the gain in PKM might 
be expected to be larger. However, the relatively low elasticity of demand results in a small overall 
reduction in urban PKM, and the application of the distortion to all urban transport modes makes its impact 
on modal shares very small. 
 
Table 4.1.1 – Effects of Reduced Rates in Germany 
 
Metro Bus Rail Total 
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Current PKM (million) 17,186 27,254 38,779 83,219 
PKM with VAT at 19% 
(million) 
16,717 26,611 37,157 80,485 
Reduction in PKM (million) 512 702 1,834 3,048 
% Change 2.7% 2.4% 4.2% 3.3% 
Current VAT Revenue  
(EUR million) 
1,203 1,908 2,714 5,825 
Revenue with VAT at 19% 
(EUR million) 
5,056 7,060 15,292 27,408 
Loss of VAT revenue  
(EUR million) 
2,154 3,436 4,914 10,504 
% Loss 76.2% 73.0% 82.2% 78.7% 
 
Italy 
The distortion from the exemption of urban taxis from VAT in Italy is almost the reverse of that of the 
UK, where taxis are the only mode that is not zero-rated for VAT. By making taxi services exempt rather 
than rating them at zero takes away some of the advantage they would otherwise receive from being able 
to reclaim the VAT on their inputs. A recent survey of world taxi prices ranked Rome as 23rd highest, with 
a minimum fare per kilometre of about EUR 2.24, which was slightly less than Brussels and Paris. If the 
same VAT rate of 10% that applies to other urban transport modes was applied to taxis, the minimum fare 
in Rome would increase to about EUR 2.50 per kilometre, which is slightly higher than Brussels and Paris, 
and 20th highest in the ranking. A three-kilometre taxi ride at the current rate would cost about EUR 6.70, 
or more than four times the bus fare for unlimited travel of 100 minutes. Taxis are not competing for the 
same share of the market as buses, so exempting taxis from VAT does little to distort the competition 
between the two. 
The other impact of the exemption in Italy relates to exempting domestic maritime services from VAT 
without a right to recovery of VAT, whereas intra-EU and extra-EU maritime services are zero-rated. 
Therefore, the distortion arises as input VAT can be recovered in two markets but not in the other. 
There were about 33 million non-cruise passengers using Italy’s ports in 2012, nearly all of them 
passengers on the many services to Sicily, but also to Sardinia, Elba, Capri, and several smaller islands. 
There are also ferry services on several of the lakes. These services are VAT exempt without the right to 
reclaim input VAT, whereas international ferry services, such as the many across the Adriatic, are zero-
rated (as international maritime services) and, therefore, are able to reclaim VAT on their inputs. This 
difference in treatment of input VAT does not affect the competition between domestic and international 
maritime services as they serve different markets. It also does not affect competition between the 
international services provided by Italian operators and their competitors based in other countries or with 
air services as all have the same zero-rated VAT treatment. The inability to reclaim input VAT on domestic 
ferry services does somewhat reduce the advantage that comes from the exempted rate they benefit from 
compared to other transport modes, which are VAT rated at 10%.  
The VAT on inputs for a ferry operator that has a fare of EUR 100 is about EUR 8 to EUR 10 of a base 
ferry fare of EUR 70 (typical of Naples to Palermo). However, on most routes, ferry transport already has 
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lower fares but longer travel times than air transport. There is a limited market in which air and ferry 
transport compete, and in these markets, an additional 8% to 10% of total operating costs could change the 
competitive balance. The markets where the two modes compete could be for business passengers on trips 
of several days (for which the extra travel time is less important) or non-business passengers also on trips 
of several days, so that inclusion of the hotel cost in the total trip cost can make the impact of the higher 
airfare less important.  
On lake ferries, the market for most passengers is very different, being more for the travel itself than to 
arrive at a specific destination. In this market, there is no close competition, so the impact of the cost of 
non-recoverable VAT only affects the total demand and not the competition with other modes. 
Poland 
The optional flat-rate VAT scheme for taxi operators in Poland is similar in effect to the schemes in other 
Member States that have special provisions for small companies. These schemes usually require a 
maximum turnover to access the special provisions, thus the Polish scheme has a wider impact in that it 
applies to taxi companies, whose turnover would be above the thresholds for the schemes in other Member 
States. With lower taxi fares in Poland than in Italy (the minimum fare in Krakow is only EUR 1.50 per 
kilometre and ranks 38th highest), a taxi operator would need at least two vehicles to reach the threshold 
turnover of EUR 100,000. The loss of the right to reclaim VAT on inputs reduces the financial benefit to 
taxi operators; however, the administrative simplification could be enough to make the flat-rate scheme 
seem attractive to operators of one or two taxis.  
UK 
The impact of the UK distortion, which applies a zero VAT rate to all public transport vehicles with 10 
or more seats, is addressed under Distortion 2a. 
The remaining distortions have an even more limited impact than those described. 
Overall, this distortion has a small impact on demand or inter-modal competition. However, in a few 
specific instances, it could have some impact on demand and mode shares in urban transport. 
The UK vehicle size criterion applies to all modes; however, there are a few air and rail passenger service 
vehicles that are excluded by this criterion. This distortion primarily affects urban transport where it 
excludes taxis and certain mini-buses from qualifying for a zero VAT rate. UK urban transport accounts 
for about a 13% share of all EU-28 urban passenger transport.   
With the exception of that of Germany, distortions of this type have little impact on competition in urban 
public transport markets, as they mostly offer a small cost advantage to the taxi mode, which does not 
usually compete on price, but rather on convenience, speed, and comfort. Where the distortion applies to 
type of bus service (scheduled or other), there could be some competitive impact on those competing 
unscheduled services that operate in the same market. 
Even the distortion in Germany, which applies to urban transport as a whole, compared to domestic 
transport, rather than to one mode compared to the others within urban transport, does not have a large 
competitive effect. This is because it applies to all competing modes and they have similar tariffs. 
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1b) VAT Rates between Modes at the Domestic Level 
Issue: The application of different VAT rates to domestic transport modes is aimed at influencing the 
modal share of specific modes.  
Description: The application of different VAT rates to the various modes of domestic transport within 
a Member State is not very common. Unambiguous examples include the Netherlands, where domestic air 
travel is taxed at the standard rate of 21%, whereas all other modes benefit from a reduced rate (6%); 
Belgium, where only maritime shipping is zero-rated and other modes are taxed at 6%; and Cyprus, where 
the standard rate (19%) is applied to transport by air and inland waterways, and maritime shipping is taxed 
at the reduced rate of 9%. Road transport in Cyprus is subject to 3 different rates (19%, 9%, and 5%).  
 
Table 4.2 – VAT Rates between Modes (Domestic) 






Belgium 6% 6% 6% 0% 6% 6 
Cyprus 5/9/19% 
flat-rate 
n.a. 19% 9% 19% 14 
Netherlands 6% 6% 6% (ex.) 6% 21% (6%) 15 
 
It is more common that the VAT rate depends on particular provisions, which are, in theory, applicable 
to all modes of transport; however, some modes will benefit more than others. An example is Germany, 
where domestic high-speed rail (HSR) and other inter-city rail travel is subject to the standard rate, in most 
cases, because of a distance exceeding 50 kilometres, whereas taxi transport will usually benefit from the 
reduced rate as a mainly local service (less than 50 kilometres). Similar situations can also be found in the 
UK, where the application of the zero rate usually depends on the size of the vehicle. Consequently, long-
distance taxi services and minibuses are nearly always taxed at 20%, whereas passenger transport by train 
is mostly zero-rated. Finally, Member States that tax certain scheduled services at a lower rate (e.g. the 
Czech Republic, Malta, and Lithuania) belong to this category, since rail transport is almost exclusively 
scheduled, whereas bus transport is not. For details on such cases, see 1a above.  
Extent: The extent and impact of this type of distortion are both very limited, as they are confined to 
Cyprus, where domestic passengers only account for 2% of total air passengers and services are only 
available on one route.89 
The extent of the distortion of different VAT rates on scheduled and unscheduled services and of the UK 
vehicle size distortion are described and estimated under distortion 2a. The other distortions in this group 
have a minimal impact on competition between transport modes, as the modes with different VAT rates do 
not compete strongly with each other (e.g. with very few exceptions, taxi and HSR travel in Germany). 
Finally, there are also cases where lower rates, special schemes, or exemptions are only available for certain 
modes, or the modes profit in different degrees (e.g. an exemption for ferries in the Netherlands; a reduced 
rate for most bus transport in Germany restricted to approved regular services, in addition to the distance 
                                                   
89 Economics of Air Transport in Cyprus, Oxford Economics, 2011 
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criterion, but not for rail and air; an exemption for urban transport in Italy only available for taxi in water 
transport and the like (for details see 1a)). Most of these have a limited impact. 
1c) Different VAT Rates within One Mode of Transport between Domestic, Intra-EU, and Extra-EU 
Transport 
Issue: For all Members State, there are policy reasons to encourage transport in one market over another. 
This objective can be supported through different VAT rates in different markets for the same transport 
mode. 
Description: This distortion is one of the most widespread and particular gaps between domestic and 
intra-EU VAT rates are quite high, to the extent that a few Member States have devised schemes to 
eliminate the differences in certain situations. 
All 28 Member States apply higher VAT rates to domestic passenger transport than to intra-EU and 
extra-EU transport, at least for some modes or in some situations (UK). 
 
Table 4.3 – Gap between Rates for Domestic and International Transport by Mode 





Air # Modes / Gap  
Austria 0 0 10(0) n.a. 10 2 of 5 
Belgium 0 0 0 0 6 1 of 5 
Bulgaria 20 20 20 20 20 5 of 5 
Croatia 0 0 25 25 25 3 of 5 
Cyprus 5/9/19 n.a. n.a. 9 19 3 of 3 
Czech Republic 15/21 15 15/21 n.a. 15/21 4 of 4 
Denmark Inp. (25) Inp. Inp. Inp. Inp. 5 of 5 
Estonia 20 20 20 20 20 5 of 5 
Finland 10 10 10 10 10 5 of 5 
France 0 (10) 10 (0) 0 10 10 3(4) of 5 
Germany 0 0 0 7/19 19 (7) 2 of 5 
Greece 0 0 0 13 13 2 of 5 
Hungary 27 27 27 n.a. 27 4 of 4 
Ireland Inp. Inp. Inp. Inp. Inp. 5 of 5 
Italy 10 (Inp.) 10 10 (Inp.) 10 (Inp.) 10 5 of 5 
Latvia 12/21 12 12/21 12/21 12/21 5 of 5 
Lithuania 9/21 9 9/21 9/21 9/21 5 of 5 
Luxembourg 3 3 3 n.a. 3 4 of 4 
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Malta n.a. n.a. n.a. 0/18 18 1/2 of 2 
Netherlands 0 0 0 6 21 (6) 2 of 5 
Poland 0 8 0 8 8 3 of 5 
Portugal 6 6 6 6 6 5 of 5 
Romania 24 24 24 24 24 5 of 5 
Slovakia 20 20 20 n.a. 20 4 of 4 
Slovenia 0 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 4 of 5 
Spain 0 0 0 10 10 2 of 5 
Sweden 6 6 6 6 6 5 of 5 
UK 0(20) 0 0 (20) 0 (20) 0 (20) 190 of 5 
Number of 
Member States91 
16 18 18 21 27  
Note: inp. = right to deduct inputs 
 
There are 14 Member States that zero-rate all international services irrespective of mode of transport 
while at the same time apply a positive VAT rate to all modes of domestic transport:92 
 In five countries, this is the standard rate (Bulgaria (20%), Estonia (20%), Hungary (27%), 
Romania (24%), and the Slovak Republic (20%)); 
 In three countries, all domestic transport is subject to the reduced rate (Finland (10%), Portugal 
(6%), and Sweden (6%)). In Luxembourg, domestic transport is subject to a super-reduced rate of 
3%; and, 
 In five countries, domestic transport is taxed at different rates (Cyprus (5/9/19%), the Czech 
Republic (15/21%), Italy (10%/exempt),93 Latvia (12/21%), and Lithuania (9/21%)). 
Special cases are Denmark and Ireland, where both domestic94 and international transport are exempt, 
but input VAT may only be deducted with respect to international transport. 
Of the remaining Member States, rate gaps between domestic and international transport occur for the 
following modes: 
 All modes except for road: Slovenia (9.5%),  
 Inland waterways, maritime shipping, and air: Croatia (25%), 
 Rail, maritime shipping, and air: France (10%)95 and Poland (8%), 
                                                   
90 Only in certain situations, since most domestic road passenger transport is zero-rated as well. 
91 Not including MS, where this gap applies only in certain situations. 
92 The relevant tax rate is indicated in parentheses. 
93 Domestic urban transport by taxi or ship is exempt, but input VAT may not be deducted. 
94 In the case of Denmark, with the exception of tourist bus services. 
95 Additionally, road up to a certain extent (zero-rating of occasional bus transport of foreigners). 
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 Inland waterways and air: Austria (10%), 
 Maritime shipping and air: the Netherlands (6%/21%), Germany (7%/19%), Spain (10%), and 
Greece (13%), and 
 Air: Belgium (6%) 
In Malta, domestic travel is subject to higher VAT in the case of air transport (18%). With respect to 
road and maritime transport, this is mostly restricted to non-scheduled services like sightseeing tours. In 
the UK, domestic transport is taxed at higher rates in certain limited situations. 
Related effects could also be based on special regimes, which are, for example, applied in Germany (i.e. 
journey specific VAT assessment for foreign buses entering Germany at a third-country border) and Greece 
(i.e. possible lump sum tax for foreign buses). 
Extent: The impacts of this type of distortion are difficult to estimate quantitatively, as they are 
potentially widespread and complex. Unlike distortions related just to one market, where potential impact 
can be estimated from market size, distortions of this type may have an impact on demand between markets. 
The markets that may be impacted are domestic, intra-EU, and, to a lesser extent, extra-EU. Since all 
Member States have some form of VAT discrimination between markets and within modes, the potential 
extent of this distortion covers all Member State and transport modes. 
However, the practical impact of the distortion is less than its potential one, as there is only limited 
competition between the markets that could be influenced by transport fares. Passenger travel choices are 
conventionally considered as a three-stage process: first, a choice of destination, followed by a choice of 
mode, and then finally by a choice of route. Although, increasingly, the latter choices are simultaneous. 
Choice of destination and, accordingly, of travel market is, to some extent, influenced by transport fares 
(and so by VAT rates) for some non-business travel, but choice of destination for business travel is usually 
determined by factors other than fare.  
To estimate the extent of this distortion, we have compared the current VAT regime with a comparator 
in which the VAT rate is same for each mode in the three markets to which the distortion applies (intra-EU, 
extra-EU, and domestic), but not necessarily the same rate for each mode. The metro mode is only relevant 
in the urban transport market, so has not been considered to be relevant to this distortion. Bus transport is 
currently VAT rated at a wide range of rates between markets and countries, the most frequent being the 
national reduced rates used in 17 Member States that account for just over 40% of bus PKM in the three 
relevant markets. Therefore, we used the reduced VAT for each country as the comparator (so bus passenger 
transport was rated at the reduced national rate in all markets). For rail, we have used the same comparator: 
the national reduced rate for all markets. However, for air passenger transport we have used the zero-rate 
in all three markets, as is this rate already applies to all Member States for extra-EU and intra-EU passengers 
and to all but two for domestic passengers.  
This is only one of many different sets of comparator VAT rates that could have been used. The results 
for others can be found in the assessment of Scenarios in Chapter 6. For example, setting the comparator 
VAT rate to the standard rate for all modes can be found in the assessment of Scenario 1, while that of 












Intra-EU 0 0.0% 
Extra-EU 0 0.0% 
Domestic 1,452 3.1% 
Bus 
Intra-EU -10 -0.1% 
Extra-EU 0 0.0% 
Domestic 1,017 0.3% 
Rail 
Intra-EU -147 -0.7% 
Extra-EU 0 0.0% 
Domestic -468 -0.2% 
Total 
Intra-EU -157 -0.1% 
Extra-EU 0 0.0% 
Domestic 2,001 0.3% 
Sum of positive distortions 
(increase in PKM 
2,469 0.4% 
Sum of negative distortions 
(reduction in PKM) 
-625 -0.1% 
 Total 1,844 0.3% 
 
The impact of this distortion on PKM is small, as it reduces PKM by about 1.8 billion, or 0.3% of the 
total. The largest impact in absolute and percentage is for domestic air passengers, where the zero VAT rate 
in the comparison is lower than the standard and reduced rates were currently applied (where the current 
rate is zero, there is no distortion). The loss in PKM is about 1.5 billion, or 3.1%. The next highest impact 
of the distortion is for buses in the domestic market, where the distortion results in a loss of about 1.0 billion 
PKM, or about 0.3% of the total.  
There are very few practical examples of where passengers might be able to take advantage of the 
difference between domestic and intra-EU VAT rates. One situation is where, instead of traveling directly 
from an origin to a domestic destination (‘true’ destination), passengers might travel on an intra-EU trip 
(therefore incurring a lower VAT rate) to a destination just over the border (‘false’ destination) from their 
true destination, and then take another intra-EU trip back to the true destination. For this to be advantageous, 
the additional cost of traveling the extra distance to the false destination then back to the true destination 
would have to more than the VAT saved on what would have been the domestic trip to the true destination. 
For this to be possible, the origin and true destination must be a long distance apart to generate enough 
VAT saving to cover the cost of the extra distance, and the true and false destination must be close enough 
together to keep the additional transport cost as low as possible.  
                                                   
96  A negative entry in the table indicate that the PKM with the current VAT rates are higher than they could have been with the 
comparator rates 
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After examining more than 20 possible instances97, we found only two where it might be feasible; in all 
others the fare from the origin to the ‘false’ destination would be more than the cost to the true destination. 
In the first instance, a passenger from Paris with a true destination of Menton would incur a train fare of 
EUR 154,98 whereas going to a ‘false’ destination of Ventimiglia (Italy) would incur a fare of EUR 152. 
However, the return fare to Menton would be EUR 5 making this trip more expensive than the direct one, 
but if private transport were available, the objective would be achieved.  
In the second instance, a passenger traveling from Paris to Strasburg has two options for the ‘false 
destination: Offenburg and Kehl (both in Germany and neither with a direct train service from Paris, a 
change must be made at Strasburg). Among the many possible fare options is a reduced fare from Paris to 
Offenburg for EUR 70, but this is the same as the least cost direct fare EUR 70 and so offers no advantage. 
However, from Paris to Kehl there is a EUR 58 fare available, which together with a Kehl to Strasburg fare 
of EUR 4, is a total fare of EUR 62, which is EUR 8 less than the direct fare. Therefore, with these fares, a 
passenger would be able to take advantage of the distortion with a savings in fare of about 10%. However, 
using only regular price tickets, there is no advantage as Paris to Strasbourg is EUR 80 and Paris to 
Offenbach or Kehl is EUR 82. Subsequently, the opportunity of the lower fare is more a result of incentive 
fares more than differences in VAT rates. 
1d) Different VAT Rates between Different Modes of Transport for Intra-EU and Extra-EU Travel 
 Issue: There has been a long-term international community reluctance to tax international trade, of 
which international passenger transport is an integral part. The current VAT rules of Member States are a 
mixture of some zero-rating only air and maritime transport and some extending the zero rate to one or 
more other modes of transport. 
Description: Whereas all Member States zero-rate intra-EU and extra-EU air and maritime passenger 
transport, 10 Member States apply positive tax rates to extra-EU road passenger transport, 7 to rail transport, 
and 6 to inland navigation. The gap between the rates applied to the different modes of intra-EU and extra-





Table 4.5 – Gap between VAT Rates Applied to Transport Modes in Intra-EU and Extra-EU Passenger Transport 







(ppts, highest to lowest) 
                                                   
97 These instances were selected based on satisfying a criterion that the VAT on the cost of the domestic trip be less than the sum 
of the travel cost to an intermediate intra-EU destination and the return trip to the true domestic destination. Most instances that 
satisfy this criterion require that the distance between the origin and true destination be of the order of 1,000km, so the distortion 
is unlikely to occur for small Member States. As an example, with a distance of 1,000km between the origin and true domestic 
destination, a fare of €0.20 per km and a domestic VAT rate of 10%, the travel cost would be the same as travel to an intermediate 
destination that is 50km further than the domestic destination, the same per km fare but without any VAT. Any shorter domestic 
distance would make the alternative more expensive.  
98 All fares are based on a one week advance purchase, for one way travel on a Wednesday in October 2014 
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Austria 10% 10% 0% (10%) n.a. 0% 10 
Belgium 6% 6% 6% 0% 0% 6 
Bulgaria 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 
Croatia 25% 25% 0% 0% 0% 25 
Cyprus 0% n.a. n.a. 0% 0% 0 
Czech Republic 0% 0% 0% n.a. 0% 0 
Denmark 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 
Estonia 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 
Finland 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 
France 10% 0% 10% 0% 0% 10 
Germany 19%/7% 19%/7% 19%/7% 0% 0% 19/7 
Greece 13% 13% 13% 0% 0% 13 
Hungary 0% 0% 0% n.a. 0% 0 
Ireland 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 
Italy 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 
Latvia 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 
Lithuania 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 
Luxembourg 0% 0% 0% n.a. 0% 0 
Malta n.a. n.a. n.a. 0% 0% 0 
Netherlands 6% 6% 6% 0% 0% 6 
Poland 8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 8 
Portugal 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 
Romania 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 
Slovakia 0% 0% 0% n.a. 0% 0 
Slovenia 9.5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 9.5 
Spain 10% 10% 10% 0% 0% 10 
Sweden 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 
United 
Kingdom 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0 
 
If we take the gap between international air transport and HSR transport, which are likely competitors 
in some markets, as an example, the numbers are: 
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 19 Member States apply the same rate to both modes of transport; 
 For 4 Member States, the gap is 10% or lower (6% for Belgium and the Netherlands, 10% for 
Austria and Spain); 
 For another 2 Member States, the gap is between 10% and 20% (13% for Greece and 19% for 
Germany); and, 
 For Croatia, the gap is 25%. 
However, especially in the cases of Greece and Croatia, the substitutability between international air 
and rail transport is currently very limited. Cyprus and Malta currently do not operate a rail system; 
therefore, this comparison would not make sense for them. 
Another example of different modes of transport potentially competing is that of bus and rail services. 
Here, three Member States apply lower rates to international rail transport than to road transport: Slovenia 
(0% vs. 9.5%), Poland (0% vs. 8%), and France (0% vs. 10%99). 
 










































 … is taxed at a higher rate than … (# of Member States) 





Road - 3 3 10 10 
Rail 0 - 2 7 7 
Inland Navigation 0 2 - 7 6 
Maritime Navigation 0 0 0 - 0 
Air 0 0 0 0 - 
Remark: The table reads: “The rate applied to international passenger transport by road is higher than the rate for 
rail in 3 Member States, higher than the rate for inland navigation in 4 Member States, and higher than the rate for 
maritime navigation and air in 10 Member States.  
 
Extent: This distortion applies to the difference of VAT rates between modes in intra-EU and extra-EU 
markets. To estimate of the extent of the distortion, we have compared the current VAT rates with a situation 
in which all modes would be zero-rated, this being the rate that is used in 80% of the country and mode 
combinations in these two markets.  
The impact of the distortion is insignificant overall in terms of bus and rail passenger kms, resulting in a 
loss of some 0.5 billion PKM, less than 1% the total, but more significant in terms of revenues for affected 
operators reducing them by 2% - 3%. The situation is evolving as HSR services expand (these still do not 
                                                   
99 Some bus services for foreign travellers are however exempt. 
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serve large parts of the intra-EU market, even at the average trip length of almost 700 kilometres in the 
intra-EU market), and therefore the distortion could increase over time. 
 





Intra-EU Air 0 0.0% 
 Bus 156 1.2% 
 Rail 147 0.5% 
Extra-EU Air 0 0.0% 
 Bus 82 3.4% 
 Rail 78 2.7% 
Intra-EU Total 303 0.1% 
Extra-EU Total 160 0.0% 




Box 4.1 – A Special Case of Intermodal Competition - Night trains 
Night trains have been part of the European passenger transport scene since the middle of the 19th century. 
Now they compete with low cost airlines, daytime HSR trains and inter-city express buses. There are still more 
than 20 advertised night train services operating within and between Member States, but this number has 
significantly declined in the last few years. Examples include: 
 Paris to Barcelona and Madrid (which used variable gauge coaches to avoid passengers having to 
transfer) was discontinued in December, 2013; 
 Paris to Rome, a France-Italy joint venture direct sleeper service discontinued at the same time; 
 Brussels to Copenhagen ceased from 1 November, 2014;  
 Paris to Berlin and Hamburg and Munich services will end in December 2014; 
 Amsterdam to Prague and Warsaw services will be cut back to run only from Cologne at the same 
time;  
 Berlin to Warsaw and Kiev was withdrawn in 2010, and the weekly Sibirjak service to Siberia at the 
end of 2013. 
Rail operators have cited several reasons for the reduction in services, all related to a reduced demand, as much 
as 25% over the last five years on some routes. The most frequent cited causes are the rise of low-cost airlines, 
more daytime HSR services that allow return trips to be made avoiding overnight stays (one of the advantages of 
sleeper trains, and expanded inter-city bus services.  
The Caledonian Sleeper between London and three destinations in Scotland, is one of two remaining night 
train services in the UK. It operates under a separate concession (recently re-awarded for 15 years) to other train 
services between England and Scotland. The concession agreement includes a capital subsidy of about €120m 
(for new coaches and station upgrading). The other UK sleeper service between London and South West England 
is operated as part of a broader passenger service concession. Although it once had an operating subsidy (PSO) 
of about €8m per year, this is no longer available but the number of passengers was reported as increasing in 
2010.  
Deutsche Bahn has cited the need for passengers to pay VAT on rail but not on rail services as a contributing 
factor. The UK is one of the few Member States that has the same VAT rate for all domestic passenger transport 
modes, but even without this distortion only one sleeper train is financially viable. One report cited the costs of 
estimating and paying track access charges and VAT to different administrations as a possible additional 
contributing factor. 
Of the Member States that have cancelled night train services, Germany (19%), Spain (10%) Netherlands (%) 






In practice, competitive distortions only affect the limited country and market combinations where there 
is potential competition between modes in the absence of VAT considerations. Depending on the distance 
between the origin and destination cities, there could be two or three competing modes. Up to distances of 
about 350km, rail and bus are the competitive modes, with air services only competing at the upper limits 
of the range. But the range of distances at which bus is competing with low-coat airlines is expanding as to 
some extent they are operating in the same market, that for passengers looking for a low-cost service and 
who are not very sensitive to time considerations.  
 
Table 4.7.1 Bus and rail competitive city pairs 
City A  City B  Rail distance 
(km) 
Strasbourg FR Stuttgart DE 162 
Constanta RO Varna BG 251 
Turin IT Grenoble FR 270 
Lisbon PT Badajoz ES 277 
Bialystok PL Kaunas LT 286 
Paris FR Brussels BE 332 
Gothenburg SE Oslo NO 365 
London UK Brussels BE 377 
 
From about 350km to 800km rail and air100 are competitive, with bus services being competitive only in 
non-time sensitive segments of the market. Typical of cities close to the upper limit of this range are: 
 
Table 4.7.2 Rail and air competitive city pairs 
City A  City B  
Rail distance 
(km) 
Warsaw PL Vilnius LT 595 
Berlin DE Warsaw PL 602 
Sofia BG Istanbul TR 621 
Copenhagen DK Stockholm SE 648 
Warsaw PL Prague CZ 653 
Madrid ES Lisbon PT 665 
Paris FR Turin IT 780 
Berlin DE Brussels BE 794 
 
Taking the last two these two of these city pairs, Paris to Turin and Berlin to Brussels as examples, where 
there is a direct HSR service (Paris to Turin) the rail service is competitive on time with air although its 
                                                   
100 Rail and bus distances between cities can be much longer than air distances. Since rail is competitive over a large range of 
distances we have used rail distances in Tables 4.7.1 and 4.7.2  
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fare more than 50% higher. Bus has the lowest fare but is not competitive for most passengers on a basis of 
time. Where there is only a connecting HSR service (Berlin to Brussels requires a change of train in 
Cologne) the time is less competitive and does not permit a return trip within one day. The rail fare is even 
less competitive than for Paris to Turin. Part of the reason for this is that the rail fare is liable to VAT both 
for its part in Germany (at 19%) and its part in Belgium (at 6%), giving an average VAT rate of 14%. 
Without the VAT the rail far would be about € 127, still more than double the lowest air fare101.The Paris 
to Turin rail fare is not subject to VAT in France or Italy.      
 
Table 4.7.3 Comparison modes for typical city pairs 
 Paris to Turin Berlin to Brussels 
Mode Fare in € Time in hours Fare in € Time in hours 
Bus 50+ 12+ 70+ 11+ 
Rail 110+ 5.6+ 145+ 7+ 
Air 70+ 5.5 60+ 4+ 
 
Based on the data in the CPM, about 25% of intra-EU city pairs are less than 350 rail kilometres apart, 
50% are between 250 and 750 kilometres apart, and the remaining 25% are more than 750 kilometres apart. 
Therefore, bus and rail are competitive in about 25% of the city pairs, bus and air in approximately 50%, 
and in the remaining 25%, air transport does not have significant competition. There are few Member States 
that have different VAT rates for Intra-EU passengers on bus and rail (France and Poland) so few city pairs 
at distances of less than 350 kms where this distortion could impact on competition between these modes.  
These percentages are approximate and are changing as more direct long distance city-to-city bus 
services become available (e.g. increasing the 350 kilometre limit in which bus and rail are competitive, as 
more HSR services are introduced and hence, increasing the proportion of cities in the 350 kilometre to 750 
kilometre range in which rail and air are competitive), and as more low cost air passenger services are 
available (bringing an extended passenger market into the same distance range). 
1e) Different Delimitation between Domestic, Intra-EU, and Extra-EU (Two-Sector Trips) 
Issue: This distortion results from Member States having different interpretations of how to define the 
three transport markets (domestic, intra-EU, and extra-EU), and this impacts those passenger trips that could 
be considered as taking place partially in two or more markets. There could also be an issue of Member 
States applying different definitions of the markets to maximize VAT revenue rather than to maximize the 
overall economic benefit of passenger transport. 
Description:  A few Member States consider the domestic sections of international trips to be part of 
the international trip, if the connection indicated on the ticket is international (Finland, Lithuania, and 
                                                   
101 Al the fares are city center to city center so the air fares include bus or rail transport to/from the airports to the city center, in 
most Member States subject to domestic VAT rates. 
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Poland). In Croatia, the ticket specification is also decisive, but this is restricted to air and sea transport; 
Luxembourg and Italy also refer to a single contract.  
Extent: This distortion usually applies to intra-EU and extra-EU passenger trips that have a stopover or 
interchange at an intermediate airport or terminal (possibly rail terminal) that is within the Member State 
in which the trip originated. This distortion arises because of the different VAT rates that some Member 
States apply to domestic and international air passengers.  
However, the Member States that currently apply this distortion (i.e. they apply domestic VAT to the 
domestic section of international trips) account for approximately 14% (or approximately 30 billion) of the 
PKM which could be impacted by this distortion (e.g. those who are making a connecting international trip 
from a domestic trip through an airport located in the Member State in which their trip originates). 
Airlines that provide interconnecting domestic and international flights tend to have lower yields for a 
connecting service than they would from ticketing the two sections of the trip separately. This suggests that 
they prefer to ticket two direct journeys rather than sell a through ticket for the domestic and connecting 
trip.102 The use of a through ticket from the origin to final destination makes it easier for a Member State 
that applies VAT for the domestic section of such trips to identify the domestic part as being a section of 
what is really an international trip. If the passenger travels on two separate tickets, it is very difficult for the 
domestic ticket to be identified as relating to an international trip. Through ticketing is common for 
international air travel and for Intra-EU rail travel, particularly for HSR services. It is less common for 
international bus travel, making the domestic sections of international bus trips more difficult to identify 
and therefore to apply domestic VAT to them. 
There is no data available for the number of domestic-international connecting rail passengers, but the 
number is much smaller than for air passengers as there are fewer domestic-international rail connections 
available for rail. Even if the number of interconnecting rail and bus passengers in the Member States 
impacted by this distortion were as many as the number of air passengers (approximately 90 billion PKM), 
this would still represent only about 16% of all international PKM (720 million PKM). 
Where the domestic section of the international trip can be identified, and for those Member States that 
apply VAT to these sections, the addition of the national VAT is the fare will have only a small impact on 
competitiveness. For the intra-EU city pairs included in the CPM database, the domestic section is an 
average of just over 300 kms. If the average domestic fare is EUR 0.15 per kilometre and the average VAT 
rate on domestic passenger travel is 12%, adding VAT to the domestic portion of the trip would add EUR 
5.40 to a total fare of EUR 225, an increase of about 2.4%. From the elasticities in the TREMOVE and 
CPM models, a change in fares of this order would reduce the number of trips by 0.8%, a small magnitude. 
1f) Lower VAT Rates Applied in Certain Regions 
Issue: Some Member States have economic and social policies aimed at stimulating the economies of 
specific territorial regions by attracting additional tourists, and part of the implementation of these policies 
can be to apply a lower VAT rate for passenger travel to and from these regions than for other domestic 
                                                   
102 Connecting Passengers at UK Airports, Civil Aviation Authority, 2008 
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transport. Part of the objective of these VAT incentives is to attract potential tourists from competing 
Member States and other countries. 
Description: We found two Member States that apply lower VAT rates with respect to passenger 
transport in certain regions: 
 Portugal: Madeira (5% instead of 6%) and the Azores (4% instead of 6%). Some passenger 
transport between the mainland and the Autonomous Regions of the Azores or Madeira as well as 
between those Regions and between the islands within these regions is zero-rated. 
 France: Corsica (within the island, 2.1% instead of 10%). In addition, passenger transport 
between continental France and Corsica is zero-rated, except for the section in continental France. 
Furthermore, passenger transport services to some regions are treated as international because they are 
not part of the national (and European) VAT area (e.g. the Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla (Spain), 
Helgoland (Germany), the French overseas departments and territories, the Åland Islands (Finland), and 
the Channel Islands (UK)). These are not considered as VAT distortions but simply are the result of the 
application of VAT territoriality rules. 
Extent: The regions that benefit from these distortions account for a small share of the total population 
of the Member State of which they are a part. The Azores and Madeira, together, comprise 5% of the 
population of Portugal, while Corsica comprises only 0.5% of the population of France.    
The different VAT rates applied are only a few percentage points different from those applied to other 
domestic passenger transport, and with the exception of fares to Corsica, make a small impact on passenger 
fares to these regions. The difference in VAT rates is aimed at attracting non-business passengers, as 
business passengers can reclaim the VAT charged on their fares.  
For many non-business passengers, the air or ferry fare to and from their destination is less than half the 
total cost of their trip.103 With a low cost five-day package holiday from Lisbon to Funchal, costing about 
EUR 250 per person, the airfare component of EUR 50 would be only 20% of the total cost. The VAT share 
of the airfare would be approximately EUR 2.50 and only EUR 0.5 less than it would have been with the 
full domestic air VAT applied. This distortion would only have increased the cost of the total trip by 0.2%. 
The increase in total cost for comparable trips to Corsica (e.g. from Marseille) would have been more, but 
still less than 1%. 
From Marseille to Ajaccio, the airfare is more than double than the ferry fare. The difference in the VAT 
savings between air and ferry transport with regional VAT rates is nearly EUR 6.00, which, with an overall 
travel cost of EUR 250, would represent a difference of about 2.5% and may affect competition between 
the modes (although it would make the more expensive mode slightly more expensive, but would not 
change its ranking).  
Table 4.8 – Estimated Impact of VAT Distortion 1f 
Origin Lisbon Lisbon Marseille Marseille 
Destination Funchal Terceira Ajaccio Ajaccio 
Mode Air Air Air Ferry 




Current Fare 46 70 88 30 
Current VAT pass rate 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Domestic VAT pass rate 6% 6% 10% 10% 
Fare using Domestic VAT 48.8 74.2 96.8 33.0 
 
Source: Air and Ferry fares from Rome2Rio; VAT rates from Chapter 3 
 
For all combinations of itinerary and transport mode considered, the lower regional VAT rate has little 
impact on total fare and even less of an impact on the total cost of travel. The proportion of national tourists 
to each of the two destinations is about one-third for Madeira104 and about two-thirds for Corsica.105 
This is, therefore, considered a small distortion. 
Group 2: Distortions Due to the Scope of Passenger Transport Services and Associated 
Supplies 
2a) Definition of Passenger Transport and Related Incidental Services 
Issue: Most Member States have a clear directive in their legislation regarding which passenger services 
are subject to VAT. However, in practice, some Member States are prone to making practical 
implementations that are potentially inconsistent with legislation.  
Description: Although only a few Member States provide detailed definitions for the scope of passenger 
transport, there are some differences with respect to the exact delimitation of passenger transport. The 
renting of vehicles including a driver is normally considered passenger transport, whereas the rental of a 
means of transport without a driver or crew is not. Incidental services like the transport of accompanying 
luggage, seat reservations, or the provision of sleeping compartments are usually subject to the same rules 
as the underlying passenger transport service, though some countries seem to restrict that to services that 
are not separately billed (e.g. Poland). The transport of accompanying motor vehicles is usually also 
covered if it is incidental to passenger transport, with certain exceptions. 
A variation of this deviation can apply to domestic passengers on services that also transport intra-EU 
passengers. Since both types of passengers use the same service, and many board and disembark from the 
transport vehicle at the same place, certain Member States treat domestic passengers as though they were 
intra-EU passengers for VAT purposes. This variation does not apply to domestic and extra-EU passengers, 
as they need to be segregated for immigration and security purposes. 
Extent: The extent of this distortion is small, but not insignificant, as the majority of passenger travel 
falls clearly within or outside Member State VAT regulations.  
One instance of this distortion is the limit on public transport vehicle size that qualifies VAT to be zero-
rated on their revenue. One Member States that has the most widespread distortion of this type is the UK, 
                                                   
104 Anuario Estadistico da Regiao Autonoma de Madeira, 2012  
105 Ministère des Transports de Equipment du Tourisme et de la Mer, Ministère délègue au Tourisme, France 
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where a vehicle size of 10 seats is the limit for zero rating of VAT. This limit excludes taxis, hire cars, and 
mini-buses that are licensed to carry passengers from being zero-rated as are other public transport modes. 
In the UK in 2012, there were 230,000 of these vehicles. With a fare of EUR 4.00 per kilometre106 and 
the standard UK VAT rate of 20%, there is an additional VAT revenue of about EUR 400 million that 
would not have been charged had these vehicles had the same VAT zero-rate as other public transport in 
the UK. 
 
Table 4.9 - Estimated VAT Revenue from Small Public 
Transport Vehicles in the UK 
Small Licensed Public Transport Vehicles 200,000 
Population  64,000,000 
Passenger Occupancy Rate 0.5 
Average km Year per Vehicle 50,000 
Annual PKM 5,000 
Average Fare 4 
VAT Rate  20% 
VAT Revenue (EUR)  400,000,000 
 
Thus, even for a Member State that has an example of this distortion with a wide application, its impact 
is small, at only about 0.3% of UK VAT revenue. 
2b) Consumption On Board Ships, Aircraft, or Trains 
We have not addressed this distortion, since it is covered in detail in the “Expert study on the issues 
arising from taxing the supply of goods and the supply of services, including restaurant and catering 
services, for consumption on board means of transport” by PWC107 and was not included in the terms of 
reference. 
Group 3: Distortions Due to the Treatment of Inputs in the Passenger Transport Sector  
Issue: There are three distortions identified in this group. The first is the zero-rating of inputs to air and 
maritime passenger transport. The second is where Member States have their own regulations on how to 
specify when a vehicle is used predominantly for passenger services (and, hence, subject to VAT rates for 
                                                   
106 http://www.priceoftravel.com/555/world-taxi-prices-what-a-3-kilometre-ride-costs-in-72-big-cities/ 
107  For further information, see EC Report COM (2012) 605 final available on: http://ec.europa.eu/
taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/vat/key_documents/reports_published/com_2012_605_en.pdf and the “Expert 
study on the issues arising from taxing the supply of goods and the supply of services, including restaurant and catering services, 
for consumption on board means of transport” by PWC available on: https://circabc.europa.eu/w/browse/59941dff-4fd3-47bb-
8ee9-c502cab5b7b6.  The report does not cover the distinction between the supply of goods and services and does not clarify if 
the supply of services might be covered by the derogation listed under Annex X, Part B, Point 9 of the VAT Directive.  
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passenger transport) and when it is used for private use (and, hence, subject to standard VAT rates).The 
third is the possible effects of the preferential treatment of certain energy inputs. 
3a) Exemptions Following Article 148 VAT Directive  
Description: Article 148 of the VAT Directive provides the framework for the zero-rating of certain 
supplies to maritime and international aviation. It covers the supply of vessels and aircraft fulfilling certain 
requirements, as well as their equipment, services related to such qualifying vessels and aircraft, their 
equipment or cargo, and the provisioning and fuelling of such vessels and aircraft. However, it is for the 
national legislation to provide specific details. Furthermore, a number of Member States apply derogations 
from the provisions of Article 148. Article 148 applies not only to aircraft and vessels meeting the above 
requirements, but also to qualified aircraft or vessels that are used for exempt activities and where there 
would normally be no right to deduct, e.g. public sector, education and financial services.  
The functioning of the exemption for maritime services is rather different than that for air passenger 
services, in that it applies to “navigation on the high seas,” whereas for air passenger services, it refers to 
“operations for reward chiefly on international routes.” These differences have been the subject of 
differences of opinion, two of which were submitted to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
for clarification108. 
With respect to qualifying vessels, certain Member States require additional conditions to be met, such 
as minimum size (e.g. Finland and Sweden) or tonnage (e.g. UK and Ireland), to qualify for zero-rating. 
Others extend the scope to other types of vessels (e.g. Italy and Greece extend the scope to certain military 
vessels or to vessels used by state institutions; Finland extends the scope to all vessels of a certain size 
except those intended for recreation or sports purposes).  
Aircraft generally qualify for zero-rating if they are used by airlines “operating for reward chiefly on 
international routes.” We have found such a definition of this term for 19 Member States. The most common 
criterion used is a preponderance of turnover realized on extra-EU or intra-EU routes (e.g. Austria, Estonia, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, and Portugal); however, certain Member States also apply other criteria. 
More restrictive provisions are found in Denmark (55% or more of both turnover and number of 
kilometres), France (80% or more of the services performed on international routes), Bulgaria (60% of the 
total income in a period of five years), Latvia (80% or more of turnover and routes), and Poland (60% or 
more of revenues, number of flights, and number of passengers or amount of goods). The rules applied in 
the UK (e.g. any assessment method, as long as it produces fair and reasonable results and is consistently 
applied) and Ireland (50% or more of revenue, passengers, miles flown, or routes), on the other hand, are 
more flexible. The Swedish rule is that the airline’s domestic operations must be less comprehensive than 
its international ones, taking into account all proper metrics including sales. In Belgium, airlines operating 
scheduled international air transport services are covered automatically, while other Belgian airlines must 
                                                   
108 The VAT Committee discussed in its 98th meeting  the implications of the ruling of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) in case C-33/11 A Oy  regarding the exemptions in Article 148(e) and (f) of the VAT 
Directive. Following that discussion, guidelines were approved agreeing that the exemption provided for in Article 
148(f) should be granted, not only when an aircraft was acquired by an airline operating chiefly on international routes, 
but also when that aircraft was acquired by a taxable person which was not itself an airline but it was bought with a 
view of allowing its exclusive use to companies that qualify as airlines operating chiefly on international routes. 
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achieve at least 80% of their turnover on international routes and foreign airlines must present a respective 
attestation by their competent national authorities. Finish administrative practice is that at least 50% of 
flights must be oriented outside Finland. In Spain, the share of the distance in the route of international 
flights is decisive (50% or more). 
A comparison of how other supplies to maritime shipping and international aviation (e.g. provisioning 
and services for the direct needs of qualifying vessels or aircraft and their cargoes) are addressed is 
particularly difficult, because national implementations are often structured very differently than what is 
indicated in the VAT Directive. Certain Member States, for example, provide lists of services covered, 
while others adopt the general wording of the VAT Directive. 
Extent: There are two rather different but related impacts of this distortion. The first is the VAT revenue 
effects of the exemptions themselves, and the second relates to the recovery of the VAT paid that is the 
object of the exemptions. 
The impact of these exemptions for maritime and air services result in a difference in operating costs 
between these two modes others that compete with them (e.g. rail and bus). The extent of the difference in 
operating costs is not as great as might at first appear. While these two modes do not have to pay VAT on 
their qualifying inputs, the competing modes of rail and bus transport can reclaim the VAT they pay on 
inputs. The additional operating costs to rail and bus operators derive only from the financing costs of VAT 
for the period between when the payments are made and reimbursements received. 
The differences between the two sets of modes (maritime and air vs. rail and bus) apply to all intra-EU 
and extra-EU passenger travel. Tables 2.2 through 2.5 presented earlier in this report show that all Member 
States have VAT rates for intra-EU and extra-EU passengers, even though in many the rate is zero.109 Even 
where the rate is zero, VAT on inputs is deductible. 
 
Table 4.10 - Liability to Pay VAT on Inputs 
Mode Intra-EU Extra-EU 
Maritime Not liable Not liable 
Air Not liable Not liable 
Rail Liable with right to deduct Liable with right to deduct 
Bus Liable with right to deduct Liable with right to deduct 
 
Table 4.11 shows combinations of input and output VAT for a typical transport operator providing intra 
and extra EU passenger services, with non-labour inputs making up about 80% of pre-VAT fares110. 
 
 
                                                   
109 Since neither Malta nor Cyprus have intra-EU or extra-EU rail or bus passengers they do not have corresponding VAT rates. 
110 To maintain consistency, a VAT rate of 10% has been assumed for input and output VAT for all four columns  
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Table 4.11 Example of impact of Article 148 exemption 
 i ii Iii iv 
Modes Rail and Bus 
Rail and Bus Air and 
Maritime All 
Member States 
9 for bus, 7 for 
rail 
17 for bus, 19 
for rail All  
VAT charged on inputs Yes Yes No No 
VAT on fare Yes No No Yes 
Labor input 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 
Non labour input 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 
VAT on non-labour input 2.1 2.1 0.0 0.0 
Total input cost  
inc. VAT on inputs 99.1 99.1 97.0 97.0 
Profit margin on cost  
(excl. VAT on inputs)  3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Pre-VAT fare 102.1 102.1 100.0 100.0 
VAT on fare 10.2 0.0 0.0 10.0 
Fare to passenger 112.3 102.1 100.0 110.0 
% change from exemption with no 
VAT on fare 12.3% 2.1% 0.0% 10.0% 
 
Column (i) shows the effect of a combination of charging VAT on inputs that is deductible, with VAT 
also being charged on outputs, used by many Member States for their Intra-EU and Extra-EU passenger 
services by rail and bus. Column (ii) shows the combination used by most Member States, charging VAT 
in inputs but having fares zero rated. For Intra-EU and Extra-EU passenger services by air and maritime 
transport, all Member States apply a combination of exemption of VAT on inputs and zero-rating VAT on 
outputs (Column (iii). The UK is different in that it applies the third of these combinations to all passenger 
transport modes for Intra-EU and Extra-EU passenger transport111. 
If the Article 148 exemption were to be removed, air and maritime transport would move from column 
(iii) to column (i) or Column (ii) depending on whether VAT would be charged on outputs. If the exemption 
were to be extended to all transport modes, rail and bus transport would move from column (i) to column 
(iii) or to column (iv) which is combination of exemption of VAT on inputs but VAT being charged on 
outputs (this combination is not currently applied by any Member State). 
                                                   
111 Demark exempts domestic passenger services from VAT without the right to deduct VAT on inputs. Ireland exempts domestic 
passenger services without right to deduct input VAT whereas the UK zero rates air, rail, bus and maritime passenger transport 
with the right to deduct input VAT.  
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The combination with the highest passenger fare is that where VAT is charged on both inputs and outputs, 
which is about 12% higher than the lowest where VAT is not charged on inputs or outputs. 
Supporters of retaining the terms of the Article occasionally cite the principle of not taxing international 
trade, of which passenger transport can be considered an important component. 
The overall impact of the exemption on operators has been measured as the total avoided cost of 
financing the VAT liability that maritime and air passenger operators would have incurred if Article 148 
were not operational.  
The value of the goods and services that are subject to the exemptions granted under this Article is large. 
There are no consistent and readily available estimates of the value of inputs to maritime and aviation 
services, and less so for those that are the subject of this Article. To gauge the magnitude of the value of 
the goods and services, we have made estimates based on available data sources from the industry. 
The air transport services referred to in the Article are those for “aircraft used by airlines operating for 
reward chiefly on international routes.” Domestic air passenger services are not covered by the exemption, 
and no distortion is introduced by its application to extra-EU passenger services as those provided by other 
modes of transport (e.g. trains and buses) are also excluded from VAT considerations.  
Extent: The overall cost reduction of the distortions resulting from the implementation of Article 148 is 
small, although the impact on any particular operator might be quite large if its operations are in a highly 
competitive market and where the competitors are not included in the terms of the Article, such as cruise 
lines competing with non-European operators. The overall cost reduction of €121 million (Table 4.12) is 
less than 0.1% of the total operating costs of the affected operators. The impact of eliminating the distortion 
also would be small and unlikely to affect the competitiveness of most operators. 
An example of the impact of the exemption might be an airline purchasing a fleet of ten new aircraft for 
exclusive use on intra-EU and extra-EU routes, or a ferry company purchasing a new vessel for an intra-
EU route. If the total investment cost of either of these were of the order of €500m, and a VAT rate of 10% 
were to be applied, the additional cost to the operator would initially be €50m. But this VAT would be 
recoverable as an input cost, so the real cost to the operator would be the cost of financing the €50m between 
when it was paid and the reimbursement was received. If this period were to be as long a year (the average 
period is about 3 months) and if real interest rates are about 3.5% per year, the cost to the operator would 
be €1.75m. Over the average period of three months it would be €0.44m 
The combination of the ability of operators to recover VAT on inputs when the outputs are positively 
rated, the relatively short periods within which input VAT is now reimbursed by most Member States, and 
the current low interest rates that would apply to funding the VAT during this period, result in a small 






Table 4.12 - Estimation of Operating Cost Impact of Abolition of Article 148112 
  Passenger Mode 
 Unit Air Cruise Ferry Total 
Passengers million 430,341  63.8  
PKM million 660,361    
Unit Operating Cost EUR per PKM 0.11  100  
Total Operating Cost EUR billion 73.9626 6.366 6.386 86.7039 
Labor Share of Cost % 20% 20% 20% 20% 
Non-Labor Cost EUR billion 59.2 5.2 5.2 69.6 
VAT Rate % 20% 20% 20% 20% 
VAT Liability EUR billion 11.8 1.0 1.0 13.86 
Financing Period months 3 3 3 3 
Interest Rate % 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 
Distortion Impact EUR million 103.5 8.95 8.95 121.4 
  
Therefore, while these provisions provide certain operators a cash-flow advantage through not having to 
carry the burden of VAT payments before refunds are issued, this advantage does not lead to significant 
discrimination among operators, as generally all inputs into the business process are deductible (with few 
restrictions and exceptions). The different time to process VAT reimbursements might increase the 
distortion in certain Member States (see distortion 4a). 
In practice, providers of transport inputs, particularly capital, have taken advantage of the lack of 
precision in the wording of Article 148, and the different interpretations by Member States, to minimize 
their VAT liabilities by purchasing assets in one Member State for use in another that has different 
interpretations of the Article. In some cases, these efforts have come close to the line between what is legal 
and what is not, and have resulted in action being taken by the European Court. These have related to both 
shipping (e.g. when a leased private yacht can be considered as being used for passenger or commercial 
activities)113 and aviation (e.g. what is an airline and what should “chiefly on international routes” be defined 
as).114 
If Article 148 were to be rescinded, air and maritime transport operators would need to determine in 
which Member States their inputs had been purchased and take the appropriate actions with the tax 
                                                   
112 The estimates of total passenger kms for air travel, numbers of ferry passengers and operating costs for all the modes are derived 
from an analysis of data from several sources. Air passenger kms were derived from the TREMOVE model and the number of 
ferry passengers derived from Eurostat statistics (Maritime ports freight and passenger statistics). Airline operating costs were 
derived from reports published by CAPA (Center for Aviation) including European Airline Labor Productivity (2013) and 
European Airlines Financial Results (2012). Cruise line operating costs were derived from Contribution of Cruise Tourism to the 
Economies of Europe, (2012), European Cruise Council.  





authorities of those Member States to receive their re-imbursements (as to operators in other transport 
modes that provide Intra-EU and Extra-EU passenger services. If the rescinding of Article 138 were to be 
associated with charging of VAT on Intra-EU and Extra-EU air and maritime passenger services, operators 
would encounter the additional issues associated with determining in which Member State the services had 
been provided (see distortion 4d). 
3b) Specification of Vehicle Use for Passenger Transport for Purposes of Input VAT 
Description: All Member States allow for the deduction of input VAT on vehicles used for the provision 
of commercial passenger transport services (except for cases where passenger transport services are 
exempt). A few Member States apply restrictions, though, mainly in connection with passenger cars.115 In 
various Member States, passenger cars must be used exclusively (Belgium and Romania) or predominantly 
(Hungary (greater than 90% use for taxi services) and the UK (mainly for taxi services)) for commercial 
passenger transport services to allow a full deduction, and others refer to the core activity of the business 
(Bulgaria, Italy, and Portugal). France, in general, restricts the deduction of input VAT on vehicles designed 
for the transport of persons116 as well as related costs, but excludes such used by public transport enterprises 
solely for the transportation of persons from that rule. Poland restricts the deduction of input VAT on road 
vehicles to 50%, except for vehicles used entirely for business purposes and for vehicles designed for the 
carriage of at least 10 persons. 
The deductibility of related costs (e.g. for spare parts, maintenance, and fuel) is mostly bound to the 
deductibility of the respective vehicle. Further restrictions are in place in France (no deduction for VAT on 
petrol, and a full deduction for VAT on LPG and natural gas, with respect to other fuels depending on the 
deductibility of the vehicle117), Hungary (motor fuels are not deductible, purchases in connection with the 
operation and maintenance of passenger cars are deductible only up to 50% (except for car rental 
businesses)), Ireland (VAT on petrol is not deductible, even if used for international passenger transport), 
Poland (VAT on fuel for cars and other motor vehicles less than 3.5 tons, which are not used entirely for 
business purposes, is currently not deductible and will be 50% deductible starting from 1 July 2015), and 
Portugal (fuel used by motor vehicles is, in general, not deductible, except with respect to diesel, LPG, and 
natural gas (50%, in general, and 100% if the vehicle is a large passenger vehicle or is licensed for public 
transport)). 
Extent: The effect of these restrictions is most likely not relevant for competition, as they address the 
possibility of abuse of deductions. We evaluate it as not relevant for purposes of this study. 
3c) Tax Incentives for Fuel and Electricity  
Issue: To encourage the use of public transport in general and, in select transport modes and in certain 
Member States, to have lower VAT rates and reduced tax and duty rates for other inputs. While possibly 
helping to achieve this objective, these lower rates can introduce distortions. 
                                                   
115 In some Member States also with respect to vessels used for sports or pleasure purposes, aircraft, and motorcycles. For details, 
see the country sheets in Vol. 2 of this report. 
116 If they are treated as fixed business assets and not destined for sale as a new asset. 
117 Full deduction, if the vehicle was deductible, if this is not the case: no deduction with respect to aviation fuel, limited to 50% 
for kerosene, and 80% for diesel and E85 fuel. 
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Description: The general distortion of VAT on inputs is already assessed as distortion 3a. The 
descriptive assessment of this distortion is therefore limited to identifying potential distortions within one 
mode of transport (either bus or train) among different Member States. 
Multiple Member States grant providers of passenger transport services tax incentives with respect to 
fuel. However, in most cases this is put into effect by a reduction in excise duties. Regarding gasoil, only 
Portugal and Ireland apply the reduced VAT rate when supplied to railways, whereas eight Member States 
apply reduced excise duties to railways and five Member States exempt gasoil used by railways. With 
respect to buses and road transport, reduced excise duties are in place in Italy and France. Luxembourg and 
Cyprus generally apply reduced VAT rates to LPG. With respect to electricity, Greece, Ireland, and 
Luxembourg apply reduced VAT rates, but six Member States exempt railways from excise duties on 
electricity (five of which also exempt other public transport) and one provides a reduced excise rate. 
Therefore, the majority of tax benefits granted on fuel and electricity seem to be based on excise duties. 
In Germany, train operators do not pay any supplements on electricity except VAT.  
The assessment of distortion 3b recognizes that the main differences among Member States are in 
relation to excise duties on fuel.  
Extent: Although most Member States (19) apply their standard VAT rate to the energy used in 
passenger train services, only two do so while applying a reduced rate to bus passenger services (Belgium 
and Portugal).118 Two Member States have exemptions for gasoil used in rail transport and four apply their 
reduced rate (these are the same four that apply their reduced rate to gasoil used in bus passenger transport). 
Only one Member State has an exemption for VAT on electricity used in rail services, and the same four 
Member States apply their reduced rate. 
Air passenger services are only liable for VAT in the domestic market. Fifteen Member States apply 
their standard rate, nine apply their reduced rate, one applies a zero rate, and two provide exemptions. The 
two exemptions are the same as the energy exemption for bus and rail transport.  
Energy is the smallest component of passenger train operating costs (at 10% to 12%), is rather higher 
for bus operations (up to 20%), and is significantly higher (about 30%) for air passenger operations. 
However, all VAT expenditures on fuel used as an input to passenger transport operations can be reclaimed 
(other than in the Member States where services are exempt from VAT without the right to reclaim). 
As for VAT on other inputs to passenger transport operations, those for energy are refundable, thus the 
only cost distortion is that of financing the difference in energy cost from those operators who do not benefit 
from the distortion. Even when the refund period is long, the financial cost is a small percentage of total 
operator cost. 
The overall impact of this distortion is very small.  
Group 4: Distortion With Regard to Place of Supply 
There are four distortions in this group. The first results in burdens for operators and also influences 
total revenue and its distribution among Member States; the second results in the imposition of additional 
costs on transport operators; the third derives from the part of domestic trips that takes place outside of the 
                                                   
118 An Inventory of measures for internalizing external costs of transport, Final Report, November 2012 
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national territory; and the fourth distortion is a potential distortion that could arise in the case of the taxation 
of international air and maritime passenger transport, and is linked to distortion 1d above. 
4a) Place of VAT Liability: Complexity of Calculating Place of Supply (Distance) of Extra-EU and 
Intra-EU Rail and Road Transport 
Issue: The place of VAT liability has attracted much attention for the administrative costs that it is 
believed to impose on transport operators for its collection and distribution to the various Member States 
through which passenger trips pass. The implementation of this rule is not itself a distortion, but does 
impose higher costs on transport operators than might be incurred with alternative (and simpler) 
specifications of the place of liability for passenger transport VAT for intra-EU travel. 
Extent: This distortion is relevant for rail and bus and for countries that charge VAT on international 
travel (both intra- and extra-EU), namely nine Member States for bus and seven Member States for rail. It 
is important to note that operators from countries that do not impose such charges, but where sections of 
passenger travel occur, also incur such administrative costs. 
 Measuring VAT according to distance obliges companies in the bus and railway passenger transport 
sector to determine VAT for each trip separately. Whereas the use of informatics tools allow for such 
calculations, they do involve start-up and maintenance costs. These costs are largely independent of the 
size of an operator, although more complex route patterns do require more complex software with higher 
costs. Such costs are deemed higher for coach operators, in particular, with regard to journeys involving 
several stopovers. The costs may even be considered as a handicap for small operators that cannot make 
use of professional software tools.      
The correct calculation of distances passengers travel in each country is particularly important for small 
Member States whose passenger travel VAT revenue is largely earned from transit passengers. This 
proportion is higher for Member States located closer to the geographic centre of the EU territory. As an 
indication of the potential importance of this revenue, from the cities included in the City Pairs Model (see 
Chapter 6), about 62% of the total PKM within Belgium is from transit trips between other Member States, 
as compared to 87% from the more centrally located Austria.  
These high percentages are indicative of the importance to small Member States to bear the additional 
administrative cost to ensure all transport operators comply with the supply-based allocation of VAT 
passenger transport revenues. This cost of ensuring compliance by the national VAT administrations is 
possibly higher than that of the operating companies in calculating the distance allocations and amounts, as 
the latter is a more mechanical exercise. 
4b) Additional Compliance Costs 
Supplying passenger transport services in certain Member States necessitates higher administrative costs 
than in others because, for example, rules with respect to registration and returns differ. Furthermore, the 
occasions where output VAT must be paid and when input VAT can be refunded vary considerably between 
Member States. 
In some aspects, detailed rules from the legislation are not always clear and can depend on administrative 
practice. An example is the obligation to register for non-established providers of exclusively international 
passenger transport, which is zero-rated (or exempt with credit respectively) in many Member States (in all 
Member States with respect to maritime shipping and aviation). Based on the information we received from 
national VAT authorities, providers of such zero-rated international passenger transport services are obliged 
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to register in Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, and Spain. In Italy and 
the UK, such providers, in principle, are required to register for VAT as well, but they can apply for an 
exemption with the tax authorities. In Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Ireland, Slovenia, and Sweden, on the other hand, providers of zero-rated international 
passenger transport services are not per se obliged to register. In some of these countries, registration is, 
however, required in order to get a refund for input VAT (e.g. Austria, Denmark, and Finland). However, 
in others this can be done via the procedures of the Council Directives 2008/9/EC (providers established in 
Member States) and 86/560/EEC (providers established in third countries, for example, in Ireland, 
Lithuania, and Sweden). Nevertheless, even if there is the obligation to register for foreign providers, it 
might be not equally enforced among Member States.  
With respect to small taxable persons, most Member States provide some kind of simplification. In most 
cases, an optional VAT exemption is available, with thresholds ranging from approximately EUR 5,000 to 
EUR 100,000 within one year. The detailed requirements of these exemptions, however, differ between 
Member States, for example, with respect to the items included in the calculation of the relevant turnover, 
the reference period (e.g. the calendar year or any 12 subsequent months), and the commencement of VAT 
obligations in case the threshold is exceeded (e.g. a retrospective application to the complete tax year or to 
start even after the month of the transgression). However, the thresholds are so low that only small taxi 
businesses could be concerned. Other simplifications for small businesses include the additional deduction 
of a part of output VAT paid (e.g. Finland and the Netherlands), extended taxable periods, cash-based 
accounting, flat-rate schemes (e.g. the UK or for taxis in Poland), or lump-sum schemes (e.g. urban taxis 
in Cyprus).  
Taxable periods, in general, last between one and three months, and for smaller businesses, can last up 
to one year. Returns and VAT payments are usually due between 10 days and 2 months after the end of the 
relevant tax period and, in the case of annual returns, sometimes later. The period between a taxable supply 
and the relevant VAT payment can, therefore, vary considerably, ranging from less than two weeks to five 
months. This, of course, is not unique to the passenger transport sector. In certain Member States, an annual 
summary return must also be submitted. Closely related to and especially relevant for operators supplying 
occasional services in many different Member States is the obligation to submit nil-returns for tax periods 
in which no taxable turnover was generated. In the majority of cases, such nil-returns are obligatory. 
Exceptions to this rule are found in Austria and, with respect to non-established providers, in Italy and 
Slovakia. 
An issue frequently mentioned in the statements in the Green Paper on the Future of VAT as a possible 
distortion, which is especially relevant for international passenger transport, is the difference regarding the 
deduction of input VAT. In most Member States, input VAT can be recovered in the period the tax point 
occurs or when the invoice is issued. The invoice must, however, be available when applying for the 
deduction. Some Member States, however, also refer to the period the invoice is received. 
Distortions may also arise from the treatment of excess amounts of input VAT deducted. A few Member 
States automatically refund such excesses (e.g. Sweden and the UK). In the majority of cases, a 
corresponding application is necessary. Some Member States, however, restrict the right to receive refunds, 
for example, to certain dates (e.g. in France, Latvia, Luxembourg, and Spain refunds are usually dealt with 
only via the last return of the year) until excess amounts have been carried forward for a certain period (e.g. 
Bulgaria, Portugal, and Slovakia), minimum amounts are reached (e.g. Hungary and Romania), or certain 
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other conditions are fulfilled (e.g. Italy). In many Member States, there are additionally exceptions from 
the general procedures for certain taxable persons or in certain cases.119 Also, the duration of the refund 
procedure varies significantly between Member States, ranging from about 10 days up to a couple of 
months. 
The rules for foreign providers usually match those applied to domestic enterprises with certain 
exceptions: the exemptions for small enterprises, for example, cannot be applied by operators without a 
fixed establishment in the relevant Member State, and a few Member States apply the reverse charge rule 
to B2B suppliers of passenger transport services. Certain Member States provide administrative 
simplifications for foreign providers (e.g. a waiver for nil-returns or simplified tax procedures). Special 
schemes can be available especially for foreign providers of occasional international bus transport (e.g. 
Germany and Poland).  
Only four Member State allow VAT returns in three or more languages, but the effects of this distortion 
are declining as more Member States allow the electronic submission of VAT claims from companies 
registered in other Member States. Since there is a high compatibility in the structure of electronic VAT 
forms between Member States and, so, between different languages, it is easier make electronic 
submissions. Still, certain Member States require 100% compliance in the completion of forms (i.e. if 
differences show up in electronic checks, the forms are rejected).   
Extent: There are two distinct cost impacts of VAT rules and regulations and the distortions that arise 
when they are more complex. One impact is on the public administration for implementing the rules and 
regulations and the other is on the businesses for complying with them. In the assessment of this distortion, 
we consider only the latter.120 Most studies of compliance costs emphasize their variation, some of which 
is found between countries and the other of which is found between different types of company (usually 
distinguished by their size). Most of these studies are macro-economic based and thus focus on the overall 
economic and social cost of compliance, while a few of the more micro-economic focused studies make 
some attempt to estimate the costs on individual companies. A study recently undertaken for TAXUD 
provided a summary of the previous studies.121 The two studies122 we used that provided monetary estimates 
of the costs of compliance were completed several years ago, so their results, as presented here, have been 
indexed to end-2012. 
VAT Compliance Costs in the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden 
One study undertaken in 2005 reported the cost per business of VAT compliance to be between EUR 
180 and EUR 1,510 (EUR 210 to EUR 1,795 in 2012 prices), depending on the country and the number of 
VAT rates to manage (Table 4.13). 
                                                   
119 E.g. for refundable amounts originating from the acquisition of fixed assets, if a high percentage of the business’ supplies are 
zero-rated or if the refundable amount exceeds certain thresholds.  
120 There is some confusion in the literature about how to name these different costs. Some studies refer to the compliance costs on 
companies as the administrative burden on them, but this excludes the indirect costs imposed on other companies. 
121 The Costs of VAT: A review of the literature. 
122 International comparison of measurements of the administrative burdens related to VAT in the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, 




Table 4.13 – VAT Administrative Burden 
Country # VAT 
Rates 
Cost per Business per Year 
(EUR of 2005; indexed to 2012) 
Denmark 1 210 
Netherlands 1 940 
Netherlands 2 1,013 
Norway 1 908 
Norway 2 to 3 501 
Sweden 1 587 
Sweden 2 987 
Sweden 3 1,758 
Source: International comparison of measurements of the administrative burdens related to VAT in the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, SCM Network, 2005, updated to 2012 
 
VAT Compliance Costs in the UK 
Another study from the following year123 estimated the total compliance cost of VAT in the UK to be 
about GBP 1.02 million, which when converted to a cost per company, adjusted for inflation, and converted 
to EUR, is about EUR 862. This figure is between the costs for Norwegian and Swedish VAT companies 
that have to deal with three VAT rates, which is about the same as UK transport companies dealing with 
VAT due on inputs to intra-EU and extra-EU passenger transport.   
If size of the business is also taken into account and is proportional to the number of employees, the 
compliance cost per company for small employers (i.e. less than 50 employees) is highest, for the smaller 
medium-size companies (i.e. 50 to 250 employees) is lowest, and for the larger companies (i.e. more than 
1,000 employees) is second highest. 
Order of Magnitude Estimate of the Distortion 
Airlines, cruise and ferry, and rail companies are all likely to be in the category of large employers, 
while bus companies are a mixture of all sizes. While this data does not specifically relate to transport 
companies, their VAT compliance costs probably follows the same pattern. Hence, the compliance burden 
for complex distance-based VAT rates across several Member States will fall disproportionally on small 
operators. 
There are nearly 250124 transport companies operating in the EU that could provide intra-EU or extra-
EU services that could be affected by this distortion. Company ownership is difficult to distinguish and 
changes rapidly; accordingly, knowing exactly how many companies are affected is difficult to determine. 
However, even if all 250 companies benefited from the distortion, and each company had more than 1,000 
                                                   
123 Administrative Burdens – HMRC Measurement Project, HMRC, 2006 
124 About 150 airlines, 20 railway passenger operators, and 60 bus companies. It is not clear from their websites that all of these 
operators are actually providing intra-EU/extra-EU services. 
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employees, if they were to eliminate all VAT compliance costs, the total cost savings would be less than 
EUR 1 million. 
 
Table 4.14 – VAT Compliance Costs, UK 
 Units Company size by number of employees  
No. of employees Number 0-50 50-250 250-1000 1000+ TOTAL 
Number of companies Number 305,108 865,132 380,836 95,209 1,551,076 
Admin cost per company (2005 
£) 
£/company 2,193 109 202 1,882 608 
Total VAT administrative cost  £m 669 94 76.8 179.2 1019 
Administrative costs (2012 €) €/company 3,361 167 309 2,885 931 
Total administrative cost (2012 
€m) 
€m 1,025.6 144.1 117.7 274.7 1,287 
2012 costs in € based on 2005 prices in £, adjusted by UK inflation and 2012 exchange rate 
Source: Administrative Burdens – HMRC Measurement Project, HMRC, 2006 and UK Government 
Employment database 
 
Estimated compliance cost is based on evidence from four Member States. However, the first study 
noted does provide an indication of how the costs might be higher in Member States that have more complex 
VAT systems and regulations that transport operators have to comply with. The evidence from Sweden 
suggests that compliance costs can be three times higher when a company has to deal with more than one 
VAT rate. If compliance costs were to be directly proportional to the number of VAT rates that a company 
has to deal with, the costs for transport operators in several Member States could be up to ten times higher 
than used in the estimates.  
There is no direct evidence on the VAT compliance costs of having to deal with documents in several 
different languages. With transport operators other than small bus operators, this is unlikely to impose a 
significant burden. However, few small bus operators offer services in multiple Member States, as we found 
only 60 bus companies providing these services.  
To take account of these possible higher costs in an order of magnitude estimate of compliance costs, 
we considered a situation in which the cost per company was 10 times greater than that of UK large 
companies and the number of transport operating companies is four times greater than we have found. Even 
on these assumptions, total VAT compliance cost would still be less than EUR 30 million per year. This is, 
therefore, considered to be a small distortion.125 
                                                   
125 It is highly improbable that eliminating this distortion would reduce VAT compliance costs of the intra-EU and extra-EU 
operating companies to zero, so in this respect the estimate of the compliance cost is possibly a maximum. 
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4c) Different Treatment of Sections in or Above International Areas outside EU 
Issue: Member States have their own regulations for determining the VAT liability for passenger 
transport that takes place in international water or airspace when it forms part of a domestic trip. Resulting 
distortions are due to the fact that Member States may have difficulties in measuring the distance of journeys 
that are not entirely domestic and they are, therefore, a result of the current rules to define the place of 
supply as the place where the transport effectively takes place. 
Description: Sections of international waters are treated differently among Member States when they 
are crossed in the course of otherwise domestic journeys. According to information we received from 
national VAT authorities, such trips are commonly considered domestic passenger transport (with the 
exceptions of Estonia, where such journeys are regarded as international transport, and Germany, where 
VAT treatment depends on the distance covered in and outside German territorial waters), unless there is 
stopover in foreign territory. Even between those Member States that consider such trips domestic, there 
are differences with respect to the distance that is subject to national VAT. In certain Member States, the 
distance travelled through national territorial waters is taxed at the rate for domestic transport, whereas the 
section through international waters is regarded as outside the scope of national VAT and is, therefore, 
zero-rated (e.g. in France (see e.g. ECJ Case C-30/89), the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain). Italy (see ECJ 
Case C-283/84), on the other hand, also taxes sections of international waters between the Italian peninsula 
and Sardinia (at the rate for domestic transport). The same holds for Sweden (travel to Gotland). The UK 
considers sections through international waters, and even sections through foreign territorial waters, 
domestic, although in most cases the tax rate will be zero. 
Another possible source of distortion closely related to this is the differentiation between domestic and 
international transport. Many Member States define international transport as transport where the place of 
departure, the place of arrival, or both (often as indicated on the ticket) are outside the territory of the 
relevant Member State (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, and Romania). Journeys starting and ending within 
the Member State, therefore, seem to be considered domestic, even if the territory of another country is 
crossed. Sweden, on the other hand, treats a transport service as international if only a short section takes 
place in the territory or the territorial waters of another country (sections through international waters, 
however, do not constitute international transport).  
Finally, certain Member States also apply derogations to the normal place of supply rules. The most 
prominent example is Germany, which treats short sections in foreign countries as domestic and short 
domestic sections as foreign, subject to certain conditions. 
Extent: The extent of this distortion is believed to be very limited as few domestic trips pass through 
international airspace or waters. However, the distortion appears to raise important issues for some Member 
States.   
Many of the instances of domestic travel that pass outside of the national territory for some part of its 
distance are addressed under Distortion 1f. This assessment illustrated the limited impact of these instances 
of the distortion. 
A land-based variation of this distortion is where domestic passengers might extend their trip a short 
distance to an international destination and then make a return international trip to their real destination. 
With two international trips that are zero-rated replacing one domestic trip that is positively rated, the 
passenger could incur a lower overall cost. In the City Pairs Model, we have examined 12 possible instances 
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of this distortion and found that it does not apply to any of them.126 Invariably, travel on an international 
train is at a higher cost per kilometre than on a domestic train, making this potential distortion not cost 
effective. Even where the trains have the same fare, there are few instances of a station in the second country 
that is close enough to the border to avoid incurring high distance costs. For these instances, we found that 
the domestic distance that would have to be travelled to make the trip cost effective would be about 1,500 
kilometres (depending on the VAT rate of the Member State). This, again, dramatically reduces the possible 
instances of this distortion. 
4d) Difficulty in Determining Place of Supply (Distance) of Extra-EU and Intra-EU Air and Sea 
Transport 
Issue: If extra-EU and intra-EU sea and air travel were to be positively rated for VAT, it would be 
difficult to determine what distance had been travelled in the territorial water or air space of the transited 
Member States.  
Description: Sea and air transport of passengers for extra-EU and intra-EU travel is zero-rated for VAT 
purposes. Although the generally accepted explanation of the different treatment of these modes of transport 
to those for land transport refers to historical taxation habits (see description of distortion 1d), it would be 
virtually impossible to create equal treatment between different modes of transport under the current rules 
if Member States intended to tax extra-EU and intra-EU passenger transport. As a result, those Member 
States that tax extra-EU and intra-EU passenger transport only tax road, railway, and inland navigation 
transport services. 
Extent: Rail and, to a lesser extent, road transport is constrained in its distances and routes by the fixed 
infrastructure that it uses, which subsequently limits the complexity of calculating the distances travelled 
in each Member State for the liability to account for VAT. Sea and air transport are less constrained in this 
sense. Passenger vessels have a wider scope in their use of shipping lanes and passenger aircraft are 
constrained by available flight paths. These can be indirect because of military air space and other 
constraints and the actual flight paths might be different to those planned because of congestion and other 
reasons. Given that the distances actually travelled by air and sea are in many cases much greater than for 
rail or road transport, the distortion would be greater than for those modes if sea or air travel were to be 
positively rated for VAT. In the broader sense, this potential distortion represents the ultimate cause of 
distortion 1d, because it complicates the taxation of air and sea travel. The extent to be quantified would 
thus represent a strict subset of distortion 1d (i.e. the amount of VAT collected by companies providing 







                                                   
126 See City Pairs Model for the examples 
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Figure 4.1 – Extra Air Distance Flown Related to Direct Distance 
 
Source: ATM Flight Efficiency and its Impact on the Environment, EEC/ENV/2003/001 
 
On average, air flight distances in Europe are about 8% longer than they would be using great circle 
routes. Part of this is attributable to the pattern of available flight paths, which do not necessarily follow the 
shortest distance routes.127 Other differences are attributable to constraints imposed by military air space 
(many of these are permanent, but some are imposed at short notice and for relatively short periods). While 
still others are attributable to climatic circumstances (e.g. a dramatic incidence of this occurred in 2010 
with the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Iceland.) 
A third major category of additional flight distances is that attributable to congestion and the elongated 
flight paths or holding patterns that are imposed to compensate for the congestion.  
The estimate of the size of this potential distortion is measured by the extra airline costs incurred for the 
less than minimum distances travelled and the extra-VAT incurred if it were to be applied to these modes 
of travel for intra-EU and extra-EU travel.  
Several estimates have been made on the cost of additional flight distances, one of which was conducted 
by Eurocontrol as a measure of its own effectiveness and of the environmental impacts of the additional 
aviation fuel burned. An estimate made in 2002 found the additional airline operating cost was roughly 
EUR 1.6 billion to EUR 2.1 billion per year, which, taking account of increases in airline operating costs, 
is equivalent to about EUR 2.1 billion and EUR 2.8 billion per year. These costs were for all commercial 
passenger flights. 
Since airline costs are usually measured in costs per hour, this was the basis of the Eurocontrol estimate. 
However, to estimate the potential VAT impact of the additional distances and the potential estimation 
errors, we have converted the in-flight component of these hours to kilometres. We have further assumed 
                                                   
127ATM Flight Efficiency and its Impact on the Environment, EEC/ENV/2003/001 
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an average airfare of EUR 0.10 per kilometre, an average aircraft occupancy of 100 passengers, and a 
potential VAT rate of 10%. 
 
Table 4.15 – Estimate of VAT Revenue from Additional Flight 
Distances 





Average Passengers Per 
Aircraft 
Passengers 100 
Additional PKM PKM (million) 35,765 
Average Fare EUR  per PKM 0.10 
VAT Rate % 0.1 
Extra VAT Revenue EUR (million) 367.6 
 
The indicated order of magnitude of the additional PKM travelled would be about 36 billion and the 
VAT revenue generated resulting from air space restrictions would be about EUR 368 million.   
The additional maritime distances that have to be sailed are mostly for climatic reasons, while only 
occasionally to avoid restricted maritime space or for congestion on maritime routes.128 There is no data on 
the additional distances that cruise ships and ferries have to travel to compensate for these restrictions. The 
total number of ferry passengers using European ports was about 213 million in 2012, but only about one-
third, or approximately 70 million, of these passengers were on intra-EU or extra-EU trips, which taken 
together with the 6 million cruise passengers, is only 36% of intra-EU and extra-EU air passengers.  
There is no data on the average distance maritime passenger travel, or on the extra distances travelled 
for each diversion or for the frequency of diversions. If we assume the parameter values indicated in Table 
2.5 presented earlier in our report, the risk of an unaccounted diversion in the maritime sector is the same 
order of magnitude as for the air passenger sector. 
 
Table 4.16 - Estimate of VAT Revenue from Additional Maritime Distances 
  Ferry Cruise 
Average Extra km per Sailing km 50 100 
Sailings Diverted % 1% 1% 
Number Of Sailings per  1,800 1,980 
Average Passengers per Sailing passengers 100 1,300 
Average Fare EUR per trip 50 1,500 
                                                   




VAT Rate % 0.1 0.1 
Extra VAT Revenue EUR million 0.45 386.1 
    
 
Compliance Cost 
Software is available that allows airlines to calculate the en-route navigation charges to Eurocontrol 
based on the flight distances travelled. This software would be easily adaptable to calculate the VAT 
charges due for overflights of intra-EU and extra-EU passenger flights. With the availability of the software, 
the probability of airlines having difficulty in estimating the actual distances that their flights travel is very 
low. If this is the case, the cost of avoiding this potential distortion is very low. Airlines already have the 
capacity to calculate flight and passenger distances as part of their yield management activities, and these 
estimates could be used to calculate the VAT liability when the passenger ticket is purchased (as it is for 
those Member States that have a positive VAT rate on domestic air passengers). These estimates would 
need to be reconciled with actual distances travelled. While potentially a high administrative cost, the 
availability of appropriate software would make it manageable at a low cost.  
 
Figure 4.2- Eurocontrol Software to Estimate Flight Distances 
 
 
For cruise lines, which already have sophisticated software that allows optimization of their revenue 
yield and operating costs, it is highly probable that they also have software that would allow them to 
estimate the actual distances that their vessels travel. If they do not, it is also highly probable that software 
companies will make it available should it be needed. For ferry operators, the probability that they already 
have such software is less than for cruise lines as some of them are relatively small operators with few 
vessels operating in less competitive markets. Nevertheless, even if the full costs are incurred, they will be 
relatively small since, over the short distances of most ferry routes, voyages between a specific origin port 
and destination port have little opportunity for variation. 
Overall Impact 
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The assessment of this distortion is that its impact on potential distances travelled, compared with least 
cost routes, would be moderate for air and cruise line travel and small for ferry routes, and the administrative 
costs in estimating those distances for all three modes would be small. 
We assess the potential impact of this distortion as large in respect to airline operating costs, medium in 
terms of potential VAT differences due from passenger flights, and small in terms of estimating flight and 
voyage distances. 
Overall Assessment of Distortions 
Table 4.17 provides a summary of the assessment of distortions. 
 







1 - Different VAT Rates 
1a Different VAT rates within one mode 
at the domestic level 




1b Different VAT rates between modes at 
the domestic level  
Only applies to three MS Very small 
1c Different VAT rates within one mode 
between domestic, extra-EU, and intra-
EU 
-1.8 billion 
Reduced PKM from 
distortion 
Medium 
1d Different VAT rates between modes for 
domestic, extra-EU, and intra-EU 
-0.5 billion 
Reduced PKM from 
distortion 
Medium 
1e Different delimitation between 





1f Lower VAT rates applied in certain 
regions at the domestic level 
 
 Small 
2 - Scope of Passenger Transport Services and Associated Supplies 
2a Definition of passenger transport and 
related incidental services 
400 
million* 
Excess VAT collected on 
taxis etc. in UK 
Small 
2b Consumption on board ships, aircraft, 
or trains 
n.a. 
Not addressed in this study 
3 - Treatment of Inputs in the Passenger Transport Sector 
3a Exemptions following Article 148 of 
VAT Directive / Delay in processing 
VAT refunds 
121 million 
Estimate of possible 
added financial cost to 
operators  
Not large 
3b Specification of vehicle use for 
passenger transport for purposes of 
input VAT deductibility 
 
Aimed at avoiding abuse 
of deductions 
Not relevant for 
competitive 
purposes 
3c Tax incentives on fuel and electricity 
between Member States 
 
 Very small 
4 - Place of Supply 
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4a Complexity of calculating the place of 
supply (distance) of extra-EU and intra-
EU rail and road transport 
 
 Small 
4b Additional compliance costs 




4c Different treatment of sections in/above 
international areas outside EU 
  Small 
4d Difficulty in determining the place of 
supply (distance) of extra-EU/intra-EU 
air and sea transport 







                                                   
 
 
129 e.g. different registration and documentation requirements, invoicing rules, VAT returns, languages 
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Chapter 5 - Policy Options to Address Distortions 
Chapter 5 presents the alternative VAT reform scenarios that we are using to assess how to address the 
distortions described in Chapter 4. Specifically, we identify 11 policy scenarios, which are discussed in the 
remainder of this Chapter and then evaluated in Chapter 6. 
VAT Reform Scenarios 
VAT Scenario 1 
Output VAT on all modes of passenger transport in the urban, other domestic, and intra-EU markets will 
be set at national standard rates while the current input VAT rates will be retained to approximate the 
principle of VAT without output exemptions in the application of national rates. Scenario 1 would have a 
large impact on inter-modal competition between air and rail in the intra-EU markets, where air is currently 
the dominant mode and is zero-rated for VAT. It would also have a large impact on total demand for urban 
and other domestic passengers in the Member States where these services are currently rated lower than the 
standard rates, especially in the UK, where most passenger travel is zero-rated, and in Ireland, where it is 
exempted from VAT.  
Scenario 1 is aimed at reducing distortions within and between modes (Distortions 1a-d, Table 4.16, 
presented earlier in our report). It would not address distortions arising from Member States applying 
different VAT rates to each other. This scenario would involve ending the temporary derogations that allow 
the use of VAT rates for passenger transport that are lower than the national standard rates, some of which 
have continued for decades rather than the originally-intended five years.  
VAT Scenario 2  
Scenario 2 is similar to Scenario 1; however, the output VAT rates are set to the reduced national rates. 
The objective of this scenario is similar to that of Scenario 1, but it is intended to have a smaller negative 
impact on the demand for urban and other domestic transport, as many Member States currently apply less 
than the standard rate.130 This scenario would also have a smaller impact on competition between air and 
sea transport in the intra-EU market, as the VAT increase in these modes would be less than that in Scenario 
1.  
VAT Scenario 3 
Scenario 3 is based on Scenario 1, except Scenario 3 changes the place of taxation from the Member 
State in which the transport service is provided to the Member State of passenger departure. The objective 
of this scenario would be to reduce the distortions that arise from the requirement of passenger services 
operators to calculate, charge, and distribute VAT based on the distance the passenger travels in each 
Member State through which he or she passes. We choose the option of “departure point” and do not 
separately consider the option of “arrival point,” as we assume that most intra-EU trips are round-trip and, 
                                                   
130 See Chapter 3 for the details of which Member States apply standard, reduced, super-reduced, and zero/exempt VAT rates to 
passenger transport outputs. 
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hence, the considerations applying to each option are similar.131 A justification for this assumption is 
provided in the “Note on Multi-Sector Trips and Definition of Place of Departure” presented later in this 
Chapter.  
VAT Scenario 4 
 Scenario 4 is the same as Scenario 2, except with a change in place of taxation as per Scenario 3. 
VAT Scenario 5 
Scenario 5 utilizes current VAT rates, but with the place of taxation as per Scenario 3. 
VAT Scenario 6 
Scenario 6 utilizes current output VAT rates and abolishes Article 148 of the VAT Directive exempting 
VAT on selected passenger transport inputs. It, therefore, extends VAT to the inputs used to provide sea 
and air passenger services. Under Article 148, aircraft must operate “chiefly for hire or reward on 
international routes” while ships must navigate “on the high seas.” Since “the high seas” are, for legal 
purposes, maritime areas outside of territorial waters, there is some (but not exact) comparability between 
the conditions for ships and aircraft to qualify for the exemption. Since there is no land equivalent of the 
high seas, we will use a similar condition for trains and buses to that for aircraft to allow them to qualify 
for the exemption. As for aircraft, international routes for trains and buses will include both intra-EU and 
extra-EU routes. The objective of this scenario is to remove one distortion of competition between transport 
modes in the intra-EU market (however evaluated in Chapter 4 as being of a small magnitude).  
VAT Scenario 7 
The objective of Scenario 7 is the same as that of Scenario 5; however, instead of removing the 
exemptions of Article 148, it extends its provisions to inputs for bus and passenger rail services. Since there 
is no land equivalent of “the high seas,” this scenario requires use of a similar condition for trains and buses 
as that for aircraft to qualify for the exemption. As for aircraft, international routes for trains and buses will 
include both intra-EU and extra-EU routes. 
VAT Scenario 8 
Scenario 8 is similar to VAT Scenario 4, which utilizes the Member State of passenger departure as 
where VAT liability is incurred, and extends that liability to the domestic part of an extra-EU passenger 
trip.  
VAT Scenario 9  
Scenario 9 is similar to VAT Scenario 8; however, the VAT liability for VAT on extra-EU passengers 
is based on the fare before user charges or taxes are added, with specific ticket taxes eliminated as they are 
replaced by VAT. This is consistent with VAT based on value-added and the taxes and user charges not 
reflecting any benefit. User charges that are to recover the costs of using transport infrastructure would 
                                                   
131 Exceptions are trips that involve permanent relocation outside the Member State of departure and trips for which one way might 
entail a different mode than the return. These two factors are assumed to be of a second order of magnitude. 
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remain included in the basis for VAT. This variation is intended to reduce the negative impact of imposing 
VAT on extra-EU passengers on total demand.  
VAT Scenario 10 
This scenario implements the one-stop-shop provision for VAT transactions and addresses distortions 
4a and 4b. 
VAT Scenario 11 
Finally, Scenario 11 utilizes current domestic rates, but harmonizes the rates on non-domestic transport 
to zero (or exemption with right to deduct). 
  
Table 5.1 – Summary of Alternative VAT Scenarios 
Scenario Description of VAT Scenario 
Distortions 
Addressed 
Method of  
Assessment 
1 
The national standard rates will apply to outputs of all 




The national reduced rates will apply to all modes of urban, 
other domestic, and intra-EU passenger transport. If no 
reduced rate exists, the standard rate will apply. 
1 Q 
3 
Similar to Scenario 1, but with the place of taxation 
changed to the Member State of departure. 
1, 4a, 4d Q 
4 
Similar to Scenario 2, but with the place of taxation 
changed to the Member State of departure. 
1, 4a, 4d Q 
5 
Current VAT rates, but the place of taxation changed to the 
Member State of departure. 
 
4a, 4d Q 
6 





Exemptions according to Article 148 of the VAT Directive 
extended to buses and trains. 
3a O 
8 
Similar to Scenario 4, but with the obligation to extend 
VAT to extra-EU passengers departing from a Member 
State. 
1, 4a, 4c, 4d Q 
9 
Similar to Scenario 8, but with VAT applied to pre-tax 
fares as for the Air Passenger Duty. 
1, 4a, 4c, 4d O 
10 Implementation of one-stop-shop for all VAT transactions. 4a, 4b D 
11 
Current rates apply on all domestic transport. Intra-EU and 
extra-EU rates set to zero for all operators. 
1d, 4b Q 




Possible Additional Administrative Distortions from the Implementation of 
Scenarios 
For operators in transport modes that are currently VAT zero-rated, there would be additional 
administrative costs (distortions) in all scenarios except for Scenario 6. The impact of Scenario 10 would 
be to reduce additional costs; however, they would, nevertheless, continue from the other scenarios. 
For operators in transport modes that are currently positively VAT rated, there would be administrative 
cost reductions with Scenarios 3, 4, 7, and 10. There would be no administrative cost reductions from 
Scenarios 1, 2, and 6: they would still have to manage different VAT rates in each Member State as well as 
VAT charged on inputs. There would be an administrative cost increase with Scenarios 8 and 9, as they 
would be responsible for collecting VAT due on extra-EU travel, but this and other administrative costs 
would be less with Scenario 10. 
Passenger Trips Excluded from the Quantitative Assessments  
Cruise passengers and tourist coach passengers are not included in the ETISplus database and, therefore, 
cannot be included in the same quantification of outcomes as other passengers. There is data on the current 
number of cruise line passengers for nine Member States, which accounts for 97% of European cruise 
passengers, and three markets (but not the same market definitions as used in this Study). This will be 
estimated using projected growth rates for cruise trade and used in an order of magnitude estimate of the 
impacts of each VAT scenario on this category of passenger. There is no equivalent estimate of tourist 
coach passengers; rather, there is only an estimate of the total coach market size for 12 Member States and 
estimates of the coach share of the bus and coach market of the EU-27. There are no projections of demand 
available for coach passengers, so with the limited data on the current market size, we will make a 
descriptive assessment of the VAT scenarios for coach passengers.  
Note on Multi-Sector Trips and Definition of Place of Departure 
Two Sector and Multi-Sector Trips 
The database we will use for the modelling method of quantifiable assessment (see Chapter 6) includes 
one-way single sector trips. The assumption in compiling the database is that all passenger trips are of two 
sectors, one origin to destination, and the other using that destination as the origin of a return trip. There 
are no records of more complex trips, such as those with multiple destinations, which could be included in 
the database. Even if such data were available, its introduction into the database would increase its 
complexity because of the vast number of different types of trips required to be included, with many 
different combinations of origins, intermediate, and final destinations. Even the specification of multi-sector 
trips would require a restructuring of the model to accommodate the concept of intermediate destinations. 
As far as we are aware, there is no analysis of what proportion of total trips are multiple rather than two-
sector trips. Recent changes in the structure of the airline industry and in airline fare policies have reduced 
the incentives for multi-sector tickets. The route structure of low-cost airlines is based on direct origin to 
destination travel and airlines offer few or no incentives to passengers to make multi-sector trips. 
Conventional airlines tend to lose revenue yield with multi-sector travel and, consequently, the practice is 
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discouraged through pricing strategies.132 By combining recent IATA estimates of multi-sector and total 
international air passengers, it appears that the former represented less than 2% of the total in 2010.133 There 
are no equivalent published estimates of the proportion of multi-destination trips for other transport modes.  
Our database limits us to considering two sector travel; however, since multi-sector travel accounts for 
such a small percentage of air trips (less than 2%) and a declining share of total trips, we assume that all 
trips are two-sector trips and that this assumption will not introduce any significant errors into our analyses. 
Additional Costs of Arrival Point of VAT Liability  
There are few differences in the impacts of an arrival or departure option for the location of liability for 
VAT. In the only previous comprehensive assessment of these two alternatives, there was found to be some 
additional accounting cost compared to a departure option, as most scheduled airlines locate their hub in 
their home country. This is the place of departure rather than arrival for most of their passengers (passengers 
are more likely to use an airline based in their home country than one based in another country) as well as 
where the airline’s main accounting facility is located. However, it was concluded: “under the arrival 
option, the additional cost of VAT accounting should not be particularly onerous.”134 
Notwithstanding the similarities between an arrival and a departure option, a departure option would 
require certain special considerations: 
Special considerations for a place of departure option: 
 Definition of place of departure: For many passengers, defining the place of departure would not be 
difficult. However, some issues would need to be addressed for multi-sector trips where there is an 
intermediate break between the places of departure and destination. These could be treated as a single 
trip or two separate trips. The former would be more practical where the first leg is a feeder to the second 
leg, while the latter would be more appropriate for a second case where the two parts of the trip are 
largely independent of each other. The departure point could be defined as the place where the passenger 
travel begins. In VAT regimes where “intra-EU legs” of extra-EU trips were to come within VAT 
coverage, the place of departure for inbound journeys could be defined as the external EU frontier. This 
would detract from one of the main advantages of a place of departure VAT liability as it would require 
the use of distances to determine VAT liability, whereas the VAT liability for all other passenger trips 
would depend only on the ticket price. Where operators issue “through” tickets (which involve the 
passenger traveling with a number of transport operators using a ticket issued by a single operator), the 
same issues and principles could apply. 
 Intra-EU sector of extra-EU trips: A resolution would be needed for the situation of non-EU operators 
providing passenger services wholly or partly within the EU. A mechanism will need to be put into 
place to ensure that such operators include VAT in the first case and, in the second, for the regimes 
where VAT is applied to the intra-EU part of extra-EU trips. 
 Return journeys: Another issue to be addressed is that of return journeys for which the passenger buys 
                                                   
132 Flying Off-Course: Airline Economics and Marketing Fourth Edition, Rigas Doganis, Routledge, 2010 
133 http://www.iata.org/about/pages/history_2.aspx and http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/pages/2012-12-06-01.aspx 
134 KPMG, 1997 
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a single ticket for both the outbound and return leg of the trip. Such return travel could be considered 
as two separate trips, with the relevant departure VAT assessed separately for each, but the sum of the 
two included in the ticket price. 
 Multi-sector trips: There are at least two VAT options for passengers making trips that require stops in 
at least one intermediate destination. The first option, to have one ticket with multiple sections, would 
be relatively easy to address, with each intermediate stop being the place of departure for the next leg of 
the trip. The second option would need to address tickets that cover a region or period without 
intermediate destinations defined. The simplest solution would be to charge the VAT rate of the first 
point of departure, but this might not reflect the VAT liability actually incurred with use of the ticket.  
 Stopovers: Stopovers are similar to intermediate destinations of multi-sector trips when a passenger 
makes them voluntarily. However, stopovers require a different consideration when they are 
imposed by the operator and are not intermediate destinations from the passenger perspective. A 
mechanism would be required to distinguish between the two situations, allowing two places of 
departure for the first and only one for the second. 
 Documentation issues: Whichever definition of place of departure is used, operator accounting and 
ticketing systems would have to identify the place of departure for each segment of the journey. For 
simple one-way trips, VAT liability will be more straightforward than with the current place of service 
VAT liability, as only one VAT rate will apply to the whole trip and there will be no need to use distances 
travelled in each Member State to calculate the VAT charge. Even for simple return trips, calculation 
and accounting will be simpler than under the current system. However, for multi-stop trips, the 
administration will not be very different. Each segment will have to be considered a separate trip. 
Otherwise, if a formula based on distance travelled in each Member State were to be used, there would 
be no difference to the current situation for this type of trip. 
From a business passenger’s perspective, reclaiming VAT on passenger travel would be simplified as 
there would be fewer Member States to deal with and the liability for each will be easier to calculate. Even 
for the multi-sector trips, accounting for the reclaim process will be simpler. The information provided on 
the passenger’s ticket should be sufficient to enter the VAT deduction or refund claims with relative ease.  
Note on the Pass-Through Coefficient 
Not all changes in VAT rates will be fully passed through from the operators who are liable for the VAT 
to the passengers. Depending on the level of competition in the market in which the operators’ service is 
being provided, the percentage of change in VAT passed through to passenger fares will be different. 
However, there is little empirical evidence on what percentage of previous changes in VAT have been 
passed through.  
The previous study of the VAT regime and competition in the field of passenger transport noted: “the 
extent to which any tax costs will be passed on to consumers will depend on the operators’ cost structure... 
and the degree of competition that they face.” The study also noted: “...the flatter their  (average) cost 
structures and the more competition that exists in the market, the less scope there will be for absorption of 
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tax costs by the operator and the higher will be the degree of pass-through.”135 Based on these premises, 
the study presented three scenarios: 
 A perfectly competitive case where all costs arising from VAT charges are passed through; 
 An imperfect competitive case where only 50% of these costs are passed through; and,  
 A central scenario with 60% to 90% of costs passed through, with the exact amount determined 
by the extent of competition on the particular route. 
Only in the third of these scenarios was there any distinction made between the extent of the pass-
through and the level of competition on a particular route. The other two scenarios applied the same pass-
through rate (100% or 50%) to all routes. 
To better understand how the imposition of new VAT rates changes market equilibrium in transport 
markets, we have utilized a theoretical framework of an n-firm Cournot oligopoly market with ad valorem 
taxation. A Cournot model is an appropriate tool to analyse equilibrium in imperfectly competitive markets 
when firms face capacity constraints, as in transport markets. This tool is also general enough to allow the 
treatment of two extreme cases of perfect competition and pure monopoly. The imposition of VAT alters 
market equilibrium. In comparative statics, output distortion and the resulting consumer price adjustments 
can be observed. Our analysis in the above theoretical framework showed that the magnitude of equilibrium 
price adjustment is, in general, determined by three key factors: demand elasticity, technology, and the level 
of competition measured by number of firms in the market. More specifically, the impact of tax on 
consumer price is expected to be larger on:  
 More demand-inelastic markets, 
 More competitive markets, and  
 When firms face higher marginal costs.  
While our theoretical results support the assumptions adopted in previous studies of the VAT regime in 
the field of passenger transport, we acknowledge the fact that they all interact and might drive consumer 
prices in a complex way. For example, the modes that are more competitive are, at the same time, more 
demand-elastic, leading to opposing influences on the tax on pass-through. Therefore, assessing the 
magnitude of tax impact for different transport modes (including the possibility of overshifting) is purely 
an empirical issue and, if possible, should not be based on simple generalizations.  
In our empirical analysis, we adopt a pass-through measure, which is defined as the portion of monetary 
tax liability resulting from an increased tax rate that is shifted to consumer price. We believe that this way 
of measuring the tax impact is convenient and informative for policy making. We performed calculations 
of pass-through coefficients for all country-mode pairs in a step procedure. First, we utilized regression 
techniques to estimate the size of the pass-through effect resulting from VAT rate changes in four passenger 
transport modes on an EU-28 level. We analysed a unique dataset with 112 cross sections (country-mode 
combinations) and 11 time series. In our estimation, we controlled for input prices, market structure, and 
demand shifters, which possibly determine consumer prices. Unlike some empirical studies that provide 
evidence of tax overshifting on various markets, we have obtained less than complete pass-through 
magnitudes for all four transport modes.  
                                                   
135 KPMG, 1997, p 91 
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In the second step, we utilized data on market concentration to quantify the impact of competition on 
pass-through magnitudes. We obtained a result that is in line with the theoretical insights from the Cournot 
oligopoly analysis. On more concentrated markets, pass-through on consumers is smaller, and this 
difference between perfect competition (HHI=0) and monopoly (HHI=1) equates to an additional 20 cents. 
Using this figure, we were able to scale mode-specific values of tax pass-through with HHI levels in each 
of the EU-28 countries. Our major underlying assumption is that intra-mode demand elasticity and 
technology are fixed and that those pass-through effects follow ceteris paribus differentiation of competition 
intensity in particular countries. Linking theoretical insights with empirical analyses of historical passenger 
transport data, we obtained reliable estimates of the tax pass-through for utilization in the TREMOVE 
model (see Table 5.2). As discussed in Chapter 6, the simulations for the various policy scenarios will be 
presented with two sets of results, the first set assuming a full pass-through, and the second set incorporating 
the estimated coefficients in Table 5.2136.For a more in-depth discussion of the model and methodology, see 
Appendix D. 
 
Table 5.2 – Calculated Pass-Through Rates 
 Rail Road Waterways Air 
Country HHI PASS-T HHI PASS-T HHI PASS-T HHI PASS-T 
AT 0.78 0.49 0.31 0.41   0.31 0.05 
BE 0.93 0.46 0.24 0.42   0.10 0.09 
BG 1.00 0.44 0.06 0.46 0.62 0.22 0.15 0.08 
CY     0.13 0.32 0.06 0.10 
CZ 0.98 0.45 0.10 0.45   0.16 0.08 
DE 0.77 0.49 0.01 0.47 0.07 0.33 0.25 0.06 
DK 0.77 0.49 0.16 0.44 0.42 0.26 0.19 0.07 
EE 0.43 0.56 0.56 0.36 0.42 0.26 0.20 0.07 
ES 0.88 0.47 0.04 0.46 0.13 0.32 0.12 0.08 
FI 1.00 0.44 0.28 0.41 0.25 0.29 0.55 0.00 
FR 0.74 0.50 0.22 0.42 0.11 0.32 0.25 0.06 
GR 1.00 0.44 0.02 0.47 0.09 0.33 0.14 0.08 
HU 0.51 0.54 0.01 0.47   0.10 0.09 
HR 1.00 0.44 0.01 0.47 0.52 0.24   
IE 1.00 0.44 0.51 0.37 0.17 0.31 0.25 0.06 
IT 0.83 0.48 0.01 0.47 0.09 0.33 0.13 0.08 
LT 1.00 0.44 0.08 0.45 0.50 0.24 0.30 0.05 
LU 1.00 0.44 0.10 0.45   0.43 0.02 
LV 1.00 0.44 0.15 0.44 0.59 0.23 0.39 0.03 
MT   0.11 0.45 0.29 0.29 0.26 0.06 
NL 0.91 0.46 0.25 0.42 0.16 0.31 0.10 0.09 
                                                   
136 The effect of different pass-through estimates in the various scenarios is not strictly linear, as the business exemption of VAT 
on travel introduce differences among countries and modes. 
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PL 0.26 0.59 0.01 0.47 0.34 0.28 0.27 0.05 
PT 0.94 0.46 0.01 0.47 0.29 0.29 0.40 0.03 
RO 0.93 0.46   1.00 0.14 0.28 0.05 
SE 0.46 0.55 0.12 0.44 0.27 0.29 0.22 0.06 
SI 1.00 0.44 0.06 0.46 0.35 0.27 0.43 0.02 
SK 0.98 0.45 0.06 0.46   0.70 0.00 
UK 0.06 0.63 0.13 0.44 0.18 0.31 0.12 0.08 
Mode 
Average 




Chapter 6. Simulation of Policy Scenarios   
Introduction 
In Chapter 5, we discussed the 11 policy scenarios that could be used to inform any eventual decision of 
how best to address the distortions reviewed and quantified in Chapter 4. In this Chapter, we report the 
results of the assessments of those scenarios. We start with a short comparison at the EU28 level of the 
major projected outcomes of the scenarios that have been capable of quantification. This is followed by a 
more thorough assessment the scenarios, offering a detailed breakdown at the Member State level and an 
indication of the possible outcomes for selected routes. 
Both the EU28 and the detailed assessments of the quantifiable scenarios make use of two sets of 
simulations. The first, using TREMOVE and EDIP models, provides basic results at the EU28 and Member 
State level, and a separate model (CPM), provides specific results at the route (city pairs) level. All scenario 
assessments are made relative to the current VAT rates in force in the Member States (referred to as business 
as usual (BAU)) for each of the four markets (urban, other domestic, intra-EU, and extra-EU). To provide 
context for the scenario assessments, we provide an outline quantification of the BAU baseline. The 
quantification of the BAU and assessments of the quantified scenarios are provided for the years 2020 (as 
an indication of the short-term impacts) and 2030 (as an indication of the longer-term impacts). The 
assessments are based on projections of six main parameters (PKM, VAT revenue, operator revenue, 
change in Member State GDP, change in Member State employment, and CO2 emissions) and are supported 
by two supplementary parameters (GDP distribution and NOx emissions). The CPM provides fewer 
parameters (fare, number of passengers, and VAT revenues), but at a much greater level of detail. To 
simplify the presentation of results, only those for 2030 are presented here. Those for 2020 have a similar, 
but less pronounced pattern, as the short-term fare elasticities are lower than those for the long-term used 
for 2030. 
We have not made our own projections of the economic and social parameters for the BAU that provide 
the framework for the models used (such as population and GDP), but instead use those incorporated in the 
2010 Transport White Paper. We also assume that its proposals will be implemented according to the 
schedules indicated in the papers. 
Throughout this assessment, a key parameter is the amount of taxable PKM; that is, the number of PKM 
in each Member State that are liable to VAT. At present, these are based on territoriality: when transport 
takes place on a Member State’s infrastructure, it can charge VAT for each passenger based on the fare and 
the share of total PKM performed within its own borders (though it may choose not to). Business transport 
will generate revenue for transport operators, but not for Member States, through VAT, as this amount can 
be reclaimed. 
The TREMOVE model contains estimates of ticket prices disaggregated by: 
 Net fare: income for transport operators directly impacting their financial result; 
 Taxes or subsidies: many public transport modes are subsidized to some extent; and 
 VAT. 
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Assumptions on the levels of passenger fares (used in the TREMOVE model) are based on those in yet 
another model (SCENES137), which was last validated in 2010. Hence, all fares and other monetary values 
are expressed in EUR of the year 2010. The fares in SCENES are comprised of three components (operating 
costs, net subsidies, and VAT). Using this fare structure, we can calculate the revenue from the ticket sales 
of transport operators, along with the revenue for Member States from the VAT charged on these tickets.  
The CPM uses the same source of numbers of trips (i.e. the NUTS3138 database) and the same growth 
rates (at the county and mode level) as the TREMOVE model (from the NUTS3 base year to 2020 and 
2030). It uses estimates of elasticities based on the results of the TREMOVE model for the BAU baseline 
and for Scenario 1 (by comparing their differences in county and mode fares and number of passengers). 
The fares used in the CPM are based on those available in July 2013.139 The CPM includes data on 220 city 
pairs, but the results presented in this Chapter are for a sub-sample of 20 city pairs: 11 domestic, 6 intra-
EU, and 3 extra-EU. 
Pass-Through of VAT Changes and Quantified Scenarios 
An essential input to the estimation of passenger fares and demand for each of the quantified scenarios 
is the amount of any change in VAT that will be passed onto passengers and the amount that will be 
absorbed by operators. The rationale for and results of our assessments of the pass-through rates is given in 
Chapter 5. The estimates of passenger demand and operator revenue are provided for the first two scenarios 
at two different levels of pass-through. The first is full pass-through, with which the impact on passengers 
would be maximized and that on operators minimized (operators would be affected only by the number of 
passengers and PKM). The second is with the less-than-full pass-through rates indicated in Chapter 5, which 
would reduce the impact on passenger demand by reducing fare changes (increased for most of the 
quantified scenarios), but increase the impact on operators (mostly negative) by requiring them to absorb 
some of the VAT change. 
There is, however, an important side effect of this less-than-full pass-through, namely for business 
passengers in the Member States that allow expenditures on business travel to be taken into account as an 
input cost for VAT purposes.140 In these Member States, transport operators would charge the same price 
to all transport users, but business travellers would be able to recover their VAT paid. Operators under less-
than-full pass-through would absorb some of the VAT increase; thus, in effect, reducing fares as a result. 
Business users de facto would perceive this as a net reduction in fare, and, consequently, (paradoxically) 
pushing demand up instead of down. Given that the estimated pass-through rates for some modes are very 
low, the increase in business demand could outweigh the decrease in non-business demand.  
                                                   
137 ME&P. (2000) SCENES European Transport Forecasting Model and Appended Module: Technical Description. SCENES 
Deliverable 4 to the European Commission. 
138 The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) has three levels of aggregation. This category refers to regions 
belonging to the third level (NUTS 3, also known as NUTS III), which is largely used by Eurostat and other European Union 
bodies. 
139 There is no single set of fares for any city pair. We have used the one-way fare for a single passenger booking a return ticket 
one week in advance for an outward trip on a Wednesday morning and a return one week later. Where such a fare was not 
available, we used the closest equivalent we could find. 
140 In the simulations, we have taken into account business exemptions for all Member States except France, Greece, Italy, and 
Portugal. Some Member States apply other ad-hoc restrictions that are small and cannot be quantified with our models. 
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Overview of Results 
Table 6.1 presents an overview of the highlights of the results of the model simulations, which are 
discussed in detail in the rest of this chapter. 
By design, and as discussed in Chapter 5, the various scenarios eliminate one or several of the distortions 
that have been identified and discussed or quantified in Chapter 4. Thus, to the extent that the elimination 
of these distortions could be a desirable policy objective, the objective would be accomplished. The 
simulations displayed in Table 6.1, therefore, have to be considered as a quantification (to the extent 
possible) of the effects of the elimination of such distortions. If the elimination of the distortion is a benefit, 
the simulations give us an indication of the potential costs associated with these benefits. Not all of the 
consequences, however, are in the form of costs. As discussed later, while different scenarios may be 
associated with reductions in transport volumes, employment, or even (modestly) GDP, there are also 
benefits accruing from the scenarios, for instance, in the form of reduced environmental emissions and 
increased VAT revenues (at least in some of the scenarios), which can then, in turn, be used for other 
purposes by national governments. 
With this caveat, Table 6.1 shows that the scenario with the largest economic and environmental impact 
is Scenario 1, which is not surprising in view of the fact that it provides the largest shock to the existing 
system. Overall demand for transport declines by between 0.7% and 4.8% by 2030 (for the EU28, with 
wide variations across Member States). VAT revenue from passenger transport almost trebles as a result of 
the increase to national standard rates. However, transport operator revenue decreases by 3% (short term, 
full pass-through) to 10% (long term, limited pass-through) when compared to the BAU Scenario. 
Economy-wide effects on GDP are minor, also because of the hypothesis that compensatory tax reductions 
or transfer increases cushion households from a negative fiscal shock. Employment in the sector declines, 
sometimes substantially, according to the mode. 
Scenario 2 has a much more moderate effect on all of the variables discussed, since the increases in rates 
are more limited and apply to fewer Member States and modes. 
Scenarios 3, 4, 5, and 8 provide information on the consequences of a change in the place of taxation. 
The main message here is that if such change were to be desirable for policy purposes, its effects would be 
rather marginal and we presume easily handled with minor compensatory mechanisms. 
Scenarios 6 and 7 explore the consequences of removing or extending the provisions of Article 148 to 
all operators. Our conclusion is that the consequences are trivial.   
Scenario 9 shows that using VAT based on pre-tax fares and national reduced rates for all transport 
modes and on the Member State of departure would not have a significant impact (on fares, demand, and 
competitiveness between or within modes) as compared to VAT based on final ticket prices. 
Scenario 10 argues that the introduction of a single window for passenger transport VAT issues might 
be desirable, but cannot be evaluated without a specific study. We argue that such a scheme could be offered 
on a voluntary basis and then assessed on the basis of accumulated experience. 
Finally, Scenario 11, which is the closest to the principle of subsidiarity, in that it would only affect 




Table 6.1 – Overview of Scenario Assessments 
Scenario Description of VAT Scenario Distortions 
Addressed 
Method of  
Assessment 
Main Highlights 
1 The national standard rates will apply to outputs of all 
modes of urban, other domestic and intra-EU passenger 
transport. 
1 Q Total transport demand declines by between 0.7% and 4.8% 
by 2030 (for the EU28, with wide variations across Member 
States). Business demand, however, increases due to 
deductibility of VAT for business passenger transport 
purposes. VAT revenue almost trebles as a result of the 
increase to national standard rates. However, revenue of 
transport operators decreases by 3% (short term, full pass-
through) up to 10% (long term, limited pass-through) when 
compared to the BAU Scenario. Economy-wide effects on 
GDP minor. Employment in the sector declines, sometimes 
substantially according to the mode. Environmental effects 
are generally positive and proportional to the reduction in 
different forms of passenger transport modes. 
2 The national reduced rates will apply to all modes of 
urban, other domestic and intra-EU passenger transport. 
If no reduced rate exists, the standard rate will apply. 
1 Q Total transport demand declines slightly or increases slightly 
(depending on the scenario). The increase in VAT revenues 
is more modest than in Scenario 1 (about 23% for full pass-
through in 2030), and so is the decline in revenues of 
operators. In some Member States, VAT revenues decline. 
GDP effects are minimal; employment effects in the sector 
are also smaller than in Scenario 1.  
3 As for Scenario 1, but with the place of taxation changed 
to the Member State of departure/arrival. 
1, 4a, 4d Q This scenario extends Scenario 1. Results are identical except 
that a redistribution of revenues among Member States 
occurs, limited to revenues from international tariffs. Smaller 
Member States tend to see an increase in their revenues at the 
expense of the larger ones. 
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4 As for Scenario 2, but with the place of taxation changed 
to the Member State of departure/arrival. 
1, 4a, 4d Q Same as in Scenario 3, with very few differences. 
5 Current VAT rates, but the place of taxation changed to 
the Member State of departure/arrival. 
4a, 4d Q Effects of scenario consist of re-distribution of international 
travel revenues among Member States. In practice, the 
resulting changes are small, and no Member State gains or 
loses more than 1% of its revenues. 
6 Exemptions according to Article 148 of the VAT 
Directive abolished. 
3a O Minimal effects on the air and sea transport industries, 
provided right of deduction is allowed. 
7 Exemptions according to Article 148 of the VAT 
Directive extended to buses and trains. 
3a O Would allow to recover more speedily capital costs for buses 
and trains. Magnitude of the effect hard to estimate, but likely 
of minor importance. 
8 As for Scenario 4, but with obligation to VAT extended 
to extra-EU passengers departing from a Member State. 
1, 4a, 4c, 
4d 
Q Relatively small impacts given that the long-term fare 
elasticities of demand are quite low. 
9 As for Scenario 8, but with VAT applied to pre-tax fares 
as for the Air Passenger Duty. 
1, 4a, 4c, 
4d 
O Relatively small impacts once all transport modes are liable 
for VAT at the same rates. 
10 Implementation of One-Stop-Shop for all VAT 
transactions. 
4a, 4b D The reform would be desirable, although estimating its 
quantitative impacts would require a separate study. 
11 Current rates apply on all domestic transport, intra- and 
extra-EU rates set to zero for all operators. 
1d, 4b Q Minimal impact on PKM and on VAT revenues from this 
scenario, given the low share of bus and rail in international 
travel. 




In the following pages, these summary findings are reviewed in more detail. The review of each of 
the quantified scenarios follows the same pattern: as assessment of the impact of the VAT changes of 
the level of demand, measured in taxable PKM at the EU28 and Member State level, as indicated by the 
TREMOVE model; an indication of the same changes in VAT rates at the city pair level, as indicated 
by the CPM; and an indication of the probable macro-economic, social, and environmental impacts as 
indicated by the EDIP model (for the first two of these impacts) and the TREMOVE  model (for the 
environmental impacts). The descriptions of the impacts of Scenario 1 are the most complete, as those 
of the other scenarios are, in many cases, similar but smaller in extent. 
Business As Usual (BAU) 
The Business As Usual (BAU) baseline assumes that no changes are made to the current VAT rates 
as described in Chapter 3. The demand projections for the BAU are, therefore, based only on projected 
changes in per capita incomes and populations and the various elasticities related to these parameters. 
a. Member State Passenger Demand 
The growth rates of passenger transport demand for BAU used for the periods to 2010, 2020, and  
2030 are as described in the Second Interim Report of this Study (May 2014) and are based on those of 
the 2011 Transport White Paper. 
Table 6.2 summarizes the BAU evolution of transport demand at EU28 level over this period.141 Air 
transport is expected to grow the most (it has the highest elasticity with respect to per capita income), 
followed by rail, bus, and metro. 
 
Table 6.2 – Summary of Business As Usual (EU28, PKM) 
 
 







Air 217,039 309,499 405,815 42.6% 87.0% 
  Bus 10,123 12,713 13,588 25.6% 34.2% 
  Rail 21,867 28,084 32,542 28.4% 48.8% 
  Total Intra-EU 249,029 350,296 451,945 40.7% 81.5% 
Extra-EU 
Air 315,826 446,025 573,286 41.2% 81.5% 
  Bus 2,052 2,392 2,551 16.6% 24.3% 
  Rail 2,326 2,915 3,352 25.3% 44.1% 
  Total Extra-EU 320,204 451,331 579,188 41.0% 80.9% 
Urban 
Metro 92,241 102,970 109,481 11.6% 18.7% 
  Bus 145,336 162,433 173,684 11.8% 19.5% 
  Rail 147,600 172,445 197,624 16.8% 33.9% 
  Total Urban 385,177 437,847 480,789 13.7% 24.8% 
Other Domestic Air 46,374 54,332 69,396 17.2% 49.6% 
                                                   
141 Detailed data by Member State is available in Annex 6A. 
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  Bus 389,695 427,695 456,235 9.8% 17.1% 
  Rail 220,299 256,663 298,044 16.5% 35.3% 
 Total Other 656,367 738,689 823,676 12.5% 25.5% 
Total Air 579,239 809,856 1,048,497 39.8% 81.0% 
 Bus 547,207 605,233 646,058 10.6% 18.1% 
 Rail 392,091 460,106 531,563 17.3% 35.6% 
 Metro 92,241 102,970 109,481 11.6% 18.7% 
Total of Totals Total 1,610,778 1,978,164 2,335,599 22.8% 45.0% 
 
For the baseline scenario, gross revenue from passenger transport operations and VAT are projected 
to evolve as in Table 6.3. The largest incomes are generated in France, where transport is relatively more 
expensive than in Germany or the UK. Italy is also near the top. For the EU28 as a whole, VAT revenues 
are projected to increase by 16% by the year 2020 and by 31% by 2030. VAT as a percentage of gross 
fares is projected to fall very modestly from about 3.1% to about 3.0%, as the share of air passengers 
(most of which are not subject to VAT) increases. Operator revenue increases at a somewhat faster rate 
(19% and 39%, respectively), due to faster growth in lower-taxed modes and markets (particularly air). 
 
Table 6.3 – Business As Usual: VAT Revenues from Transport Sector (EUR m) 
 2010 2020 2030 
 VAT Tickets VAT Tickets VAT Tickets 
AT 372.2 8,220.0 427.6 9,818.3 469.3 11,239.5 
BE 155.9 9,701.1 181.2 11,490.5 192.4 12,447.6 
BG 110.1 2,207.9 121.8 2,686.4 128.2 3,100.8 
CY 2.4 917.0 2.7 1,275.9 3.0 1,679.3 
CZ 281.8 4,848.5 308.3 5,851.9 328.3 6,859.4 
DE 1,207.2 34,395.2 1,413.6 41,975.4 1,527.8 47,589.1 
DK 0.0 4,231.9 0.0 5,070.1 0.0 5,962.7 
EE 18.7 229.4 19.0 283.3 19.7 367.1 
ES 755.4 22,817.9 897.9 28,842.4 1,030.2 35,480.6 
FI 128.2 3,298.8 144.4 3,894.0 156.5 4,555.1 
FR 2,754.8 52,767.0 3,233.5 61,603.7 3,787.4 72,078.2 
GR 308.6 7,967.9 434.7 10,200.1 500.0 12,742.0 
HR 57.4 714.0 68.0 896.5 78.0 1,130.4 
HU 235.6 3,736.7 247.4 4,169.5 265.4 4,807.4 
IE 0.0 2,511.6 0.0 3,261.0 0.0 3,997.4 
IT 1,192.7 43,102.5 1,289.5 47,324.5 1,434.5 53,662.4 
LT 11.9 332.2 13.4 438.7 13.9 579.1 
LU 2.3 426.0 2.6 517.9 2.9 597.3 
LV 13.3 322.1 14.9 440.5 16.8 605.5 
MT 0.0 286.3 0.0 416.8 0.0 535.7 
NL 186.4 6,803.6 217.0 8,325.0 239.2 9,604.8 
PL 283.5 7,926.4 325.8 9,496.7 366.4 11,181.6 
PT 73.0 3,478.5 91.1 4,281.7 105.0 5,371.8 
RO 188.3 3,280.3 223.1 3,941.3 250.4 4,468.0 
SE 152.0 5,967.8 184.6 7,307.7 206.1 8,700.6 
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SI 22.7 541.4 26.5 650.5 28.1 717.8 
SK 80.9 948.2 85.5 1,097.4 88.8 1,273.9 
UK 0.0 31,198.3 0.0 38,557.2 0.0 44,095.5 
EU28 8,595.0 263,178.4 9,974.2 314,114.8 11,238.0 365,430.6 
% Change w.r.t. 2010, EU28 16.0 19.4 30.7 38.8 
 
b. Demand between City Pairs 
The results and analysis of the CPM all relate to 2030; those for 2020 are similar but smaller and less 
pronounced. There is a slight redistribution of trips and VAT revenue for 2030 as compared to 2020, as 
the growth rates are slightly different for each Member State and mode combination. Since the BAU 
assumes no changes in fares, those used in the CPM are based on current fares. They are presented here, 
together with number of passengers and VAT revenue, as they are the basis from which changes in VAT 
in the scenarios are compared.  
From the wide range of fares available for most of the city pair and mode combinations, those used 
are closer to those for non-business than business passengers; they assume a one-week advance purchase 
and a stay of seven days. These fares are at the lower end of those available.142 For air passengers, these 
fares tend to be those of the low cost airlines, and these are more used by non-business than business 
passengers. The highest available fares (all for economy class or equivalent travel) are, on average, more 
than double the lowest, whereas the fares used in the estimates of demand and VAT revenue are, on 
average, only 25% higher than the lowest.  
The baseline scenario fares, number of passengers, and VAT revenue for the BAU are shown in Table 
6.4. 
 
Table 6.4 – Business As Usual City Pairs Model: Fares, Passengers, and VAT Revenue 
   
Fares (EUR) Trips  (m) 
VAT Revenue 
(EUR m) 
 City A City B Air Rail Bus All  All  
1 Athens Thessaloniki 64 40 40 3.13 19.8 
2 Berlin Hamburg 132 80 33 2.74 28.2 
3 Budapest Debrecen 0 20 13 0.99 4.3 
4 Cluj Iasi 194 17 25 0.52 2.9 
5 Copenhagen Aarhus 0 55 40 3.90 0.0 
6 Dublin Cork 102 20 18 1.95 0.0 
7 Krakow Wroclaw 107 15 13 0.16 0.2 
8 Lisbon Porto 64 35 26 1.69 3.7 
9 London Glasgow 111 110 70 2.22 0.0 
10 Madrid Barcelona 58 49 30 2.89 14.0 
11 Paris Toulouse 81 120 71 4.01 32.3 
12 Berlin Warsaw 49 127 45 0.12 0.4 
                                                   
142 The source for most of the fares was Rome2Rio (http://www.rome2rio.com/), a website that provides fares for air, rail, and 
bus (as well as ferry where relevant) for city pairs selected by the user. We have used the city center to city center fares 
available from this source. Fares and services provided by some small bus operators are not available from this (or from any 
other) Internet accessible source.   
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13 Constanta Varna 0 0 20 0.02 0.0 
14 Copenhagen Vilnius 140 143 116 0.20 0.0 
15 London Brussels 121 162 60 3.42 8.4 
16 Ostrava Katowice 0 64 8 0.16 0.0 
17 Paris Lisbon 115 180 50 0.99 0.0 
18 Frankfurt Oslo 139 213 247 0.04 0.5 
19 Gothenburg Oslo 122 39 35 0.12 0.0 
20 Riga Moscow 221 76 75 0.02 0.0 
 
For some city pairs, where their distance apart is less than about 200 kilometres (e.g. pairs 3, 5, and 
13), there are sometimes no air services; or, if there are, their fares are not competitive (e.g. pairs 2, 4, 
6, and 7). For certain city pairs that are long distances apart (e.g. pair 18), the fares by bus and sometimes 
by rail are not competitive with air. For other city pairs, even if the bus fare is competitive, the travel 
time is not (e.g. pairs 11, 15, and 20). For certain city pairs where the VAT revenue shows zero, this is 
because the VAT rates for all modes are zero or exempt (e.g. city pairs 5, 6, and 9), while for others it 
is because there are few trips and the VAT revenue is close to zero (e.g. pairs 13 and 14). For some 
intra-EU city pairs, most passenger travel is by air, which VAT zero-rated and the VAT revenue from 
those traveling by rail and bus is too low to register (e.g. pair 17).  
 
VAT Scenario 1: VAT Rates for Urban, Domestic, and Intra-EU International 
Transport Set to National Standard Rates 
This scenario entails an increase in VAT rates for most Member States and modes. As a result, 
demand for all transport subject to the rate increase will decrease according to the price sensitivity of 
demand. 
a. Impact on Member State Passenger Demand 
The differences between the two pass-through assumptions is shown by the difference between the 
results shown in Table 6.5 (for full pass-through) and Table 6.6 (for less-than-full pass-through). For 
the full pass-through effects, air demand decreases for the Member States and mode combinations where 
the VAT rate would increase (i.e. a “normal” reaction). However, with less-than-full pass-through, 
overall demand for air transport in these Member State and mode combinations would increase. The low 
pass-through rate (7% on average) for air transport would result in a moderate decrease in non-business 
transport, while business transport, which comprises around 40% of the market (expressed in PKM), 
would expand significantly in the countries where VAT deductions on transport expenses are allowed.  
 
Table 6.5 - Scenario 1 Full Pass-Through: Transport Demand (EU28, PKM) 
 







Air 297,892 375,300 -3.8% -7.5% 
 Bus 12,384 12,888 -2.6% -5.2% 
 Rail 27,213 30,845 -3.1% -5.2% 
 Total 337,489 419,033 -3.7% -7.3% 
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Extra-EU 
Air 446,025 573,286 0.0% 0.0% 
 Bus 2,392 2,551 0.0% 0.0% 
 Rail 2,915 3,352 0.0% 0.0% 
 Total 451,331 579,188 0.0% 0.0% 
Urban 
Metro 100,559 105,224 -2.3% -3.9% 
 Bus 158,020 164,240 -2.7% -5.4% 
 Rail 164,977 183,404 -4.3% -7.2% 
 Total 423,556 452,867 -3.3% -5.8% 
Other 
Domestic 
Air 52,098 63,705 -4.1% -8.2% 
 Bus 411,896 422,448 -3.7% -7.4% 
 Rail 244,215 273,928 -4.8% -8.1% 
 Total 708,208 760,081 -4.1% -7.7% 
Total Air 796,014 1,012,290 -1.7% -3.5% 
 Bus 584,692 602,126 -3.4% -6.8% 
 Rail 439,320 491,529 -4.5% -7.5% 
 Metro 100,559 105,224 -2.3% -3.9% 
 Total 1,920,585 2,211,169 -2.9% -5.3% 
 
Table 6.6 - Scenario 1 Less-Than-Full Pass-Through: Transport Demand (EU28, 
PKM) 







Air 314,090 417,974 1.5% 3.0% 
 Bus 12,451 13,030 -2.1% -4.1% 
 Rail 27,396 31,205 -2.4% -4.1% 
 Total 353,937 462,209 1.0% 2.3% 
Extra-EU 
Air 446,025 573,286 0.0% 0.0% 
 Bus 2,392 2,551 0.0% 0.0% 
 Rail 2,915 3,352 0.0% 0.0% 
 Total 451,331 579,188 0.0% 0.0% 
Urban Metro 101,804 107,424 -1.1% -1.9% 
 Bus 160,601 169,762 -1.1% -2.3% 
 Rail 168,907 190,907 -2.1% -3.4% 
 Total 431,312 468,093 -1.5% -2.6% 
Other Domestic Air 54,594 70,089 0.5% 1.0% 
 Bus 420,747 441,373 -1.6% -3.3% 
 Rail 250,717 286,561 -2.3% -3.9% 
 Total 726,058 798,023 -1.7% -3.1% 
Total Air 814,709 1,061,349 0.6% 1.2% 
 Bus 596,192 626,716 -1.5% -3.0% 
 Rail 449,935 512,024 -2.2% -3.7% 
 Metro 101,804 107,424 -1.1% -1.9% 
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 Total 1,962,639 2,307,513 -0.8% -1.2% 
  
These changes in demand would have remarkable effects on the revenue collected by transport 
operators (from net fares) and by the government (from VAT), as displayed in Table 6.7. As is to be 
expected, VAT revenue would almost treble as a result of the increases to national standard rates (this 
also occurs if we modify the rates in the base year 2010 without allowing for any demand effects to 
operate, as in the second column of Table 6.7). However, when compared to the BAU Scenario, the 
revenue of transport operators would decrease by 3% (in the short term with full pass-through) and up 
to 10% (in the long term with less-than-full pass-through). The sum of VAT revenue and ticket revenue 
would only increase for the short-term simulation with full pass-through; in all other cases, transport 
would generate fewer transport kilometres. The distribution of the increase in VAT and the decrease in 
operator revenue would differ between the modes and Member States143 (see Excel Annex for detailed 
results). 
 
Table 6.7 – Scenario 1: Changes in VAT and Operator Revenues   













 VAT VAT Tickets VAT Tickets VAT Tickets VAT Tickets 
AT 107.9% 103.9% -2.4% 97.1% -6.6% 120.7% 9.8% 116.5% 6.1% 
BE 276.5% 265.5% -3.7% 255.4% -9.3% 280.0% 1.3% 267.7% -3.1% 
BG 16.1% 24.7% -0.7% 23.2% -3.6% 36.8% 13.6% 36.3% 10.7% 
CY 3033.6% 3533.5% -2.5% 3223.5% -13.0% 4381.7% 25.1% 4182.5% 15.6% 
CZ 60.0% 63.7% -1.9% 60.7% -6.8% 78.2% 13.2% 76.1% 8.4% 
DE 191.7% 183.9% -3.3% 175.3% -9.1% 201.9% 6.9% 195.7% 1.8% 
DK .. .. -5.8% .. -15.3% .. 5.9% .. -2.4% 
EE 20.2% 31.0% -0.9% 31.0% -6.1% 50.5% 27.0% 49.2% 19.6% 
ES 148.7% 144.1% -2.2% 144.1% -9.9% 174.5% 18.0% 168.6% 11.2% 
FI 208.0% 210.3% -3.1% 194.2% -11.4% 236.4% 10.4% 225.0% 3.1% 
FR 112.8% 107.1% -3.0% 102.6% -7.2% 136.6% 11.0% 132.0% 7.4% 
GR 210.8% 243.5% -3.8% 209.0% -13.2% 313.3% 15.8% 286.1% 6.7% 
HR 6.0% 5.3% -0.3% 2.8% -4.9% 23.8% 25.2% 23.8% 21.2% 
HU 18.0% 21.8% -1.4% 23.2% -3.0% 33.5% 12.3% 34.7% 11.0% 
IE .. .. -3.9% .. -14.5% .. 13.7% .. 4.7% 
IT 146.2% 142.7% -3.5% 135.5% -8.2% 164.4% 6.3% 157.1% 2.7% 
LT 211.0% 233.1% -3.8% 217.8% -10.5% 293.6% 22.5% 287.6% 16.3% 
LU 573.3% 587.4% -1.8% 596.9% -8.4% 662.3% 11.5% 633.8% 4.9% 
LV 149.2% 177.3% -3.1% 177.0% -10.2% 249.3% 29.6% 241.8% 22.0% 
MT .. .. -2.8% .. -13.4% .. 21.6% .. 11.6% 
NL 285.0% 277.0% -3.1% 260.9% -10.3% 308.7% 9.2% 294.1% 2.3% 
PL 203.0% 193.0% -4.7% 193.5% -9.0% 221.6% 7.8% 217.9% 4.9% 
                                                   
143 Member States with an initial VAT revenue of zero, such as the UK, Denmark, and Ireland indeed register “infinite” 
percentage increases. 
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PT 537.2% 560.0% -4.4% 516.6% -15.1% 665.0% 15.0% 630.0% 5.1% 
RO 16.0% 18.5% -0.7% 24.1% -2.9% 31.8% 11.8% 31.4% 10.3% 
SE 432.7% 424.7% -4.3% 392.8% -12.8% 486.2% 10.0% 461.7% 2.0% 
SI 141.6% 131.9% -3.1% 129.2% -7.8% 138.4% 4.1% 134.1% 0.8% 
SK 7.8% 9.7% -4.0% 11.9% -3.9% 17.3% 10.3% 17.4% 10.4% 
UK .. .. -4.2% .. -12.2% .. 5.9% .. -1.3% 
EU28 194.4% 191.8% -3.3% 182.8% -9.2% 222.9% 9.6% 213.9% 4.4% 
 
b. Impact on Demand between City Pairs 
The city pairs results for Scenario 1 and how they differ to the BAU situation are shown in Table 6.8. 
For simplicity of presentation, only the results of the full pass-through are presented. In terms of 
passenger demand and VAT revenue, the impacts of the less-than-full pass-through would be similar 
but less pronounced. 
The impacts of setting all domestic and intra-EU VAT rates to the national standard rates would be 
similar at the city pair to the national level. In all 20 of the city pairs included in Table 6.8, the fare either 
increases (where the current rates are lower than the national standard rates, for example in city pairs 6 
through 12) or stays the same (where the current rates are the same as the standard rates, for example 
pairs 2, 3, and 4).  
For intra-EU city pairs, the outcome would be a combination of the two effects, as sometimes there 
would be a large increase in one of the Member States (from a zero or reduced rate to a standard rate); 
while in the other (or others where the route crosses other Member States), the increase would be zero 
(where all involved Member States currently apply their standard rate). 
 
Table 6.8 - Scenario 1 City Pairs Model, Full Pass-Through: Changes in Fares, Trips, and VAT Revenue 
(Comparison with BAU) 












 City A City B Air Rail Bus All    
1 Athens Thessaloniki 9% 9% 9% -5% 35.6 69% 
2 Berlin Hamburg 0% 0% 0% 0% 31.1 0% 
3 Budapest Debrecen n.a. 0% 0% 0% 5.0 0% 
4 Cluj Iasi 0% 0% 0% 0% 3.3 n.a. 
5 Copenhagen Aarhus n.a. 25% 25% -10% 30.7 n.a. 
6 Dublin Cork 23% 23% 23% -13% 7.6 n.a. 
7 Krakow Wroclaw 14% 14% 14% -8% 0.6 164% 
8 Lisbon Porto 16% 16% 16% -9% 13.5 251% 
9 London Glasgow 20% 20% 20% -10% 43.8 n.a. 
10 Madrid Barcelona 10% 10% 10% -6% 29.1 98% 
11 Paris Toulouse 13% 13% 13% -8% 73.8 117% 
12 Berlin Warsaw 22% 11% 11% -5% 1.3 235% 
13 Constanta Varna n.a. n.a. 0% 0% 0.0 n.a. 
14 Copenhagen Vilnius 16% 10% 9% -5% 4.3 n.a. 
15 London Brussels 21% 16% 17% -6% 72.0 n.a. 
16 Ostrava Katowice n.a. 12% 12% -5% 0.0 n.a. 
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17 Paris Lisbon 22% 13% 13% -7% 22.9 n.a. 
18 Frankfurt Oslo 0% 10% 10% 0% 0.9 71% 
19 Gothenburg Oslo 0% 11% 4% 0% 0.0 n.a. 
20 Riga Moscow 0% 3% 4% -1% 0.0 n.a. 
 
The change in trips would always be negative and less than the change in fares, as all the fare 
elasticities are less than one. Where we could not find a current fare (e.g. by air for some of the city pairs 
that are relatively close to each other), we assumed that there is not, and would not be, a service. The 
largest reductions in trips would be for Member States that currently have either a zero or exempt VAT 
rate. 
Changes in VAT revenue would be either zero (or not applicable) or large. These impacts would be 
a combination of the change in VAT rates and the changes in numbers of passengers (and, therefore, the 
PKM on which the VAT is based). The size of the impact of the changes in VAT rates is greater than 
that of the numbers of passengers, as the latter is diminished by the elasticities (always less than one). 
Pair 18 is the only extra-EU city pair that has a measurable change in VAT revenue even without the 
extra-EU VAT rates being changed. This is because it is the only one in the sample that has a high 
proportion of rail and bus trips, and these are the only modes where through tickets are not generally 
available; hence, making the domestic portion of the trip liable to VAT. Air trips are nearly always made 
on through tickets, so the domestic section is not generally liable to VAT, and these account for nearly 
all the trips for city pair 20. 
c. Macro-Economic and Social Effects 
In order to assess the economy-wide effects of Scenario 1 (as well as for the other quantified 
scenarios), we assumed that the VAT increases would be budget-neutral through a system of 
proportional transfers to households. This effect was taken into account using the EDIP model to 
estimate the effect on GDP and employment in the transport sector and on the purchasing power of 
different per capita income quintiles of the population. 
 
Table 6.9 - Scenario 1: GDP Effects (Comparison with BAU) 





AT -0.01 -0.07 
BE -0.01 -0.04 
BG -0.01 -0.01 
CZ -0.01 -0.06 
DE -0.01 -0.02 
EE 0.00 -0.02 
ES -0.02 -0.05 
FI -0.02 -0.05 
FR -0.07 -0.03 
GR -0.04 -0.01 
HU 0.00 -0.01 
IE -0.03 -0.10 
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IT -0.11 -0.04 
LT -0.05 -0.08 
LV -0.02 -0.03 
NL -0.01 -0.05 
PL -0.04 -0.09 
PT -0.04 -0.01 
RO -0.01 0.00 
SE -0.02 -0.06 
SI -0.01 -0.04 
SK 0.00 -0.02 
UK -0.02 -0.04 
 
With this assumption, the effects of the VAT changes of Scenario 1 on GDP would be, in general, 
small and would result from several countervailing effects. Given the model assumption of revenue-
neutral VAT changes, an increase in VAT would be countered by a decrease in other taxes or an increase 
in lump-sum transfers to households; thus, the main effect of the changes would be a shift in 
consumption patterns, with less transport and more of other goods and services being consumed. This 
shift in consumption patterns would lead to increased production and GDP for some economic sectors, 
and decreased production and GDP for others. Whether the sum of these effects would be positive or 
negative would depend on the profitability of the affected sectors and on the interrelations between the 
sectors: if the demand for sector A were to decrease, then sector A would require less input from sector 
B, which, in turn, would require less input from sector C, and so on. For sectors with large 
interdependences, the effects would be largest. The net effect for each Member State would, therefore, 
depend on the structure of its economy and the profitability of its different economic sectors. A common 
feature for all Member States is that the effect on GDP would be more marked when the transport sectors 
are highly subsidized, as illustrated in Figure 6.1.144 
Figure 6.1 shows the relationship for each Member State of the change in GDP that would result from 
the VAT and Member States subsidies on rail transport. 
The subsidies are expressed as a percentage of the fare, and are based on data in the supply tables of 
each of the Member States.145 This relationship can be explained by the distortions resulting from high 
subsidies being partially balanced by VAT increases. If demand for transport were to decrease, the cost 
of subsidies would also decrease, making more of the budget available for the consumption of other 
goods. This impact would be higher in the Member State, market, and mode combinations where 
subsidies are high.  
 
                                                   
144 The model used in these simulations does not take into account possible positive effects that could stem from shifting direct 





Figure 6.1 - Subsidies and GDP Change 
 
Overall, the effect of the VAT increases of Scenario 1 on GDP would be negative. The main 
explanation is that a decrease in the consumption budget of the households would result in a decrease in 
overall demand for consumption. A secondary explanation is that current investment in capital and 
materials are optimized for the current tax regime. If the VAT regime were to change, there would be 
over-capacity in transport sectors and under-capacity in other sectors, which would result in inefficient 
production. In the longer term, investments would shift to where they were most productive, reducing 
the inefficiency of resource misallocation and increasing GDP. 
In almost all Member States, we would see a more negative effect on GDP when the VAT increase 
is only partially passed-through in fare changes. In those Member States were business travel is treated 
as a business input cost, business passenger transport would increase as a consequence of this 
deductibility of VAT. This, in turn, would increase the amount of subsidies paid by the government and 
require compensatory reductions in transfers to households (recall the balanced-budget constraint 
imposed on government in the general equilibrium model). In addition, the difference between full and 
partial pass-through would be an additional cost to transport operators and would decrease their 
consumption budget. Finally, as demand for business transport would increase, transport operators 
would readjust their fares upwards, further increasing the price of transport for non-business passengers. 
The combination of these three effects would result in consumption decreasing further, leading to a yet 
a further decrease in GDP. 
 







Train Bus Plane Train Bus Plane 
AT -3.29 -3.65 -2.15 0.31 -0.01 3.88 
BE -6.55 -7.82 -0.90 -0.84 -2.36 6.14 
BG -0.41 -0.36 -6.11 -0.04 -0.02 -0.09 
CZ -3.49 -5.19 -0.60 1.39 -0.67 1.20 








0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35
GDP 
(% change)
Subsidies (as a fraction of total price)
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EE -0.10 -0.09 -0.90 0.50 0.44 2.21 
ES -5.20 -6.36 -2.00 1.42 -0.11 3.40 
FI -6.30 -8.94 -1.75 1.77 -2.27 4.85 
FR -8.03 -7.01 -2.70 -4.29 -3.54 -0.12 
GR -6.60 -6.76 -3.57 -3.24 -3.37 -0.56 
HU -0.58 -0.65 -2.25 0.08 0.09 0.32 
IE -11.12 -15.65 -1.50 -0.99 -7.83 8.15 
IT -5.92 -9.06 -1.32 -2.95 -4.46 0.22 
LT -2.60 -2.62 -9.01 0.31 0.00 0.88 
LV -3.12 -3.20 -1.37 0.25 -0.15 -0.07 
NL -4.26 -4.58 -0.60 0.54 0.61 1.66 
PL -7.91 -8.31 -0.54 0.02 -1.13 1.68 
PT -11.19 -11.35 -4.09 -5.66 -5.63 -0.29 
RO -0.24 -0.29 -4.57 -0.01 0.01 0.44 
SE -13.36 -14.66 -2.02 -4.74 -7.05 6.81 
SI -5.44 -5.96 -3.18 0.63 -0.47 4.91 
SK -0.04 -0.02 -0.09 0.29 0.29 2.12 
UK -11.64 -12.68 -1.04 -6.64 -6.12 1.65 
 
Employment in the Transport Sector 
Employment in the transport sectors follows closely the demand for transport. In the case of full pass-
through, demand would decrease for all three modes in all Member States. In the case of partial pass-
through, this decrease would be small, and sometimes would even convert to an increase when the 
number of business trips would increase substantially. This would be particularly true for air transport, 
where the fare reductions would be largest.  
Income Distribution 
The change in purchasing power that would occur for different household types is shown in Table 
6.11. It shows how much more or less each quintile of the population could buy of their own 
consumption bundle. In EDIP, there are five household types (quintiles) based on per capita income. 
The quintile with the lowest per capita income is designated as household 1 (hh1) and the quintile with 
the highest per capita income as household 5 (hh5). Each of the five per capita income quintiles has a 
different consumption pattern, employment, and per capita income. Households in the lower income 
quintiles typically spend a smaller overall share of their income on transport in general, but a higher 
share of their income on public transport. 
Household purchasing power would be affected by VAT increases in two ways. Ceteris paribus, a 
price increase would decrease household purchasing power, but the increase of the VAT rate would also 
increase government revenues. We assume that these extra revenues would be used to decrease overall 






Table 6.11 – Scenario 1: Distributional Effects  
 
Full Pass-Through Less-Than-Full Pass-Through 
hh1 hh2 hh3 hh4 hh5 hh1 hh2 hh3 hh4 hh5 
AT -0.22 -0.08 -0.09 -0.01 0.01 -0.16 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.23 
BE -0.04 -0.08 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.11 -0.15 -0.10 -0.04 -0.07 
BG 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.09 -0.04 
CZ -0.16 -0.15 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.14 -0.08 -0.03 -0.06 -0.19 
DE -0.11 -0.08 -0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 
EE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 
ES -0.14 -0.13 -0.07 -0.03 0.00 -0.14 -0.10 -0.06 -0.05 -0.13 
FI -0.10 -0.07 -0.02 0.02 -0.08 -0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.07 -0.26 
FR -0.09 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 -0.16 -0.01 0.04 0.07 0.07 -0.17 
GR -0.27 -0.17 -0.08 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.09 -0.03 0.00 0.00 
HU -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.04 
IE -0.24 -0.27 -0.20 -0.16 0.00 -0.49 -0.23 -0.21 -0.10 -0.31 
IT -0.16 -0.14 -0.08 -0.08 -0.11 -0.15 -0.07 0.01 0.03 -0.09 
LT -0.11 -0.44 -0.12 0.10 -0.07 0.01 -0.14 0.12 0.25 -0.26 
LV -0.13 -0.23 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.08 0.07 0.07 -0.12 
NL -0.16 -0.07 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.16 -0.10 -0.05 0.01 -0.21 
PL -0.22 -0.27 -0.11 -0.04 0.00 -0.07 -0.22 -0.06 -0.06 -0.18 
PT -0.20 -0.17 -0.06  -0.01 0.01 -0.10 -0.11 0.05 0.05 -0.01 
RO -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.03 
SE -0.61 -0.80 -0.33 0.34 0.08 -0.31 -0.10 -0.04 0.01 -0.28 
SI -0.03 -0.09 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.02 -0.13 
SK 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 
UK -0.31 -0.19 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.20 -0.13 -0.06 0.03 -0.09 
 
With full pass-through, the entire VAT increase would be passed on as an increase in transport fares. 
This would have a negative effect, especially on lower income households, since they spend a larger 
share of their income on public transport. For higher income households, the effect would be smaller, 
and sometimes even positive because of the tax cuts that would be made possible by the increased VAT 
revenues. 
d. Environmental Impact 
Any policy that affects transport demand has direct consequences for emissions of greenhouse gasses 
(e.g. CO2 and others) and of other pollutants with a more regional or local impact (e.g. particulates and 
NOx). Given the nature of the changes to VAT policy considered in the present study, which does not 
entail any explicit or implicit stimulus to improve the environmental qualities of vehicles, the assessment 
is as straightforward as applying the relative changes in demand to the projected emission levels per 
mode and per market. In other words, the emission factors (g/PKM)146 are not expected to change from 
the baseline; the only driver for changes to emissions is the amount of PKM performed. Naturally, 
                                                   
146 Source of emission factors is TREMOVE 3.5 
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different transport modes have different emission factors, so a modal shift from VAT policy can 
certainly impact overall emission levels in a manner that is not proportionate to demand changes. For 
example: 
 Air has higher CO2 emissions than bus, which has higher CO2 emissions than rail, in general; 
 NOx emissions are highest for bus; for air, the environmental effect of NOx differs for emissions 
at landings and take-offs and during cruise flight; and  
 Particulates (PM) emission factors are only considered for bus transport. The impact of this 
pollutant would be local to the source of emissions, making it less relevant for rail and certainly 
for air. 
 While only demand effects on public passenger transport are considered, an increase in its end-user 
cost will also increase the demand for private transport, most notably personal car transport. This effect 
was not covered in this assessment. 
As an illustration, Table 6.12 below shows the estimated effect of Scenario 1, which would create the 
most drastic changes, with overall CO2, PM, and NOx emissions down by 4.1%, 7.3%, and 7.3%, 
respectively, as compared to the BAU Scenario. The other scenarios show the same tendencies, but to a 
lesser extent. The absolute savings in terms of CO2 emissions for the transport modes considered amount 
to 6.2 million tons for 2030 (total EU CO2 emissions for 2011 were around 4.5 billion tons).147  
 
Table 6.12 – Scenario 1: Environmental Effects  
 2020 2030 2020 2030 2020 2030 
 CO2 CO2 NOx NOx PM PM 
AT -1.5% -2.8% -2.8% -5.5% -2.7% -4.8% 
BE -1.9% -3.7% -3.1% -6.3% -3.5% -6.6% 
BG -1.3% -2.7% -0.5% -1.1% -0.5% -0.9% 
CY -2.4% -4.7% -5.1% -10.3% -5.1% -10.3% 
CZ -1.7% -3.2% -2.4% -4.9% -2.3% -4.0% 
DE -2.0% -3.7% -3.6% -7.2% -4.0% -6.9% 
DK -3.3% -5.9% -6.8% -13.2% -7.6% -12.9% 
EE -1.1% -2.4% -0.5% -0.9% -0.5% -0.8% 
ES -1.4% -2.8% -3.3% -6.6% -3.3% -6.1% 
FI -2.5% -4.8% -4.1% -8.2% -3.8% -7.1% 
FR -2.0% -3.9% -2.4% -4.7% -3.2% -5.7% 
GR -2.1% -4.0% -4.1% -8.2% -3.8% -6.8% 
HR -0.7% -1.4% -0.1% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
HU -1.4% -2.9% -0.6% -1.2% -1.2% -2.3% 
IE -2.3% -4.5% -6.9% -13.6% -5.4% -9.6% 
IT -2.1% -4.1% -3.1% -6.2% -3.2% -6.1% 
LT -3.1% -6.0% -3.6% -7.2% -3.1% -5.3% 
LU -1.0% -1.9% -1.9% -3.8% -1.8% -3.4% 
LV -2.6% -5.0% -2.9% -5.9% -2.5% -4.3% 
MT -2.5% -5.0% -4.6% -9.3% -4.6% -9.3% 
NL -1.4% -2.7% -3.5% -7.1% -3.7% -6.7% 
                                                   
147 Source: EEA, http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/data/data-viewers/greenhouse-gases-viewer 
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PL -3.6% -6.8% -5.3% -10.6% -5.2% -9.4% 
PT -1.4% -2.7% -5.0% -10.0% -4.9% -9.1% 
RO -1.5% -3.0% -0.5% -0.9% -0.4% -0.7% 
SE -2.9% -5.7% -4.9% -9.9% -5.1% -9.8% 
SI -2.2% -3.9% -3.5% -7.1% -3.4% -6.1% 
SK 0.5% 1.1% 0.0% -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% 
UK -2.1% -3.8% -5.2% -10.4% -6.0% -10.5% 
EU28 -2.1% -4.1% -3.6% -7.3% -4.1% -7.3% 
 
VAT Scenario 2: VAT Rates for Domestic and Intra-EU International Transport 
Set to National Reduced Rates 
a. Impact of Member State Passenger Demand 
For many Member States, this scenario would be a continuation of the current policy for domestic 
transport. For intra-EU transport, the effects would follow the same trend as Scenario 1, albeit at lower 
levels. The difference between the full pass-through and less-than-full pass-through for Member States 
that allow business travel as a VAT deduction would be the same for air transport as in Scenario 1: 
demand would increase due to the net reduction of the net fare (Tables 6.13 and 6.14).  
 
Table 6.13 – Scenario 2 Full Pass-Through: Transport Demand (EU28, PKM) 
 
 





Air 304,570 392,823 -1.6% -3.2% 
 Bus 12,700 13,564 -0.1% -0.2% 
 Rail 27,830 32,041 -0.9% -1.5% 
 Total 345,100 438,427 -1.5% -3.0% 
Extra-EU 
Air 446,025 573,286 0.0% 0.0% 
 Bus 2,392 2,551 0.0% 0.0% 
 Rail 2,915 3,352 0.0% 0.0% 
 Total 451,331 579,188 0.0% 0.0% 
Urban 
Metro 102,896 109,356 -0.1% -0.1% 
 Bus 162,248 173,280 -0.1% -0.2% 
 Rail 172,227 197,244 -0.1% -0.2% 
 Total 437,371 479,880 -0.1% -0.2% 
Other 
Domestic 
Air 54,379 69,521 0.1% 0.2% 
 Bus 428,798 458,517 0.3% 0.5% 
 Rail 256,102 297,003 -0.2% -0.3% 
 Total 739,279 825,041 0.1% 0.2% 
Total Air 804,973 1,035,630 -0.6% -1.2% 
 Bus 606,138 647,911 0.1% 0.3% 
 Rail 459,073 529,639 -0.2% -0.4% 
 Metro 102,896 109,356 -0.1% -0.1% 




Table 6.14 – Scenario 2 Less-Than-Full Pass-Through: Transport Demand (EU28, 
PKM) 






Intra-EU Air 311,707 411,673 0.7% 1.4% 
 Bus 12,661 13,478 -0.4% -0.8% 
 Rail 27,839 32,063 -0.9% -1.5% 
 Total 352,206 457,214 0.5% 1.2% 
Extra-
EU 
Air 446,025 573,286 0.0% 0.0% 
 Bus 2,392 2,551 0.0% 0.0% 
 Rail 2,915 3,352 0.0% 0.0% 
 Total 451,331 579,188 0.0% 0.0% 
Urban Metro 102,961 109,468 0.0% 0.0% 
 Bus 162,434 173,681 0.0% 0.0% 
 Rail 172,375 197,512 0.0% -0.1% 
 Total 437,769 480,661 0.0% 0.0% 
Other 
Domestic 
Air 54,237 69,151 -0.2% -0.4% 
 Bus 428,353 457,604 0.2% 0.3% 
 Rail 256,472 297,711 -0.1% -0.1% 
 Total 739,062 824,466 0.1% 0.1% 
Total Air 811,969 1,054,110 0.3% 0.5% 
 Bus 605,839 647,314 0.1% 0.2% 
 Rail 459,600 530,637 -0.1% -0.2% 
 Metro 102,961 109,468 0.0% 0.0% 
 Total 1,980,369 2,341,530 0.1% 0.3% 
 
VAT revenues by 2030 would increase overall (EU28) by over 36% (full pass-through) to 22% (less-
than-full pass-through). Unlike Scenario 1, however, a number of Member States would see a reduction 
in their VAT revenues (sometimes quite dramatic), as their BAU rates are higher than the reduced rates 
of Scenario 2 (e.g. Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia, see Table 6.15). 
Revenue for operators by 2030 would drop slightly compared to the BAU, by 0.5% with full pass-
through and 2.0% with limited pass-through. For Member States where there would be reduced overall 
VAT revenues, the operators’ revenues would tend to increase (e.g. Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, and 
Slovakia), whereas the opposite would be true for the Member States with higher relative increases (e.g. 
Denmark would have the highest decrease at -17%). The mechanical application of the scenario to the 






Table 6.15 – Scenario 2: Changes in VAT and Operator Revenues 




Full Pass-Through Less-Than-Full  
Pass-Through 
Full Pass-Through Less-Than-Full  
Pass-Through 
  VAT VAT Tickets VAT Tickets VAT Tickets VAT Tickets 
AT 4.0% 2.9% -0.1% 2.7% -1.1% 2.0% -0.2% 2.0% -1.2% 
BE 7.7% 6.3% 0.0% 5.0% -0.5% 5.4% -0.1% 5.2% -0.6% 
BG -47.7% -43.4% 2.4% -43.6% 3.5% -40.1% 4.0% -39.9% 3.8% 
CY 724.7% 886.3% -0.6% 856.4% -3.7% 1027.7% -1.2% 1011.9% -3.4% 
CZ 14.3% 16.4% -0.6% 13.9% -3.3% 18.5% -1.2% 18.2% -3.8% 
DE 7.5% 6.4% -0.2% 4.5% -1.7% 6.0% -0.4% 5.5% -1.9% 
DK .. .. -5.8% .. -15.3% .. -10.0% .. -17.0% 
EE -45.9% -39.1% 1.9% -37.0% 1.6% -30.3% 2.7% -30.1% 0.6% 
ES 18.4% 12.2% -0.2% 6.5% -3.6% 6.5% -0.5% 5.2% -3.2% 
FI 28.4% 33.6% -0.5% 32.0% -3.2% 37.8% -1.0% 36.4% -3.5% 
FR 6.4% 7.0% -0.2% 7.6% -1.3% 7.0% -0.4% 6.4% -1.4% 
GR 75.8% 100.4% -1.2% 88.8% -6.8% 116.4% -2.4% 105.9% -7.5% 
HR -78.7% -77.0% 3.3% -75.7% 6.5% -74.9% 5.7% -74.0% 6.8% 
HU -78.1% -75.9% 5.2% -74.1% 11.2% -73.8% 9.2% -73.0% 12.6% 
IE .. .. -1.6% .. -6.4% .. -3.0% .. -6.4% 
IT 12.0% 14.4% -0.2% 15.1% -1.1% 15.7% -0.4% 14.6% -1.3% 
LT 33.3% 38.7% -0.6% 28.0% -2.9% 57.4% -1.6% 56.5% -3.6% 
LU 34.7% 33.6% -0.1% 32.3% -0.8% 30.9% -0.2% 30.6% -0.9% 
LV 42.6% 56.2% -0.9% 53.1% -4.4% 74.0% -1.9% 72.0% -5.1% 
MT .. .. -0.8% .. -4.2% .. -1.6% .. -4.1% 
NL 10.1% 9.5% -0.1% 7.1% -1.3% 9.0% -0.2% 8.6% -1.5% 
PL 5.4% 4.9% -0.1% 6.7% -0.7% 4.9% -0.4% 4.9% -0.9% 
PT 66.4% 81.7% -0.5% 82.7% -3.4% 93.0% -1.1% 89.9% -3.7% 
RO -75.8% -75.5% 4.6% -74.7% 9.6% -76.1% 8.6% -75.7% 11.4% 
SE 27.9% 32.1% -0.3% 31.1% -1.9% 38.1% -0.6% 36.8% -2.2% 
SI 4.3% -2.9% -0.1% -7.4% -0.8% -8.9% -0.2% -8.8% -0.8% 
SK -46.0% -45.3% -1.3% -44.4% 2.7% -43.9% -0.5% -43.2% 2.5% 
UK .. .. -1.1% .. -3.5% .. -2.0% .. -3.9% 
EU28 23.3% 24.6% -0.3% 22.8% -1.9% 25.0% -0.6% 23.6% -2.1% 
Note: Percentage change from BAU Scenario for VAT revenues and Operators’ revenues 
For DK, IE, MT and UK the percentage change in VAT is not meaningful, as there are no revenues under the 
BAU 
 
b. Impact on Demand between City Pairs 
The changes in fares, trips, and VAT revenue at the city pairs level for Scenario 2 would also similar 
to those in Scenario 1, but at lower percentages. City pairs in a Member State (or between Member 
States) that currently apply their standard VAT rate to all modes of transport (e.g. city pairs 2 and 4) 
would show no change in fares, trips, or VAT revenue for Scenario 1. For Scenario 2, the same city 
pairs would show a decrease in fares, an increase in trips, and a large reduction in VAT revenue. In 
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contrast, city pairs in Member States that currently apply their reduced rates and would show an increase 
in fares and a reduction in trips in Scenario 1 would show no change in Scenario 2. 
 
Table 6.16 - Scenario 2 City Pairs Model Full Pass-Through: Changes in Fares, Trips, and VAT 
Revenue (Comparison with BAU) 






City A City B Air Rail Bus Total Total 
Athens Thessaloniki 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Berlin Hamburg -10% -10% -10% 7% -60% 
Budapest Debrecen n.a. -7% -7% 5% -30% 
Cluj Iasi -12% -12% -12% 8% -60% 
Copenhagen Aarhus n.a. 25% 25% -10% n.a. 
Dublin Cork 13% 13% 13% -8% n.a. 
Krakow Wroclaw 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Lisbon Porto 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
London Glasgow 5% 5% 5% -3% n.a. 
Madrid Barcelona 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Paris Toulouse 3% 4% 3% -2% -2% 
Berlin Warsaw 8% -2% -2% 0% 23% 
Constanta Varna n.a. n.a. -10% 0% n.a. 
Copenhagen Vilnius 7% 0% -2% -3% n.a. 
London Brussels 2% 3% 3% -1% n.a. 
Ostrava Katowice n.a. 0% 0% 0% 52% 
Paris Lisbon 9% 1% 1% -3% n.a. 
Frankfurt Oslo 0% 1% 1% 0% 9% 
Gothenburg Oslo 0% 0% 0% 0% n.a. 
Riga Moscow 0% 0% 0% 0% n.a. 
 
In comparing the VAT revenues for the BAU, Scenario 1, and Scenario 2, each city pair (with the 
exceptions of pairs 6, 9, and 15) would show the same results for two of the situations, a reflection that 
they are currently applying either their standard rate or their reduced VAT. For the three exceptions, the 
current rate is either exemption or zero; hence, the BAU has VAT revenue, Scenario 1 would show the 
highest VAT gain, and Scenario 2 would show a lesser VAT revenue. City pair 5 shows the same 
revenue for Scenarios 1 and 2, as the Member State (Denmark) does not have a reduced rate of VAT; 
subsequently, for Scenario 2, the same standard rate has been used as in Scenario 1. 
In all three situations (BAU and Scenarios 1 and 2), city pair 11 (Paris/Toulouse) would generate the 
highest VAT revenue. In the BAU, city pair 2 (Berlin/Hamburg) would have the second highest VAT 
revenue, while for Scenario 1, it would be city pair 15 (London/Brussels) with the second highest VAT 
revenue gain and in Scenario 2, it would be city pair 5 (Copenhagen/Aarhus). This city pair would also 
show the largest percentage reduction in passengers in Scenario 2 and city pair 4 (Cluj/Iasi), the largest 























c. Macro-Economic and Social Effects  
In this scenario, the effect on GDP would be much smaller for most Member States as compared to 
Scenario 1, because the change in VAT is much smaller (for many Member States, only the VAT on air 
transport would increase). For some Member States, the VAT would decrease for train and bus (e.g. 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia), and the effect on GDP would be positive as the 
decreased transport fares would increase disposable household budgets and increase consumption 
demand (Table 6.18). 
For those Member States where the VAT would increase, GDP would decrease if the VAT increase 
were to be passed on only partially. This result would be similar to that obtained under Scenario 1. The 
opposite would be true for those Member States where VAT would decrease; GDP would increase 
further for these Member States. This outcome would result from a decrease in government subsidies to 
the bus and rail sectors: a VAT decrease for bus and rail transport would be passed-through only partially 
by raising the fares for these modes. The net effect for non-business trips would still be a fare decrease, 
but for business passengers, fares would increase. As a result, their demand for bus and rail transport 
will be reduced. This reduction in demand would result in reduced subsidies to these modes, and the 
extra available budget could be passed on to the households via tax reductions. 
Table 6.17 – BAU and Scenarios 1 and 2 City Pairs Model: Comparison of VAT 
Revenue  
 
  VAT Revenue (EUR m) 
 City A City B BAU Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
1 Athens Thessaloniki 21.1 35.6 21.1 
2 Berlin Hamburg 31.1 31.1 12.4 
3 Budapest Debrecen 5.0 5.0 3.5 
4 Cluj Iasi 3.3 3.3 1.3 
5 Copenhagen Aarhus 0.0 30.7 30.7 
6 Dublin Cork 0.0 7.6 4.7 
7 Krakow Wroclaw 0.2 0.6 0.2 
8 Lisbon Porto 3.8 13.5 3.8 
9 London Glasgow 0.0 43.8 11.8 
10 Madrid Barcelona 14.7 29.1 14.7 
11 Paris Toulouse 34.0 73.8 33.5 
12 Berlin Warsaw 0.4 1.3 0.5 
13 Constanta Varna 0.0 0.0 0.0 
14 Copenhagen Vilnius 0.0 4.3 1.9 
15 London Brussels 1.0 72.0 26.2 
16 Ostrava Katowice 0.0 0.0 0.0 
17 Paris Lisbon 0.0 22.9 9.8 
18 Frankfurt Oslo 0.5 0.9 0.6 
19 Gothenburg Oslo 0.0 0.0 0.0 
20 Riga Moscow 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table 6.18 – Scenario 2: GDP Effects (Comparison with 
BAU) 





AT 0.00 -0.02 
BE 0.00 -0.01 
BG 0.04 0.05 
CZ 0.00 -0.02 
DE 0.00 0.00 
EE 0.02 0.02 
ES 0.00 -0.01 
FI 0.00 -0.01 
FR 0.00 0.00 
GR -0.01 0.00 
HU 0.02 0.03 
IE -0.01 -0.04 
IT 0.00 0.00 
LT 0.00 0.00 
LV 0.00 0.00 
NL 0.00 0.00 
PL 0.00 -0.01 
PT 0.00 0.00 
RO 0.09 0.12 
SE 0.00 0.00 
SI 0.00 -0.01 
SK 0.02 0.02 
UK 0.00 -0.01 
 
d. Employment in the Transport Sector 
Employment in the transport sectors would again follow the pattern of the transport PKM for each 
mode. In Member States where the VAT rate would decrease (e.g. Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Romania, 
and Slovakia), there would be a positive effect on employment. In Member States that already charge 
the reduced rate, the effect would be small; while in Member States with a current zero rate or exemption 
(e.g. Ireland and the UK), there would be a large negative effect on employment. 
If there were to be a partial cost pass-through, business demand would increase due to the decrease 















Train Bus Air Train Bus Air 
AT -0.04 -0.04 -0.91 0.12 0.11 1.57 
BE -0.02 -0.03 -0.22 0.12 0.07 1.50 
BG 6.22 6.43 -2.43 0.84 1.49 0.38 
CZ -0.04 -0.15 -0.30 0.29 0.18 0.64 
DE 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.00 0.06 
EE 3.67 4.19 -0.52 0.58 -0.12 0.73 
ES -0.05 -0.06 -0.65 0.24 0.23 0.95 
FI -0.03 -0.05 -0.49 0.26 0.09 1.23 
FR 0.01 0.00 -0.23 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
GR 0.03 -0.06 -1.97 -0.02 -0.02 -0.18 
HU 8.75 9.82 0.75 2.35 2.77 0.58 
IE -4.86 -6.86 -0.61 -0.65 -3.26 2.97 
IT 0.03 0.01 -0.29 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
LT -0.03 -0.03 -3.33 0.01 0.01 0.31 
LV -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
NL -0.01 -0.01 -0.12 0.05 0.05 0.34 
PL -0.02 -0.08 -0.15 0.25 0.23 0.40 
PT 0.03 0.00 -0.94 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 
RO 5.42 5.73 1.57 -0.15 0.45 1.37 
SE -0.02 -0.02 -0.20 0.04 0.00 0.67 
SI -0.20 -0.20 -1.06 0.12 0.11 1.79 
SK 2.87 3.34 -0.07 0.52 0.55 0.73 
UK -3.28 -3.57 -0.25 -1.82 -1.63 0.39 
 
For Member States where the VAT would decrease for bus and rail transport (e.g. Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia), the purchasing power of lower-income households would increase 
as they could make more use of these modes. This increase would be larger with full pass-through as 
compared to partial pass-through because the decrease in consumer price would be larger in the former 
case. For the other Member States, the results would be similar to Scenario 1: with partial pass-through, 
the purchasing power would decrease mainly for the higher income households. 
 
Table 6.20 – Scenario 2: Distributional Impact 
 
Full Pass-Through Less-Than-Full Pass-Through 
hh1 hh2 hh3 hh4 hh5 hh1 hh2 hh3 hh4 hh5 
AT -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 
BE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
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BG n.a.148 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.08 0.15 0.12 -0.13 0.10 
CZ -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 
DE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EE 0.11 0.21 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.04 0.07 
ES -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 
FI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.04 
FR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
GR 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
HU 0.14 0.19 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.11 -0.03 -0.03 0.08 
IE -0.09 -0.11 -0.08 -0.06 0.00 -0.19 -0.09 -0.08 -0.04 -0.11 
IT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.02 
LV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
PL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
PT -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
RO 0.38 0.47 0.18 0.03 0.06 0.23 0.35 -0.09 -0.16 0.30 
SE -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 
SI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
SK 0.15 0.18 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.09 0.11 -0.02 0.01 0.03 
UK -0.08 0.00 -0.06 0.02 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 
 
VAT Scenario 3: VAT Rates for Domestic and Intra-EU International Transport 
Set to National Standard Rates, Place of Taxation Changed to Member State of 
Departure/Arrival 
a. Impact on Member State Passenger Demand 
This scenario is a variation of Scenario 1, but with a fundamental change in the way that VAT would 
be calculated and collected. We have argued earlier that there is a paucity of data on which it would be 
possible to project how intra-EU passengers might react to a change in the place of VAT liability. There 
is a multitude of possible current patterns of intra-EU trips, some of which appear to be designed to 
minimize VAT impacts. With an increase in the average level of VAT on passenger travel, it might be 
expected that the innovative ways of minimizing VAT on passenger travel might expand. However, 
evidence provided in the Second Interim Report indicated that the vast majority (e.g. more than 98% of 
air passengers) makes simple one-way or direct return trips. 
Given the complexity of possible trip patterns between Member States, but considering that most 
intra-EU trips are of a round-trip nature, we have assumed that all trips are simple, two-leg out and 
return trips. Another complicating issue is that of the current zero rating of intra-EU air (and maritime) 
passenger travel. With zero rating, it has not been necessary to determine how passengers flying over 
transit Member States would be assessed for VAT. For possible future VAT regimes that retain the 
distance basis, one possibility would be that this part of the travel would not be taken into account in 
assessing liability for VAT; while at the other extreme, the transit travel would liable to VAT in the 
                                                   
148 The model did not solve for Bulgaria in this scenario due to numerical errors. 
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same way that rail and bus are liable (for some Member States). This scenario avoids both of these 
options by making VAT liability based on country of departure or arrival.  
Most intra-EU travel passengers will not be affected by a change in the place of VAT liability. 
However, this does not imply that changing the place of taxation would have no impact at all: there will 
be a shift in VAT revenues between Member States.  
The result of the shift in PKM subject to VAT because of the change in place of taxation would 
mainly affect the amount of taxable PKM for large, centrally located Member States (for transit), such 
as France and Germany. The smaller Member States located next to them would be the primary 
beneficiaries (Table 6.21 and Figure 6.2). 
 
















AT 44,075 943.7 43,942 941.6 -0.3% -0.2% 
BE 48,655 688.6 50,026 708.1 2.8% 2.8% 
BG 27,729 166.5 27,925 167.6 0.7% 0.6% 
CY 17,609 119.3 17,609 119.3 0.0% 0.0% 
CZ 60,571 549.3 60,671 550.5 0.2% 0.2% 
DE 304,375 4,267.8 303,631 4,254.7 -0.2% -0.3% 
DK 31,740 539.9 31,848 541.5 0.3% 0.3% 
EE 5,707 28.6 5,711 28.6 0.1% 0.1% 
ES 309,088 2,464.9 308,897 2,463.1 -0.1% -0.1% 
FI 28,761 485.9 28,790 486.6 0.1% 0.1% 
FR 283,410 5,965.0 280,618 5,918.9 -1.0% -0.8% 
GR 93,551 1,167.0 93,556 1,167.1 0.0% 0.0% 
HR 8,992 84.2 9,039 84.9 0.5% 0.8% 
HU 41,651 330.2 40,875 324.9 -1.9% -1.6% 
IE 31,768 388.9 31,813 389.6 0.1% 0.2% 
IT 250,500 3,070.5 250,656 3,072.7 0.1% 0.1% 
LT 7,549 52.8 7,570 52.9 0.3% 0.3% 
LU 2,620 20.2 2,702 21.0 3.1% 4.2% 
LV 8,174 52.1 8,172 52.1 0.0% 0.0% 
MT 5,632 52.4 5,632 52.4 0.0% 0.0% 
NL 63,520 886.9 64,364 901.9 1.3% 1.7% 
PL 81,297 1,047.8 81,248 1,047.4 -0.1% 0.0% 
PT 52,043 392.6 52,148 394.2 0.2% 0.4% 
RO 44,208 294.0 44,199 293.8 0.0% -0.1% 
SE 50,569 1,081.9 50,523 1,080.7 -0.1% -0.1% 
SI 5,676 63.2 5,666 63.2 -0.2% 0.0% 
SK 16,932 100.2 16,962 100.6 0.2% 0.3% 
UK 293,512 3,942.8 293,614 3,952.5 0.0% 0.2% 




Given the very small impact on VAT revenue, the effects on GDP, employment, and purchasing 
power would vary only marginally from Scenario 1. For Member States where the new VAT regime 
would lead to a decrease in tax revenues, GDP, employment, and purchasing power would decrease, 
and vice versa for Member States where there would be a net increase in tax revenues. 
The same argument holds for the assessment of Scenarios 4 and 5. 
b. Impact on Demand between City Pairs 
The impact of the changes of Scenario 3 from BAU would be in two parts: first, the change in VAT 
rates to the national standard rates and second, the change in the basis for VAT liability. 
The impacts of the first type of change are described under the impacts of Scenario 1; consequently, 
here we focus on the differences between Scenarios 1 and 3, which is the difference between calculating 
VAT on a distance versus departure basis. 
For domestic city pairs, a departure basis makes no difference, as the city of departure (or arrival) 
would always be in the same Member State as would be levying VAT under the current distance-based 
system. 
With standard VAT rates and a departure basis for calculating VAT revenue, there would be a 
substantial difference in fares, numbers of trips, and VAT revenue for many intra-EU city pairs, whether 
the comparison is with the current VAT rates and a distance basis for VAT attribution or to Scenario 1.   
As the standard rates apply equally to all three transport modes, the differences compared with 
Scenario 1 occur at all trip lengths and are not dependent on the modal shares (if they had been limited 
to air passengers, for example, the impacts would be concentrated on longer distance city pairs where 
the air mode predominates). 
There are three principal criteria for a change to the departure basis to have a potential significant 
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Figure.6. 2 - Change in VAT Revenues
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 The passengers’ route between the city pair must transit at least one Member State. If this 
condition is not met, only the Member States of the origin and destination cities are involved 
(as with domestic passenger trips) and the VAT per trip will be the same as with a distance or 
departure basis for VAT attribution;149  
 For those parts of any routes between city pairs that pass over non-EU territory, either sea 
outside of territorial waters (as are parts of the Mediterranean Sea) or airspace over non-EU 
countries (such as Switzerland or Serbia), the distance-based VAT will not incur VAT for this 
part of the travel. In contrast, a departure-based VAT will take into account the full fare, 
including that part for travel outside of the EU territory and, subsequently for these city pairs, 
will be higher than with the distance-based VAT. While not an essential condition, to have part 
of the route passing over non-EU Member State territory would create a difference in impact 
between a distance and a departure basis for VAT where it does occur; and 
 Demand for travel between the city pairs needs to be at least about 0.1 million passengers per 
year, otherwise there are too few passenger trips for the difference in VAT rates to become 
evident in the changes in the numbers of passengers or in VAT revenue. The impact of the 
change in VAT basis on passenger fares is independent of the mode share.150 
The twenty city pairs used to illustrate the impacts of standard VAT rates using the current distance 
basis (Scenarios 1 and 2) are not appropriate to illustrate Scenario 3. The domestic city pairs (numbers 
1 through 11) would not show any difference with a departure basis and, of the intra-EU city pairs, only 
three pass through a transit Member State.  
To assess the impact of changing to a departure basis, we have used seven different city pairs, all of 
which have a substantial part of their travel through one or more transit Member States or over non-EU 
Member State territory. They were chosen from the many more that satisfied the first two criteria 
described above, but introducing the third criterion reduced the potential sample size as many of the city 
pairs at longer distances from each other have few passengers. These seven city pairs, the distances 
between them, their current estimated fares, and the modal shares of demand were: 
 
Table 6.22 – Scenario 3: Basic Parameters of Sample City Pairs 
 City A City B Distance151 
(km) 






    Air Rail Bus  Air 
1 Athens Prague 1,541 149 201 90 0.141 100% 
2 Bucharest Lisbon 2,492 164 n.a. 255 0.143 88% 
3 Berlin Rome 1,168 125 n.a. 135 0.180 93% 
4 Brussels Copenhagen 768 108 250 250 0.172 99% 
5 Brussels Warsaw 1,162 140 220 220 0.063 66% 
6 London Prague 919 149 255 80 0.247 88% 
7 Paris Stockholm 1,547 147 297 246 0.345 99% 
 
                                                   
149 In the CPM, for calculating VAT on a distance basis, we have been able to use the actual distances of air, rail, and bus travel 
and have not had to make an assumption about the location of the cities, as is needed for the TREMOVE model. 
150 With 0.1 million passengers per year, an average fare of EUR 100 and an average VAT rate of 20%, the annual VAT revenue 
would be EUR 2 million. 
151 For simplification, we show only the air distance, although the actual distances for each mode have been used in the estimates 
of the impacts. 
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Of the city pairs in the sample, the share of rail distance in transit Member States averages about 52%, 
with a range of 7% to 74%. All city pairs in the reduced sample are more than about 700 kilometres 
apart and, of these, three have air modal shares close to 100% (city pairs 1, 4, and 7). The other city 
pairs (city pairs 2, 3, 5, and 6) have a higher proportion of non-business passengers who are less prepared 
than business passengers to pay the generally higher fares of air travel to save time and, accordingly, 
have rather lower air mode shares. Even for these city pairs, the air mode share is between 66% and 
93%.  
 
Table 6.23 – Scenario 3: Changes in Fares, Trips, and VAT Revenue (Comparison with BAU) 

















1 Athens Prague 0.134 -0.7% 1.5% -0.35 2.79 36% 
2 Bucharest Lisbon 0.95 -5.7% 3.2% -1.97 3.50 32% 
3 Berlin Rome 0.175 -10.0% 5.2% -2.32 1.77 1% 
4 Brussels Copenhagen 0.153 -4.4% 3.2% -0.84 2.74 11% 
5 Brussels Warsaw 0.059 3.0% -0.5% -0.93 0.70 10% 
6 London Prague 0.227 -8.3% 3.3% -2.22 2.55 6% 
7 Paris Stockholm 0.314 -9.2% -0.3% -5.03 5.41 4% 
 
Changing to a departure basis would not have a consistent impact on VAT and fares. Of the seven 
city pairs, all but one would see a reduction in fares of up to 10% compared to Scenario 1. However, all 
seven city pairs would generate more VAT revenue. This increase would be of more than 30% for the 
first two city pairs. For the first, a large part of the passenger travel between the cities is in countries that 
are not members of the European Union. With a distance based VAT this part of the travel would not 
generate any VAT revenue to Member States. With a departure based VAT, VAT liability would fall on 
the full ticket price, and so generate more VAT revenue. For city pair 2, the distance based VAT would 
lose revenue for the approximate one third of the air distance that would be over the Mediterranean Sea 
and not generate VAT revenue. With the departure based VAT, liability would be on the full fare and 
so generate more VAT revenue, as with city pair 1. The additional VAT revenues for the other city pair 
derive from the different VAT rates in the transit Member States compared to the Member State of 
departure.  
 
VAT Scenario 4: VAT Rates for Domestic and Intra-EU International Transport 
Set to National Reduced Rates, Place of Taxation Changed to Member State of 
Departure/Arrival 
a. Impact on Member State Passenger Demand 
As for Scenario 3, this scenario builds on the policy changes envisaged in Scenarios 2 and 3. The 






Table 6.24 – Scenario 4: Changes in PKM and VAT Revenue, 2030 














AT 45,583 478.7 45,444 477.6 -0.3% -0.2% 
BE 51,370 202.7 52,807 208.6 2.8% 2.9% 
BG 29,140 76.8 29,352 77.3 0.7% 0.6% 
CY 18,314 33.6 18,314 33.6 0.0% 0.0% 
CZ 61,966 389.0 62,070 389.9 0.2% 0.2% 
DE 320,086 1619.0 319,301 1613.9 -0.2% -0.3% 
DK 31,740 520.0 31,848 521.6 0.3% 0.3% 
EE 5,956 13.7 5,960 13.7 0.1% 0.1% 
ES 319,197 1097.7 319,000 1096.8 -0.1% -0.1% 
FI 30,074 215.7 30,105 216.0 0.1% 0.1% 
FR 295,919 4052.0 293,021 4028.0 -1.0% -0.6% 
GR 96,670 693.0 96,676 693.1 0.0% 0.0% 
HR 9,520 19.5 9,572 19.7 0.5% 0.8% 
HU 46,180 69.4 45,274 68.3 -2.0% -1.6% 
IE 33,046 151.5 33,092 151.8 0.1% 0.2% 
IT 262,837 1439.6 262,998 1440.6 0.1% 0.1% 
LT 7,973 21.9 7,996 21.9 0.3% 0.3% 
LU 2,685 3.8 2,769 4.0 3.1% 4.5% 
LV 8,465 29.2 8,463 29.2 0.0% 0.0% 
MT 5,855 15.4 5,855 15.4 0.0% 0.0% 
NL 66,424 260.6 67,290 265.0 1.3% 1.7% 
PL 88,408 384.5 88,354 384.3 -0.1% 0.0% 
PT 54,325 105.8 54,436 106.3 0.2% 0.4% 
RO 47,984 59.9 47,974 59.9 0.0% -0.1% 
SE 54,094 284.6 54,045 284.3 -0.1% -0.1% 
SI 6,014 25.6 6,003 25.6 -0.2% 0.1% 
SK 17,658 49.8 17,689 50.0 0.2% 0.4% 
UK 306,843 1028.7 306,957 1031.2 0.0% 0.2% 





b. Impact on Demand between City Pairs 
As with Scenario 3, the impacts of Scenario 4 are found in two parts: first, the change in VAT rates 
to national reduced rates and, second, the change from a distance basis to a departure basis. As with 
Scenario 3, for domestic city pairs, the change would make no difference, as the city of departure is 
always in the same Member State as would be levying VAT under the current distance-based system. 
The same sub-set of seven intra-EU city pairs has been used as for the description of the impacts of 
Scenario 3, and the same three criteria for a change in basis of VAT application to make a noticeable 
difference apply here as for Scenario 3.   
The seven city pairs register a reduction in passenger numbers (between 0.3% and 1.8%) compared 
to Scenario 2, as the reduced VAT rates applied on a departure basis result in higher VAT components 
of fares for city pairs that require transport through a transit Member State. However, these increases in 
fares and reductions in trips are both smaller than for Scenario 3. 
VAT revenues increase substantially due to the generation of VAT revenue from air passengers (all 
zero rated with current rates). VAT revenue would also increase for several city pairs where rail and bus 
passengers would also incur VAT, which they did not before. All but one of the city pairs (Brussels to 
Warsaw) would generate VAT revenue of more than EUR 2 million, and one of them (Paris to 
Stockholm) would generate more than EUR 4 million. These revenue would accrue to the Member States 
of the named cities and none to the transit Member States. 
The change to a departure basis would result in a small change (-1.1%) in the number of passenger 
trips for Bucharest/Lisbon. Current VAT rates are zero for air passengers, 5% for rail passengers, and 
7% for bus passengers, all generated in transit Member States. With Scenario 4, these would all increase 
to 11% (based on Romania having a rate of 9% and Portugal of 13%) for all modes, and would accrue 







































Figure 6.3 - Changes in VAT, Scenario 4
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Table 6.25 – Scenario 4: Changes in Fares, Trips, and VAT Revenue (Comparison with Scenario 2) 

















1 Athens Prague 0.134 4.2% -1.5% 0.34 2.23 15% 
2 Bucharest Lisbon 0.195 3.0% -1.1% 0.29 2.80 10% 
3 Berlin Rome 0.174 -1.1% -0.3% 0.24 2.24 11% 
4 Brussels Copenhagen 0.163 5.3% -1.8% 0.46 2.20 21% 
5 Brussels Warsaw 0.063 -18.4% -0.1% -0.17 0.56 -31% 
6 London Prague 0.243 3.3% -1.6% 0.15 2.04 7% 
7 Paris Stockholm 0.332 2.1% -0.8% 0.07 4.32 2% 
 
VAT Scenario 5: VAT Rates for Domestic and Intra-EU International Transport 
Are Equal to BAU, Place of Taxation Changed to Member State of 
Departure/Arrival 
a. Impact on Member States Passenger Demand 
The most important variable affected in this scenario would be the distribution of VAT revenues 
among Member States. As to be expected, the overall EU28 revenue from VAT and tickets would 
scarcely change.  
The situation of this scenario differs from the previous ones in the application of current national 
VAT policies. The shifts in taxable PKM, as shown in Table 6.26, are only relevant to the extent that 
VAT would be charged on intra-EU trips. In Scenarios 3 and 4, all PKM would be subject to a positive 
VAT rate. 
 Several Member States (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, and the 
UK) have a zero rated VAT on intra-EU trips for any mode; subsequently, the VAT revenue 
shift will not happen in practice. 
 Another group of Member States (France, Poland, and Slovenia) charge VAT on international 
road transport, but have a zero rate for rail. Only part of the shift would be realized there. 
In practice, revenue shifts would be very modest. Belgium and the Netherlands would make small 
gains from the rail trips to France and Germany. No other Member State would win or lose more than 
1% of its current transport VAT revenue.152 The mechanical application of the scenario to the 2010 




                                                   
152 Note that in this case, the assumption of the unchanged total demand is weaker, as differences between current rates can be 
higher than in Scenarios 3 and 4. However, the TREMOVE model does not have the level of precision required to do this. 
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Table 6.26 – Scenario 5: Changes in PKM and VAT Revenue, 2030 

















AT 45,788 469.3 45,651 468.3 -0.3% -0.2% -0.2% 
BE 51,489 192.4 52,910 198.1 2.8% 3.0% 2.4% 
BG 28,250 127.4 28,476 127.4 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
CY 18,546 3.0 18,546 3.0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
CZ 62,825 328.3 62,937 328.3 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
DE 321,609 1523.1 320,838 1509.5 -0.2% -0.9% -0.8% 
DK 34,665 0.0 34,775 0.0 0.3% 0.0% .. 
EE 5,811 19.7 5,814 19.7 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
ES 320,942 1029.4 320,751 1028.5 -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% 
FI 30,467 149.2 30,499 149.2 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
FR 297,841 2882.9 294,886 2875.3 -1.0% -0.3% -0.2% 
GR 98,277 318.5 98,283 318.5 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
HR 9,070 77.8 9,116 78.5 0.5% 0.9% 0.8% 
HU 42,559 265.4 41,619 265.4 -2.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
IE 33,966 0.0 34,014 0.0 0.1% 0.0% .. 
IT 264,220 1304.6 264,386 1304.6 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
LT 8,080 13.9 8,104 13.9 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
LU 2,690 2.9 2,774 2.9 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
LV 8,604 16.8 8,602 16.8 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
MT 5,947 0.0 5,947 0.0 0.0% 0.0% .. 
NL 66,584 239.2 67,432 243.5 1.3% 1.8% 1.4% 
PL 88,857 365.7 88,802 365.6 -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
PT 54,536 81.0 54,650 81.0 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
RO 44,850 249.3 44,839 249.3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
SE 54,502 197.3 54,453 197.3 -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
SI 6,029 28.1 6,018 28.0 -0.2% -0.2% -0.3% 
SK 16,866 88.8 16,899 88.8 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
UK 311,730 0.0 311,848 0.0 0.0% 0.0% .. 
EU28 2,335,599 11238.0 2,333,832 11225.7 -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% 
 
b. Impact on Demand between City Pairs 
With current VAT rates, the departure basis for calculating VAT revenue would make very little 
difference to fares, numbers of trips, or VAT revenue for any of the selected city pairs. 
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As with Scenarios 3 and 4, for domestic city pairs, the departure basis would make no difference as 
the city of departure is always in the same Member State as would be levying VAT under the current 
distance-based system. For intra-EU city pairs, the departure basis would only make a difference for 
those city pairs that cross a transit Member State.  
We present the results for the same city pairs as for the other scenarios that involve a departure basis 
for calculating VAT, as the criteria for this basis to make a difference are the same as for those scenarios. 
Some Member States with significant numbers of transiting passengers currently apply positive VAT 
rates on intra-EU passengers (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands). Other Member 
States that apply positive VAT rates to intra-EU bus and rail passengers do not have important transiting 
services (e.g. Croatia, Poland, Slovenia, and Spain). 
Given the current high air mode shares and the current zero rating of intra-EU air travel, the VAT 
currently generated is quite low and, in fact, zero for five of the city pairs. There would be very little 
change with a departure based VAT as the Member State and mode VAT rates themselves would not 
change, only how those rates would be used as the basis for VAT liability.  
The increases in VAT would result in small changes in the numbers of passengers, between -1.4% 
and 3.3%, in the number of their passenger trips. For the other three city pairs, there would be very small 
changes in demand, between zero and -1%, as the corresponding VAT changes would also be very small. 
With small changes in VAT rates and in numbers of passengers, the VAT generated would remain small 
and almost unchanged. 
No passengers departing from London or Prague would incur VAT with a departure basis, as both 
Member States (the UK and the Czech Republic) currently apply a zero VAT rate to all intra-EU 
passengers. With the distance based VAT, the non-air passengers incur VAT for the part of their trips 
that takes place in transit Member States (France, Belgium Netherlands, Germany or Austria depending 
on the route). 
 
Table 6.27 – Scenario 5: Changes in Fares, Trips, and VAT Revenue (Comparison with BAU) 

















1 Athens Prague 0.144 -14.7% 2.5% 0.00 0.00 -3.7% 
2 Bucharest Lisbon 0.185 -15.1% 0.0% 0.00 0.00 -9.1% 
3 Berlin Rome 0.187 -17.8% 3.3% 0.00 0.03 -5.9% 
4 Brussels Copenhagen 0.174 -2.8% 1.1% 0.00 0.03 -6.2% 
5 Brussels Warsaw 0.062 -4.5% +1.4% -0.04 0.57 -6.2% 
6 London Prague 0.120 -5.5% +0.5% -0.01 0.12 -4.3% 
7 Paris Stockholm 0.345 -8.4% 0.2% 0.01 0.06 -3.0% 
 
VAT Scenarios 6 and 7: Exemptions According to Article 148 of the VAT 
Directive Abolished (6) or Extended to Buses and Trains (7) 
We have demonstrated in the assessment of distortions in Chapter 4 of this report that the terms of 
Article 148 of the VAT Directive have little, if any, practical impact on the costs of passenger travel or 
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on the relative competitiveness of different transport modes. For transport operators that are obliged to 
pay VAT on their inputs, the only financial cost to them is that of financing those payments between the 
time that they are made and the time that they are rebated. With current low interest charges, these costs 
are small. 
We have, therefore, not even made an order of estimate of the impact of either of these two scenarios 
beyond that included in Chapter 4, which showed the impacts to be small or negligible. 
Even for extra-EU city pairs, in which EU operating companies are in strong competition with 
operators based outside of the EU who might or might not pay VAT or sales tax on their inputs, the fact 
that these taxes are reimbursable for operators for most Member States minimizes any competitive 
disadvantage that EU operators might suffer. 
Exemptions to these generalizations occur for Member States (e.g. Ireland and Denmark) that exempt 
some or all domestic passenger services from VAT without the right to recover VAT on inputs. 
Operators of domestic passenger services in these Member States do suffer some competitive 
disadvantage with those from other Member States and possibly with operators from outside the EU; 
however, if these operators are licensed to operate within these Member States, their services will be 
subject to the same VAT rules and regulations as national operators. It therefore appears that exempting 
domestic passenger services from VAT without the right to recover input VAT does not create any 
significant competitive distortions.  
These two scenarios, each of which would eliminate any such distortion by either making all or no 
operators liable to pay VAT on inputs would not eliminate any significant distortions; however, Scenario 
5, which would extend the input exemptions to all transport modes, would have an additional impact of 
reducing administrative costs.   
 
VAT Scenario 8: All VAT Rates Including Extra-EU are Set to National Reduced 
Rates, Place of Taxation Changed to Member State of Departure/Arrival 
Scenario 8 would extend the national reduced rates and the departure basis of Scenario 4 to extra-EU 
passengers departing from a Member State. It is conceptually rather different from Scenario 4 in that it 
would not (and probably practically could not) extend VAT to passengers departing from countries 
outside of the EU to Member States. 
In analysing the impacts of this scenario, we have overlooked the practicality and impacts on 
passenger behaviour of extending VAT to non-EU destinations. As VAT would be applied to the whole 
price of the ticket and not just the share attributable to distance travelled within EU borders, these could 
include passengers making short distance trips to destinations close to the EU border (and hence 
incurring only a small amount of VAT) and then continuing travel on a separate ticket from that close-
by false destination to the true destination to avoid paying VAT on that part of the travel. There is 
evidence that this behaviour exists for some air passengers departing from Member States that apply an 
Air Passenger Charge; consequently, it could be expected to occur to reduce liability to VAT. 
In the analysis made here, we continue the assumption that there are an equal number of VAT-paying 
passengers traveling in each direction (i.e. half of the total passengers for each city pair are departing 
from a Member State).  
a. Impact on Member States Passenger Demand 
This scenario would build on Scenario 4, but include extra-EU transport in the pool of taxable PKM. 
In practice, the additional extra-EU transport market coming under VAT coverage is air transport only, 
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as it has a 98.5% market share. Only for some Member States close to the eastern border of the EU and 
neighbours of Switzerland is land based extra-EU transport of significance. The effects for intra- and 
extra-EU transport are very similar, as is to be expected; although, the share of business demand (and 
thus the increasing effect) is lower in extra-EU than in intra-EU transport. For urban and other domestic 
transport, the amount of PKM would be identical to that of Scenarios 2 and 4 (Table 6.28). 
 
Table 6.28 – Scenario 8: Revenue Effects (Compared with Scenario 4) 
 Full Pass-Through Less-Than-Full Pass-Through 
 Scenario 4 Scenario 8 % Change Scenario 4 Scenario 8 % Change 
AT 477.6 534.8 12.0% 477.4 533.5 11.7% 
BE 208.6 258.6 24.0% 208.1 257.3 23.6% 
BG 77.3 90.9 17.6% 77.6 91.0 17.3% 
CY 33.6 49.4 46.9% 33.1 48.6 46.8% 
CZ 389.7 484.3 24.3% 388.8 479.8 23.4% 
DE 1613.9 2239.3 38.8% 1607.0 2219.4 38.1% 
DK 521.6 794.2 52.3% 493.8 738.1 49.5% 
EE 13.7 19.7 43.7% 13.8 19.6 42.3% 
ES 1096.8 1262.5 15.1% 1082.7 1242.7 14.8% 
FI 216.0 276.2 27.9% 213.8 272.0 27.2% 
FR 4018.8 4650.1 15.7% 3997.5 4610.7 15.3% 
GR 1082.3 1387.8 28.2% 1029.4 1316.9 27.9% 
HR 19.7 20.9 6.2% 20.4 21.6 5.9% 
HU 68.3 76.2 11.6% 70.4 78.2 11.1% 
IE 151.8 203.8 34.3% 149.0 199.2 33.7% 
IT 1660.6 2088.8 25.8% 1645.7 2059.3 25.1% 
LT 21.9 27.1 23.5% 21.8 26.9 23.3% 
LU 4.0 6.0 50.1% 4.0 6.0 49.7% 
LV 29.2 37.6 28.8% 28.9 37.0 28.2% 
MT 15.4 19.2 25.0% 15.0 18.8 25.0% 
NL 265.0 379.0 43.0% 264.0 374.9 42.0% 
PL 384.3 422.6 10.0% 384.1 422.0 9.9% 
PT 203.2 291.5 43.4% 200.0 286.3 43.1% 
RO 59.9 64.8 8.2% 60.9 65.7 7.9% 
SE 284.3 386.6 36.0% 281.7 381.5 35.4% 
SI 25.6 26.2 2.5% 25.6 26.2 2.5% 
SK 50.0 59.0 18.1% 50.6 59.9 18.4% 
UK 1031.2 1519.6 47.4% 1019.6 1495.5 46.7% 
EU28 14024.2 17676.9 26.0% 13864.6 17388.6 25.4% 
 
The effects on VAT revenues would be substantial (Table 6.28). By 2030, overall VAT revenue 
would increase by 25-26% against Scenario 4 (limited or full pass-through). For some Member States 
with large international hubs for air travel, the increase would be even more substantial (e.g. the UK 
with an increase of 47% and the Netherlands with an increase of 43%) and, correspondingly, for Member 
States with limited direct flights to extra-EU destinations, the changes would be rather minimal (e.g. 
Slovenia and Hungary). 
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b. Impact on Demand between City Pairs 
This scenario would apply specifically to extra-EU travel, so we present the results for all fourteen of 
the extra-EU city pairs included in the CPM. 
Since VAT applies to the full ticket price, the impacts in absolute terms on total fares would be quite 
large; however, expressed as percentages, they would be the same as for the other city pairs with the 
national reduced VAT rates applied. We have seen from the assessment of Scenarios 2 and 4 that the 
effects would be modest. Ten Member States have reduced VAT rates that are less than 10% and all 
others, with two exceptions, are 15% or less.153 With relatively low fare elasticities, these VAT rates 
would result in reductions in demand of 3% or less. VAT revenues are modest in comparison with the 
larger of the intra-EU city pairs; however, Helsinki/St. Petersburg would generate more than EUR 4 




c. Macro-Economic and Social Effects 
The results for GDP would be very similar to those of Scenario 2. The further increase in VAT for 
extra-EU transport would mainly affect the air sector. Especially in the case of partial pass-through, this 




                                                   
153 For Denmark, which does not have a reduced VAT rate, we have used the standard rate of 25%. 
Table 6.29 - Scenario 8 Extra-EU City Pairs Model: Fares, Passengers, and VAT Revenue  








 City A City B Air Rail Bus All  
1 Berlin Kiev 5% 5% 5% -1% 0.5 
2 Bratislava Kiev 4% 0% 6% -2% 0.6 
3 Brussels Moscow 4% 2% 4% -2% 2.8 
4 Copenhagen Reykjavik 15% 0% 0% -2% 0.7 
5 Frankfurt Oslo 12% 0% 12% -2% 0.9 
6 Gothenburg Oslo 4% 0% 4% -3% 0.5 
7 Helsinki St. Petersburg 4% 0% 5% -3% 4.2 
8 Marseille Algiers 1% 0% 0% 0% 0.5 
9 Riga Moscow 4% 0% 4% -1% 0.0 
10 Rome Tunis 1% 0% 0% 0% 0.4 
11 Sofia Istanbul 5% 0% 5% -2% 0.1 
12 Stockholm St. Petersburg 2% 0% 6% -2% 1.8 
13 Tallinn St. Petersburg 5% 6% 7% -2% 0.1 
14 Warsaw Kiev 2% 0% 3% -2% 2.8 
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AT 0.01 -0.09 
BE 0.00 -0.06 
BG 0.00 0.10 
CZ 0.00 -0.05 
DE 0.00 -0.03 
EE 0.05 0.02 
ES -0.01 -0.02 
FI -0.01 -0.02 
FR -0.01 0.00 
GR -0.01 0.00 
HU 0.01 0.02 
IE 0.02 -0.08 
IT -0.01 0.00 
LT -0.04 0.00 
LV 0.00 0.00 
NL 0.00 -0.03 
PL 0.01 -0.05 
PT -0.01 0.00 
RO 0.24 0.18 
SE 0.00 -0.03 
SI 0.00 -0.02 
SK 0.08 -0.04 
UK 0.00 -0.03 
Employment in the Transport Sector 
The effect on employment is also similar to that of Scenario 2. The higher VAT rate causes less 
employment (as compared to Scenario 2) in the air sector in the case of full pass-through and higher 
employment in the case of partial pass-through, due to a further increase in business air demand. There 
are also some indirect effects on employment in the bus and rail sector. As price further increases for air 
transport, total travel budget decreases, and consumers will travel less by bus or train in the case of full 
cost pass-through. In the case of partial cost pass-through, there is a further increase in business bus and 
train demand, as they spend less on air travel. 
 
Table 6.31 – Scenario 8: Employment Effects  






Bus Plane Train Bus Plane 
AT -0.12 -0.13 -2.81 0.41 0.37 5.42 
 176 
BE -0.08 -0.09 -0.74 0.42 0.27 5.48 
BG 6.15 6.30 -4.60 0.82 1.48 0.35 
CZ -0.09 -0.35 -0.65 0.70 0.44 1.57 
DE -0.09 -0.10 -1.69 0.24 0.13 2.10 
EE 3.58 4.10 -1.26 1.00 0.24 2.72 
ES -0.12 -0.13 -1.38 0.53 0.51 2.14 
FI -0.09 -0.12 -1.25 0.71 0.23 3.36 
FR 0.10 0.03 -4.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.26 
GR 0.05 -0.09 -3.21 -0.03 -0.04 -0.31 
HU 8.57 9.63 0.16 2.36 2.79 0.66 
IE -4.91 -6.95 -1.21 0.15 -3.27 6.78 
IT 0.27 0.13 -2.71 -0.01 -0.02 -0.10 
LT -0.05 -0.04 -4.93 0.02 0.02 0.48 
LV -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
NL -0.03 -0.04 -0.50 0.22 0.22 1.54 
PL -0.04 -0.16 -0.31 0.56 0.51 0.91 
PT 0.06 0.01 -1.95 -0.02 -0.02 -0.12 
RO 5.38 5.69 0.92 -0.15 0.45 1.42 
SE -0.07 -0.09 -0.73 0.14 -0.02 2.55 
SI -0.38 -0.36 -1.93 0.24 0.22 3.53 
SK 2.81 3.31 -0.19 0.92 0.96 3.81 
UK -3.32 -3.69 -1.17 -1.71 -1.64 1.39 
 
Income Distribution 
Regarding purchasing power, again, the results are very similar to Scenario 2. The purchasing power 
of households would decrease further as compared to Scenario 2 for almost all household types and 
Member States.  
 
Table 6.32 – Scenario 8: Distributional Impacts 
 
Full Pass-Through Less-Than-Full Pass-Through 
hh1 hh2 hh3 hh4 hh5 hh1 hh2 hh3 hh4 hh5 
AT -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.18 
BE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 
BG 0.08 0.17 0.11 -0.01 0.01 0.08 0.14 0.11 -0.09 0.09 
CZ -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.15 
DE -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
EE 0.11 0.21 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 
ES -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 
FI -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.10 
FR -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.02 
GR 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
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HU 0.16 0.20 0.08 0.01 -0.05 0.04 0.11 -0.03 -0.03 0.07 
IE -0.10 -0.11 -0.09 -0.08 0.00 -0.33 -0.14 -0.14 -0.07 -0.24 
IT -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.01 
LT 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.03 
LV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NL -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 
PL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 
PT -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 
RO 0.47 0.46 0.24 -0.09 0.08 0.23 0.35 -0.09 -0.16 0.29 
SE -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 
SI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 
SK 0.15 0.17 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 
UK -0.07 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.09 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 -0.05 
 
VAT Scenario 9: All VAT Rates Including Extra-EU are Set to National Reduced 
Rates, Place of Taxation Changed to Member State of Departure/Arrival, With 
VAT Applied to Pre-Tax Fares 
There are three types of charges that air passengers in Member States must pay and that are included 
in ticket prices: user charges to cover part or all of the cost of the infrastructure that passenger transport 
operators use for their services; charges that are intended to internalize some of the external costs of 
passenger transport that would not otherwise be taken into account in passengers’ decision making; 
and indirect taxes aimed at raising revenues for local, regional, or national budgets.  
Since the first of these charges is for a service that has provided added value to the output of 
passenger services, it is legitimately included in the part of the ticket price that is subject to VAT. This 
can include track access charges for passenger rail services, most airport charges for the use of runways 
and terminals, and Eurocontrol charges for en-route navigation services. In the maritime sector, this 
can include port charges for use of berths and other facilities and fairway charges imposed by some 
maritime authorities to cover the cost of keeping the freeways open and to a predetermined depth. In 
road passenger transport, it can include part of the cost of vehicle licenses as part of the charges for 
use of the road network, but the main user charge in this respect is the tax on transport fuels.  
Taxes on transport fuel can have a variety of applications, of which the three most significant could 
be: to bring the retail price of transport fuel up to its opportunity cost (only applicable for fuel 
producing states where the cost of production and distribution could be less than the border price); to 
cover some of the costs of providing and maintaining road infrastructure; and to raise revenue for local, 
regional, and national budgets. Only the second of these applications is a user charge that should be 
included in the price of the ticket that is subject to VAT. The first could be considered a tax to make 
user decisions consider the economic costs of the resources they consume. Since the estimates of the 
amount of the fuel tax for this purpose do not usually take VAT into account, this amount of the fuel 
charge could be excluded from the ticket price that is subject to VAT. The third application is more 
clearly an indirect tax that should not attract VAT. 
Charges that are aimed at internalizing the cost of transport externalities are more difficult to 
categorize for the application of VAT. They do not represent added value to passenger transport 
services, but could be considered as an unavoidable cost that is a direct consequence of providing 
passenger transport services and, so, is the same as any other cost that contributes to the added value 
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of the service provided.154 As such, it would be legitimate to include these charges in the part of the 
ticket price that is liable to VAT. 
There are few charges included in the price of passenger tickets that do not fall clearly into the 
category of a user charge or a charge for the internalization of an external cost. One of the most 
prominent of these is the Air Passenger Duty (APD) or Air Passenger Charge (APC). Some Member 
States refer to these as ecological charges aimed at internalizing the external cost of emissions from 
aircraft fuels that impact global warming. Evidence for this interpretation can be found in the distance 
travelled basis of some of the charges (others are fixed fees). However, there is little reliable analysis 
on the costs of global warning that are attributable to air passenger travel; although, there are estimates 
of the CO2 intensity of air travel compared to that of other modes.  
Of the charges that are included in the price of a passenger ticket, the two that most clearly have 
some component of an indirect tax are fuel taxes and the APC. The impact of excluding the latter from 
the part of the ticket price that is liable to VAT is relatively straightforward, as the amount of the APC 
is clearly stated. While the amount of fuel taxes is also known, the fuel consumption (and, hence, the 
incidence of the fuel tax) is highly variable between modes, within modes, between different operators, 
and even between different services on the same route. Therefore, the part of the fuel tax that can be 
considered as a user charge is difficult to estimate. 
In Scenario 9, we have first considered the impacts of not applying VAT to that part of the ticket 
price that is attributable to the APC. Second, to give an approximate indication of the possible impact 
of excluding the amount of fuel tax from the VAT basis, we have made assumptions about the general 
contribution of fuel to the cost of bus and rail passenger transport (international air and maritime 
services are exempt from fuel taxes). 
Air Passenger Charges 
At least six Member States have some form of APC: Austria, Croatia, France, Germany, Italy, and 
the UK. Since these do not, in general terms, represent any value added, it could be argued that they 
should not be included in that part of an air fare that is subject to a value added tax. At times, these 
charges have been described as environmental charges to represent some of the carbon emission 
consequences of air travel. However, as there is no indication that the revenue from the charges is used 
to alleviate the consequences of these emissions, they are usually perceived more as a tax than a user 
charge. 
These charges are in the form of a fixed amount or a range of values related to the distance travelled. 
In a few instances, they have the form of a luxury tax, being related to the seat pitch of the part of the 
aircraft in which the passenger has purchased a seat. 
 Austria has three rates of charge for short-haul, medium-haul, and long-haul flights. All 
destinations in Member States are in the short-haul rate category;  
 Croatia has a two-level charge, one for domestic and the other for international passenger 
departures; 
                                                   
154 Based on internalization measures and policies for the external cost of transport - Produced within the study 
Internalisation Measures and Policies for all external cost of Transport (IMPACT) – Deliverable 3, CE 
Delft/INFRAS/Fraunhofer-ISI/University of Gdansk, 2008 and quoted in An inventory of measures for internalising external 




 France levies four charges on departing air passengers, the revenues of only the first two being 
included in this assessment: 
o Civil Aviation Tax – the rate varies according to destination (domestic and European 
destinations are taxed at one rate and all other destinations at another) and class of travel 
(economy at one rate and all others at another); 
o Solidarity Charge – the revenue of which is earmarked to UNITAID, a World Health 
Organization fund aimed at providing low cost medicines for specific diseases 
(including AIDS and malaria) in developing countries. Eight other countries have 
similar charges, but France is the only one that is a Member State. This charge is 
included in the assessment; 
o Airport Tax – to cover the costs of the safety and security equipment and procedures. 
This is a user charge and not included in this assessment; and 
o Air Transport Noise Tax – the tax rate varies according to the type of airport and aircraft 
and is given to airport operators. The revenues from this charge are not included in the 
estimate as the specific tax rates are very complex. The average charge is about EUR 
12 per departing passenger, a little more than the sum of the first two taxes; 
 Germany’s passenger departure tax has three rates of charge for short-haul, medium-haul, and 
long-haul flights. All destinations in Member States are in the short-haul rate category; 
 Ireland had a passenger departure tax; however, it was abolished in 2013 and is therefore not 
considered further in this assessment;  
 Italy’s charge has the nature of a luxury tax and only applies to air-taxi services. It is not 
considered further in this assessment; and 
 Until 2015, the UK has levied an Air Passenger Duty (APD) based on four distance bands; 
however, from April 2015, there will be only two: one for passengers departing on flights with 
a distance of 2,000 kilometres or less (and so including destinations in most Member States, as 
with the current four band system) and the other for longer distance flights. The luxury tax 
nature of the charge is represented by its being doubled for business and first class passengers 
and being up to six times higher for passengers on private aircraft. 
The estimates of the revenues from Air Passenger Charges155 for the Member States that still apply 
them are based on estimated numbers of departing passengers in 2013 for each of the three markets that 
include aviation (domestic, intra-EU, and extra-EU) and the 2013 tax rates.  
If VAT had been applied in 2013 at the reduced national VAT rates on a departure basis, it would 
have generated revenue equivalent to almost 70% of that of the Air Passenger Charges. This comparison 
is greatly influenced by the UK, where VAT at the reduced national rate of 5% would generate only 
about 25% as much revenue as its high Air Passenger Duty.156 In the other four Member States, the 





                                                   
155 The revenues for France are for the sum of the Civil Aviation Tax and Solidarity Charge. 
156 The UK refers to its air passenger charge as a duty and not a tax. 
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Table 6.33 – Scenario 9: Air Passenger Charge Revenue and VAT on Air Passengers 







  Domestic Intra-EU Extra-EU Total Total  
AT 1.4 35.2 42.2 78.8 224.3 285% 
HR 0.1 0.8 0.3 1.1 8.7 765% 
FR 59.8 68.3 185.0 313.0 1,334.0 426% 
DE 61.9 376.0 457.1 895.0 988.6 110% 
UK 100.4 916.9 2,591.9 3,609.2 891.1 25% 
Total 223.5 1,397.2 3,276.4 4,897.2 3,446.8 70% 
 
City Pairs Assessment  
In the city pairs assessments, we have used approximate applications of the charges to the flight 
distance between the cities and, where appropriate, have applied the level of charge application to intra-
EU passengers. For the UK in particular, the charges indicated in the table are weighted averages by 
purpose and class of travel. Although the definitions of short, medium, and long distance are different 
for each of the Member States, for most of them, domestic and intra-EU destinations are in the short 
distance category. 
 
Table 6.34 – Scenario 9: Approximation of Air Passenger 
Charges Used in CPM 






distance Austria 7.0 15.0 35.0 
Croatia 0.7 1.4 1.4 
France 6.0 6.0 20.0 
Germany 7.5 23.4 42.2 
UK 6.0 6.0 20.0 
 
A comparison for the sample of twenty city pairs of the current VAT regime (the BAU Scenario) with 
reduced national VAT rates, applied on a departure basis by excluding the APC from the fare on which 
the VAT is based, is shown in Table 6.35. 
 
Table 6.35 Scenario 9: Changes in Fares, Trips, and VAT Revenue (Comparison with BAU) 






City A City B Air Rail Bus All EUR (m) 
Athens Thessaloniki 6% 6% 6% -3% -0.6 
Berlin Hamburg 1% 3% 3% -2% -17.4 
Budapest Debrecen n.a. 7% 7% -5% -1.4 
Cluj Iasi 9% 4% 4% -2% -1.6 
Copenhagen Aarhus 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0 
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Dublin Cork 0% 6% 6% -4% 4.5 
Krakow Wroclaw 4% 4% 4% -3% 0.0 
Lisbon Porto 3% 6% 6% -3% 2.3 
London Glasgow -23% 2% 2% 9% 2.9 
Madrid Barcelona 4% 5% 5% -3% -0.4 
Paris Toulouse -10% -5% 5% 5% -32.3 
Berlin Warsaw -2% 7% 6% -2% 0.5 
Constanta Varna n.a. n.a. 10% 0% 0.0 
Copenhagen Vilnius 4% 4% 4% -2% 2.4 
London Brussels -7% 5% 5% -2% 42.4 
Ostrava Katowice n.a. 9% 9% -4% 1.8 
Paris Lisbon 7% 9% 9% -3% 22.2 
Frankfurt Oslo -8% 3% 0% 2% -0.5 
Gothenburg Oslo 0% 5% 0% 0% 0.0 
Riga Moscow 0% 5% 0% -1% 0.1 
 
Of the 220 city pairs included in the sample, the airfares of 74 (34%) are increased to a greater or 
lesser extent by the inclusion of an APC. Of the 20 city pairs in the reduced sample, 7 (35%) have fares 
that include an APC. The change in trips in Table 6.34 between Scenario 9 and the BAU has three 
components. First, changing current VAT rates to the national reduced rates; second, changing the basis 
of applying VAT to the departure rather than to distance; and finally, excluding the APC from the fare 
to which the VAT is applied. The impacts of these changes were not always in the same direction. Most, 
but not all, city pairs currently have VAT rates that are lower than the national reduced rates; hence, 
changing to a departure basis would only impact a few city pairs and, where it would, the effect is to 
increase the VAT for the whole trip, even though the same national reduced rates are used. For 
approximately one-third of city pairs that currently have an APC included in their fare, excluding the 
APC charge always results in a reduction in airfare from what it would be with the national reduced 
rates.  
 
VAT Scenario 10: Implementation of a One-Stop VAT Shop for Passenger 
Transport 
In earlier discussions on how to simplify compliance with VAT regulations for transport operators, 
serious consideration was given to the inclusion of passenger transport operations together with 
broadcasting, telecommunications, and electronic services in this first application of a one-stop-shop. 
For B2C transactions (such as those of most transport operators) and B2B transactions (such as those 
of most suppliers to transport operators) subject to VAT in a Member State other than that in which the 
operator or supplier is established, complying with the particular rules of that Member State is not 
always easy. For transport operators and suppliers with services in multiple Member States, the 
difficulties are greater. There is evidence that businesses (but not passenger transport operators or their 
suppliers) avoid such transactions because of difficulties. In other cases, the rules are ignored and VAT 
is charged in the Member State where the supplier is established rather than where the supply actually 
takes place.  
Intra-EU and extra-EU transport operators tend to operate in more Member States than those in most 
other industries. By its nature as a network service provider, an operator gains efficiency by providing 
 182 
services in markets with different demands so that its assets can be allocated where and when needed. 
This tends to make the operators providing services in more Member States more efficient than those 
operating in less. 
The Mini One-Stop-Shop (MOSS) that comes into force on 1 January 2015 addressed some of these 
concerns for specific sectors. It will allow companies supplying telecommunication services, television 
and radio broadcasting services, and electronically supplied services to non-taxable persons in Member 
States in which they do not have an establishment to account for the VAT due on those supplies via a 
web-portal in the Member State in which they are located (and formally registered). 157 This scheme 
is optional and follows changes to the VAT place of supply rules that now specify that the supply takes 
place in the Member State of the customer and not the Member State of the supplier, as previously.158 
The MOSS allows companies to avoid registering in each Member State in which their products are 
consumed. 
The MOSS applies to two different types of supplier: those that have an establishment and registration 
in a Member State (the Union scheme) and those that do not (the non-Union scheme). Under the first, a 
supplier cannot use the MOSS for supplies made in any Member State in which it has an establishment 
(business establishment or fixed establishment). The second applies only to suppliers that do not have 
an established business (or even have a fixed establishment) in a Member State and are not registered 
or identified for VAT in the EU. 
If the MOSS were to be extended to suppliers of transport operators and the operators themselves, 
these restrictions would severely limit its usefulness, as most do have an establishment (as defined) in 
the Member States in which they supply services. Most are also registered for VAT in at least one 
Member State. 
As currently envisaged, the MOSS legislation would not apply to businesses trading below the VAT 
registration threshold. These small businesses would, therefore, be required to register for VAT in the 
Member State of each customer in which they provided transport services. While this could be expensive 
and impractical for small businesses in other industries, the thresholds in the transport industry are so 
low that a passenger transport operator with more than one vehicle (even the smallest intra-EU operator 
will need more than one vehicle) will be above the threshold and consequently qualify to register for the 
MOSS.  
Given the analyses in Chapter 4 that showed only a small distortional impact of the administrative 
costs of compliance with VAT regulations, it is unlikely that an extension of the MOSS to the passenger 
transport sector would have a significant impact on competitiveness. Although, it would present a win-
win situation by having few, if any, negative consequences and small but measurable cost savings once 
operational. Even the smallest intra-EU and extra-EU transport operators and their suppliers will be 
above the minimum thresholds and so will qualify for registration in the MOSS as currently planned, 
but the restrictions on registration or having a fixed establishment in the Member State of supply would 
bar almost all passenger transport operators and suppliers from participating. For the MOSS to be of 
practical use to most passenger operators, these restrictions would need to be substantially revised. If 
the passenger transport sector were to move in the direction of taxation in the place of destination, an 
equivalent of the MOSS would no doubt be more useful for a large number of operators. 
 
                                                   
157 Guide to the Mini One-Stop-Shop, DGTAXUD, September 2013. 
158 Transport services remain liable for VAT in the Member State in which they are consumed rather than supplied. 
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VAT Scenario 11: All Domestic VAT Rates as in BAU, All International (Intra- 
and Extra-EU) VAT Rates Set to Zero 
This scenario would be that which fits best with the subsidiarity principle: it would leave the domestic 
market to national governments while regulating trade between Member States. 
a. Impact on Member States Passenger Demand 
This scenario, while equalizing the treatment of modes in the intra- and extra-EU markets, would 
have limited effects. First, domestic transport demand would not be affected by this scenario. Secondly, 
given the low share of bus and rail in intra- and extra-EU markets, the overall results would be minimal 
concerning PKM in international travel and VAT revenues. 
 
Table 6.36 – Scenario 11 Full Pass-Through: Transport Demand 
(EU28, PKM) 
 






Intra-EU Air 309,349 405,426 0.0% -0.1% 
 Bus 12,882 13,953 1.3% 2.7% 
 Rail 28,247 32,853 0.6% 1.0% 
 Total 350,478 452,232 0.1% 0.1% 
Extra-
EU 
Air 445,710 572,490 -0.1% -0.1% 
 Bus 2,473 2,723 3.4% 6.8% 
 Rail 3,012 3,539 3.3% 5.6% 
 Total 451,194 578,752 0.0% -0.1% 
Urban Metro 102,970 109,481 0.0% 0.0% 
 Bus 162,433 173,684 0.0% 0.0% 
 Rail 172,445 197,624 0.0% 0.0% 
 Total 437,847 480,789 0.0% 0.0% 
Other 
Domestic 
Air 54,332 69,396 0.0% 0.0% 
 Bus 427,695 456,235 0.0% 0.0% 
 Rail 256,663 298,044 0.0% 0.0% 
 Total 738,689 823,676 0.0% 0.0% 
Total Air 809,391 1,047,313 -0.1% -0.1% 
 Bus 605,482 646,595 0.0% 0.1% 
 Rail 460,366 532,060 0.1% 0.1% 
 Metro 102,970 109,481 0.0% 0.0% 






Table 6.37 Scenario 11 Less-Than-Full Pass-Through: Transport Demand (EU28, 
PKM) 







Air 309,438 405,657 0.0% 0.0% 
 Bus 12,780 13,734 0.5% 1.1% 
 Rail 28,120 32,609 0.1% 0.2% 
 Total 350,338 451,999 0.0% 0.0% 
Extra-EU 
Air 445,885 572,935 0.0% -0.1% 
 Bus 2,426 2,623 1.4% 2.8% 
 Rail 2,954 3,428 1.4% 2.3% 
 Total 451,265 578,985 0.0% 0.0% 
Urban 
Metro 102,970 109,481 0.0% 0.0% 
 Bus 162,433 173,684 0.0% 0.0% 
 Rail 172,445 197,624 0.0% 0.0% 
 Total 437,847 480,789 0.0% 0.0% 
Other 
Domestic 
Air 54,332 69,396 0.0% 0.0% 
 Bus 427,695 456,235 0.0% 0.0% 
 Rail 256,663 298,044 0.0% 0.0% 
 Total 738,689 823,676 0.0% 0.0% 
Total Air 809,655 1,047,988 0.0% 0.0% 
 Bus 605,333 646,275 0.0% 0.0% 
 Rail 460,181 531,706 0.0% 0.0% 
 Metro 102,970 109,481 0.0% 0.0% 
 Total 1,978,140 2,335,450 0.0% 0.0% 
 
Given the fact that intra-EU and extra-EU passenger transport is mostly by air and is already zero-
rated, the impact on operator revenue would be small. VAT revenues would not change much at the 
EU28 level, with very few noticeable country variations (Table 6.38).  The mechanical application of 
the scenario to the 2010 demand structure yields very similar results (See also table 6.40 for detailed 
estimates in Euros). 
 
Table 6.38 – Scenario 11: Revenue Implications (Comparison with BAU) 












 VAT VAT Tickets VAT Tickets VAT Tickets VAT Tickets 
AT -2.4% -2.8% 0.1% -2.8% 0.2% -2.9% 0.1% -2.9% 0.2% 
BE -8.5% -10.6% 0.1% -10.6% 0.4% -10.6% 0.2% -10.6% 0.4% 
BG 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% -0.6% 0.4% 0.0% 0.1% -0.8% 0.4% 
CY 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
CZ 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
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DE -4.6% -5.4% 0.0% -5.8% 0.1% -5.4% 0.0% -5.9% 0.1% 
DK .. .. 0.0% .. 0.0% .. 0.0% .. 0.0% 
EE 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 
ES -0.5% -0.5% 0.0% -1.2% 0.0% -0.5% 0.0% -1.3% 0.0% 
FI 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -0.5% 0.2% 0.0% -0.1% -0.6% 0.2% 
FR -0.4% -0.5% 0.0% -1.0% 0.1% -0.5% 0.0% -1.0% 0.1% 
GR -0.5% -0.6% 0.0% -4.2% 0.0% -0.6% 0.0% -4.9% 0.0% 
HR -2.7% -2.4% 0.1% -5.1% 0.3% -2.7% 0.2% -2.7% 0.4% 
HU 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 
IE .. .. 0.0% .. 0.0% .. 0.0% .. 0.0% 
IT 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -0.6% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% -0.7% 0.1% 
LT 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
LU 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
LV 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 
MT .. .. 0.0% .. 0.0% .. 0.0% .. 0.0% 
NL -3.4% -4.4% 0.0% -4.3% 0.1% -4.4% 0.1% -4.4% 0.1% 
PL -0.7% -0.6% 0.0% -0.7% 0.0% -0.6% 0.0% -0.7% 0.0% 
PT 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -1.1% 0.0% 
RO 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% -0.7% 0.6% 0.0% 0.2% -0.8% 0.6% 
SE 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -0.5% 0.0% 
SI -1.2% -1.0% 0.0% -1.0% 0.2% -1.0% 0.0% -1.0% 0.2% 
SK 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 
UK .. .. 0.0% .. 0.0% .. 0.0% .. 0.0% 
EU28 -1.2% -1.4% 0.0% -2.0% 0.1% -1.4% 0.0% -2.1% 0.1% 
 
b. Impact on Demand between City Pairs 
Scenario 11 in the CPM is presented only for comparison purposes and is not intended to provide an 
indication that it might be considered as a realistic proposal for changing the current VAT regime. 
Its only purpose is to provide an alternative basis to the BAU on which the other strategies could be 
considered. From some perspectives, it provides the most rational basis for comparison between the 
other scenarios, as in some sense, its fares and demand estimates for intra-EU and extra-EU passenger 
trips are unbiased by any VAT content in their fares. 
 
Table 6.39 – Scenario 11: Changes in Fares, Trips, and VAT Revenue (Comparison with BAU) 







(% Change)  
 City A City B Air Rail Bus All All  
1 Athens Thessaloniki 0% 0% 0% 0.0% 0.00% 
2 Berlin Hamburg 0% 0% 0% 0.0% 0.00% 
3 Budapest Debrecen 0% 0% 0% 0.0% 0.00% 
4 Cluj Iasi 0% 0% 0% 0.0% 0.00% 
5 Copenhagen Aarhus 0% 0% 0% 0.0% 0.00% 
6 Dublin Cork 0% 0% 0% 0.0% 0.00% 
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7 Krakow Wroclaw 0% 0% 0% 0.0% 0.00% 
8 Lisbon Porto 0% 0% 0% 0.0% 0.00% 
9 London Glasgow 0% 0% 0% 0.0% 0.00% 
10 Madrid Barcelona 0% 0% 0% 0.0% 0.00% 
11 Paris Toulouse 0% 0% 0% 0.0% 0.00% 
12 Berlin Warsaw 0% -7% -8% 2.6% -0.43% 
13 Constanta Varna 0% 0% 0% 0.0% 0.00% 
14 Copenhagen Vilnius 0% -5% -5% 0.0% 0.00% 
15 London Brussels 0% -6% -6% 2.3% -8.36% 
16 Ostrava Katowice 0% -12% -12% 5.1% -0.01% 
17 Paris Lisbon 0% -12% -12% 0.0% -0.01% 
18 Frankfurt Oslo 0% -4% 0% 0.0% -0.48% 
19 Gothenburg Oslo 0% -6% 0% 0.0% 0.00% 
20 Riga Moscow 0% -6% 0% 0.0% 0.00% 
 
For the 11 domestic city pairs, Scenario 11 is identical to BAU; so, for these city pairs, it would have 
no change in fares or demand of VAT revenue. For the six intra-EU and three extra-EU city pairs, there 
would be no change in airfare, which is already based on zero VAT rates. However, for these city pairs 
(other than Ostrava/Katowice), there would be a reduction in fares for the other modes, ranging from 
4% to 12% (these current fares include some element of VAT, depending on which Member States are 
those of origin, transit, and destination). The VAT rates of these transit Member States would not be 
included in the Scenario 11 fares. 
c. Macro-Economic and Social Effects 
For most Member States, there is no change in the VAT regime; accordingly, there is no change at 
the GDP level. For those Member States where the VAT regime changes (i.e. Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, and Spain), the effect on GDP is negligible. The 
effects on employment in the sector are equally negligible. The effect on purchasing power is negligible 
in all Member States, with no changes greater than 0.01%. 
 
Final Note 
The detailed results of the TREMOVE-based simulations for all countries are reported in Volume 3 of 
this report (Excel file). 
Following (Table 6.40) is the summary table on the VAT revenue effects for Scenarions 1,2,5, and 11 of 
the mechanical application of the rates to the demand structure  of the baseline in 2010. 
 
Table 6.40 - Mechanical Application of Scenario Rates to 
2010 Demand Structure 
(EUR m) 








AT 372.2 773.9 387.0 371.5 363.2 
BE 155.9 586.8 167.9 159.6 142.6 
BG 110.4 128.2 57.7 110.4 110.4 
CY 2.4 73.7 19.4 2.4 2.4 
CZ 281.8 451.0 322.2 281.8 281.8 
DE 1210.0 3529.3 1300.7 1200.9 1154.7 
DK 0.0 447.3 447.3 0.0 0.0 
EE 18.7 22.4 10.1 18.7 18.7 
ES 755.9 1879.8 895.3 755.4 752.4 
FI 133.2 410.3 171.1 133.2 133.2 
FR 2801.6 5961.9 2980.3 2796.8 2790.7 
GR 391.9 1218.2 689.0 392.0 390.1 
HR 59.1 62.7 12.6 59.6 57.5 
HU 235.6 277.9 51.5 235.6 235.6 
IE 0.0 305.2 119.5 0.0 0.0 
IT 1205.6 2968.0 1349.9 1205.6 1205.6 
LT 11.9 36.9 15.8 11.9 11.9 
LU 2.3 15.7 3.1 2.3 2.3 
LV 13.3 33.0 18.9 13.3 13.3 
MT 0.0 29.6 8.2 0.0 0.0 
NL 186.4 717.6 205.1 189.0 180.0 
PL 283.7 859.8 299.0 283.7 281.7 
PT 83.7 533.5 139.4 83.7 83.7 
RO 189.0 219.3 45.8 189.0 189.0 
SE 157.3 838.2 201.2 157.3 157.3 
SI 22.7 54.8 23.7 22.6 22.4 
SK 80.9 87.2 43.7 80.9 80.9 
UK 0.0 3286.8 822.2 0.0 0.0 






Annex 1 - Relevant EU VAT Legislation 
This Annex (i) reproduces the section on EU Output VAT legislation from the Interim Report, and (ii) 
completes it with a review of laws and regulations concerning Input VAT. 
Legal Framework 
The basis of the EU VAT legislation is Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the 
common system of value added tax (VAT Directive (VATD)). It replaced and consolidated Directive 
77/388/EEC (Sixth Directive) as well as Directive 67/227/EWG, which was in force at that time. 
Further relevant legislation includes Directive 2008/9/EC (VAT Refund-EU business), Directive 
86/560/EEC (VAT Refund-non-EU business), Directive 2009/132/EC (VAT-free importation), Directive 
2006/79/EC (private consignments), Directive 2007/74/EC (travellers’ allowances), and Council 
Regulation No. 282/2011 (VAT Implementing Regulation). Further information is available on European 
Commission websites. 159 
Provisions Regarding Passenger Transport (Output VAT) 
The transport of passengers is generally taxable as a service (Art. 24 VAT Directive). The taxable 
amount results from Art. 73 as the total consideration received in return for providing the transport 
service.160 In most cases, the service provider, as the taxable person,161 is obliged to pay the VAT due to the 
tax authorities. However, under certain conditions, this obligation can be passed to the recipient (reverse 
charge). 
Place of Supply 
The place of supply of passenger transport is defined in Art. 48 VAT Directive, which states: “The place 
of supply of passenger transport shall be the place where the transport takes place, proportionate to the 
distances covered.”162 In other words, passenger transport services are taxable where they are performed, 
                                                   
159 http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/vat/index_en.htm.  
160 “In respect of the supply of goods or services, other than as referred to in Articles 74 to 77, the taxable 
amount shall include everything which constitutes consideration obtained or to be obtained by the 
supplier, in return for the supply, from the customer or a third party, including subsidies directly linked to 
the price of the supply.” (Art. 73 EC VAT Directive) 
161 Passenger transport services are also subject to VAT, if they are provided by government authorities or other bodies governed 
by public law (Art. 13 VAT Directive in conjunction with Annex I). 
162 The question, if the allocation in case of cross-border passenger transport services may also include other factors, e.g. the 
duration of the stays in the various countries, was raised in case C-36/99. The ECJ decided, that in case of the supply of cross-
frontier passenger transport on an all-inclusive basis, the total consideration must be allocated on a pro rata basis based on the 
distances covered in each Member State, other factors must not be considered (ECJ, 6 November 1997, Case C-116/96, Reisebüro 
Binder GmbH vs. Finanzamt Stuttgart-Körperschaften, [1998], I-01889). 
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which is an application of the destination principle. Concerning the place of supply, the rule is the same for 
business-to-business and business-to-consumer services as well as for intra-EU and domestic services.163  
Passenger transport services provided outside the borders of the EU are usually outside of the scope of 
the EC VAT Directive,164 although the Member States may extend the scope of their tax legislation beyond 
their normal territorial borders (including territorial waters), if purely internal services are affected and no 
conflicts of jurisdiction regarding taxation arise with other States.165  
Rates Applicable 
Basic Rules (Title VIII, Chapter 2 VATD) 
Supplies of goods and services are normally subject to a standard rate, which can be set individually by 
Member States. However, Art. 97 of the VAT Directive states that the standard rate may not be lower than 
15%. 
Member States are also allowed to apply a reduced rate to the “transport of passengers and their 
accompanying luggage” (Art. 98 VAT Directive in conjunction with Annex III, Item 5). This reduced rate 
must not be lower than 5% and there may only be two different reduced rates in each Member State (Art. 
98 and 99 VAT Directive). 
There is no obligation to apply the same VAT rate to different modes of transport. According to ECJ 
Case C-36/99 (European Court of Justice, Idéal Tourisme SA vs. Belgian State), diverging VAT rates on 
different modes of transport do not conflict with the Community’s principle of equal treatment.166 
A general exemption, without input VAT credit, as an activity in the public interest is stated by the VAT 
Directive for the “supply of transport services for sick or injured persons in vehicles specially designed for 
the purpose, by duly authorised bodies” (Art. 132, Item 1, Letter p, VATD). 
In summary, according to the general rules, the transport of passengers may be taxed at either the 
standard rate or (one of) the reduced rate(s), unless it is a special medical service. Nevertheless, there are a 
number of derogations at present that allow Member States to apply other rules. 
Special Provisions (Title VIII, Chapter 4 VATD) 
Article 110 VATD lays down a transitional arrangement, which allows Member States to continue to 
apply the zero rate or reduced rates lower than permitted by Article 99 under certain conditions and until 
the adoption of definitive EU-wide arrangements (see Art. 109 and Art. 402). The conditions state that these 
measures must have been adopted "for clearly defined social reasons and for the benefit of the final 
consumer” (Art. 109 and Art. 402 VAT Directive) and they must have been in place on 1 January 1991. 
                                                   
163 This is in contrast to the place-of-supply rules for the transport of goods, where a distinction is made between B2B and B2C 
and between intra-EU and domestic transport (Lang, Melz & Kristoffersson (2009), p. 1097). 
164 See e.g. ECJ, 13 March 1990, Case C-30/89, Commission of the European Communities vs. French Republic, ECR 1990, Page 
I-00691. 
165 See ECJ, 23 January 1986, Trans Tirreno Express SpA vs. Ufficio provinciale IVA, ECR 1986, Page I-00231. 
166 See ECJ, 13 July 2000, Case C-36/99, Idéal Tourisme SA vs. Belgian State, [2000], I – 6060. 
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In addition, Art. 114 also allows Member States, “which, on 1 January 1993, were obliged to increase 
their standard rate in force at 1 January 1991 by more than 2%” (Art. 114 VATD), to apply a reduced rate 
lower than 5% to the goods and services listed in Annex III, which includes passenger transport (Item 5). 
However, in contrast to Art. 110, this article does not permit zero rating (Art. 114, Par. 2). Like Art. 110, 
these lower rates may be used until the adoption of a definitive EU-wide regime. Furthermore, Greece is 
allowed to apply lower rates, up to 30% lower than corresponding rates in the mainland, on certain Aegean 
Islands (Art. 120). In addition, Portugal may treat sea and air transport between the islands of the Azores 
and Madeira and between those islands and the mainland as international transport (Art. 149). 
Derogations (Title XIII VATD) 
Title XIII of the VAT Directive, which contains derogations for individual Member States, also includes 
rules that apply to passenger transport. 
Article 371, in conjunction with Annex X (Part B, Item 10), allows Member States that joined the EC 
before 1978,167 to continue to exempt the transport of passengers,168 provided that this exemption was in 
place on 1 January 1978. This also holds true for the transport of accompanying goods (e.g. luggage or 
motor vehicles) and for the supply of services relating to passenger transport. 
Similar rules are in place for a number of Member States that joined the Community later and have 
negotiated a respective derogation upon accession. These provisions can be found in Article 375ff (in 
conjunction with Annex X, Part B, Item 10). Specifically, passenger transport may be exempt based on 
such derogation in the following Member States, as far as in place at the time of accession, to the following 
extent: 





International passenger transport carried out by air, sea or inland waterway, with 
the exception of passenger transport operations on Lake Constance;
169
 input VAT 
deduction is possible 
Bulgaria 390a 
International passenger transport services as referred to in Annex 10, Part B, Item 
10 as far as exempt at time of accession
170
 
                                                   
167 I.e. Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, France, Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. 
168 The exact coverage is “the transport of passengers and, in so far as the transport of the passengers is exempt, the transport of 
goods accompanying them, such as luggage or motor vehicles, or the supply of services relating to the transport of passengers.” 
169 Linked to the restriction that this exemption is also in place in any of the Member States, which were members of the Community 
on 31 December 1994. 
170 Linked to the restriction that this exemption is also in place in any of the Member States, which were members of the Community 
on 31 December 2006. 
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Croatia 390c 





International passenger transport services as referred to in Annex 10, Part B, Item 




International passenger transport services as referred to in Annex 10, Part B, Item 




International passenger transport services as referred to in Annex 10, Part B, Item 
10 as far as exempt at time of accession172 
Finland 379 
Passenger transport services, the transport of accompanying goods, and the 
supply of services relating to passenger transport169 
Hungary 386 
International passenger transport services as referred to in Annex 10, Part B, Item 
10 as far as exempt at time of accession172 
Latvia 384 
International passenger transport services as referred to in Annex 10, Part B, Item 
10 as far as exempt at time of accession172 
Lithuania 385 
International passenger transport services as referred to in Annex 10, Part B, Item 
10 as far as exempt at time of accession172 
Malta 387 
Domestic and international passenger transport as well as domestic inter-island 
sea passenger transport services as referred to in Annex 10, Part B, Item 10 as far 
as exempt at time of accession172 
Poland 388 
International passenger transport services as referred to in Annex 10, Part B, Item 
10 as far as exempt at time of accession172 
Portugal 377 
Passenger transport services, the transport of accompanying goods, and the 
supply of services relating to the passenger transport as far as exempt on 1 
January 1989 
Romania 390b 
International passenger transport services as referred to in Annex 10, Part B, Item 
10 as far as exempt at time of accession170 
Slovakia 390 
International passenger transport services as referred to in Annex 10, Part B, Item 
10 as far as exempt at time of accession172 
Slovenia 389 
International passenger transport services as referred to in Annex 10, Part B, Item 
10 as far as exempt at time of accession172 
                                                   
171 Linked to the restriction “for as long as the same exemption is applied in any of the Member States which were members of the 
Union before the accession of Croatia.” 
172 Linked to the restriction that this exemption is also in place in any of the Member States, which were members of the Community 




Passenger transport services, the transport of accompanying goods, and the 
supply of services relating to the passenger transport as far as exempt at time of 
accession169 
Source: Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (VAT 
Directive); Adaptation and Demonstration: IHS, 2013. 
 
It is unclear how far the exemptions of Art. 371-390c permit zero rating. Only the Austrian and the 
Maltese derogations (Art. 378 and Art. 387c) explicitly include the deduction of input VAT whereas the 
others, strictly speaking, only state a ‘pure exemption.’ KPMG173 concludes that input VAT deduction is 
generally not allowed whereas one might also argue that input VAT deduction is still possible if in place at 
the time of accession (“as far as exempt at time of accession”).174 
Further derogations are based on special authorization by the Council of the European Union (see Art. 
394-396 VATD). Examples include the treatment of short internal transport journeys as international 
transport, and vice versa, and the flat-rate calculation of the taxable amount for foreign providers of 
passenger transport services in Germany and special VAT treatment of journeys through the tunnels of 
Mont Blanc and Fréjus in Italy and France.175 
However, this system of derogations is also seen as a transitional system. In a final regime, passenger 
transport shall be taxed in the country of departure for the whole intra-EU part of the journey (Art. 393). 
Extra-EU Passenger Transport 
In the case of international passenger transport services, only the domestic leg is taxed in each Member 
State. Foreign legs (i.e. passenger transport services provided outside the borders of the respective Member 
State) are taxable in the Member State or third country where the transport takes place (see chapter (a)). 
Since Art. 169, letter a, of the VAT Directive permits the deduction of input VAT incurred on foreign legs, 
passenger transport services outside the EU are effectively zero-rated as far as EU VAT is concerned. Since 
a majority of Member States also exempts domestic legs (some of them only for certain modes of transport 
though) under the derogations described above, international passenger transport is often completely zero-
rated. 
Supply of Goods and Services on board Ships, Aircraft, or Trains176 
Articles 37 and 57 of the VATD provide particular rules for on-board supplies. The place of supply of 
goods and catering and restaurant services supplied on-board ships, aircraft, or trains “during the section of 
                                                   
173 KPMG (1997), p. 67. 
174  This is the position of the British HM Revenue & Customs (see: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals
/vtransmanual/VTRANS020200.htm). 
175  A list of relevant derogations currently in place can be found on http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/
documents/taxation/vat/key_documents/table_derogations/vat_index_derogations_en.pdf 
176  For further information see EC Report COM(2012) 605 final available on http://ec.europa.eu/
taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/vat/key_documents/reports_published/com_2012_605_en.pdf and the “Expert 
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a passenger transport operation effected within the Community” is deemed to be at the point of departure 
of the passenger transport operation (Art. 37 VATD). The section of a passenger transport operation 
effected within the Community (Community section) is defined as “the section of the operation effected, 
without a stopover,177 outside the Community, between the point of departure and the point of arrival of the 
passenger transport operation” (Art. 37 VATD). The point of departure is the first scheduled stop within 
the Community, where passengers can board; the point of arrival is the last scheduled stop within the 
Community, where people, who embarked in the Community, can get out. In case of interim stopovers in 
a third country, the journey is split into two or more Community sections.  
These rules apply to all goods and restaurant and catering services supplied on board ships, aircraft, and 
trains during the Community section. Consequently,  
 For other services supplied during the Community section, 
 For any goods and services supplied on board within the Community, but outside the Community 
section,178 and 
 For any goods and services supplied on board other means of transport (e.g. buses), 
The standard rules of Art. 31 VATD for goods (“the place of supply shall be deemed to be the place 
where the goods are located at the time when the supply takes place”), Art. 55 VATD for restaurant and 
catering services (“the place of supply… shall be the place where the services are physically carried out”), 
and Art. 44 and 45 VATD for other services apply. 
Regarding the relevant tax rate, Art. 37 (3) VATD states that Member States may exempt, with input 
VAT deduction, the supply of goods for consumption supplied on board ships, trains, and aircraft during 
the Community section. Goods supplied outside the Community section, supplied on board other means of 
transport like buses, or not intended for consumption on board are not covered by this exemption allowance. 
Services relating to the transport of passengers (e.g. restaurant and catering services) might be exempt 
in a number of Member States, in so far as the transport of the passengers is exempt, according to Art. 371 
in conjunction with Annex X, Part B (10) VAT Directive or Art. 375 to 390b VAT Directive. For other 
services supplied on board (e.g. hairdressing services during cruises), an exemption is not permitted. 
However, a detailed analysis of the European VAT reform scenarios regarding supplies of goods and 
services on board means of transport is provided in EC Report COM (2012) 605
179
 and therefore will not be 
further addressed in this report. 
                                                   
study on the issues arising from taxing the supply of goods and the supply of services, including restaurant and catering services, 
for consumption on board means of transport” by PWC available on https://circabc.europa.eu/w/browse/59941dff-4fd3-47bb-
8ee9-c502cab5b7b6. 
177 A stop, which doesn’t have to be a scheduled point of passenger (dis)embarkation (cf. COM(2012) 605 final, p. 4 or European 
Court of Justice, Case C-58/04, Antje Köhler vs. Finanzamt Düsseldorf-Nord, I-8233). 
178 I.e. within the borders of the EC, but before the point of departure or after the point of arrival. 
179 See footnote 176. 
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Provisions with Respect to Input VAT 
The VAT Directive also provides a number of rules especially relevant for inputs to passenger transport 
services. In the following, we look at the rules applicable to the acquisition of means of transport and related 
expenses (e.g. repair, modification, maintenance, and fuel). 
Exemptions Related to International Transport 
Article 148 of the VAT Directive provides specific exemptions for the supply of goods and services 
related to international transport by air and sea. It covers, broadly speaking, the supply of certain seagoing 
vessels and aircraft used by airlines operating chiefly on international routes, the supply of goods for their 
fuelling and provisioning, and a number of services directly connected thereto. 
 
Figure A1.1 – Art. 148 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC 
Council Directive 2006/112/EC Article 148: 
“Member States shall exempt the following transactions: 
 (a) the supply of goods for the fuelling and provisioning of vessels used for navigation on the high seas and carrying 
passengers for reward or used for the purpose of commercial, industrial or fishing activities, or for rescue or 
assistance at sea, or for inshore fishing, with the exception, in the case of vessels used for inshore fishing, of ships' 
provisions; 
(b) the supply of goods for the fuelling and provisioning of fighting ships, falling within the combined 
nomenclature (CN) code 8906 10 00 leaving their territory and bound for ports or anchorages outside the Member 
State concerned; 
 (c) the supply, modification, repair, maintenance, chartering and hiring of the vessels referred to in point (a), and 
the supply, hiring, repair and maintenance of equipment, including fishing equipment, incorporated or used therein; 
(d) the supply of services other than those referred to in point (c), to meet the direct needs of the vessels 
referred to in point (a) or of their cargoes; 
(e) the supply of goods for the fuelling and provisioning of aircraft used by airlines operating for reward chiefly on 
international routes; 
(f) the supply, modification, repair, maintenance, chartering and hiring of the aircraft referred to in point (e), and 
the supply, hiring, repair and maintenance of equipment incorporated or used therein; 
(g) the supply of services, other than those referred to in point (f), to meet the direct needs of the aircraft 
referred to in point (e) or of their cargoes.” 
 
Since Art. 169 (b) permits the deduction of input VAT with respect to the supply of those goods and 
services, they are effectively zero-rated. In detail, the provisions are as follows: 
Maritime Shipping 
The following supplies are zero-rated according to Art. 148 (a)-(d) of the VAT Directive: 
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Supply of Qualifying Vessels: Art. 148 (a) and (c) 
The supply of qualifying vessels is zero-rated. These are vessels: 
 Used for navigation on the high seas and carrying passengers for reward or used for the purpose of 
commercial, industrial, or fishing activities,  
 For rescue or assistance at sea, or  
 For inshore fishing. 
In the first case it is conditional that the vessel is actually used (or planned to be used) on the high seas, 
it is not sufficient that the vessel is designed in a way that is could potentially be used for ocean 
shipping.180 Not covered are pleasure boats used (e.g. by the lessee) for leisure activities.181 
Services Relating to Qualifying Vessels: Art. 148 (c) and (d) 
Certain services relating to such qualifying vessels are also zero-rated, for example:  
 Chartering and hiring, 
 Modification, repair, and maintenance, and 
 The supply of other services182 to meet the direct needs of such vessels or of their cargoes. 
Chartering in this respect comprises full charter as well as partial charter.183 
Supply of Equipment and Related Services: Art. 148 (c) 
The supply of equipment, including fishing equipment, incorporated or used in qualifying vessels, as 
well as the hiring, repair, and maintenance of such equipment is zero-rated according to Art. 148 (c). 
Fuelling and Provisioning: Art. 148 (a) 
Finally, the supply of goods for the fuelling and provisioning of qualifying vessels as above, with the 
exception of the ships’ provisions for ships for inshore fishing, is zero-rated (Art. 148 (a)). According to 
C-185/89,184 in order to profit from zero-rating, goods for the fuelling and provisioning must be supplied 
directly to the operator of the vessel, and supplies at previous stages are not covered, one of the reasons 
being that it would be too difficult for the Member States to verify the final use of the goods. However, 
                                                   
180 ECJ, 21 March 2013, Case C-197/12, Commission of the European Communities vs. French Republic. 
181 ECJ, 22 December 2010, Case C-116/10, État du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg and Administration de l’enregistrement et des 
domains vs. Pierre Feltgen (in his capacity as administrator in the bankruptcy of Bacino Charter Company SA) and Bacino Charter 
Company SA. 
182 Only if supplied directly to the shipowner (ECJ, 14 September 2006, Joined Cases C-181/04 to C-183/04, Elmeka NE vs. 
Ipourgos Ikonomikon, ECR 2006, Page I-8167). 
183 ECJ, 18 October 2007, C-97/06, Navicon SA vs. Administración del Estado. 




it is not conditional that the goods are loaded directly on board the vessel at the time of supply to the 
operator. The goods can also be stored ashore by the operator for later use.185 
 
Most of these provisions are binding for Member States and only the supply of goods for fuelling and 
provisioning may be restricted by Member States until the adoption of definitive arrangements (Art. 150). 
Extra-EU Aviation 
Similar exemptions are in place for international aviation and are dealt with in Art. 148 (e)-(f). The 
following supplies are covered: 
 
Supply of Qualifying Aircraft: Art. 148 (e) and (f) 
The supply of qualifying aircraft (i.e. aircraft used by airlines operating for reward chiefly on 
international routes), is zero-rated based on Art. 148 (e) and (f) of the VAT Directive. 
In contrast to the exemptions for vessels, which depend on the use of the individual vessels, here the 
properties of the airline, not the individual aircraft, are decisive.  
“Operating for reward” suggests that the planes must be used for some kind of commercial activities.  
“Chiefly on international routes” signifies that international services must outweigh domestic services. 
The VAT Directive does not give detailed information on how this assessment must be conducted, but 
C-382/02186 states “all information which indicates the relative importance of the type of operations 
concerned, in particular turnover,” may be taken into account. In practice, Member States apply different 
rules with respect to the assessment if international operations prevail.  
Although the term routes might suggest that the exemption only applies to regular flights on specified 
routes, the European Court of Justice confirmed that charter flights, even if they mainly serve the 
demands from undertakings and private persons, fulfil the requirements, if the predominance of 
international operations is given.187 Finally, the supply of such qualifying aircraft must not necessarily be 
effected directly to the airline operating on international routes. The exemption is also applicable if a 
third party acquires the aircraft for the purposes of exclusive use by such an undertaking.187 
Services Relating to Qualifying Aircraft: Art. 148 (f) and (g) 
Art. 148 (f) and (g) zero-rate certain services relating to qualifying aircraft, for example:  
 Chartering and hiring,  
 Modification, repair, and maintenance, and 
                                                   
185 Art. 148 (b) furthermore zero-rates the provisioning of certain fighting ships. The supply of such fighting ships and related 
services is not covered by the exemption according to Art. 148, but it can be based on Art. 371ff and Annex X, Part B, Item 12, 
which is applied e.g. in Greece and Spain. 
186 ECJ, 16 September 2004, Case C-382/02, Cimber Air A/S vs. Skatteministeriet, ECR 1990, Page I-8395. 
187 ECJ, 19 July 2012, Case C-33/11, A Oy. 
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 The supply of other services to meet the direct needs of such aircraft or of their cargoes. 
Supply of Equipment and Related Services: Art. 148 (f) 
The supply of equipment incorporated or used in qualifying aircraft, as well as the hiring, repair, and 
maintenance of such equipment is also zero-rated. 
Fuelling and provisioning: Art. 148 (e) 




Article 3 extends the scope of Art. 148 “supplies to intra-EU acquisitions.” Services by intermediaries, 
acting in the name and on behalf of another person and taking part in transactions referred to in Art. 148, 
are also zero-rated (Art. 153). 
Some Member States furthermore exempt the supply of aircraft used by state institutions and related 
supplies (e.g. Greece and Spain). However, this is not covered by Art. 148, but rather is a derogation based 
on Art. 371ff and Annex X, Part B, Item 11. 
VAT on Means of Transport and Fuel 
The acquisition of means of transport and fuel is taxed according to standard rules in most Member 
States and usually the standard rate is applicable. Some propellants can be taxed at a reduced rate, especially 
electricity (Art. 102) and LPG (Cyprus, Art. 104a).  
Reduced levels of excise duties on fuel and electricity as applied in many Member States are mainly 
based on Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for 
the taxation of energy products and electricity.  
VAT incurred on inputs is generally deductible in so far as it is used for business purposes (Art. 168). 
Nevertheless, derogations from that principle can be found, especially with respect to passenger cars and 
related goods and services (e.g. Italy, Poland, and Latvia)188 or capital goods used primarily for private 
purposes (e.g. Austria, Germany, and France). These derogations are mostly based on Art. 394/395 of the 
VAT Directive. Finally, we also encountered an instance where a derogation from the normal VAT rules is 
based on an accession act (i.e. the - compared to Art. 148 wider – zero-rating of the supply of vessels and 






                                                   
188 Vehicles used for commercial passenger transport are however frequently except from such restrictions. 
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Annex 2 – Methodological Note on Demand Data 
As seen in Chapter 2, Section A, demand data has been obtained using TREMOVE and ETISplus 
databases. As ETISplus does not deliver PKM directly, an attempt was made to derive PKM data from the 
amount and distance of trips. However, the NUTS3 level at which trips were defined proved too coarse a 
measure for a correct estimate of trip distance. For rail transport, the PKM estimate from ETISplus 
underestimated actual demand from TREMOVE and EUROSTAT by a significant margin (overestimated 
on average by 36%), while the opposite was generally true for bus transport (underestimated on average by 
37%).  
 

















AT 9,180.05 7,018.94 1.31 9,856.35 12,378.55 0.8 
BE 9,868.01 4,666.76 2.11 18,921.51 9,944.68 1.9 
BG 2,450.98 1,671.84 1.47 11,419.21 17,605.40 0.65 
CY 0 0  1,339.77 2,162.87 0.62 
CZ 6,404.71 5,266.42 1.22 16,257.84 48,308.59 0.34 
DE 76,658.75 54,632.48 1.4 68,511.81 77,767.94 0.88 
DK 6,171.17 5,740.82 1.07 7,403.22 10,726.05 0.69 
EE 271.04 177.23 1.53 2,669.04 8,119.73 0.33 
ES 21,125.31 24,954.19 0.85 59,691.35 113,447.31 0.53 
FI 3,786.66 3,381.95 1.12 7,565.84 20,346.25 0.37 
FR 79,968.83 64,129.16 1.25 47,524.18 114,023.71 0.42 
GR 1,936.34 1,391.35 1.39 22,156.56 34,702.79 0.64 
HR 1,112.70 1,249.53 0.89 2,170.51 7,175.87 0.3 
HU 8,546.04 4,893.26 1.75 17,049.10 28,646.30 0.6 
IE 1,881.60 1,504.16 1.25 7,167.75 11,699.86 0.61 
IT 49,323.73 32,741.36 1.51 103,671.15 181,930.87 0.57 
LT 407.44 357.81 1.14 3,598.17 19,962.53 0.18 
LU 315.27 244.94 1.29 857.51 1,091.72 0.79 
LV 900.7 600.87 1.5 2,546.21 8,166.13 0.31 
MT 0 0  517.96 304.5 1.7 
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NL 16,129.55 11,581.47 1.39 12,364.83 16,645.83 0.74 
PL 20,079.15 13,414.43 1.5 28,278.88 118,278.07 0.24 
PT 3,938.15 2,812.07 1.4 10,839.15 17,709.15 0.61 
RO 7,384.88 4,373.47 1.69 12,602.94 36,398.54 0.35 
SE 10,197.13 9,340.58 1.09 8,578.11 46,743.50 0.18 
SI 834.65 463.88 1.8 3,292.66 2,768.48 1.19 
SK 2,160.08 2,058.19 1.05 8,757.96 30,053.57 0.29 
UK 51,058.37 39,252.28 1.3 51,597.19 74,674.44 0.69 
    Average 1.36  Average 0.63 
 
There are a number of potential factors contributing to this: 
 The ETISplus estimate covers only domestic trips, while the TREMOVE and EUROSTAT data 
cover both domestic trips and the part of the international trip on the country’s territory. 
 Rail transport often does not use the shortest distance between two zones due to the structure of 
the network. 
 Only pure rail trips are counted. When rail is used as the first or last leg of an air trip, for 
example, it is counted as part of an air trip. 
 For trips within a NUTS3 zone, no estimate of trip distance was available. The distance was, 
instead, estimated based on the surface area of the zone, which may have led to too low a value 
(the opposite could explain the overestimation for bus, which was generally used for short trips). 
 Different data collection methods for EUROSTAT PKM and trips. 
For this reason, it was decided to only use the TREMOVE and EUROSTAT estimates for PKM, and 
ETISplus for amount of trips. ETISplus PKM data will only be relied upon to estimate ratios for the share 
of international transport, which is not identified in TREMOVE. 
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Annex 3 – Background Assumptions and Analytical Tools for Evaluating 
VAT Reform Scenarios  
This Annex describes the background assumptions and analytical tools used to provide inputs to and 
outputs from the quantified assessments of VAT scenarios.  
Background Assumptions 
The analyses of alternative VAT reform scenarios are based on the reference scenario in the 2011 
Transport White Paper “Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area - Towards a competitive and 
resource efficient transport system.”189  
A comprehensive description of the White Paper reference scenario is given in the Impact Assessment 
document.190 Key assumptions are: 
 GDP projections follow the baseline scenario of the 2009 Ageing Report. 191 Furthermore, the 
reference scenario assumes a lasting effect of the economic crisis that started in 2008, leading to a 
permanent loss in GDP. The projected growth rate for the EU27 for 2010-2020 is around 2.2%, 
which is similar to the growth rates between 1990 and 2000. Beyond 2020, growth rates are 
projected to fall to 1.6%, mainly due to the ageing of the population. 
 Oil prices are assumed to be relatively high and are based on the most recent projections (at that 
time) of the International Energy Agency (IEA). From US$59 per barrel in 2005, the oil price is 
expected to rise to US$106 per barrel in 2030. 
 Total passenger transport activity is expected to grow by 34% between 2005 and 2030 in the 
reference scenario, which is equivalent to an average growth of 1.2% per year. However, growth is 
not distributed proportionally among transport modes, with air transport activity almost doubling 
by 2030. Weaker growth in passenger transport compared to GDP per capita (1.4% per year) is 
explained by the assumption that passenger car activity in select EU-15 Members States is close to 
saturation and by national and EU policies to reduce the transport intensity of the economy. Rail 
competes with both road and air, but the results of its performance differ considerably between the 
EU-15 and the EU-13. In the EU-15, given the expected saturation of passenger car demand, a large 
share of potential additional demand could be covered by (in most cases, high-speed) rail, at least 
in the Member States where investments in (high-speed) rail are foreseen. At the same time, high-
speed rail attracts traffic from air transport. In the EU-13, the competitive situation of rail relative 
to air and road is expected to worsen, resulting in slower growth than the other main two modes.  
 Policies whose effects are accounted for in the reference scenario include: 
o Minimum levels of biofuel content in fuels (Directives 2003/30/EC and 2009/28/EC) 
                                                   
189 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/strategies/2011_white_paper_en.htm 
190 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/strategies/doc/2011_white_paper/white_paper_2011_ia_full_en.pdf, starting from p.130. 
191 European Commission, DG Economic and Financial Affairs: 2009 Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary projections for the 
EU-27 Member States (2008-2060). EUROPEAN ECONOMY 2|2009, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication14992_en.pdf 
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o Fuel quality directives (98/70/EC and 2009/30/EC) 
o Eurovignette (amendment 2006/38/EC) 
o Energy taxation directive (2003/93/EC) 
o Improvement to the Trans-European Network (TEN) 
o Euro V and Euro VI for heavy-duty vehicles (HDV), Euro 6 for light-duty vehicles (LDV) 
o CO2 targets for cars and vans (95 and 135 grams per kilometre, respectively, by 2025)  
o Inclusion of aviation in EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) 
o Single European Sky 
o Third Railway Package 
The Three Models 
The quantitative analyses at the country level uses two models, TREMOVE and EDIP, that have a long 
history of use in transport policy research by DG MOVE, DG CLIMA, and DG ENV. The models are 
designed specifically to simulate the effects of transport policy at the national level and use a wide range 
of input parameters for which values have been collected and updated over the years. The two models have 
been designed to work together and complement each other. 
The analyses at the most disaggregate levels use a City Pairs Model (CPM) and database that have been 
developed specifically for this study. The database that provides inputs to the CPM includes details of 
passenger travel between a sample of 220 city pairs, including some pairs where both cities are in one 
country, some where each city is in different Member State, and a smaller number where one city is within 
a Member State and the other city is outside. 
For the analyses of the impact of different VAT reform scenarios on transport operators at the market level, 
we also used the TREMOVE and EDIP models. Although the basic outputs from these models are at the 
national level, their inputs from the ETISplus database are at the zone level. Therefore, by careful selection 
among the zones, it is possible to closely replicate outputs for the four identified markets (urban, domestic, 
intra-EU, and extra-EU).   
Table 6.1 shows which outputs from which models will be used in the assessments of alternative VAT 
reform scenarios.  
Models for the Quantified Assessment of Scenarios – Outputs, Strengths and 
Weaknesses 
TREMOVE 
The first model used in the assessment is TREMOVE. In this section, we briefly present the main 
mechanisms of the model and show the potential impact of the VAT reform scenarios described in the 
previous chapter using the model. 






Figure A3.1 - Structure of TREMOVE 
 
The most important effects of a change in VAT policy are processed in the transport demand module. 
This module will calculate changes in demand relative to a given baseline (i.e. the Transport White Paper 
reference scenario) as a result of a change in relative costs (i.e. “usage cost” in the figure) of different  
transport options (i.e. the tree structures included in the first interim report), using a methodology based on 
a nested CES (constant elasticities of substitution) tree.192  
As the relative usage costs and prices of two options change because of VAT policy (e.g. a plane and a 
train ticket), their relative demand changes as well. The model calculates these relative changes throughout 
the user choice tree to come to an aggregated outcome. The model runs and generates output for the entire 
period 1995-2030. It can be run for the entire EU or for specific countries. One VAT scenario can be run at 
a time. 
The effects of these changes in demand also work through in the other modules. If air transport demand 
decreases, so would the emissions of airplanes. Emissions of trains and buses, on the other hand, could 
increase, which may or may not create a positive balance. This could, for example, be impacted by the 
energy mix of a country (e.g. how much of the electricity used by trains comes from fossil fuels, nuclear 
power, or renewable energy) and the structure of the vehicle fleet (e.g. old vs. new buses). While these are 
secondary effects, it is important to note that there would also be an effect on the government budget (e.g. 
income from VAT or other taxes and expenses on subsidies) calculated in the welfare cost module. 
The VAT rate is an integral part of the calculation of the usage costs and can be modified directly as a 
model parameter for simulations with TREMOVE. Any considerations on cost pass-through will be 
processed exogenously in the fare level, as it will also be done in reality. For example, if only 50% of the 
                                                   
192 For an elaborate discussion of the mechanisms of CES, we refer to the paper of Ramskov, J. and Munksgaard, J.: “Elasticities 
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VAT can be passed on to consumers, the fare will be decreased in the model simulation so that net fare plus 
VAT equals the final user price and the VAT rate follows the VAT scenario. These adaptations, all standard 
within the model’s setup, allow us to model the first four VAT scenarios (BAU, VAT standardized at 
national normal rates, reduced rates, and zero rates). For the scenarios where the place of taxation changes 
to Member State of departure or arrival, a more extensive procedure was followed whereby the demand for 
international trips is redistributed over the countries, based on country of origin. We constructed a matrix 
of international trips, based on the ETISplus dataset, to assess the amount of taxable trips and VAT revenue 
that would shift between countries, with special attention for the transit countries most likely to feel negative 
consequences from such a policy change. 
The output of the model is a standardized set of pivot tables with all main outputs. Relevant outputs will 
be changes in PKM, vehicle kilometres, vehicle stock, emissions, and VAT and fare revenue (in part). These 
outputs will be split by country, mode, trip distance class, and trip motive. 
Strengths and Weaknesses of TREMOVE 
The main strength of the TREMOVE model is that it calculates all these effects together. It takes into 
account almost all of the relevant choices and costs for transport users. Indeed, transport costs are calculated 
as generalized prices, meaning that not only the monetary cost of the trips (for the context of this study: the 
fare) is accounted for, but also the time cost. This allows for a differentiation in preferences depending, for 
example, on the travel motive, which has an effect on value of time. 
However, the model is not without its weaknesses. Some of these are hardly relevant for this study, such 
as the lack of income effects (a given total transport budget is assumed). However, others are: 
 The model is at the Member State level, which implies that it does not directly allow the 
identification of international trips. We have mitigated this by using supporting data from the 
ETISplus model, and have matched these with TREMOVE data to identify cross-border trips, both 
intra- and extra-EU. 
 Another implication of the Member State level is that only aggregate results can be shown. For 
example, while a distinction can be made for long distance air trips, there is no direct identification 
of trips that would compete heavily with rail transport and of those where no real alternatives exist. 
These effects will be covered in the City Pairs Model. 
 The elasticities are fixed, so called “point elasticities,” which may only be applicable for limited 
changes in the costs parameters. While the range in which these “limited changes” are valid is not 
determined by economic theory, and could well vary between applications, results will not diverge 
too much from expected outcomes. The model projection would, in such a case, be a cautious 
estimate of the effect of a policy. 
 The substitution elasticities at the lower levels of the tree are identical and set at 0.5. This 
assumption can be defended based on the previous point and on the fact that the model works with 
generalized costs, instead of just monetary costs, which provides a more equal playing field (i.e. it 
incorporates the extra time cost “paid” by users choosing a slow mode over a fast mode). Few 
sources from literature exist that have reviewed elasticities with regard to generalized cost. Past 
work with the model, however, gives confidence that the values used provide a good reflection of 
real user behaviour. 
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 The effects on government income only cover those aspects that are directly related to the decisions 
of transport users. For a more general assessment of the evolution of government income as a result 
of changes to VAT policy, the EDIP model will be used. 
EDIP 
The second model used in the assessment is EDIP, a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model that 
describes the interactions between numerous economic agents (households, firms, government, and the rest 
of the world) on different markets (goods and services (G&S), capital, and labour). Households supply 
labour and capital to firms that organize production activities. In return, households receive payments for 
the use of labour and capital factors in the form of wages and capital income (e.g. interest or dividends). 
Furthermore, households spend income on G&S, which are delivered by firms. The government is involved 
in transfers to and from households and firms. The transfers may refer to taxes on G&S, production, 
subsidies, income taxes, social security contributions, and social benefits. There is also an interaction with 
the rest of the world. 
The reference scenario is assumed to be in a state of equilibrium: for current prices there are stable flows 
of money and commodities between economic agents. Households have no incentive to change 
consumption patterns or supplied labour and firms have no incentive to alter production processes. 
VAT taxes are part of product and corporate taxes (indicated in red in Error! Reference source not 
found.) and can be modified directly as a model parameter. A change in VAT policy will initiate a chain 
reaction of changes in monetary and commodity flows. First, as the relative prices between G&S change, 
the preferences of consumers change, resulting in different consumption patterns. As in TREMOVE, this 
is modelled by using a methodology based on a nested CES tree. Different transport options are represented 
in the transport module in the G&S market. Hence, a change of the VAT regime for one transport option 
will change the demand for the other transport options, as well as the demand for other G&S. 
Different consumption patterns have an effect on the prices and quantity of G&S produced by firms. In 
turn, this has an effect on the amount of labour and capital required in production processes. This change 
in demand for capital and labour has an effect on the wages and return to capital, and leads to a change in 
income for households. Furthermore, a change in VAT rate will affect government revenues and, as a result, 
its expenditure. The government will adapt its own consumption, which will again affect the quantity of 











Figure A3.2 – EDIP Structure and Effect of VAT Policy 
 
   
As with TREMOVE, one VAT scenario is run at a time for each Member State. The output of EDIP is 
a standardized set of reports in the form of pivot tables. Relevant outputs will be changes in price and 
expenditures for different transport options, emissions, VAT and fare revenue (in part), GDP, and social 
effects.  
Strengths and Weaknesses of EDIP 
The main strength of the EDIP model is the fact that all income and substitution effects and the 
interactions between economic agents are considered. An important element in the case of a change in the 
VAT regime is its effect on government expenditure. In many European countries, the government is an 
important customer in the service sector. A decrease in government expenditures leads to less work in this 
sector, and can effect on other sectors as well. The importance of such effects in the transport sector has 
been studied, for example, in the NEUJOBS project.193 
However, EDIP also has a number of weaknesses: 
 Even though a large number of different G&S have already been modelled (56 non-transport goods 
and 14 transport options), the number of transport options is not as disaggregated as in TREMOVE. 
For example, no distinction is made between national, intra-EU, and extra-EU air transport, and 
one average VAT rate is applied. Therefore, a differentiation of the VAT regime for these three 
options needs to be calculated externally from the model and is then used as input for EDIP. More 
specifically, a new average VAT rate should to be calculated outside of the model based on new 
VAT rates and the old relative importance of each option. The effect of this new average VAT rate 

























can then be calculated using EDIP. However, possible changes in the relative importance of each 
option are not considered. 
 EDIP works with expenditures. All (initial) prices are normalized to one. To convert the output to 
physical units (e.g. PKM, VKM), we use conversion factors based on TREMOVE. 
Interaction between TREMOVE and EDIP 
The EDIP model was built to support the analyses of TREMOVE by looking further into the effects of 
transport policy on the rest of the economy. The partial equilibrium model of TREMOVE simulates 
transport policies with variables and parameters that reflect the specific needs of transport policy makers. 
While the effects on wealth, public budgets, and society as whole are somewhat covered in the model’s 
welfare module, the results are only indicative and far from exhaustive. EDIP, as a general equilibrium 
model, was designed to work with TREMOVE results, albeit in a less detailed way, and to add interactions 
with economic sectors other than transport. In addition, whereas TREMOVE works with transport volumes 
and how they are affected by changes in policies, and thus in transport costs, EDIP models economic 
interactions expressed in expenditures or monetary terms (i.e. euros). 
The mechanisms linking both models have been tried and tested in several projects, but have not been 
automated, mainly because the EDIP model is constantly being updated and refined.  
TREMOVE and EDIP were run simultaneously for each of the VAT scenarios. Given the more detailed 
setup of the transport markets in TREMOVE, its results will give a more detailed reflection of expected 
outcomes for the transport market. This TREMOVE output, mainly with regard to transport volumes (PKM 
and VKM) will then be compared with EDIP output. If differences are found, EDIP will be recalibrated and 
run again to provide a closer match to the transport volume approach of TREMOVE. With the transport 
module of EDIP matching TREMOVE’s output, the effects on other sectors is more realistic than for an 
independent run. 
 
City Pairs Model (CPM) 
Uses of the CPM 
The objective of the CPM is to provide practical illustrations of how alternative VAT reform scenarios 
will change the VAT rates that passengers will be faced with and to gain insight into how these changes 
might influence passenger behaviour. The CPM will also provide indications of how operator revenue will 
change with alternative VAT reform scenarios. So far, the model does not include an operator cost function; 
hence, it is not possible to assess changes in profitability. 
The database that supports the model also includes data on the services provided between each city pair. 
This supports the other objective of the model, which is to provide a basis on which an assessment can be 
made about how competition between modes and between operators within modes might be influenced by 
alternative VAT reform scenarios. There are no directly applicable models of operator behaviour that can 
be applied to passenger transport and that would be sensitive to the relative changes in fares resulting from 
alternative VAT reform scenarios (remembering that the pass-through of VAT changes to fares is less than 
100%). Hence, the assessment of alternative VAT reform scenarios on how operators will respond will be 
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more subjective than that of passenger responses, where the concepts of fare elasticity and cross elasticity 
indicate a simpler and more direct impact. 
The CPM is a valuable resource to understand how VAT on passenger travel will change with alternative 
VAT rates on passenger fares (it is less useful for assessing the impact of changes on input VAT rules). By 
including the distance within each Member State for each city pair, and applying the particular VAT rates 
for intra-EU passengers of each Member State, it is possible to calculate VAT liability in fares for each 
mode.  
While not one of its objectives, the CPM is also used to provide verification of the results of the 
TREMOVE model. Using the ratio of the populations of cities in the city pair model to the total population 
of Member States, it is possible to approximate changes in VAT revenue from city pairs to national totals.  
Structure of the Model 
The CPM consists of five parts, each with a specific set of data for the 220 city pairs (see below for a 
discussion on the choice of cities for the model).  
The first part of the model provides basic travel data, such as the distances, travel times, and fares 
between each city pair for each feasible mode. Certain city pairs are too close to each other for air to be a 
viable transport mode; conversely, for others, the travel times by train and bus are too long to be viable 
transport modes other than for a small segment of non-business passengers. The feasible modes are defined 
as those for which there are identified trips between the relevant city pairs in the ETISplus data. 
The second part of the model includes data on the quantity of services provided by each mode. This data 
is based on the number of services provided in a specific week in July 2013 and is derived from various 
websites that offer booking services. For rail, data is based on the print edition of Thomas Cook’s European 
Railway Timetable using the same week in July 2013. This part of the model is used for a different purpose 
than the other parts (i.e. to estimate the inter-modal and intra-modal competition). For an estimate of intra-
modal competition, we estimate the capacity of the service provided by operator in each mode. This data is 
proving difficult and time consuming to collect and may not be obtainable for bus operators for many city 
pairs where there are no published timetables or on-line booking services.    
The third part of the model includes the distances travelled in each Member State between each city pair 
for each mode. It also includes the VAT rates for each travel market (domestic, intra-EU, and extra-EU) 
for each Member State. By multiplying the share of distance in each Member State by the appropriate VAT 
rate, it is possible to derive the VAT charged for each mode for each Member State, as well as the VAT-
free fare for each city pair.  
The fourth part of the model incorporates the number of passenger trips for business and non-business 
travel purposes for each transport mode. This data is extracted from the ETISplus database. 
The fifth part of the model consolidates the data to provide intermediate and final outputs. First, the 
model multiplies fares (Part 1) by VAT rates (Part 3) to provide the actual VAT applicable to travel by each 
feasible transport mode between city pairs. These VAT components of fares are then multiplied by the 
number of trips between each city pair (Part 4) to provide a measure of VAT revenue. The revenue is then 
allocated to each of the countries based on its share of trip distance (Part 3). By summing the VAT revenue 
for each country from each city pair, we then have an index of VAT revenue. By comparing the number of 
trips from each city pair in each country with the total trips for that market indicated by ETIS data, we have 
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a multiplier between the VAT revenue from the city pairs model and the VAT revenue for that country and 
from that market. By applying the multiplier for each market type to the city pairs in that market, and then 
summing over all markets, we are able to estimate the total VAT from passenger transport attributable to 
each Member State. 
 Applications of the Model 
The CPM is used to estimate the impact of each VAT scenario. Different VAT reform scenarios will 
result in different VAT rates for each combination of city pair and transport mode, different fares, different 
total numbers of passengers and distributions between modes, and finally, different total fares paid by 
passengers, VAT revenues to each Member State, and to transport operators.  
The first stage of estimating these impacts is to assess the change in VAT for each mode and city pair 
combination, starting from the VAT-free fare for each mode (Part 3). The relevant new VAT rates for each 
mode and country and market combination are entered into the model (also Part 3). Initial estimates are 
made of the new VAT for each city pair and mode combination by applying the new inter-city VAT rate to 
the VAT-free fare, and then adding the two components together. The resulting initial estimate of the new 
fare is then compared with the current fare (from Part 1) and the “pass-through percentage” is applied to 
the difference. The resulting revised estimate of the VAT component of the fare is added back to the VAT-
free fare (from the original Part 3) to give the final estimate of the new VAT inclusive fare for each city 
pair and mode combination under the particular VAT scenario. 
These new fares can then be applied to the TREMOVE model (or simply the total and cross-mode 
elasticities are used for more approximate but more easily obtained results) and estimates are derived from 
the changes in demand for both trip purposes. The new data from TREMOVE (or the elasticity model) is 
entered into the CPM (Part 4). Part 5 of the model then uses the new combinations of outputs from Parts 3 
and 4 of the model to provide estimates of the new outputs for each VAT scenario. 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the CPM 
The main strengths of the model are related to its ability to assess the impact of alternative VAT reform 
scenarios at a very disaggregate level. Although based on city-to-city data, the model may also be used to 
assess individual trips. It is relatively easy to add further city pairs or to change those already included in 
the model. The CPM provides a wide selection of outputs, both in relation to passenger demand and, with 
additional assumptions, on the supply of passenger services. 
The model’s main weaknesses are related to the difficulty of scaling up city pair data to the national 
level. The city pairs do not represent the same share of passenger trips in all markets or for all Member 
States; hence any scaling up should apply different scale factors for each market and Member State 
combination.  
The model also relies on simple elasticities to estimate the impact of different VAT rates (adjusted for 
the relevant pass-through rate), whereas the TREMOVE model includes cross elasticities and can better 
estimate the impact on the modal share of trips. It would be possible to have a loop between the CPM and 
TREMOVE so that the VAT changes could feed into the demand module of TREMOVE and the resulting 
percentage shares of passengers between modes could feed back into the CPM model. While this would 
address this weakness of the CPM model, the time taken to implement the loop appears, at present, to be 
prohibitive. 
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As with the TREMOVE and EDIP model combination, the first application of the CPM will be to 
provide disaggregate assessments of the impacts of distortions 1c and 1d (Chapter 4).  
Selection of City Pairs 
The city pairs were divided into three groups: those where both cities are in the same Member State (to 
represent other domestic passengers), those where each city is in a different Member State (to represent 
intra-EU passengers), and those where only one city pair is in a Member State (to represent extra-EU 
passengers).  
Other Domestic City Pairs194 
We used three criteria to select our sample of domestic city pairs. First, we selected 15 of the 28 Member 
States based on total urban population. Second, for these countries, we selected the capital city and the three 
subsequent most populous cities (based on census data from 2010 to 2012). Third, from these four cities, 
we selected six city pairs that were at least 40 km apart, at least one city pair that included the capital city, 
and at least one north-south and one east-west route. For two Member States there were not six city pairs 
that met these criteria, so for these, a lesser number of city pairs were included in the sample.  
Intra-EU City Pairs 
The selection of city pairs for the analysis of intra-EU passengers was based on different principles than 
those for other domestic city pairs. With 104 cities within the EU with a population of more than 300,000, 
there are approximately 10,700 possible city pairs. The largest sample that could provide statistical 
significance for the results is 1% (i.e. approximately 100 city pairs). If we used a random selection of city 
pairs, we would have included too many for which there are few options of transport mode available, and 
we would not have covered a very high proportion of the population that make intra-EU trips. Instead of 
taking a random sample, we used the following selection criteria:  
We started with the capital cities of the 15 Member States that had a city included in the sample of cities, 
providing a potential of 210 city pairs. From these, we used a stratified sample to include some city pairs: 
 With four passenger transport modes (air, rail, bus, and ferry) available; 
 That are north-south and east-west; 
 That are of long, medium, and short distances;  
 That includes large, medium, and small population cities; and  
 That cross transit countries. 
The routes between capital cities did not provide enough examples of small cities or of the four transport 
mode routes, so a further seven routes were added to cover these criteria.  
Twelve extra city pairs were added where the second city was just across the border and there was 
another city in the same country as the first city that was also close to the border. The first city was at least 
250 km from the border. These city pairs represent the situation where a passenger might cross the border 
to gain the advantage of a VAT free intra-EU trip and then travel back the real destination (the city in the 
first country that is close to the border). There was a belief that this could represent a significant distortion 
                                                   




by giving passengers an incentive to convert a domestic trip into an intra-EU trip. In practice, however, we 
did not find any instances where this might occur (including the examples that were given as being city 
pairs where it did occur). However, the city pairs were retained in the database and model. The final sample 
included 119 intra-EU city pairs. 
Extra-EU City Pairs 
No attempt was made to produce a statistical sample of the many extra-EU city pairs. A sample of 12 
was chosen based on satisfying the criteria including: 
 At least one city in an island state 
 At least one city in each country with a land border with the EU28 
 At least three city pairs where the cities are not in bordering countries 
 At least one city on another continent 
The smallest sample we could find that satisfied all these criteria was 11 city pairs. 
The final sample comprised 220 city pairs with the following distances (Table A3.1). 
 
Table A3.1 City Pairs Distance Statistics 
  Domestic Intra-EU Extra-EU Total 
Number of Member States in the sample 15 22 13 22 
Number of city pairs 89 117 14 220 
Average distance between cities (km) 379 1,493 1,005 1,020 
Maximum distance between cities (km) 1,086 4,247 2,540 4,247 
Minimum distance between cities (km)  30 24 134 24 
Standard deviation of distance between cities (km)  211 222 718 973 
 
The CPM produces some of the same outputs as the TREMOVE and EDIP models but at a much lower 
level of aggregation. However, scaling the disaggregate results to the Member State and market levels 
involves more approximations than the TREMOVE and EDIP model combination. 
List of City Pairs 
The following is a list of the 220 city pairs used in the City Pairs Model. 
The city pairs are organized into three groups: other domestic city pairs, intra-EU city pairs, and extra-
EU city pairs. 
For each city pair, we provide:  
 The number of the city pair in the full list,  
 The type of city pair (A denotes Other Domestic, B denotes intra-EU, and C denotes extra-EU), 
 The name of city A, 
 The Member State of city A, 
 The name of city B, and 
 The Member State (or country for extra-EU city pairs) of city B. 
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Table A3.2 - Other Domestic City Pairs 
Pair No. Pair Type City A MS of A City B MS of B 
203 A Vienna AT Salzburg AT 
44 A Brussels BE Antwerp* BE  
95 A Lille BE Kortrijk BE 
182 A Sofia BG Varna BG 
42 A Brno CZ Liberec CZ 
43 A Brno CZ Ostrava CZ 
143 A Ostrava CZ Liberec CZ 
164 A Prague CZ Brno CZ 
165 A Prague CZ Liberec CZ 
166 A Prague CZ Ostrava CZ 
25 A Berlin DE Cologne DE 
27 A Berlin DE Hamburg DE 
31 A Berlin DE Munich DE 
84 A Hamburg DE Cologne DE 
85 A Hamburg DE Munich DE 
139 A Munich DE Cologne DE 
1 A Aarhus DK Aalborg DK 
2 A Aarhus DK Odense DK 
66 A Copenhagen DK Aalborg DK 
67 A Copenhagen DK Aarhus DK 
70 A Copenhagen DK Odense DK 
142 A Odense DK Aalborg DK 
19 A Barcelona ES Seville ES 
20 A Barcelona ES Valencia ES 
119 A Madrid ES Barcelona ES 
126 A Madrid ES Seville ES 
128 A Madrid ES Valencia ES 
201 A Valencia ES Seville ES 
86 A Helsinki FI Oulu FI 
117 A Lyon FR Toulouse FR 
135 A Marseille FR Lyon FR 
136 A Marseille FR Toulouse FR 
150 A Paris FR Lyon FR 
152 A Paris FR Marseille FR 
157 A Paris FR Toulouse FR 
11 A Athens GR Heraklion GR 
12 A Athens GR Rhodes GR 
14 A Athens GR Thessaloniki* GR 
88 A Heraklion GR Rhodes GR 
197 A Thessaloniki GR Heraklion GR 
198 A Thessaloniki GR Rhodes GR 
21 A Békéscsaba HU Arad HU 
61 A Budapest HU Debrecen HU 
77 A Dublin IE Cork IE 
137 A Milano IT Naples IT 





Other Domestic City Pairs 
Pair No. Pair Type City A MS of A City B MS of B 
140 A Naples IT Turin IT 
141 A Nice IT Ventimiglia IT 
173 A Rome IT Milano IT 
174 A Rome IT Naples IT 
178 A Rome IT Turin IT 
90 A Kaunas LT Klaipeda LT 
91 A Kaunas LT Siauliai LT 
92 A Klaipeda LT Siauliai LT 
205 A Vilnius LT Kaunas LT 
206 A Vilnius LT Klaipeda LT 
209 A Vilnius LT Siauliai LT 
4 A Amsterdam NL Eindhoven NL 
5 A Amsterdam NL Enschede NL 
6 A Amsterdam NL Groningen NL 
93 A Krakow PL Lodz PL 
94 A Krakow PL Wroclaw PL 
212 A Warsaw PL Krakow PL 
214 A Warsaw PL Lodz PL 
217 A Warsaw PL Wroclaw PL 
220 A Wroclaw PL Lodz PL 
39 A Braga PT Faro PT 
97 A Lisbon PT Braga PT 
98 A Lisbon PT Faro PT 
99 A Lisbon PT Porto PT 
162 A Porto PT Braga PT 
163 A Porto PT Faro PT 
56 A Bucharest RO Cluj RO 
57 A Bucharest RO Iasi RO 
60 A Bucharest RO Timisoara RO 
63 A Cluj RO Iasi RO 
64 A Cluj RO Timisoara RO 
199 A Timisoara RO Iasi RO 
82 A Gothenburg SE Linkoping SE 
83 A Gothenburg SE Malmo SE 
131 A Malmo SE Linkoping SE 
188 A Stockholm SE Goteborg SE 
189 A Stockholm SE Linköping SE 
190 A Stockholm SE Malmo SE 
41 A Bratislava SK Kosice SK 
80 A Glasgow UK Leeds UK 
106 A London UK Glasgow UK 
107 A London UK Leeds UK 
110 A London UK Manchester UK 
132 A Manchester UK Glasgow UK 
133 A Manchester UK Leeds UK 
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Intra-EU City Pairs 
Pair No. Pair Type City A MS of A City B MS of B 
219 B Wien AT Brno CZ 
160 B Parndorf AT Gyor HU 
218 B Wien AT Bratislava SK 
51 B Brussels BE Prague CZ 
47 B Brussels BE Copenhagen DK 
49 B Brussels BE Madrid ES 
45 B Brussels BE Athens GR 
52 B Brussels BE Rome IT 
54 B Brussels BE Vilnius LT 
8 B Antwerp BE Roosendaal NL 
55 B Brussels BE Warsaw PL 
48 B Brussels BE Lisbon PT 
46 B Brussels BE Bucharest RO 
53 B Brussels BE Stockholm SE 
144 B Ostrava CZ Katowice PL 
23 B Berlin DE Brussels BE 
33 B Berlin DE Prague CZ 
76 B Dresden DE Liberec CZ 
26 B Berlin DE Copenhagen DK 
78 B Flensburg DE Kolding DK 
30 B Berlin DE Madrid ES 
32 B Berlin DE Paris FR 
22 B Berlin DE Athens GR 
34 B Berlin DE Rome IT 
36 B Berlin DE Vilnius LT 
7 B Angermünde DE Szczecin PL 
37 B Berlin DE Warsaw PL 
29 B Berlin DE Lisbon PT 
24 B Berlin DE Bucharest RO 
35 B Berlin DE Stockholm SE 
71 B Copenhagen DK Prague CZ 
74 B Copenhagen DK Vilnius LT 
75 B Copenhagen DK Warsaw PL 
69 B Copenhagen DK Lisbon PT 
68 B Copenhagen DK Bucharest RO 
73 B Copenhagen DK Stockholm SE 
195 B Tallinn EE Helsinki FI 
124 B Madrid ES Prague CZ 
121 B Madrid ES Copenhagen DK 
89 B Irun ES Bayonne FR 
118 B Madrid ES Athens GR 
122 B Madrid ES Dublin IE 
125 B Madrid ES Rome IT 
129 B Madrid ES Vilnius LT 
130 B Madrid ES Warsaw PL 




Intra-EU City Pairs 
Pair No. Pair Type City A MS of A City B MS of B 
120 B Madrid ES Bucharest RO 
127 B Madrid ES Stockholm SE 
146 B Paris FR Brussels BE 
154 B Paris FR Prague CZ 
193 B Strasbourg FR Offenburg DE 
194 B Strasbourg FR Stuttgart DE 
148 B Paris FR Copenhagen DK 
151 B Paris FR Madrid ES 
161 B Perpignan FR Girona ES 
145 B Paris FR Athens GR 
153 B Paris FR Naples IT 
155 B Paris FR Rome IT 
158 B Paris FR Vilnius LT 
159 B Paris FR Warsaw PL 
149 B Paris FR Lisbon PT 
147 B Paris FR Bucharest RO 
156 B Paris FR Stockholm SE 
62 B Calais FR Dover UK 
18 B Athens GR Prague CZ 
10 B Athens GR Copenhagen DK 
15 B Athens GR Vilnius LT 
16 B Athens GR Warsaw PL 
17 B Athens GR Lisbon PT 
9 B Athens GR Bucharest RO 
13 B Athens GR Stockholm SE 
183 B Sopron HU Wiener 
Neustadt 
AT 
167 B Püspökladany HU Oradea RO 
175 B Rome IT Prague CZ 
171 B Rome IT Copenhagen DK 
200 B Turin IT Grenoble FR 
169 B Rome IT Athens GR 
179 B Rome IT Vilnius LT 
180 B Rome IT Warsaw PL 
172 B Rome IT Lisbon PT 
170 B Rome IT Bucharest RO 
176 B Rome IT Stockholm SE 
208 B Vilnius LT Prague CZ 
207 B Vilnius LT Lisbon PT 
204 B Vilnius LT Bucharest RO 
202 B Venlo NL Viersen DE 
3 B Amsterdam NL Bratislava SK 
215 B Warsaw PL Prague CZ 
38 B Bialystok PL Kaunas LT 
216 B Warsaw PL Vilnius LT 
213 B Warsaw PL Lisbon PT 
210 B Warsaw PL Bucharest RO 
 
 216 
Intra-EU City Pairs 
Pair No. Pair Type City A MS of A City B MS of B 
100 B Lisbon PT Prague CZ 
96 B Lisbon PT Badajoz ES 
65 B Constanta RO Varna BG 
59 B Bucharest RO Prague CZ 
58 B Bucharest RO Lisbon PT 
185 B Stockholm SE Prague CZ 
191 B Stockholm SE Vilnius LT 
192 B Stockholm SE Warsaw PL 
184 B Stockholm SE Lisbon PT 
187 B Stockholm SE Bucharest RO 
103 B London UK Brussels BE 
112 B London UK Prague CZ 
102 B London UK Berlin DE 
105 B London UK Copenhagen DK 
109 B London UK Madrid ES 
111 B London UK Paris FR 
101 B London UK Athens GR 
113 B London UK Rome IT 
115 B London UK Vilnius LT 
116 B London UK Warsaw PL 
108 B London UK Lisbon PT 
104 B London UK Bucharest RO 





Extra-EU City Pairs 
Pair No. Pair Type City A MS of A City B Country of B 
50 C Brussels BE Moscow RU 
181 C Sofia BG Istanbul TR 
28 C Berlin DE Kiev UA 
79 C Frankfurt DE Oslo NO 
72 C Copenhagen DK Reykjavik IS 
196 C Tallinn EE Kaliningrad RU 
87 C Helsinki FI St. 
Petersburg 
RU 
134 C Marseille FR Algie s DZ 
177 C Rome IT Tunis TN 
168 C Riga LV Moscow RU 
211 C Warsaw PL Kiev UA 
186 C Stockholm SE St. 
Petersburg 
RU 
81 C Gothenburg SE Oslo NO 
40 C Bratislava SK Kiev UA 
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Annex 4 – A Model of Pass-Through Coefficients for VAT in Transport 
Introduction 
The standard economic theory of supply and demand argues that the imposition of taxes or subsidies 
usually introduces output distortion and changes equilibrium price as compared to the non-taxed market. 
Changes in market prices resulting from changes in tax rates, including VAT, will typically be split in 
different proportions between suppliers and consumers. According to textbook economics, this tax 
incidence is determined by the ratio of supply and demand elasticities (Varian 1992). Only in special cases, 
when either supply or demand is completely inelastic, the price change is absorbed, respectively, by 
suppliers and consumers. We refer to those two extreme cases as zero or full pass-through. 
The above textbook insight is useful as a starting point in the study of economics of tax incidence in 
passenger transport, but misses important subtleties which are present in state-of-art research on the subject. 
The main reason why determination of pass-through on transport markets is a complex issue is their 
imperfectly competitive nature. Many theoretical and empirical contributions related to imperfectly 
competitive markets point to the fact that the impact of tax on consumer price, including also the possibility 
of tax overshifting, depends on numerous factors other than just demand and supply elasticities: such as 
market structure and type of competition, number of firms, cost and demand structures, and the time horizon 
in which the tax shifting is analysed (Fullerton and Metcalf 2002).    
This appendix describes in two steps how we have approached the determination of VAT pass-through 
effect in passenger transport. Given the objectives of the report, we start from illustrating how demand 
elasticity and level of market competition affect tax pass-through. Building on theoretical literature, we 
show that increased competition, measured by number of firms or concentration index, leads to more pass-
through on customers. This counter-intuitive result implies that profit maximizing transport carriers will 
strategically absorb a larger part of the tax in order to reduce output distortion induced by demand response. 
The second major result is, on the other hand, intuitive. It indicates that tax pass-through decreases with 
growing demand elasticity. Thus, the stronger the intra- and inter-mode substitutability possibilities for 
passengers, the more tax will be absorbed again by transport carriers.  
Secondly, we calculate estimates of pass-through effect for four main transport modes (airline, railways, 
road, and waterways) in each of the EU-28 countries. We have utilized simple econometric modelling on a 
unique dataset collected specifically for the purpose. The set contains market level data on prices, output, 
levels of competition, and VAT rates for each country-mode pair in the years 2001-2011. This approach 
allowed us to obtain VAT pass-through estimates for different modes while controlling for changes in input 
prices, level of competition, and demand shocks, which all can shift consumer price. To obtain country-
mode specific pass-through levels for each of the EU-28 member states, we utilized data on market 
concentration and performed a simple scaling procedure based on results from the model estimations.  
In the second section, we review theoretical literature on tax incidence and illustrate the most important 
results with a simple analysis of Cournot oligopoly. The third section starts with review of selected 
empirical studies and then provides econometric evidence on the relation between level of competition and 




Theoretical Foundations of tax pass-through 
A comprehensive theoretical presentation of tax incidence is made in Fullerton and Metcalf (2002). They 
clearly separate the case of perfectly and imperfectly competitive markets and consider both ad valorem 
and specific output taxation for different models of oligopolies. A general conclusion that follows from 
their work is that the magnitude of pass-through is very sensitive to particular assumptions about costs and 
demand in specific oligopolistic settings. It can be easily seen even in the simplest case of perfect 
competition. Under the constant returns to scale assumption, Fullerton and Metcalf argue that any unit tax 
increase will be fully passed on consumers since producer prices cannot fall below constant marginal cost. 
The same logic derived from the principle of zero economic profits holds for homogeneous product 
Bertrand competition, where firms compete in prices. Thus, for the reasons given above, in a long-term 
equilibrium of perfectly competitive markets, typical full-shifting might be assumed under constant returns 
to scale. On the other hand, in the short run, under perfect competition with an upward sloping supply curve 
due to increasing marginal cost, any proportion of tax sharing between consumer and producers is possible, 
excluding full-shifting or overshifting. One must remember, however, that if a market of interest has an 
oligopolistic structure, as is the case of passenger transport, then analysing taxation on such a market by 
interpolating results from either perfect competition or monopoly might be very misleading (Katz and 
Rosen 1985). 
Fullerton and Metcalf show that under many imperfectly competitive settings, tax overshifting might be 
possible or even sometimes guaranteed. Their interest in overshifting is motivated by the results of several 
empirical studies, which tend to confirm this phenomenon in various markets. However, on theoretical 
grounds, overshifting occurs only under specific model specifications regarding costs or demand. For 
example, in a monopoly case, overshifting cannot occur under linear demand and constant marginal cost; 
however, under constant elasticity demand, it will always be guaranteed. Moreover, Fullerton and Metcalf 
show that in a Cournot oligopoly, under free entry with positive fixed costs and constant marginal costs, 
overshifting is more likely because a tax increase has an additional indirect effect on consumer price via a 
changing industry structure. This result suggests that in the long run, the pass-through effect will typically 
be larger than under a fixed number of firms. We explore this intuition formally later on. 
The introduction of product differentiation brings additional avenues over which taxes can affect prices. 
Typically, with differentiated products, firm responses to tax increases might partially have a non-price 
nature. Under horizontal differentiation, oligopolistic firms can react by reducing product variety. On the 
other hand, in vertically differentiated markets, firms may respond by lowering product quality. Under the 
latter scenario, consumer prices might even drop due to a decreased marginal cost marking negative pass-
through. The general conclusion from differentiated product markets is that the pass-through will typically 
be lower as firms can respond to tax increases by reducing the degree of differentiation, which intensifies 
price competition. 
In what follows, we illustrate the impact of changes in taxation on consumer prices in imperfectly 
competitive markets by utilizing a standard n-firm Cournot model. The primary objective of this analytical 
exercise is to gain insight into the most important elements that increase or decrease an ad valorem pass-
through effect.195 The choice of this particular analytical framework can be motivated by its suitability to 
                                                   
195 We consider our exercise useful also because existing theoretical literature focuses mostly on unit tax pass-through.  
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the transport industry (Cole 2005). Moreover, empirical studies in the airline industry tend to confirm the 
consistency of market conduct with a Cournot outcome (Brander and Zhang 1990 and Fischer and 
Kamerschen 2003).  
Determinants of Taxation Pass-Through Illustrated in a Cournot Oligopoly 
Framework 
We start our illustration from the specification of model assumptions. Market demand is linear: 𝑝(𝑄) =
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄 where . Firms use identical technologies with constant returns to scale so that the cost 
function of each firm writes: . The cost of market entry is . We set and, 
initially, there is no tax imposed.  
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium in this market in the long run is shown as: 
          (1) 
The number of firms in equilibrium is determined by zero profit conditions under free entry. According 
to the above equation, the number of firms in equilibrium increases with positive (and persistent) demand 
shocks (a) and decreases with marginal costs (c) and fixed costs (f).  
In industrial economics, the notion of competition intensity is understood in terms of the market power 
that firms exercise over customers. Market power of firm (i) is usually measured by the relative mark-up 
known as the Lerner index . The higher the market power the firm poses, the higher the price 
level set by the firm above marginal costs and, thus, the market is less competitive. In the above Cournot-
Nash equilibrium, it can be shown that: 
         (2) 
In other words, the market power of an individual firm is proportional to its market share ( ) and 
inversely proportional to the elasticity of market demand ( ). The average market power of the whole 
market, which is equal to the weighted sum of individual Lerner indices, can be expressed in terms of 
demand elasticity and a measure of market concentration (the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)). The 

























































































given industry and the level of market concentration. Due to low data requirements, HHI is often used as 
yet another, although imperfect, measure of market competitiveness.196 The third equation indicates that 
market concentration increases when the number of firms drops or, for a given number of market players, 
increases with the variance of their market shares . Symmetric oligopolies will be more competitive 
than markets with dominant firms.  
Now, we will show how the introduction of ad valorem tax changes the equilibrium in a Cournot market. 
Ad Valorem Tax Pass-Through  
With the introduction of a tax, a distinction must be made between producer and consumer price, the 
latter being tax inclusive: 𝑝𝑃 = (1 − 𝑡)𝑝𝑐 where 𝑡 is tax rate (𝑡 < 1). The imposition of a tax does not affect 
the demand curve of customers, but is reflected in the profit function of a particular firm via producer 
price𝑝𝑃.197 
With tax, the equilibrium consumer price given in formula (1) now changes to: 
         (3) 
The impact of ad valorem tax on consumer price can be measured by a derivate of consumer price with 
respect to tax rate: 
          
 (4) 
It can be shown that this derivate increases with the number of firms in the market.198 This result is robust 
to various model specifications and has a clear economic interpretation. With more firms, equilibrium price 
decreases, driving down price-cost margins. Hence, firms have less space to absorb any tax increase and 
shift a larger part of tax burden to consumers. On the other hand, when price-cost margins are high 
(indicating large market power), firms recognize that a large fall in demand would be harmful for their 
profits and tend to strategically absorb more tax to minimize output distortion. This strategy will be 
profitable especially when market demand is elastic. 
To show the impact of demand elasticity (𝜖) on tax pass-through, we first utilize a general expression of 
price elasticity for the linear demand assumed in this exercise: 𝑒 = |𝜖| =
𝑝
𝑎−𝑝
 to substitute parameter (a) in 
formula (3). After rearranging, we obtain a new expression for equilibrium price in the Cournot model, with 
an explicit account for the absolute value of demand elasticity (𝑒): 
                                                   
196 HHI can serve as comparative measure of competitiveness in a relevant market provided that it is properly defined in terms of 
geographical outreach and product scope. 
197 The profit function of a single firm now writes: 𝜋𝑖 = (𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄) · (1 − 𝑡)𝑞𝑖 − 𝑐𝑞𝑖 − 𝐹. 

























         
 (5) 
The impact of demand elasticity on the magnitude of pass-through can be assessed by evaluating the 
following double derivative: 
         
 (6) 
This expression is always negative, which indicates that with the growing elasticity of demand (in 
absolute terms), the impact of tax on consumer prices decreases. This result is, again, robust to different 
model specifications and intuitive. 
As the last element in this section, we illustrate how pass-through changes in the long run as compared 
to the short run. Note that with tax, the long-run equilibrium number of firms obtained from a zero-profit 
condition now writes: 
         (7) 
It can be shown that 𝑁∗decreases with (t) indicating that an increase in tax rate will affect market 
structure in the long run and, hence, indirectly also consumer price.199 This is an additional avenue over 
which tax passes-through to customers compared to the short-run equilibrium. To assess the long-term pass-
through, we take, again, a price equation given by (5) and substitute parameter (n) with its long-run value 
provided in expression (7). Like before, the evaluation is done for the derivative of long-run consumer price 
with respect to tax rate. Unfortunately, has a complex algebraic form and we will evaluate it only 
for the special case of no entry costs: 
         
 (8) 
A quick look at formulas (4) and (8), which show tax pass-through in the short and long run, brings 
about a conclusion that the latter is always larger. For a monopoly case, short-run pass-through is two times 
smaller than in the long run, while for a low-concentrated oligopoly, the difference diminishes and 
approaches zero in the limit for the case of perfect competition.  
Overshifting of ad valorem tax in the Cournot model presented above requires that the percentage change 
in consumer price exceed 100%. This condition translates to:  
                                                   
















































       
 (9) 
Inequality (9) has a non-empty space of solutions. In theory, overshifting is likely for combinations with 
sufficiently large values of parameters 𝑡, 𝑛, and 𝑐,  and for a low value of parameter 𝑎.  Thus, our last 
conclusion says that there is no simple generalization regarding overshifting in our analytical framework, 
as the occurrence of such a result is sensitive to the values of several parameters.  
Within this section, we have illustrated a few interesting results in the theory of tax incidence for 
imperfectly competitive markets. Theoretical insights from the Cournot model allow drawing a few 
conclusions regarding the likely pass-through differentiation in particular modes of transport industry (C1-
C3). These are single factor conclusions, which assume ceteris paribus condition. 
 C1: For a given mode, VAT tax pass-through is expected to be larger for more demand elastic 
markets; 
 C1a: Markets with larger inter-modal demand substitutability and, hence, more elastic demand are 
likely to exhibit smaller pass-through; 
 C2: For a given mode, VAT tax pass-through is expected to be larger for more competitive markets;  
 C2a: Formerly vertically integrated markets, such as rail, which are now markets with dominant 
firms under third party access regulation, will be less competitive than other modes without a critical 
facility bottleneck. Thus, markets that are not fully liberalized will experience smaller pass-through 
ceteris paribus. 
 C3: For a given mode, VAT tax pass-through is expected to be larger in the long run, provided that 
only economic barriers to entry exist. 
The difficulty in formulating ex-ante pass-through comparisons for different modes lies in the multi-
causal nature of the tax impact on prices as shown in the second section. For transport markets, it will rarely 
be the case that such between-mode conclusions might be posted reliably, because a ceteris paribus 
condition does not hold in observable data. For example, those modes that are more competitive are, at the 
same time, more demand-elastic, leading to opposing influences of tax on pass-through. Without knowing 
which of those two partial effects is stronger, one cannot be sure about the total effect. 
Empirical Evidence on VAT Pass-Through in Passenger Transport 
There is a huge body of empirical literature dealing with tax incidence. This literature focuses on several 
aspects related to tax pass-through, such as: impact of competition, impact of demand elasticity, impact of 
type of taxation, overshifting, and long-term versus short-term impact. In general, empirical studies confirm 
most of the theoretical findings presented in the second section. Below, we provide a short overview of 
several studies covering a wide range of markets such as tobacco, consumer electronics, clothing, personal 
care, and repair services.  
Review of Previous Empirical Studies  
A number of studies found less shifting in less competitive or more demand elastic markets. The most 
widely cited among them are Poterba (1996), Carbonnier (2007), and Alm, Sennoga, et al. (2009). In light 














sales tax rates for low competition market goods may serve as a means to capture a greater portion of 
oligopoly rent. Secondly, the higher rates should be applied to goods whose demand elasticity is low and 
tax shifting on prices is low.  
In theory, on imperfectly competitive markets, tax shifting to consumers is larger for specific tax than 
for ad valorem tax (Delipalla and Keen 1992). This result is particularly relevant for the study of VAT 
incidence and has been empirically confirmed by Delipalla and O'Donnell (1998), who compared consumer 
shares of specific and ad valorem sales taxes on the European cigarette market. Carbonnier (2007) points 
also to the interesting issue of scale of tax changes. He speculates that large changes in tax rates tend to be 
less shifted than small changes because of consumer perception bias. 
While few studies obtained clear tax overshifting results such as Karp and Perloff (1989) and Alm, 
Sennoga, et al. (2009), others, especially multiproduct papers, obtained mixed evidence with this respect 
(Poterba 1996; Besley and Rosen 1998). There is a tendency that commodity markets close to perfect 
competition exhibit full shifting, while purely oligopolistic structures tend to exhibit under or overshifting. 
Both possibilities are theoretically plausible and there is consent in the literature that the question about 
overshifting has no a-priori answer and must be assessed case by case, because pass-through is determined 
by an interaction of several cost, demand, and competition parameters (Delipalla and O’Donnell 2001). 
While market structure is important for assessing tax incidence, with a risk of obtaining biased estimates 
if ignored (Karp and Perloff 1989), the majority of studies account for it only indirectly. Most studies adopt 
a reduced form model on pricing data. Under this approach, accounting for industry structure is usually 
limited to some measure of market concentration and has not been a common practice. In addition, many 
studies failed to maintain proper control over all potential price shifters, such as costs of inputs or wholesale 
prices, which potentially leads to overestimation of pass-through effect. Some authors discuss this risk 
explicitly (Besley and Rosen 1998), while other studies are less careful in this respect (Harris 1987). 
Modelling Framework for VAT Pass-Through in Different Transport Modes. 
In order to estimate the impact of VAT rate changes on price levels, we utilized a reduced-form pricing 
model. This framework is most frequently adopted in empirical studies of tax incidence because it fits well 
to existing market data. We have estimated our equation using cross-sectional data for EU-27 countries in 
the period of 2001-2011. We have chosen those observations where the VAT rate for passenger transport 
was changed. As a result, our sample consisted of 75 observations. Usually, sample of this size is does not 
provide strong results in term of statistical significance. However, given that actual changes in VAT rates 
have been quite infrequent in passenger transport, we had no other choice than to base our modelling effort 
on this small sample. The general model was presented in the following form: 
{𝑑𝑃 = 𝑓(𝑑𝑄(𝐿), 𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑉𝐴𝑇 , 𝑚(𝑖)𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑉𝐴𝑇, 𝑈, 𝑑𝑃𝐿 , 𝑑𝑌(𝐿)}      (10) 
where:  
 i ∈ (1) passenger transport by air (CP0733), (2) passenger transport by railway (CP0731), (3) 
passenger transport by road (CP0732), and (4) passenger transport by sea and inland waterway 
(CP0734); 
 dP – annual rate of change in a harmonized index of consumer price (HICP) and lag of consumer 
price, data source:  EUROSTAT; 
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 dQ(L) – lag of annual rate of change in the demand level, measured by the change of passengers 
(for air and water transport) and passenger-kilometres (for road and rail transport), data source: 
EUROSTAT and World Bank; and 
 dtaxVAT– the first difference in theoretical liability from changing VAT rates, data source: own 
estimations.  
The 𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑉𝐴𝑇  was calculated in the following form: 






𝑃𝑡−1        (11) 
where VATt denotes the rate of VAT in the time t (after the change of rate) and VATt−1 is the rate of 
VAT for the previous year (before the change of rate). Pt and Pt−1 are the levels of corresponding consumer 
price indices (HICP).  
 m(i)dtaxVAT are mode-specific changes in VAT liabilities, where m(i) are dummy variables for 
four modes multiplied by dtaxVAT. 
We included in our model a set of control variables that influence prices (shifters): 
 dY − annual rate of GDP growth (grasps consumers' preferences), data source: EUROSTAT,   
 dPL – growth of unit labour costs (economy's cost side, mode-invariant), data source: own 
estimations based on World Bank Data, and 
 U – rate of unemployment, data sources: EUROSTAT. 
In order to avoid multicollinearity problems, we decided to estimate equation (10) for each mode 
separately. In this, way we obtained the mode-specific parameters for the relation between changes in VAT 
and price. We performed a number of tests to check the model properties and concluded that the general 
specifications of the models are correct.200 The results of our estimations are presented in Tables A.D1-4 
below. 
 
Table A4.1 – Estimation Results: Air Passenger Transport 
Variable Coefficient  (Std.Err.) 
𝒅𝑸(𝑳) -4.666 (6.986) 
𝒅𝒕𝒂𝒙𝑽𝑨𝑻 0.450∗∗ (0.128) 
𝒎(𝟏)𝒅𝒕𝒂𝒙𝑽𝑨𝑻 -0.380∗∗ (0.128) 
𝑼 -0.216 (0.191) 
𝒅𝑷𝑳   24.816∗ (12.398) 
𝒅𝒀 -45.397∗∗ (14.713) 
Intercept 3.557 (2.891) 
 
 
                                                   
200 For all models, we performed a White test to check if our sample is heteroscedastic. For each mode, we failed to reject the 
null hypothesis that the sample is homoscedastic. According to a RESET test with a p-value greater than 10%, we failed to reject 
the null hypothesis that our models have omitted variables. In the last step, we check the multicollinearity using the variation 




Table A4.2 – Estimation Results: Railway Passenger Transport 
Variable Coefficient (Std. 
Err.) 
𝒅𝑸(𝑳) -8.948 (6.998) 
𝒅𝒕𝒂𝒙𝑽𝑨𝑻 0.233 (0.150) 
𝒎(𝟐)𝒅𝒕𝒂𝒙𝑽𝑨𝑻 0.277∗ (0.112) 
𝑼 -0.184 (0.194) 
𝒅𝑷𝑳   23.091† (12.659) 
𝒅𝒀 -40.986∗∗ (14.849) 
Intercept 3.385 (2.945) 
 
Table A4.3 – Estimation Results: Road Passenger Transport 
Variable Coefficient (Std. 
Err.) 
𝒅𝑸(𝑳) -8.157 (7.336) 
𝒅𝒕𝒂𝒙𝑽𝑨𝑻 0.404∗∗ (0.141) 
𝒎(𝟑)𝒅𝒕𝒂𝒙𝑽𝑨𝑻 0.047 (0.124) 
𝑼    -0.208 (0.203) 
𝒅𝑷𝑳 25.032† (13.196) 
𝒅𝒀 -39.417∗ (15.484) 
Intercept 2.426 (3.045) 
 
Table A4.4 – Estimation Results: Waterways Passenger Transport 
Variable Coefficient (Std. 
Err.) 
𝒅𝑸(𝑳) -9.035 (7.370) 
𝒅𝒕𝒂𝒙𝑽𝑨𝑻 0.413∗∗ (0.136) 
𝒎(𝟒)𝒅𝒕𝒂𝒙𝑽𝑨𝑻 -0.106 (0.202) 
𝑼   -0.203 (0.202) 
𝒅𝑷𝑳 23.875† (13.456) 
𝒅𝒀 -38.768∗ (15.460) 
Intercept 2.565 (3.061) 
 
The pass-through effect is captured by the sum of 𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑉𝐴𝑇 and 𝑚(𝑖)𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑉𝐴𝑇. The latter one reflects 
mode-specific effect, which adds up to the sample average. Since actual changes in VAT rates have been 
quite infrequent, we face a problem of insufficient sample size, which implies that our results are, indeed, 
not strong in terms of statistical significance. The strongest evidence of pass-through effect has been 
observed for the air mode where both coefficients are statistically significant. The negative sign for 
𝑚(1)𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑉𝐴𝑇 is an indication of significantly lower than average pass-through in passenger air transport. 
For other modes, only one of the two pass-through coefficients is statistically significant. We think that 
these results can be attributed to the large structural and regulatory differences within rail, road, and water 
modes between EU-28 countries (in contrast to a largely congruent air mode), which we could not control 
for, but which affected the standard errors of 𝑚(𝑖)𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑉𝐴𝑇 . This being said, we decided to ignore the 
problem of large standard errors and calculate the magnitude of VAT pass-through in different modes by 






Table A4.5 – HHI and Pass-Through for Each Transport Mode 
Mode Air Rail Road Waterway
s 
HHI (EU-28 Weighted Average) 0.19 0.67 0.09 0.19 
Pass-Through 0.07 0.51 0.45 0.31 
 
According to our results, the largest pass-through is observed for the rail mode. This indicates that EUR 
1 of increase in VAT liability (as a result of a VAT rate increase) increases consumer price by EUR 51 
cents. This result can be explained by low demand elasticity for passenger transport by railway. The second 
highest pass-through level has been observed in passenger transport by road, which is an expected result 
for highly competitive markets. The lowest pass-through magnitude has been obtained for the air mode, 
which is consistent with relatively high demand elasticity, especially on domestic routes where inter-modal 
competition with railway is particularly strong. An overshifting would occur if the sum of 𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑉𝐴𝑇and 
𝑚(𝑖)𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑉𝐴𝑇is greater than 1. This is, however, not the case in our model. One reason for under-shifting 
could be that we have controlled for both input costs and demand shifters, which turned out to be important 
determinants of consumer price. 
Country-Mode Pass-Through Levels 
To obtain country-mode specific pass-through levels for each of the EU-28 Member States, we decided 
to utilize data on market concentration in each country-mode. This was the only way in which we could 
differentiate the mode-specific averages calculated in the previous section. To obtain an idea of the strength 
of competition impact on pass-through magnitude, we decided to estimate a subsidiary model given by a 
slight modification of equation (10):  
{𝑑𝑃 = 𝑓(𝑑𝑄(𝐿), 𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑉𝐴𝑇, 𝑚(𝑖), 𝑚(𝑖)𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑉𝐴𝑇 , 𝑈, 𝑑𝑃𝐿 , 𝑑𝑌(𝐿), 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑉𝐴𝑇 )}   (12) 
The main variable of interest is HHIdtaxVAT. This is an interaction of HHI and dtaxVAT, which allows 
us to capture how market competition affects the VAT pass-through mechanism. This model has been 
estimated in a pooled regression with the baseline mode being waterways: m(4). The results of our 
estimations, including mode-specific changes in VAT liabilities, are presented in Table 6 below.  
Table A4.6 – Estimation Results: Impact of HHI - All Modes 
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
𝒅𝑸(𝑳)  -4.692 (7.458) 
𝒅𝒕𝒂𝒙𝑽𝑨𝑻 0.671 (0.470) 
𝑼  -0.156 (0.163) 
𝒅𝑷𝑳 22.623∗ (9.880) 
𝒅𝒀 -48.876∗∗ (15.890) 
𝒎(𝟏)   2,675  (5.654) 
𝒎(𝟐)   5,173  (4.988) 
𝒎(𝟑)   9,355†  (5.213) 
𝒎(𝟏)𝒅𝒕𝒂𝒙𝑽𝑨𝑻  -0,451  (0.495) 
𝒎(𝟐)𝒅𝒕𝒂𝒙𝑽𝑨𝑻  -0,048  (0.302) 
𝒎(𝟑)𝒅𝒕𝒂𝒙𝑽𝑨𝑻  -0,549  (0.501) 
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𝑯𝑯𝑰 𝒅𝒕𝒂𝒙𝑽𝑨𝑻  -0,202  (0.338) 
Intercept  -1,363 (5.014) 
Source: own estimation. 
The results of our estimation provided us with a theoretically consistent, albeit statistically insignificant, 
result of the impact of HHI on VAT pass-through. The coefficient for the interaction variable 𝐻𝐻𝐼 𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑉𝐴𝑇  
equals -0.202. Thus, on more concentrated markets, pass-through to consumers (at least historically), is 
smaller, and this difference between perfect competition (HHI=0) and monopoly (HHI=1) equates to an 
additional EUR 20 cents in our model. Following both the theoretical insights and empirical results from 
our model, we scaled mode-specific values of tax pass-through with HHI levels for different countries using 
a coefficient for interaction variable 𝐻𝐻𝐼 𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑉𝐴𝑇 . As a result, less competitive country markets exhibit 
less pass-through on consumers.201 Table A.D7 shows VAT pass-through estimates per individual country-
modes, obtained from the scaling procedure. 
 
Table A4.7 – Pass-Through Estimates for Country-Modes Pairs 
 Rail Road Waterways Air 
Country HHI PASS-T HHI PASS-T HHI PASS-T HHI PASS-T 
AT 0.78 0.49 0.31 0.41   0.31 0.05 
BE 0.93 0.46 0.24 0.42   0.10 0.09 
BG 1.00 0.44 0.06 0.46 0.62 0.22 0.15 0.08 
CY     0.13 0.32 0.06 0.10 
CZ 0.98 0.45 0.10 0.45   0.16 0.08 
DE 0.77 0.49 0.01 0.47 0.07 0.33 0.25 0.06 
DK 0.77 0.49 0.16 0.44 0.42 0.26 0.19 0.07 
EE 0.43 0.56 0.56 0.36 0.42 0.26 0.20 0.07 
ES 0.88 0.47 0.04 0.46 0.13 0.32 0.12 0.08 
FI 1.00 0.44 0.28 0.41 0.25 0.29 0.55 0.00 
FR 0.74 0.50 0.22 0.42 0.11 0.32 0.25 0.06 
GR 1.00 0.44 0.02 0.47 0.09 0.33 0.14 0.08 
HU 0.51 0.54 0.01 0.47   0.10 0.09 
HR 1.00 0.44 0.01 0.47 0.52 0.24   
IE 1.00 0.44 0.51 0.37 0.17 0.31 0.25 0.06 
IT 0.83 0.48 0.01 0.47 0.09 0.33 0.13 0.08 
LT 1.00 0.44 0.08 0.45 0.50 0.24 0.30 0.05 
LU 1.00 0.44 0.10 0.45   0.43 0.02 
LV 1.00 0.44 0.15 0.44 0.59 0.23 0.39 0.03 
MT   0.11 0.45 0.29 0.29 0.26 0.06 
NL 0.91 0.46 0.25 0.42 0.16 0.31 0.10 0.09 
                                                   
201 The scaling procedure was very simple. First, we took the difference between country-specific and EU-28 average HHI scores 
and multiplied them by -0.202. Secondly, we added this result to the mode-specific pass-through average. Our implicit assumption 
here is that the relation of pass-through effect and HHI is linear and has the same magnitude for all modes.  
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PL 0.26 0.59 0.01 0.47 0.34 0.28 0.27 0.05 
PT 0.94 0.46 0.01 0.47 0.29 0.29 0.40 0.03 
RO 0.93 0.46   1.00 0.14 0.28 0.05 
SE 0.46 0.55 0.12 0.44 0.27 0.29 0.22 0.06 
SI 1.00 0.44 0.06 0.46 0.35 0.27 0.43 0.02 
SK 0.98 0.45 0.06 0.46   0.70 0.00 
UK 0.06 0.63 0.13 0.44 0.18 0.31 0.12 0.08 
Mode 
Average 
0.67 0.51 0.09 0.45 0.19 0.31 0.19 0.07 
 
Note on the Use of the HHI 
Some methodological concerns are often raised with regards to utilizing HHI as a measure of 
competition. When using country-level HHI for assessing competition in particular transport modes one 
must be careful, because country level markets might be either too broad or too narrow compared to the 
true relevant market scope. In particular, a country-level HHI might provide an upward-biased assessment 
of competition in fragmented markets such as for example bus transport, if different companies operate on 
different routes without overlaps. While this is indeed the case for some particular city pairs, we have found 
many instances of on-the-route competition in the city pair data. While we could not analyse all possible 
relevant city pairs markets in Europe it seems that the greater the number of companies that operate in 
particular country (as reflected by the country level HHI), the more likely it will be that overlaps on 
particular routes will exist. In other words, even though the HHI might not be the most accurate measure 
of competition intensity in all cases, we found indications of negative correlation between the degree of 
competition on different routes and the level of the HHI at a country level. We believe that this observation 
supports our approach.  
There is an additional argument for introducing within mode pass-through differentiation by country 
with HHI scores.  As seen in Table A4.7, HHI scores are rather similar in a given mode in different member 
states, which is not surprising as all countries are bounded by the same package of EU regulatory policies. 
HHI differentiation is indeed low as indicated by standard deviation ranging from 0.15 in air and bus modes 
to 0.25 for rail transport. This small differentiation combined with the low value of coefficient for HHIVAT 
interaction variable (-0.202) generates an order of magnitude smaller pass-through differences between 
countries with standard deviation ranging from 0.02 to 0.05. Thus, even if the HHI is in some way an 
inaccurate measure of actual competition intensity in particular modes and countries, we believe that the 
resulting bias is negligible. 
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